PETITIONER:
V. K. A. RANGANATHA KONAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE TIRUCHIRAPPALLI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BY ITSCOMMISSIONER, A
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
18/12/1964
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
WANCHOO, K.N.
SHAH, J.C.
CITATION:
1966 AIR 65 1965 SCR (2) 645
ACT:
The Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 (Mad. Act 3 of
1922), ss. 4(1) and 4(4)-Landlord to pay compensation to
evicted tenant for improvements on land-Decree in favour of
landlord under s. 4(1) not specifying time within which
payment to be made-Payment not made within three months-
Provisions of s. 4(4) whether attracted Suit whether liable
to be dismissed.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was the tenant of respondent No. 1 on a piece
of land and had built a cinema house thereon. On the expiry
of the lease, respondent No. 1 filed a suit for rent and
eviction against the appellant and his sub-lessee. The suit
was decreed. Under s. 4(1) of the Madras City Tenants’
Protection Act, 1921, the court determined the value of the
superstructures made by the appellant, and the decree said
that possession of the suit properties was to be delivered
to respondent No. 1 on the latter making payment of the
compensation for the superstructures as determined by the
court. The decree did not specify the time during which the
payment was to be made. According to s. 4(4) of the Act the
compensation money had to be paid within three months of the
passing of the decree in the landlord’s favour, otherwise
the landlord’& suit would stand dismissed. Respondent No. 1
paid the compensation money into court after the said period
of three months had expired and prayed to the court that the
decree be amended by specifying the time during which the
payment was to be made. The court amended the decree by
inserting therein that the payment was to be made within
three months from the passing of the original decree. Thus
respondent No. 1 remained in default under s. 4(4) and the
court dismissed the suit. Respondent No. 1 appealed to the
High Court which held that s. 4(4) did not come into play
when the decree under s. 4(1) did not specify the period
within which payment was to be made and its decision went in
favour of respondent No. 1. The appellant then applied for a
certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court which
was granted.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the provision
prescribed by s. 4(4) is mandatory and any defect in the
decree which is passed under s. 4(1) cannot help the
plaintiff-landlord to circumvent the effect of the said
provision. On behalf of the respondent No. 1 it was urged
that s. 4(1) should be read as controlling s. 4(4), first a
decree must be properly passed under s. 4(1) specifying the
period of three months within which the amount should be
paid and then only s. 4(4) could be invoked.
HELD : The High Court was in error in reversing the order
passed by the trial court.
(i) The controversy had to be decided in the light of the
object of the Act. The object was clearly to give
protection to tenants who had taken open land on lease and
had built superstructures on it in the hope that as long as
they paid rent they would not be evicted. [649 H]
646
(ii) Having regard to the mandatory terms in which s. 4(4)
is couched it would not be reasonable to construe s. 4(1) as
controlling a. 4(4). The relevant clause provides that the
decree should direct that on payment by the landlord into
court, within three months, of the amount found due, the
tenant shall put the landlord into possession. The clause
in respect of the payment by the landlord into court within
three months amount to a condition which has to be satisfied
by the landlord before the tenant is required to deliver to
him possession of the property in question. In other words,
reference to the payment by the landlord of the amount found
due within the specific period in s. 4(1) is not so much a
direction issued by the court as specification of a
condition expressly and independently provided by s. 4(4).
[651 D-F]
(iii) In s. 4(4) the expression “the decree passed under
sub-s. (1)” merely describes the sub-section under which the
decree is passed, the emphasis in the context being on the
date of the said decree and not so much on the strict
compliance with the form prescribed in s. 4(1). The logical
way to reconcile s. 4(1) and s. 4(4) would be to treat the
provision prescribed by s. 4(4) as mandatory and paramount
and read in the relevant portion of s. 4(1) accordingly.
Even if the decree does not mention that the amount has to
be paid within three months, the landlord’s obligation to
make the payment within three months is still enforceable
under s, 4(4); otherwise defective decrees would deprive the
tenants of the benefit intended to be conferred on them by
s. 4(4). [651 G652 E]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 17, 1960 of
the Madras High Court in Appeal Suit No. 92 of 1957.
T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and S. Venkatakrishnan, for
respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J. The short question which this appeal
raises before us relates to the construction of S. 4(1) read
with S. 4 (4) of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act,
1921 (Madras Act III of 1922) (hereinafter called ’the
Act’). This question arises in this way. On September 1,
1944, respondent No. 1, Tiruchirappalli Municipal Council,
leased T.S. No. 3283/1-A/2 to the appellant, V. K. A.
