Court Judgments

PETITIONER:
SHEONANDAN PASWAN

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
STATE OF BIHAR & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/12/1982

BENCH:
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
BENCH:
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
ISLAM, BAHARUL (J)
MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:
1983 AIR  194          1983 SCR  (2)     61
1983 SCC  (1) 438      1982 SCALE  (2)1241
CITATOR INFO :
APL        1987 SC 877     (38,52,62,83)
RF        1992 SC 604     (140)

ACT:
A.      Nolles Prosequi-Nature  and scope  of power  under
section 321  of the  Code of    Criminal  Procedure,
1973-In the  discharge of  his duties,  whether  a
public prosecutor, who is always instructed by the
Government can be said to be free and independent.
B.      Special   Public   Prosecutor,   appointment     of-
Appointment  of   Special  Public   Prosecutor  to
conduct the  case in    question without  cancelling
the appointment of an earlier appointee-Competency
of the latter appointee applying for withdrawal of
the  case,   Code  of     Criminal  Procedure,  1973,
Sections 24 (8) and 321.
C.      Code    of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973-Section    321-
Grounds for  withdrawal  from     prosecution-Whether
the grounds like (a) implication of the accused as
a result  of personal     and political vendetta, (b)
inexpediency of  prosecution for  reasons of State
and Public  policy, and  (c) adverse effects which
the  continuance  of    prosecution  will  bring  on
public  interest   etc.  would   be  relevant     for
withdrawing from the prosecution.
D.      Nolles Prosequi-Accused  charged with     offences of
criminal  misconduct     and  forgery-Permission  to
withdraw on  an application  made on the ground of
lack of  prospect of successful prosecution in the
light     of   the  evidence   on  record-High  Court
confirming  the  said     order-Interference  by     the
Supreme Court under Article 136.

HEADNOTE:
After  obtaining    the  requisite     sanction  from     the
Governor on  19th February, 1979, a chargesheet in Vigilance
P.S. case  no. 9  (2) 78  was filed  by the  State of  Bihar
against Respondent  No 2  (Dr. Jagannath Mishra), Respondent
no. 3 (Nawal Kishore Sinha), Respondent no. 4 (Jiwanand Jha)
and three  others (K.P.     Gupta since  deceased, M.A. Haidari
and A.K.  Singh who  later became  approvers)  for  offences
under  Sections      420/466/471/109/120-B     I.P.C.      and  under
Section 5 (1) (a), 5 (1) (b) and 5 (1) (d) read with Section
5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Inter alia,
the gravamen of the charge against the respondent no. 2, was
that all  times material  he was  either a  Minister or     the
Chief Minister    of Bihar and in that capacity by corrupt and
or illegal  means or  by otherwise abusing his position as a
public servant, he, in conspiracy with the other accused and
with a    view to     protect Nawal Kishore Sinha, in particular,
sought to subvert criminal prosecution and surcharge
62
proceedings against  Nawal Kishore  Sinha  and    others,     and
either obtained     for himself  or conferred on them pecuniary
advantage to the detriment of Patna Urban Co-operative Bank,
its members,  depositors and creditors and thereby committed
the offence  of criminal  misconduct under Section 5 (1) (d)
read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 and  in  that  process  committed    the  other  offences
specified in  the charge-sheet,     including the    offences  of
forgery under  section 466 I.P.C. Cognizance of the case was
taken on  21st November,  1979 by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate-cum-Special Judge  (Vigilance)Patna,     who  issued
process against     the accused, but before the trial commenced
the State  Government, at  the instance of Respondent no. 2,
who in    the meantime  had come    to power  and had become the
Chief Minister; took a decision in February 1981 to withdraw
from the prosecution for reasons of State and Public Policy.
Though initially  Shri Awadesh    Kumar Dutt,  Senior Advocate
Patna High  Court, had    been appointed    as a  Special Public
Prosecutor by  the previous  Government for  conducting     the
case, the  State Government (now headed by Respondent no. 2)
without cancelling Shri Dutt’s appointment as Special Public
Prosecutor, on    24th February 1981 constituted a fresh panel
of lawyers  for conducting  cases  pertaining  to  Vigilance
Department. Sri     Lalan Prasad Sinha, one of the Advocates so
appointed on  the fresh panel was allotted the said case and
was informed  of the  Government’s said decision and on 26th
March, 1981,  he was  further requested     to take  steps     for
withdrawal of  the case     after he  had considered the matter
and satisfied  himself about  it. On  17th June,  1981,     Sri
Lalan Prasad  Sinha made  an application  under Section     321
Crl. P.C.  1973 to  the Special     Judge seeking permission to
withdraw from  the prosecution of Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4
in the case on four grounds: namely, (a) Lack of prospect of
successful prosecution    in the    light of  the evidence,     (b)
Implication of    the persons  as a  result of  political     and
personal vendetta,  (c) Inexpediency  of the prosecution for
the reasons  of the State and Public Policy; and (d) Adverse
effects that  the continuance  of the prosecution will bring
on public  interest in    the light  of the changed situation.
