PETITIONER:
STATE OF BIHAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UMA SHANKAR KETRIWAL & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT18/12/1980
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CITATION:
1981 AIR 641 1981 SCR (2) 402
1981 SCC (1) 75
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1992 SC1701 (30)
ACT:
Criminal trial-Prosecution commenced in the year 1963-
Continuing in 1979-High Court quashing proceedings as an
abuse of the process of court- Order whether valid-Limit to
period for criminal litigation to continue at trial stage-
Necessity of.
HEADNOTE:
A case was initiated through a report lodged with the
police on the 9th April, 1960 that the respondent’s firm had
misappropriated a large quantity of G. C. Sheets meant for
distribution to quota and sub-quota holders. After
investigation, a police report was submitted on the 23rd
December 1962 to the Magistrate, who took cognizance of the
case on the 25th January, 1963. Charges were framed against
the respondents under section 7 of the Essential Commodities
Act on 15th September, 1967. The progress of the case
thereafter was very tardy.
In 1979, the respondents made two applications to the
High Court for quashing the proceedings initiated against
them. The High Court allowed them on the ground that the
police report did not disclose any offence against any of
the respondents and that as the prosecution commenced in the
year 1963 was still going on in 1979, it would be an abuse
of the process of the Court to allow the prosecution to
continue any further.
In the appeal by the State to this Court, it was
contended that the finding about the police report not
disclosing any offence was erroneous and that the delay in
the conclusion of the trial was not a justification for
quashing the proceedings.
Dismissing the appeal
^
HELD: 1. There has to be a limit to the period for
which criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial
stage. [404D]
2. The present case is not a proper one for
interference inspite of the fact that the allegations
disclose the commission of an offence which is quite
serious. [404E]
In the instant case the trial has not made much headway
even though no less than 20 years have gone by. Such
protraction itself means considerable harassment to the
accused not only monetarily but also by way of constant
attention to the case and repeated appearances in court,
apart from anxiety. [404C-D]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
699 of 1980.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 6-11-1979 of Patna High Court in Criminal Misc. Nos.
3679 and 3913/79.
403
K. G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the Appellant.
S. C. Misra, M. P. Jha and A. K. Jha for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KOSHAL, J. This is an appeal by special leave against
an order dated the 6th November, 1979 of a learned Single
Judge of the Patna High Court quashing the entire
proceedings in a criminal case against the 7 respondents who
were facing a charge under section 7 of the Essential
Commodities Act in the Court of a Magistrate at Bhagalpur.
2. The case was initiated through a report lodged with
the police on the 9th of April 1960 with the allegation that
the respondents’ firm which held a licence for dealing in
iron and steel had misappropriated a large quantity of G.C.
sheets meant for distribution to quota and sub-quota
holders. After investigation a police report was submitted
on the 23rd December 1962 to a Bhagalpur Magistrate who took
cognizance of the case on the 25th January 1963. However,
the charge against the respondents was framed as late as
15th September 1967 and since then the progress of the case
was very tardy as the orders passed therein were challenged
in appeals or on the revisional side from time to time.
Ultimately in 1979 the respondents made two applications to
the High Court praying that the proceedings against them be
quashed and the same were accepted through the impugned
order. The High Court held for various reasons that the
police report did not disclose any offence against any of
the respondents. Another reason for accepting the two
applications may be stated in the words of the learned
Single Judge:
“Another important aspect of the matter is that
the prosecution commenced in the year 1963 and it is
still going on in 1979. It is true that the accused
persons themselves are partly blamed for this delay
because several revision applications have been filed
at their instance in the High Court and in the district
court. The situation, however, continues to be
unjustified because the last revision application was
some time disposed in 1973 and the record was returned
in 1974. This fact has been stated by the learned
counsel for the petitioners and five years have elapsed
since then. I am told that four witnesses have been
examined and the last witness was examined in April,
1979 and after that no witness has been examined. It
has been stated in the order sheet that prosecution is
not in a position to know the address of the witnesses
who are mostly Government Officials. Luxury of
protracted trial cannot be allowed to the
404
prosecution. If they did not know the address of their
own witnesses and if the prosecution was not in a
position to conclude its evidence by now it will be an
abuse of the process of the court to allow the
prosecution go on any further.”
3. Learned counsel for the appellant State has
challenged the impugned order not only on the ground that
its finding about the police report not disclosing any
offence against the respondents was erroneous but also with
the argument that the delay in the conclusion of the trial
was not a justification for quashing the proceedings. We
have heard him at length and although there is much to be
said against the impugned order in so far as the finding
about the police report is concerned, we cannot lose sight
of the fact that the trial has not made much headway even
though no less than 20 years have gone by. Such protraction
itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only
monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case
and repeated appearances in court, apart from anxiety. It
may well be that the respondents themselves were responsible
in a large measure for the slow pace of the case inasmuch as
quite a few orders made by the trial magistrate were
challenged in higher courts, but then there has to be a
limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed
to go on at the trial stage. In this view of the matter we
do not consider the present case a proper one for our
interference in spite of the fact that we feel that the
allegations disclosed the commission of an offence which we
regard as quite serious.
4. For the reasons stated we dismiss the appeal.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
405