THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR Vs. PARTHASARATHI SINHA & OTHERS

PETITIONER:
THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
PARTHASARATHI SINHA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/12/1982

BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:
1983 AIR  188          1983 SCR  (2) 211
1983 SCC  (1) 538      1982 SCALE  (2)1317

ACT:
Companies Act,  1956-Sections  543     and  634-Scope     of-
Misfeasance and breach of trust alleged against directors of
a company in liquidation-Death of a director during pendency
of proceedings-Heirs  and legal     representatives of deceased
director, if  could be    substituted  in     place    of  deceased
director-After declaration  of    liability  of  director,  if
amounts due could be realised from legal representatives.

HEADNOTE:
The   respondents      were     the    heirs    and    legal
representatives of  one of  the directors  of a     Company  in
liquidation. When  the company    was ordered  to be wound up,
the Official  Liquidator took  out summons under section 543
(1) of    the  Companies    Act  against  its  directors  for  a
declaration  that   the     said    directors  were      guilty  of
misfeasance and     breach of  trust  and    also  for  an  order
directing them    to repay or restore the money or property of
the company  in liquidation  which they were alleged to have
retained wrongfully.  During the pendency of the proceedings
one of    the directors  died  intestate    leaving     behind     the
respondents as    his heirs  and legal representatives. At the
instance of the Official Liquidator the Company Judge passed
an order  substituting    the  respondents  in  place  of     the
deceased director.
Allowing the  respondents’ appeal,     a Division Bench of
the  High   Court  held      that    no  further  action  in     the
misfeasance proceedings     could be  taken against  the  legal
representatives of  the deceased director. In coming to this
conclusion the    High Court  purported to follow the decision
of this     Court in  Official  Liquidator     v.  P.A.  Tendolkar
(dead) by L. Rs., [1973] 3 S.C.R. 364.
Allowing the Appeal,
^
HELD:  The     liability  arising  under  the     misfeasance
proceedings is    founded on  the principle  that a person who
has caused loss to the company by an act amounting to breach
of trust  should make  good the loss. Section 543 of the Act
provides for  a summary     remedy for  determining the  amount
payable     by   such  person   on     proof     of  the   necessary
ingredients. The section authorises the Court to direct such
persons chargeable  under it  to pay  a sum  of money to the
Company by  way of  compensation. This    is not    a  provision
intended to  punish a  man who    has  been  found  guilty  of
misfeasance  but  is  only  intended  for  compensating     the
company     in   respect  of   the     loss    occasioned  by     his
misfeasance. Whenever  there  is  a  relationship  based  on
contract, quasi     contract,  some  fiduciary  relation  or  a
failure to perform a duty, there is no
212
abatement of  the liability  on the death of the wrong doer.
When once  the liability  is declared,    it is  open  to     the
Official Liquidator  to realise     the amount due by resorting
to section  634 of  the Act  and section  50 of     the Code of
Civil Procedure.  In Tendolkar’s  case this  Court  did     not
consider the effect of section 634 of the Act which made the
relevant provisions  of the Code of Civil Procedure relating
to execution  of decrees  applicable to orders passed by the
Court under the Act. [223 C-F]
At the  conclusion of the proceedings under section 543
a declaration  of the  liability is  made. Such     declaration
partakes of  the character  of a decree in a suit. When once
such declaration  is made  it can  be enforced under section
634 of    the Act and where the order made by one court has to
be executed  by another     court the  procedure prescribed  by
section 635  of the Act has to be followed. In the course of
such execution    proceedings the     provisions of section 50 of
the Code  of Civil  Procedure have  to be  applied when     the
person who is made liable dies before the order is satisfied
and the     liability of  the legal  representatives should  be
determined accordingly. [223 G-H]
Official  Liquidator,   Supreme  Bank   Ltd.  v.    P.A.
Tendolkar (dead)  by L.Rs,  & Ors.,  [1973]  3    S.C.R.    364,
applied.