The learned  Special Judge by his order dated 20th June 1981
granted the  permission.  A  Criminal  Revision     No.  874/81
preferred by  the  appellant  against  the  said  order     was
dismissed in  limine by     the High  Court on  14th September,
1981. Hence the approval by Special Leave of the Court.
Allowing the Appeal, the Court
^
HELD: (i)    Lalan Prasad Sinha was the competent officer
entitled to  apply for    the withdrawal from the prosecution,
there being no infirmity in his appointment. [155 B-C]
(ii) He  did  apply  his  mind  and  came    to  his     own
conclusions before making the application for the withdrawal
from the prosecution. [149 G]
Per majority (Baharul Islam and Misra JJ, Tulzapurkar J
dissenting)
The executive  function of the Public Prosecutor and or
the supervisory     function of the trial court in granting its
consent to  the withdrawal  have been properly performed and
not vitiated by reason of any illegality. [143E-158A]
63
Per Tulzapurkar  J (Concurring  with Baharul  Islam and
Misra JJ.)
1:1 Sri  Lalan Prasad  Sinha was  the competent officer
entitled to  apply for    the withdrawal from the prosecution.
[84 E. 85 F]
2:2 It  is true  that the    appointment  of     the  former
prosecutor, in    the  instant  case,  made  by  the  previous
government to  conduct the  case in  question had  not    been
cancelled, though  in fitness  of things it should have been
cancelled but  that did     not prevent  the new  government to
make a    fresh appointment  of a Public Prosecutor and to put
him  in      charge  of   the  case.   Appointments  of  Public
Prosecutors generally  fall under Section 24 (3) of the Code
of  Criminal   Procedure,  but    when  the  State  Government
appoints public     prosecutors for  the purpose of any case or
class  of   cases,  the     appointees  became  Special  Public
Prosecutors under Section 24 (8) of the Code. [85 B-D]
1:2 Further  it cannot  be     disputed  that     the  former
prosecutor not    having appeared     before the Special Judge at
any stage  of the hearing was never incharge of the case not
in the    actual conduct of the case; on the other hand, after
the allotment  of this    case to him, the latter was incharge
of the    case and  was actually conducting the case he having
admittedly appeared  in the  case at least on four occasions
before the Special Judge. [85 D-F]
State of  Punjab v.  Surjeet Singh     and Anr.,  [1967] 2
S.C.R. 347;  M.N.S. Nair v. P.V. Balakrishnan and Ors [1972]
2 S.C.R. 599, followed.
1:3 It  is true  that, in    the instant  case, the State
Government had    taken its  own decision to withdraw from the
prosecution in    the case  against the accused persons and it
is also     true that the said decision was communicated to the
Public Prosecutor,  but if  the     letters  communicating     the
decision are  carefully scrutinised,  it will  be clear that
the State  Government merely  suggested him  (which  it     was
entitled to  do) to withdraw from the prosecution but at the
same time  asked him  to consider  the matter on his own and
after  satisfying   himself  about  it    make  the  necessary
application which  he did, and there is no material to doubt
the recital  that is  found in    the application     that he had
himself considered  relevant materials    connected  with     the
case and had come to his own conclusions in that behalf. [86
D-F]
2. From  the Supreme  Court’s enunciation    of the legal
position  governing   the  proper   exercise  of  the  power
contained in  Section 321, three or four things became clear
:
(i) Though     withdrawal from prosecution is an executive
function  of  the  Public  Prosecutor  for  which  statutory
discretion is  vested in  him,    the  discretion     is  neither
absolute nor  unreviewable but    it is subject to the court’s
supervisory function. In fact being an executive function it
would be  subject to  a judicial  review on  certain limited
grounds like  any other executive action; the authority with
whom the discretion is vested ‘must genuinely address itself
to the    matter before it, must not act under the dictates of
another body,  must not do what it has been forbidden to do,
must act  in good  faith, must    have regard  to all relevant
considerations    and   must  not      be  swayed  by  irrelevant
considerations, must  not seek    to promote purposes alien to
the letter  or the  spirit of  the legislation that gives it
power to act arbitrarily or capriciously.” [81 E-H, 82A]
64
(ii) Since     the trial  court’s supervisory     function of
either granting     or refusing  to grant    the permission    is a
judicial function  the same  is liable    to correction by the
High Court  under its  revisional powers  both under the old
and present  Code of  Criminal Procedure,  and naturally the
Supreme Court  would have  at least coextensive jurisdiction
with the  High Court in an appeal preferred to it by special
leave or upon a certificate by the High Court. [82 B-D]
(iii) No  dichotomy as  such between political offences
or the    like on     the one  hand and  common law crimes on the
other could  be said  to have been made by the Supreme Court
for purposes  of Section  321, for,  even in what are called
political  offences  or     the  like,  committing     common     law
crimes, is implicit, for the withdrawal from the prosecution
of which  the power under Section 321 has to be resorted to.