Ranganatha Konar, for a term of three years at a rent of Rs.
100/- per month. On the premises thus let out to him, the
appellant erected a building for the purpose of exhibiting
cinematographic films. In 1945, he sub-leased the property
to the second respondent, A. Muthukumaran. In 1947, the
lease was renewed for a period of three years, and so, it
expired on March 31, 1950. Nevertheless, the appellant and
respondent No. 2 continued in possession.
647
On December 23, 1954, respondent No. 1 instituted a suit for
the eviction of the appellant and respondent No. 2 and for
arrears of rent. While the suit was pending the Act was
extended to the Municipal Town of Tiruchirappalli.
Accordingly, the value of the improvements made by the
appellant and respondent No. 2 was determined by the learned
trial Judge and declared to be Rs. 64,661-13-5 under s. 4(1)
of the Act. On March 26, 1956, the trial Court passed a
decree which, inter alia, provided “that the defendants do
put the plaintiff in possession of the suit properties
described hereunder on payment of Rs. 64,661-13-5 by the
plaintiff to the first defendant being the compensation for
the superstructure belonging to the first defendant.” The
appellant was the first defendant in the said proceedings.
This decree did not in terms direct respondent No. 1 to say
the, said amount within three months from its date, and it
is the comission to issue this direction which has caused
the present controversy between the parties.
On October 1, 1956, the appellant filed an application I.A.
No. 301 of 1956 inviting the attention of the Court to the
fact that respondent No. 1 had not made the deposit within
three months from the date of the decree, and claiming that
by virtue of the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) of the Act,
the Court was bound to dismiss the suit filed by respondent
No. 1 for ejecting him and respondent No. 2. On November 5,
1956, respondent No. 1 filed a counter to this interlocutory
application. On the same date, respondent No. 1. filed
another interlocutory application praying that the decree in
question should be amended so as to specify the time within
which the deposit should be made. Pending these
applications, on November 15. 1956, respondent No. 1 sent a
cheque to the Court in regard to the said amount .The said
cheque was duly cashed and the amount credited in the
accounts of the Court on November 20, 1956. On the date the
trial Judge passed an order directing that the decree should
be amended by inserting a direction to the effect that the
deposit should be made before June 23, 1956, that is to say
within three months from March 26, 1956 on which date the
original decree had been passed. Since this amendment could
not help respondent No. 1, the learned trial Judge processed
to pass an order dismissing the suit under the provisions of
s. 4(4)
This order of dismissal was challenged by respondent No. 1
by an appeal preferred before the Madras High Court. It was
urged before the High Court on behalf of respondent No. 1
that since the original decree did not give a specific
direction that the amount of compensation should be paid
within three months, the
648
provisions of s. 4(4) could not be invoked until the decree
was suitably amended. The argument was that it is only when
the decree makes a direction calling upon the plaintiff to
deposit a certain amount by way of compensation to the
defendant-tenant within three months, that the requirements
of s. 4(1) are complied with. and it is only where a decree
has been properly drawn in accordance with the requirements
of s. 4(1) that the mandatory provisions of s. 4(4) could be
invoked. In substance, the High Court has accepted this
plea, with the result that the appeal preferred by
respondent No. 1 has been allowed and the original decree
passed on March 26, 1956, has been confirmed. The result of
this decision is that respondent No. 1 is at liberty to take
out execution for obtaining possession of the property. The
appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from
the High Court and it is with this certificate that he has
brought this appeal before us. On behalf of the appellant,
Mr. Tatachari has urged that the High Court’s decision under
appeal proceeds on a misconstruction of the provisions
contained in s. 4(4) read with s. 4(1) of the Act. He
argues that the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) is mandatory
and any defect in the decree which is passed under s. 4(1)
cannot help respondent No. 1 to circumvent the effect of the
said provision.
Before dealing with this point, it is necessary to read s.
4(1) & (4). Section 4(1) reads thus
“In a suit for ejectment against a tenant in
which the landlord succeeds, the court shall
ascertain the amount of compensation, if any,
payable under section 3 and the decree in the
suit shall declare the amount so found due and
direct that, on payment by the landlord into
court, within three months from the date of
the decree, of the amount so found due, the
tenant shall put the landlord into possession
of the land with the building and trees
thereon.”