Aleykutty Varkey Tharakan & Anr. v. Official Liquidator
JUDGMENT:
Shiwalik Transport     Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Thakur
Ajit Singh & Ors., [1978] 48 Comp. Cas. 465, approved.

&
CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3614 of
1982.
Appeal by    Special Leave  from the     Judgment and  Order
dated the  1st August,    1975 of     the Calcutta  High Court in
Appeal No. 324 of 1970.
Shanker  Ghosh,  A.K.  Verma  and    P.K.  Basu  for     the
Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH, J.    The short  question which arises for
decision in  this appeal  by special  leave is    whether     the
proceedings initiated  against a director of a company under
section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred
to as  ‘the Act’)  can be  continued after his death against
his legal representatives and whether any amount declared to
be due    in such     proceedings can be realised from the estate
of the deceased in the hands of his legal representatives.
213
The facts    of the    present case  may be  briefly stated
thus: Ballygunge  Real Property     and Building  Society    Ltd.
(hereinafter referred  to as  ‘the Company  in liquidation’)
was ordered  to be wound up by the High Court of Calcutta on
January 8,1958.     On January 2, 1963, the Official Liquidator
took out summons under section 543(1) of the Act against its
directors including  Dr.S. N.  Sinha for  a declaration that
the said  directors were guilty of misfeasance and breach of
trust and  also for  an order  directing them  to  repay  or
restore the  money or property of the Company in liquidation
which they  were alleged to have retained wrongfully. During
the pendency of the said proceedings, Dr. S.N. Sinha died on
November  16,    1969  intestate      leaving  behind  his    son,
Parthasarathi Sinha and two married daughters, Maya Bose and
Mira Mitra  as    his  heirs  and     legal    representatives.  On
February 12,  1970, Judge’s  summons was  taken out  at     the
instance of  the Official  Liquidator for  leave to continue
the said  proceedings  against    the  said  heirs  and  legal
representatives. The  learned Company  Judge passed an order
on November  9,1970 for     substitution of  the said heirs and
legal representatives  in  place  of  Dr.  S.N.     Sinha,     the
deceased.  Against   that  order,   the     heirs     and   legal
representatives of Dr. S.N. Sinha preferred an appeal before
the Division  Bench of the Calcutta High Court under section
483 of    the Act.  That appeal  was allowed  by the  Division
Bench on  August 1,  1975 and save and except that the death
of Dr.    S.N. Sinha  was recorded,  the order  of the Company
Judge was  set aside. This appeal is filed against the order
of the Division Bench.
Before the     Division  Bench  of  the  High     Court,     the
principal contention  urged on behalf of the heirs and legal
representatives of  Dr. S.N.  Sinha, since deceased was that
in  view   of  the   decision  of  this     Court    in  Official
Liquidator, Supreme Bank Ltd. v. P.A. Tendolkar (dead) by L.
Rs.  &     Ors.(1)  no   further    action    in  the     misfeasance
proceedings could be taken against them and we are concerned
only with  that contention  in this appeal. Since the effect
of the    above decision    is understood in one way by the High
Court of  Calcutta in  this case and differently by the High
Court of  Kerala in  Aleykutty Varkey  Tharakan     &  Anr.  v.
Official Liquidator  & Ors.(2)    and by    the  High  Court  of
Punjab and  Haryana  in     Shiwalik  Transport  Co.  Ltd.     (in
liquidation) v. Thakur Ajit Singh & Ors.(3) we
214
shall proceed  to discuss  the decision     in Tendolkar’s case
(supra) at  some length.  Before doing so, we shall refer to
the relevant  provisions of  law and  the specific averments
made in this case by the Official Liquidator.