But the     decisions do  lay down     that when common law crimes
are motivated  by political  ambitions or  considerations or
they  are   committed  during    or  are      followed  by    mass
agitations, communal frenzies, regional disputes, industrial
conflicts,  student  unrest  or     like  situations  involving
emotive issues    giving rise to an atmosphere surcharged with
violence, the  broader cause of public justice, public order
and peace  may outweigh the public interest of administering
criminal justice  in a    particular litigation and withdrawal
from  the   prosecution     of  that  litigation  would  become
necessary, a  certainty of  conviction notwithstanding,     and
persistence in    the prosecution     in the     name of vindicating
the law     may prove  counter-productive. In  other words,  in
case of     such conflict    between     the  two  types  of  public
interests, the    narrower public interest should yield to the
broader public    interest, and, therefore, an onerous duty is
cast upon  the    court  to  weigh  and  decide  which  public
interest should     prevail in  each  case     while    granting  or
refusing to  grant its    consent to  the withdrawal  from the
prosecution. For,  it is  not invariably that whenever crime
is politically    motivated or  is committed in or is followed
by any    explosive situation involving emotive issue that the
prosecution must  be withdrawn. In other words, in each case
of  such   conflict  the  court     has  to  weigh     and  decide
judiciously. But  it is     obvious that  unless the  crimes in
question are  per se political offences like sedition or are
motivated  by  political  considerations  or  are  committed
during    or   are  followed   by     mass  agitations,  communal
frenzies, regional  disputes, industrial  conflicts, student
unrest or  the    like  situations  involving  emotive  issues
giving rise  to an  atmosphere surcharged  with violence, no
question of  serving any  broader cause     of public  justice,
public order or peace would arise and in the absence thereof
the public  interest of     administering criminal justice in a
given  case   cannot  be   permitted   to   be     sacrificed,
particularly  when  a  highly  placed  person  is  allegedly
involved in  the crime,     as otherwise the common man’s faith
in the rule of law and democratic values would be sheltered.
[82 D-H, 83 A-D]
(iv) When    paucity of  evidence or     lack of prospect of
successful prosecution    is the    ground    for  withdrawal     the
court has  not merely  the power  but a     duty to examine the
material on  record without which the validity and propriety
of such ground cannot be determined. [83 D-E]
State of  Bihar v.     Ram Naresh  Pandey, [1957] SCR 279;
State of  Orissa v.  Chandrika Mohopatra  and Ors., [1977] 1
SCR 335;  Balwant Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1978] 1
SCR 604;  R.K. Jain  v. State, [1980] 3 SCR 982; M.N.S. Nair
v. P.V.     Balakrishnan and  Ors, [1972]    2 S.CR 599, referred
to.