Section 4(4) provides
“If the amount found due is not paid into
court within three months from the date of the
decree under subsection (1) or of the interim
order under sub-section (2), or if no
application is made under section 6, the suit
or application, as the case may be, shall
stand dismissed, and the landlord shall not be
entitled to institute a fresh suit for
ejectment, or present a fresh application for
recovery of possession for a period of five
years from the date of such dismissal.”
649
Mr. Sastri for respondent No. 1 has strenuously contended
that in appreciating the effect of the two relevant
provisions, it is necessary to bear in mind that ultimately,
the direction contained in the decree must be enforced, and
if the original decree did not require respondent No. 1 to
pay the compensation amount within three months, the right
of the appellant to recover that amount must inevitably be
enforced by execution proceedings under Article 182 of the
Limitation Act. In the case of such a decree, s. 4(4)
cannot apply, because s. 4(4) postulates that a proper and
valid decree has been passed in conformity with the
requirements of s. 4(1) Section 4(4) provides a period of
three months “from the date of the decree under sub-section
(1)”; it is the decree under ,sub-section (1) which starts
the period of limitation, and before a decree can be said to
be a decree under sub-section (1), it must comply with all
the requirements prescribed by the said sub-section; in the
present case, the decree did not specify that the amount in
question should be paid within three months, and so, it is
not a decree properly passed under sub-section (1) and as
such, s. 4(4) cannot be invoked.
Mr. Sastri has put his argument in another form. He con-
tends that though the original decree passed between the
parties in the present proceedings did not comply with the
requirements of s. 4(1) inasmuch as it failed to specify the
period of three months within which the amount of
compensation should be paid, it cannot be said to be a
nullity; it is a decree passed by a court of competent
jurisdiction, and so, when the appellant seeks to invoke s.
4(4), what he is virtually asking the Court to do is to
ignore the fact that the decree did not direct respondent
No. 1 to pay the amount within three months, and in the
absence of a direction in the decree, it would not be
permissible to the Court to enforce the provisions of s.
4(4) against respondent No. 1. He would, therefore, read s.
4(1) as controlling s. 4(4); first a decree must be properly
passed under s. 4(1) specifying the period of three months
within which the amount should be paid, and then s. 4(4) can
be invoked. That is how Mr. Sastri has presented before us
his solution to the problem of construing section 4(1) and
(4) together.
In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in
mind the object which the Act is intended to achieve. As
the preamble indicates, the Act was passed to give
protection to certain classes of tenants in areas to which
it was extended. The Legislature thought that it was
necessary to give protection to tenants who had constructed
buildings on others’ lands in the hope that they would not
be evicted so long as they paid a fair rent for the land.
In
650
other words, the Legislature took the view that in a large
majority of cases where open plots were let out to the
tenants and the tenants, in their turn, invested money by
constructing buildings on the said plots in the hope that
they would be allowed to remain in possession of the leased
property so long as they continued to pay a fair rent, it
was necessary to protect their tenancy rights. Though this
Act was passed in 1922, it was not extended to the whole of
the State of Madras; it has been extended stage by stage to
different areas. In fact, we have already seen that the Act
was extended to the municipal area of Tiruchirappalli while
the present suit between the parties was pending in the
trial Court.
In order to carry out its object of affording protection to
the tenants, s. 3 has provided for the payment of
compensation on ejectment. It lays down that if a tenant is
ejected, he would be entitled to compensation for the value
of the building which he might have constructed on the plot
let out to him. Section 3 deals with a question of
compensation and provides how it should be determined.
Section 4 then deals with the disposal of suits for
ejectment. Section 4(1) provides that if the landlord
succeeds in obtaining a decree for ejectment, the Court
shall ascertain the amount of compensation payable to the
tenant, and the decree in the suit shall declare the amount
so found due and direct that, on payment by the landlord
into court, within three months from the date of the decree,
of the amount so found due, the tenant shall put the
landlord into possession of the land with the building and
trees, thereon. Section 4(4) contains a mandatory provision
that if the amount found due is not paid within three
months, the suit of the landlord shall stand dismissed. We
will presently deal with the question of construing these
two sub-sections. Meanwhile, we may refer to s. 10.