Section 543 of the Act reads as follows:
“543. Power  of Court     to assess  damages  against
delinquent directors,  etc.-(1) If     in  the  course  of
winding up of a company, it appears that any person who
has taken    part in     the promotion    or formation  of the
company, or  any past  or    present     director,  managing
agent, secretaries     and treasurers, manager, liquidator
or officer of the company-
(a)  has misapplied, or retained, or become liable
or accountable  for, any money or property of
the company; or
(b)  has been     guilty of any misfeasance or breach
of trust in relation to the company;
the Court    may, on     the  application  of  the  Official
Liquidator, of  the liquidator,  or of  any creditor or
contributory, made     within the  time specified  in that
behalf in    sub-section (2), examine into the conduct of
the person,  director, managing  agent, secretaries and
treasurers, manager,  liquidator officer aforesaid, and
compel him to repay or restore the money or property or
any part  thereof respectively,  with interest  at such
rate as  the Court     thinks just,  or to contribute such
sum to the assets of the company by way of compensation
in respect of the misapplication, retainer, misfeasance
or breach of trust, as the Court thinks just.
(2) An  application under sub-section (1) shall be
made within  five years  from the date of the order for
winding  up,   or    of  the     first    appointment  of     the
liquidator in the winding up, or of the misapplication,
retainer, misfeasance  or breach  of trust, as the case
may be, whichever is longer.
215
(3) This  section shall apply notwithstanding that
the matter is one for which the person concerned may be
criminally liable.”
Section 634 of the Act reads:
“634. Enforcement  of order  of  Courts-Any  order
made by  a Court  under this Act may be enforced in the
same manner  as a    decree made  by the  Court in a suit
pending therein”.
Section 2(11)  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure defines
the expression    ’legal representative’    as ‘a  person who in
law represents    the estate of a deceased person and includes
any person  who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased
and where  a party  sues or  is     sued  in  a  representative
character the  person on  whom the  estate devolves  on     the
death of the party so suing or sued’.
Section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
“50. Legal  representative-(1)  Where     a  judgment
debtor dies before the decree has been fully satisfied,
the holder     of the     decree may apply to the Court which
passed  it     to  execute  the  same     against  the  legal
representative of the deceased.
(2)    Where the  decree is  executed against    such
legal representative,  he shall  be liable     only to the
extent of    the property  of the deceased which has come
to his  hands and    has not     been duly disposed of; and,
for the  purpose of  ascertaining such  liability,     the
Court executing the decree may, of its own motion or on
the application of the decree-holder, compel such legal
representative to    produce such  accounts as  it thinks
fit”.
The Official  Liquidator pleaded  before the High Court
that due  to various  breaches of  trust and/or     breaches of
contract, express  or implied  and/or breaches    of fiduciary
duties and other acts of misfeasance on the part of Dr. S.N.
Sinha, since  deceased, loss  had been caused to the Company
in liquidation    and that  the assets  of Dr.  S.N. Sinha had
benefitted thereby.  He further     alleged that  the assets of
Dr.  S.N.  Sinha  in  the  hands  of  his  heirs  and  legal
representatives were  liable for the claims made in the said
misfeasance proceedings.
216
We shall  now revert  to Tendolkar’s case (supra). That
case arose  out of certain misfeasance proceedings commenced
by the    Official Liquidator in the winding up proceedings of
a banking  company against  the managing director, the other
directors and  some of    the employees of the company. Two of
the directors  died while  the proceedings were pending. The
Company     Judge     dismissed  the      proceedings  against     the
employees as  time barred  and held  that the  heirs of     the
deceased directors could not be proceeded against. He was of
the view  that the  misfeasance proceedings being of special
nature    involving  an  enquiry    into  the  alleged  wrongful
conduct of directors personally, the liability of a director
for  such   wrong  doing  was  personal     in  character    and,
therefore, vanished  with the  death of the director. But in
respect of  the managing  director and    those directors     who
were alive  when he  gave  his    decision,  he  gave  certain
directions regarding  their  individual     liability.  Against
that decision  five appeals  were filed     before the Division
Bench of  the High  Court. In those appeals, the correctness
of the decision of the Company Judge to exempt the heirs and
legal representatives  of the two deceased directors was not
questioned by  any party.  In those  appeals,  the  Division
Bench reduced  the total  liability of the directors and the
individual liability  of the  managing    director  though  it
placed a  larger share    of the burden of contribution on the
managing  director.  Against  that  judgment,  the  Official
Liquidator  appealed   to  this     Court    in  respect  of     the
liability of  the managing director and two other directors.