65
3:1 In  the light    of the legal principles, it would be
clear, that  this Vigilance  P.S. case    9 (2)  (78) being an
ordinary criminal  case involving  the commission  of common
law  crimes  of     bribery  and  forgery    in  ordinary  normal
circumstances with self-aggrandisement or favouritism as the
motivating forces,  grounds (b),  (c) and  (d) stated in the
application for withdrawal were irrelevant and extraneous to
the issue  of withdrawal and since admittedly these were the
considerations which  unquestionably influenced the decision
of the    Public Prosecutor  in seeking the withdrawal as well
as the    decision of the trial court to grant the permission,
the impugned withdrawal of Vigilance P.S. case 9 (2) 78 from
the prosecution would stand vitiated in law. [87 H, 88 A, G-
H, 89 A-B]
3:2  Admittedly,  the  offences  of  bribery  (criminal
misconduct)  and   forgery  which  are    said  to  have    been
committed by  Respondent No.  2 in conspiracy with the other
accused     are   ordinary     common     law  crimes  and  were     not
committed  during   nor     were  they  followed  by  any    mass
agitation  or    communal  frenzy   or  regional     dispute  or
industrial conflict  or student unrest or the like explosive
situation involving  any emotive  issue giving    rise to     any
surcharged atmosphere  of violence;  further  it  cannot  be
disputed that  these are  not per  se political offences nor
were  they   committed    out   of  any  political  motivation
whatsoever; in    fact the  motivating force  behind them     was
merely to  give protection  to and  shield Sri Nawal Kishore
Sinha, a  close friend,     from  criminal     as  well  as  civil
liability-a favouritism     amounting  to    criminal  misconduct
allegedly indulged  in by  Respondent No.  2 by     abusing his
position as  a Minister     or  Chief  Minister  of  Bihar.  If
therefore, the    offences did  not partake  of any  political
character  nor     were  committed  in  nor  followed  by     any
explosive situation  involving emotive    issue giving rise to
any surcharged    atmosphere of  violence, no question serving
any broader  cause of  public justice, public order or peace
could arise  and in  absence thereof  the public interest of
administering criminal justice in this particular case could
not be permitted to be sacrificed. [88 C-F]
3:3. No  results of  any election,     howsoever sweeping,
can be    construed as  the people’s  mandate  to     condone  or
compound the  common law crimes allegedly committed by those
who have been returned to power; in fact such interpretation
of the    mandate would  be contrary to all democratic canons.
Success at  hustings is     no licence  to sweep all dirt under
the carpet and enjoy the fruits nonchalantly. Therefore, the
plea of     change     in  the  situation  brought  about  by     the
elections  putting  Respondent    No.  2    in  power  as  Chief
Minister and  prosecution against  the head  of State  would
have had adverse effects on public interest including public
order and  peace is  misplaced. At  the worst,    all that can
happen is  that Respondent  No. 2 will have to step down and
nothing more.  Any fear of destabilisation of the Government
is entirely  misplaced. On  the other  hand, withdrawal from
the prosecution     of such  offences would  interfere with the
normal course  of administration  of  criminal    justice     and
since Respondent  No. 2     is placed  in a  high position, the
same is     bound to  affect the common man’s faith in the rule
of law    and administration  of justice. Further if the proof
of the    offences said  to have    been committed by Respondent
No. 2,    in  conspiracy    with  the  other  accused  based  on
undisputed and    genuine documentary evidence, no question of
political and  personal vendetta  or unfair  and overzealous
investigation would arise. [89 D-H, 90 A]
66
3:4 The  documentary  evidence,  comprising  the  Audit
Reports, the  relevant notings in the concerned file and the
two orders of the Respondent No. 2, the genuineness of which
cannot be  doubted, clearly  makes out    a prima     facie    case
against Respondent  No. 2 sufficient to put him on trial for
the offence  of criminal  misconduct under Section 5 (1) (d)
read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947. Similar  is the  incidental offence  of forgery  under
Section 466  I.P.C. for     antedating the     second     order.     The
question of  “paucity  of  evidence”,  therefore,  does     not
arise. The  trial court     failed, therefore,  in its  duty to
examine     this    before    permitting   the   withdrawal    from
prosecution. [101 C-E, H, 102 A]
3:5  Yet  another    legal  infirmity  attaching  to     the
executive function  of the  Public Prosecutor as well as the
supervisory judicial function of the trial court which would
vitiate the  final order  is that  while the charge-sheet is
under sub-clauses  (a), (b)  and (d)  of Section  5 (1) read
with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act along
with other offences under the Penal Code, in the application
for withdrawal    and during  the submission  made before     the
Court as  well as in the order of the trial Court permitting
the withdrawal the reference is to Section 5 (1) (c) and not
5 (1) (d). Obviously the permission granted must be regarded
as having  been given  in respect  of an  offence with which
Respondent No.    2 had  not been charged, completely ignoring
the offence  under Section  5 (1) (d) with which he had been
mainly charged. This state of affairs brings out a clear and
glaring non-application     of mind  both on  the part  of     the
Public Prosecutor  and also  the learned  special Judge with
the issue  of withdrawal; in the High Court also there is no
improvement in the situation. [103 B, D, E, F, H, 104 A-C]
Per Baharul Islam, J.
1:1 In view of the definition of “Public Prosecutor” in
Section 2  of the  Code     of  Criminal  Procedure  read    with
Section 24  (8) of the Code and in the light of the decision
of the    Supreme Court  in State     of Punjab  v. Surjeet Singh
[1967] 2.  SCR 347, there cannot be any doubt, that Sri L.P.