Section 10(1) provides that sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 9-A
shall, inter alia, apply to suits in ejectment which are
pending or in which decrees for ejectment have been passed,
but have not been executed. Section 10(2) deals with cases
in which decrees for ejectment have been passed, but the
amount of compensation has not been determined, and it
provides that on an application by the tenant, such amount
would be determined in accordance with s. 4. Section 10(3)
deals with cases of decrees which are pending execution; and
it requires that the Court shall, on the application of the
tenant, recall execution orders, ascertain the amount of
compensation, and pass an interim order under s. 4. It will
thus be clear that wherever the Act is extended, the protec-
tion afforded by the Act and the benefits conferred by it
can be claimed not only by tenants against whom suits are
pending or
651
would be filed in future, but also by tenants against whom
decrees have already been passed, but have not been fully
executed. Section 10 clearly brings out the fact that the
policy of the legislature was to extend ample protection to
the tenants in the areas to which ‘he Act would be extended
from time to time.
Reverting then to the question of construing s. 4(1) and
(4), it would appear that what s. 4(1) purports to do is to
require that the decree in the suit to which it applies
shall, in the first instance, declare the amount found due
by way of compensation. The said provision also requires
that .he decree shall declare that the tenant shall put the
landlord into possession of the land on payment by the
landlord into court, within three months from the date of
the decree, of the amount found due. The two operative
parts of the decree as contemplated by s. 4(1) are : the
declaration of the amount due to the tenant, and the
direction to the tenant to deliver possession of the land to
the landlord in case he paid into Court within three months
of the date of the decree the amount declared due. It is
true that the decree would state that the landlord has to
pay the amount within three months from its date; but having
regard to the specific and mandatory terms in which s. 4(4)
is couched, it would not be reasonable to construe s. 4(1)
as controlling s. 4(4). The relevant clause provides that
the decree shall direct that on payment by the landlord into
Court, within three months, of the amount found due, the
tenant shall put the landlord into possession. The clause
in respect of the payment by the landlord into court within
three months amounts to a condition which has to be
satisfied by the landlord before the tenant is required to
deliver to him possession of the property in question. In
other words, reference to the payment by the landlord of the
amount found due within the specified period in s. 4(1) is
not so much a direction issued by the Court as specification
of a condition expressly and independently provided by s.
4(4).
The provision of s. 4(4) clearly shows that if the amount
found due is not paid within three, months, the suit of the
landlord shall stand dismissed. The opening clause of s.
4(4) shows that the amount has to be paid within three
months from the date of the decree passed under sub-section
(1). The expression “the decree under sub-section ( 1 ) ”
merely describes the sub-section under which the decree is
passed, the emphasis in the context being on the date of the
said decree and not so much on the strict compliance with
the form prescribed by s. 4(1). If the decree is passed
under s. (1), its date is material for the purpose of
deciding the period beyond which s. 4(4) would come into
operation. In other words,
652
as soon as it is shown by a tenant that a decree has been
passed under s. 4(1) declaring the amount of compensation
due to him from the landlord, he is entitled to claim that
he is no longer under obligation to deliver possession of
the property to the landlord, because three months have
passed from the date of the decree and the amount declared
as compensation has not been paid to him. If the decree
happens to be defective in the sense that it does not
reproduce the requirement of s. 4(1) expressly in its terms,
that would not take the case outside the purview of s. 4(4).
We are inclined to think that having regard to the mandatory
terms used in s. 4(4), it would be illogical and
unreasonable to suggest that a defective decree like the
present enables the landlord to circumvent the provisions of
s. 4(4). The applicability of s. 4(4) cannot be repelled
merely on the ground that the decree passed under 6. 4 (1 )
does not specify the period of three months within which the
amount found due has to be paid. In our opinion, the
logical way to reconcile S. 4(1) and S. 4(4) would be to
treat the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) as mandatory and
paramount and read the relevant portion of s. 4(1)
accordingly. That is why even if the decree does not
mention that the amount has to be paid within three months,
the landlord’s obligation to make the payment within three
months is still enforceable under s. 4(4), otherwise
defective decrees would deprive the tenants of the benefit
intended to be conferred on them by s. 4(4). We are
therefore satisfied that the High Court was in error in
reversing the order passed by the trial Court. Respondent
No. 1 has not paid the amount within three months from the
date of the decree and the suit instituted by it shall stand
dismissed under s. 4(4).
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by
the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court
restored. In the circumstances of this case, there would be
no order as to costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
653