One of the two directors namely, P.A. Tendolkar died pending
the grant  of his  own application  for a  certificate under
Article 133  of the  Constitution. His    heirs got themselves
impleaded and  contended that  the proceedings    against them
could not  be continued     and also that the claim against the
deceased director  was untenable on merits. Dealing with the
liability of  the heirs and legal representatives of persons
against whom  action was  taken under section 542 and 543 of
the Act, this Court observed at page 380 thus:
“The maxim  actio personalis    moritur cum persons,
as pointed     in Winfield’s Law of Tort (Eighth Edn. 603-
605), was    an invention  of English  Common Lawyers. It
seemed to    have resulted from the strong quasi-criminal
character of  the action  for  trespass.  Just  like  a
prosecution for  a criminal  offence,  the     action     for
trespass, which  was “the    parent of much of our modern
law of tort”, was
217
held, by  applying     this  maxim,  to  be  incapable  of
surviving the  death of  the wrongdoer,  and,  in    some
cases, even  of the  party injured. The maxim, with its
extensions, was  criticised by Winfield and found to be
“pregnant with  a good deal more mischief than was ever
born of  it”. Whatever view one may take of the justice
of the  principle, it  was clear  that it    would not be
applicable to  actions based  on contract    or  where  a
tortfeasor’s estate  had benefitted  from a wrong done.
Its application  was generally  confined to actions for
damages for defamation, seduction, inducing a spouse to
remain apart from the other, and adultery.
We see no reason to extend the maxim, as a general
principle,     even    to  cases   involving  breaches      of
fiduciary duties  or where     the personal conduct of the
deceased Director has been fully enquired into, and the
only question  for determination,    on an appeal, is the
extent  of     the  liability     incurred  by  the  deceased
Director. Such  liability must  necessarily be confined
to the  assets or    estate left  by the  deceased in the
hands of  the successors. In so far as an heir or legal
representative has     an interest  in the  assets of     the
deceased and  represents the estate, and the liquidator
represents the  interests of  the Company, the heirs as
well as  the liquidator  should, in  equity be  able to
question  a   decision  which   affects  the  interests
represented.”
At a  later stage in the same case, this Court made the
following observations at pages 381-382:
“It will  be seen  that, while  Section 335 of the
Act of  1913, like     Section 543 of the Companies Act of
1956, to  which it     corresponds. gives the power to the
Court to  enquire into  the conduct  of  “any  past  or
present Director”,     yet, both Section 235 of the Act of
1913 and  Section 543  of the  Companies  Act  of    1956
confine the  power of  the Court  to  make     orders     for
repayment    or  restoration     of  money  or    property  or
contribution to  the assets  of the Company against the
individuals occupying  the capacities,  either  in     the
past or  present, mentioned  therein. This     power    does
not, on  the language  of these  provisions, extend  to
making compulsive orders against heirs of delinquents.
218
As the  power to  take  these  special  proceedings  is
discretionary and    does  not  exhaust  other  remedies,
although, the  Court may,    as a  matter of     justice and
equity, drop  proceedings against delinquent Directors,
Managers, or  Officers who are no longer alive, leaving
the complainant  to his ordinary remedy by a civil suit
against the  assets of  the  deceased,  yet,  where  no
injustice may be caused by continuing these proceedings
against past  Director, even  though he  be  dead,     the
proceedings could continue after giving persons who may
be interested opportunities to be heard. But, even such
proceedings can  only result  in a     declaration of     the
liability, of a deceased director, because the language
of Section     235 of the Act of 1913, as already noticed,
does not authorise passing of orders to compel heirs or
legal representatives  to do  anything. Such compulsive
proceedings as  may become necessary against those upon
whom devolve  the assets  or the  estate of  a deceased
delinquent Director,  who may  have become liable could
only lie outside Section 235 of the Act of 1913.”