Sinha was  a Public Prosecutor validity appointed under sub-
section (8) of Section 24 of the Code. [115 D-E]
State of  Punjab v.  Surjeet Singh,  [1967] 2 SCR, 347,
followed.
1:2 The  appointment  of  Shri  L.P.  Sinha  cannot  be
collaterally challenged particularly in an application under
Article 136  of     the  Constitution.  Shri  A.K.     Dutta,     the
earlier appointee  had at  no point  of time came forward to
make any  grievance at    any stage of the case, either at the
appointment of    Sri L.P.  Sinha as Special Public Prosecutor
or in  the latter’s  conduct of the case; nor Sri L.P. Sinha
whose appointment  and right  to make  an application  under
Section 321  of the  Code have been challenged is before the
Supreme Court. [115 E-G]
1:3 The  appointment of  the latter  prosecutor without
the termination     of the appointment of the earlier one might
at best     be irregular  or improper,  but cannot     said to  be
legally invalid. The doctrine of de facto jurisdiction which
has been recognised in India will operate in this case. [115
G-H, 116A]
67
Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1981] 3
S.C.R. 474, followed.
Newzealand and Norton v. Shelly Country p. 1886; 118 US
425 quoted with approval.
1:4 Shri  L.P. Sinha  was both  de jure  and  de  facto
Public Prosecutor  in the  case. If  he     fulfilled  the     two
conditions as  required by  Section 321, namely, (i) that he
was the     Public Prosecutor;  and (ii)  was incharge  of     the
case, he was competent to supply for withdrawal of the case,
even if he were appointed for that purpose only. [118 H, 119
A-C]
2:1  Section  321    enables     the  Public  Prosecutor  or
Assistant Public  Prosecutor incharge  of a case to withdraw
from the  prosecution with  the consent of the court. Before
an  application     is  made  under  Section  321,     the  Public
Prosecutor has    to apply  his mind  to the facts of the case
independently  without     being    subject      to  any  out    side
influence. But    it cannot be said that a Public Prosecutor’s
action will  be illegal     if he receives any communication or
instruction from  the  Government.  Unlike  the     Judge,     the
Public Prosecutor  is not an absolutely independent officer.
He is  an appointee  of the  Government, Central  or  State.
appointed conducting in Court any prosecution or proceedings
on behalf  of the Government. A public prosecutor cannot act
without instructions  of the Government; a public prosecutor
cannot conduct    a case absolutely on his own, or contrary to
the instructions  of his  client,  namely,  the     Government.
Section 321 does not lay any bar on the public prosecutor to
receive any  instruction from the Government before he files
an application    under that Section. If the public prosecutor
receives such  instructions, he     cannot be said to act under
extraneous influence. On the contrary, the public prosecutor
cannot file  an application  for withdrawal of a case on his
own without  instruction from  the Government. [119 D-H, 120
B-C]
2:2 A  mere perusal  of the  application  made  by     the
public prosecutor  abundantly shows  that he  did apply     his
mind to the facts of the case; he perused the case Diary and
the relevant  materials connected  with the case”, before he
made the  application. He  did not  blindly quote  from     the
Government letter  which contained  only one ground, namely,
“inexpediency of prosecution for reasons of state and public
policy”. A  comparison of  the contents     of this letter with
the contents of the application under Section 321 completely
negatives the  contention that    he did not himself apply his
mind independently  to the  fact of  the case  and  that  he
blindly acted on extraneous considerations. [112 F-H]
3:1 The  object of Section 321 appears to be to reserve
power to  the Executive     Government to withdraw any criminal
case  on   larger  grounds   of     public      policy,  such     as,
inexpediency of     prosecutions for  reasons of State; broader
public    interest   like     maintenance   of  law     and  order;
maintenance of    public peace  and harmony,  social, economic
and  political;     changed  social  and  political  situation;
avoidance of  destabilisation of  a State Government and the
like. And  such powers    have been  rightly reserved  for the
Government; for,  who but  the Government  is in the know of
such conditions     and situations     prevailing in a State or in
the country.  The Court     is not     in a  position to know such
situations.