Again in  the same     case, it was observed by this Court
at page 383 thus:
“It may  be possible    (though we  need express  no
final opinion  on the  matter) where a proceeding under
Section 543 is covered also by the terms of Section 542
of the  Companies Act  of 1956,  to give  directions to
persons other  than those    whose  conduct    is  enquired
into,  including    directions  to     heirs     and   legal
representatives,    for   the   purpose   of   enforcing
declaration. But, we think that the power under Section
235 of  the Act  of 1913,    which corresponds to Section
543 of  the Act of 1956, would not extend beyond making
a declaration  against a deceased Director provided he,
in his  life time,     or his heirs, after his death, have
had due  opportunity of  putting forward  the  case  on
behalf of    the allegedly delinquent Director. If either
a Liquidator  or the  heir of  a  delinquent  Director,
against whom  a declaration of liability has been made,
can question determination of liability of the deceased
delinquent, who  was alive     at the time of the Judgment
against him,  it is  obvious that    the Appellate  Court
could give     a declaration either reducing or increasing
the liability even though it may not be able to enforce
it by an order under Section 235 of the Act. If
219
the declaration  can be  questioned by an appeal, as we
think that     it can, the liability can be not only wiped
off or  reduced but  also increased  on an appeal heard
after the death of a Director held liable.
Applying the    principles laid     down above  to     the
case before  us, we  find that  Tendolkar    had  a    full
opportunity   of     defending   himself   against     the
misfeasance proceedings  taken by    the  liquidator.  He
also exercised his right of appeal against the order of
the Company  Judge.  The  Division     Bench,     as  already
observed, reduced    his liability.    His heirs were heard
on merits    in the appeal before us. Any order passed by
us could  only affect  the assets    or the estate of the
deceased Tendolkar. But, as already indicated by us, we
cannot, in these proceedings, pass an order against the
heirs to Tendolkar so as to compel them to do anything.
The  OFFICIAL   Liquidator     or  the  co-Directors    may,
however, take any other proceeding which may be open to
them under     the law so as to obtain the contribution of
Tendolkar.”
Finally  this  Court  gave     inter    alia  the  following
direction occurring at pages 400-401:
“(6) The  case is  remanded to the learned Company
Judge for    passing such  orders  against  the  Managing
Director Samant  and Director  Ajgaonkar, under Section
235  of   the  Act     of  1913,  as    may  be     needed     for
discharging the  liabilities determined  above, but  no
such orders  will be passed against the heirs and legal
representatives of     deceased  Director  P.A.  Tendolkar
under Section  235 of  the Act  of 1913, although their
liabilities are  declared. The  Official Liquidator and
L.S. Ajgaonkar  are, however,  left free  to seek    such
other   remedies,      if   necessary,   by     appropriate
proceedings under the law, against the estate or assets
of P.A. Tendolkar. as may be open to them.”
Justice Masud  of the Calcutta High Court who heard the
case under  appeal understood  the above  decision  of    this
Court thus:
“The observation  of the  Supreme  Court  give  an
indication that in a proper case the declaration of the
220
liability of  a delinquent     Director, who    subsequently
dies,  is    possible  but  no  order  for  repayment  or
restoring the  money or property lying in possession of
the heirs    can be    passed against    the heirs  or  legal
representatives of such Directors.”
Justice Ghose,  the other    Judge of  the Division Bench
observed:
“In official    Liquidator Supreme Bank Ltd. v. P.R.
Tendolkar (Dead)  by L. Rs. and Others, respondents AIR
1973 S.C.    1104 the  Supreme Court     held that  where  a
delinquent Director  was examined in a proceeding under
Section 235  of the  Indian Companies  Act,  1913,     and
thereafter dies  before an     order for  payment was made
against him, in such proceeding the order that could be
passed in    the said  misfeasance proceeding  as against
the deceased  Director was     merely a  declaration as to
his liability  to the  Company in liquidation. No order
for payment  for the  discharge of such liability could
be made.  The Supreme  Court  observed  that  before  a
declaration as  to liability could be made against such
Director, his heirs and personal representatives should
be     heard.      The  Supreme     Court,     however,  expressly
negatived the  contention that  where a  Director    died
after he  had  been  examined  in    a  proceeding  under
Section 235  of the  repealed Act,     his heirs  or legal
representatives or     his estate could be directed to pay
up the loss occasioned to the Company on account of the
misfeasance of such Director in such proceeding. It is,
therefore,     apparent   from  a  perusal  of  the  above
mentioned authorities that Section 543 has not made any
departures from  the provision contained in Section 235
of the  repealed Act  and in  the premises it has to be
held  that      the  cause  of  action  in  a     misfeasance
proceeding initiated  under Section 235 of the repealed
Act of  Section 543  of the Companies Act, 1956 does at
all survive  against the heirs or legal representatives
of a  delinquent Director    or officer etc. of a company
and such  heirs  or  legal     representatives  cannot  be
substituted in  the place    and instead  of     a  deceased
delinquent Director, Officer etc.”
The effect of the decision of this Court in Tendolkar’s
case (supra)  came up  for consideration in Aleykutty Varkey
Tharakan’s
221
case (supra)  before the Kerala High Court. In that case the
legal representatives  of two  persons against    whom  orders
under Section  543 of  the Act    had been  passed by the High
Court and  against which  petitions for leave to appeal were
pending in  this Court    after the  death  of  the  said     two
persons questioned  before the Kerala High Court an order of
appointment of    a receiver  in execution of the order passed
under Section  543 of  the Act. The contention urged by them
was that  in execution    of an order under section 543 of the
Act, no     order such  as the one under appeal could be passed
against the  legal representatives  of the persons proceeded
against. In that case the Kerala High Court dealing with the
decision in Tendolkar’s case (supra) observed thus;
“Considerable argument  turned on  the  scope     and
effect of the above decision of the Supreme Court, and,
in      particular, of  the observations in the paragraphs
that we  have quoted  above. As  we understand the said
judgment, we  do not  think that  the decision  or     the
observations made    lend countenance  to the proposition
sought to    be advanced  before us    that an     order under
Section 543  of the  Companies Act,  passed  against  a
director or  directors cannot  be executed in the modes
known to  and sanctioned  by, the Civil Procedure Code,
against  his   estate  in     the  hands   of  his  legal
representatives. The  proceedings    before    the  Supreme
Court, it    should be remembered, arose by way of appeal
against the proceedings started under s. 543 of the Act
itself, and, therefore, were a continuation of the said
proceedings. No  question    directly  arose     before     the
Supreme Court  as to  whether  an    order  passed  under
section 543  could, or  could not,     be executed against
the estate of the deceased director in the hands of his
legal  representatives.   In  paragraph   22   of     the
judgement, the Supreme Court observed that the possible
liabilities of  the legal representatives of two of the
directors on  whom their assets and properties may have
developed, do  not call  for a decision from the court.
But the  general question    of liability  of  heirs     and
legal  representatives   of  delinquent  directors     had
arisen for     consideration. It was on this question that
the  Supreme   Court  pronounced.     We  are  unable  to
understand     the   decision      as   authority   for     the
proposition which counsel for the appellant put forward
before us.”
222
The above view of the Kerala High Court was approved by
the Punjab  and Haryana     High Court  in     Shiwalik  Transport
Co’s. case  (supra). Chinnappa    Reddy, J.  speaking for     the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana observed:
“Section 543    provides for  the assessment  of the
loss or  damage suffered  by the  company consequent on
acts of  misfeasance or  breach of     trust committed  by
directors and  officers of     the  company  and  for     the
making of    a compulsive repayment against the director.