[126 D-F]
68
3:2 The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive
function of  the public prosecutor and the ultimate decision
to withdraw  from the prosecution is his; the Government may
only suggest to the Public Prosecutor that a particular case
may not     be proceeded  with, but nobody can compel him to do
so; not     merely inadequacy  of evidence,  but other relevant
grounds such as to further the broad ends of public justice,
economic and  political; public     order and  peace are  valid
grounds for  withdrawal. The exercise of the power to accord
or withdraw  consent  by  the  court  is  discretionary.  Of
course, it  has to  exercise the  discretion judicially. The
exercise of the power of the Court is judicial to the extent
that the  Court in according or refusing consent has to see:
(i) whether  the grounds  of withdrawal     are valid; and (ii)
whether the  application is  bonafide and  not collusive. It
may be    remembered that     an order  passed by the Court under
Section 321 is not appealable. [128 D-G]
3:3 A mere perusal of the impugned order of the Special
Judge granting    permission to  withdraw from the prosecution
of accused  persons, in     the case  in question shows that he
has applied his mind to the relevant law. What the court has
to do  under section  321 is  to see whether the application
discloses valid     grounds of  withdrawal-valid as  judicially
laid down by the Supreme Court.
[128 G-H]
3:4 A  criminal proceeding     with a prima facie case may
also be     with drawn.  Besides, the  normal practice  of     the
Supreme Court  in a  criminal appeal  by Special Leave under
Art. 136  of the  Constitution directed     against an order of
conviction or  acquittal is  that it  does  not     peruse     the
evidence  on  record  and  appreciate  it  to  find  whether
findings of  facts recorded  by the courts below are correct
or erroneous,  far less     does it  peruse the police diary to
see  whether   adequate     materials  were  collected  by     the
investigating agency.  It accepts the findings of the Courts
below unless  it is  shown that the findings are the results
of a wrong application of the principles of law and that the
impugned order has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice.
[129 A-C]
R.K. Jain v. The State, [1980] 3 S.C.R. 982, followed.
3:5 An  order under  Section 321  of the  Code does not
have the  same status as an order of conviction or acquittal
recorded by  a Trial  Court or appellate court in a criminal
prosecution, in     as much  as the  former has  not been    made
appealable. An    order under  Section 321  of the  Code has a
narrower scope. As an order under Section 321 of the Code is
judicial, what    the trial court is expected to do is to give
reasons     for  according     or  refusing  its  consent  to     the
withdrawal. The duty of the Court is to see that the grounds
of withdrawal  are legally valid and the application made by
the public  prosecutor is  bonafide and     not  collusive.  In
revision of an order under Section 321 of the Code, the duty
of the    High Court  is to  see that the consideration by the
trial court  of the  application under    Section 321  was not
misdirected and     that the  grounds of withdrawal are legally
valid. In  this case  the trial court elaborately considered
the grounds  of withdrawal  and found  them to    be valid and
accordingly accorded its consent for withdrawal. In revision
the High  Court affirmed the findings of the trial court. In
this  appeal  by  special  leave,  therefore,  there  is  no
justification to  disturb the  findings of  the courts below
and peruse  the statements  of witnesses  recorded or  other
materials collected by the investigating officers during the
course of investigation. [129 C-H]
69
3:6 A  question of fact that needs investigation cannot
be allowed  to be  raised for the first time in an appeal by
special leave  under Article 136 of the Constitution. In his
application before  the special     Judge the appellant did not
find fault  with any  of the  grounds of  withdrawal in     the
application filed  by the  Public Prosecutor  under  Section
321. There was no mention of any forgery by antedating or by
pasting of  any earlier order and thereby making any attempt
at shielding  of any  culprit. He thus prevented the special
Judge and  the High Court from giving any finding an alleged
forgery and  thereby depriving    the Supreme  Court also from
the benefits of such findings of the courts below.
[131 C-E]
3:7 There is no prima facie case of forgery or criminal
misconduct made out on the materials on record. If the Chief
Minister found    that his first order was unwarranted by law,
it was but right that he cancelled that order. Pasting order
by a  piece of    paper containing  another order     prima facie
appears suspicious,  but pasting  is the  common practice in
the Chief  Minister’s Secretariat. Antedating simpliciter is
no offence. [132 C,E,F]
3:8 If two interpretations are possible, one indicating
criminal intention  and the  other innocent, needless to say
that the  interpretation beneficial  to the  accused must be
accepted. [132 G]
3:9 Remand for trial if made will be a mere exercise in
futility and it will be nothing but an abuse of the Court to
remand the  case to the trial court in view of the following
circumstances, namely,    (1) the     occurrence  took  place  as
early as  1970; it  is already    more than twelve years; (ii)
Respondent No.    2 is  the  Chief  Minister  in    his  office.
Knowing human  nature, as  it is,  it can hardly be expected
that the  witnesses, most  of whom  are officials, will come
forward and  depose against a Chief Minister; and (iii) Even
after the  assumption of  office by  Respondent No. 2 as the
Chief Minister    is  in    the  court  of    Special     Judge,     the
prosecution was pending on several dates but the Prosecutor,
Sri A.K.  Dutta, did  not take    any interest  in the case at
all.  It   cannot  be  accepted     that  a  Public  Prosecutor
appointed by the Government in power, will now take interest
and conduct  the case  so as to secure conviction of his own
Chief Minister. [136 F-H, 137 A-B]
Per R.B. Misra J.