Though the     object of  assessing the damages is for the
purpose  of  recompensing    the  loss  suffered  by     the
company and,  therefore, the  cause  must    survive     the
death of  the director  to that extent, the language of
the provision  insofar as    it relates to the compulsive
order is  so peremptorily directed against the director
that  it    must  be  held    that  the  compulsive  order
contemplated by  the section cannot be made against the
legal representatives.  Thus, while  the loss or damage
may be  determined and declared even after the death of
the delinquent  director, no  compulsive order  may  be
made against the legal representatives. The proceedings
under section  543 may  be continued  against the legal
representatives for  the  purpose    of  determining     and
declaring the loss or damage caused to the company, but
not to  make an order for recovery against them. We are
relieved of  the necessity of considering the matter at
greater length  because of     a recent  decision  of     the
Supreme Court in Official Liquidator, Supreme Bank Ltd.
v. P.A.  Tendolkar [1973]    43 Comp Cas 382. The Supreme
Court, there,  considered the  broad question whether a
proceeding under  Section 235  of the  Indian Companies
Act of  1913 which     corresponded to  Section 543 of the
1956 Act,    survived the  death of the director, though,
on the  facts of  the case,  the  question     really     was
whether the  legal representatives     could    continue  an
appeal filed  by a     deceased director  against an order
made under Section 235.”
Having given  our anxious consideration to the question
before us, we are of the view that the Kerala and Punjab and
Haryana High Courts have applied the decision in Tendolkar’s
case (supra)  correctly and  that the  two learned Judges of
the Calcutta  High Court  who delivered     the judgment  under
appeal erred  in its  application. If  this Court had really
come to the conclusion that on the death of a
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person against    whom proceedings  under Section 543 had been
initiated such    proceedings could  not be  proceeded against
his legal  representatives, the     final order  would not have
been what  was actually     made therein. “The true doctrine is
that whenever  you find     that the deceased person has by his
wrong diverted    either    property  or  the  proceeds  of     the
property belonging  to someone else into his own estate, you
can then  have recourse     to that  estate through  his  legal
representative when  he is  dead, to  recover it.” The legal
representative, of  course, would  not be liable for any sum
beyond the value of the estate of the deceased in his hands.
The liability arising under the misfeasance proceedings
is founded  on the  principle that  a person  who has caused
loss to     the company  by an act amounting to breach of trust
should make  good the  loss. Section 543 of the Act does not
really create  any  new     liability.  It     only  provides     for
summary remedy    for determining     the amount  payable by such
person on  proof of  the necessary  ingredients. The section
authorises the Court to direct such persons chargeable under
it to  pay  a  sum  of    money  to  the    company     by  way  of
compensation. This  is not  a provision intended to punish a
man who     has  been  found  guilty  of  misfeasance  but     for
compensating the  company in  respect of the loss occasioned
by his    misfeasance. Whenever  there is a relationship based
on contract,  quasi-contract, some  fiduciary relation    or a
failure to  perform a  duty, there  is no  abatement of     the
liability on  the death     of the     wrong-doer. When  once     the
liability is  declared it is open to the official Liquidator
to realise the amount due by resorting to section 634 of the
Act and     section 50  of the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.  In
Tendolkar’s case  (supra) this    Court did  not consider     the
effect of  section 634    of the    Act which  made the relevant
provisions of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure    relating  to
execution of  decrees applicable  to orders  passed  by     the
court under the Act.
At the  conclusion of the proceedings under section 543
a declaration  of the  liability is  made. Such     declaration
partakes of  the character  of a decree in a suit. When once
such declaration  is made  it can  be enforced under section
634 of    the Act and where the order made by one court has to
be executed  by another     court the  procedure prescribed  by
section 635  of the Act has to be followed. In the course of
such execution    proceedings the     provisions of section 50 of
the Code  of Civil  Procedure have  to be  applied when     the
person who is made liable dies before the order is satisfied
and the     liability of  the legal  representatives should  be
determined
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accordingly. Any  other construction  of the  provisions  of
section 543  of the  Act would    make the  entire process  of
determination  of   the     liability   of     persons   under  it
meaningless.
We are,  therefore, of  opinion that  the view taken by
the Division  Bench of    the High  Court of  Calcutta in this
case is     erroneous. We,     therefore, allow  this appeal,     set
aside the  judgment of    the Division Bench of the High Court
and restore  the order    of the    learned Company     Judge.     The
misfeasance proceedings     shall now  be continued accordingly
against the  heirs and    legal representatives  of  Dr.    S.N.
Sinha since deceased.
There shall be no order as to costs.
P.B.R                         Appeal allowed.
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