1:1 A  bare perusal  of Section  321  of  the  Criminal
Procedure Code    shows that  it does  not put  any embargo or
fetter on  the power  of the  Public Prosecutor     to withdraw
from prosecuting  a particular    criminal case pending in any
court. All  that he  requires is that he can only do so with
the consent  of the  court where  the case is pending in any
court. [140 C-D]
1:2 In  this country,  the scheme    of criminal  justice
places    the  prime  responsibility  of    prosecuting  serious
offences on  the  executive  authority.     The  investigation,
collection of requisite evidence and the prosecution for the
offences with  reference to  such evidence are the functions
of the    executive. The function of the court in this respect
is a limited one and intended only to prevent the abuse. The
function of the court in according its consent to withdrawal
is, however,  a judicial  function. It,     therefore,  becomes
necessary for the court before
70
whom the  application for  withdrawal is filed by the public
prosecutor to apply its mind so that the appellate court may
examine and be satisfied that the court has not accorded its
consent as  a matter  of course     but has applied its mind to
the grounds  taken in  the  application     for  withdrawal  by
Public Prosecutor. [140 E-G]
State of  Bihar v.     Ram Naresh Pand ey, [1957] SCR 297;
M.N.S. Nair  v. P.V.  Balakrishnan & Ors., [1972] 2 SCR 599,
State of  Orissa v.  C. Mohapatra, [1977] 1 SCR 355; Balwant
Singh v.  State of  Bihar, [1978]  1 SCR  604; R.K.  Jain v.
State; [1980] 3 SCR 982, referred.
2:1 Section  321 is  in very  wide terms and in view of
the decisions  of the Supreme Court, it will not be possible
to confine  the grounds of withdrawal of criminal proceeding
only to     offences which     may be termed as political offences
or offences  involving    emotive     issues.  The  only  guiding
factor which  should  weigh  with  Public  Prosecutor  while
making    the   application  for     withdrawal  and  the  court
according its  permission for  withdrawal is  to see whether
the  interest    of  public   justice  is  advanced  and     the
application for     withdrawal is not moved with oblique motive
unconnected with  the vindication  of the  cause  of  public
justice. [145 E-G]
2:2 The  Indian Penal  Code or  the  Code    of  Criminal
Procedure  does      not  make  any  such    distinction  between
political offences  and offences  other than political ones.
Even if     it is    accepted that political offences are unknown
to jurisprudence  and other  Acts do  contemplate  political
offences, the  fact remains that Section 321 Cr. P.C. is not
confined only  to political  offences, but it applies to all
kinds of  offences and the application for withdrawal can be
made by     the Public  Prosecutor on  various grounds. [145 H,
146 A-B]
2:3 To  say that  unless the  crime allegedly committed
are per     se political offences or are motivated by political
ambition or  consideration  or    are  committed    during    mass
agitation, communal frenzies, regional disputes, no question
of serving  a broader  cause of public justice, public order
or peace  can arise  is to put limitation on the broad terms
of Section 321 of the Code. [148 F-G]
3:1  The    Public    Prosecutor  may     withdraw  from     the
prosecution not     only on  the ground  of paucity of evidence
but on    the other  relevant grounds  as     well  in  order  to
further broad aims of justice, public order and peace. Broad
aim of    public justice    will certainly    include     appropriate
social, economic and political purposes. [143 G-H]
3:2 An  application for withdrawal from the prosecution
can be    made on     various grounds  and it  is not confined to
political offences.  Therefore, it  cannot be  said that the
grounds mentioned in the application for withdrawal, namely:
(i)  implication of  the accused persons as a result of
political and personal vendetta,
(ii) inexpediency of the prosecution for the reasons of
State and Public policy, and
71
(iii)adverse  effects   that  the    continuance  of     the
prosecution will  bring on  public interest in the
light of the changed situation, are irrelevant.
are not liable grounds for withdrawal. [145 G-H]
3:3 Further,  the decision     of the public prosecutor to
withdraw from  the case     on the     grounds given by him in his
application for     withdrawal cannot be said to be actuated by
improper oblique  motive. He  bonafide thought    that in     the
changed circumstances  it would     be inexpedient     to  proceed
with the case and would be a sheer waste of public money and
time to     drag on with the case if the chances for conviction
are few     and far  between. In  the circumstances, instead of
serving the  public cause  of justice,    it will     be  to     the
detriment of public interest. [149 B-D]
3:4 The  letter sent  by the  Government to  the public
prosecutor did    not indicate  that the    Government wants him
not to    proceed with  the case,     but the  letter  gave    full
discretion to  the Public  Prosecutor, to apply his own mind
and to    come to     his own  conclusion. Consultation  with the
Government or  high officer  is not improper. But the Public
Prosecutor has    to apply  his own  mind     to  the  facts     and
circumstances of the case before coming to the conclusion to
withdraw from  the prosecution.     From the  materials on     the
record, it  is clear  that the Public Prosecutor has applied
his own mind and came to his own conclusions. [155 D-F]
3:5   The     statutory   responsibility   for   deciding
withdrawal squarely  rests upon the public prosecutor. It is
non-negotiable and cannot be bartered away. The court’s duty
in dealing  with the application under Section 321 is not to
reappraise the    materials which led the public prosecutor to
request withdrawal  from the  prosecution  but    to  consider
whether public    prosecutor applied  his mind as a free agent
uninfluenced  by   irrelevant  and   extraneous     or  oblique
considerations, as  the court  has a  special duty  in    this
regard in  as much  as it  is  the  ultimate  repository  of
legislative  confidence      in  granting    or  withdrawing     its
consent to withdrawal from prosecution. [149 D-E]
3:6 If  the view of the Public Prosecutor is one, which
could in  the circumstances  be taken by any reasonable man,
the court  cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the
Public Prosecutor.  If the Public Prosecutor has applied his
mind on     the relevant  materials  and  his  opinion  is     not
perverse and which a reasonable man could have arrived at, a
roving enquiry into the evidence and materials on the record
for the     purpose of finding out whether his conclusions were
right or wrong would be incompetent. [154 H, 155 A]
In the  view taken     that no  prima facie  case has been
made out  under Section     466 of     the Indian  Penal Code     and
Section 5  (1) (d)  of the  Prevention of Corruption Act and
the fact  that the  High Court    in revision  agreed with the
view of     the Special  Judge giving consent to the withdrawal
from the  prosecution  on  the    application  of     the  Public
Prosecutor under Section 321 I.P.C. this Court cannot make a
fresh  appraisal   of  evidence     and  come  to    a  different
conclusion.
72
All that this Court has to see is that the Public Prosecutor
was not     actuated by  extraneous or  improper considerations
while  moving    the  application  for  withdrawal  from     the
prosecution. Even  if it  is possible  to have    another view
different from    the one taken by the Public Prosecutor while
moving the  application for  withdrawal from prosecution the
Supreme Court  should be  reluctant to    interfere  with     the
order unless  it comes    to the    conclusion that     the  Public
Prosecutor has    not  applied  his  mind     to  the  facts     and
circumstances of  the case,  and has  simply  acted  at     the
behest of  the Government or has been actuated by extraneous
and improper  considerations. On the facts and circumstances
of the    case, it  is clear  that the  Public Prosecutor     was
actuated by oblique or improver motive. [157 B-F]

JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE     JURISDICTION: Criminal     Appeal     No.
241 of 1982.
Appeal by    Special leave  from the     judgment and  order
dated the  14th September,  1981 of  the Patna High Court in
Criminal Revision No. 874 of 1981.
K.K. Venugopal,  S.K. Sinha,  S.K. Verma,    V.N.  Singh,
L.K.  Pandey,    M.N.  Krimanani      and  V.N.  Sinha  for     the
Appellants.
K.     Parasaran,  Soliciter    General,  K.P.    Verma,    P.S.
Mishra and R.P. Singh for Respondent No. 1.
A.K. Sen,    O.P. Malhotra  and R.K.     Jain for Respondent
No. 2.
Rajendra Singh, R.P. Singh Ranjit Kumar and S. Goswami,
for Respondent No 3.
S.N. Kacker and M.P. Jha for Respondent No. 4.
Jaya Narayan and Smt. Nirmala Prasad for Intervenor.
The following Judgments were delivered
TULZAPURKAR, J.  By this appeal, preferred on the basis
of the    special leave  granted    to  him,  the  appellant  is
challenging  the   withdrawal  from   the   prosecution      of
Respondents Nos.  2, 3 and 4 in a criminal case under s. 321
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
After  obtaining    the  requisite     sanction  from     the
Governor on  19th February, 1979 a charge-sheet in Vigilance
P.S. Case  9 (2)  78 was filed by the State of Bihar against
Respondent No.    2 (Dr.    Jagannath Misra),  Respondent No.  3
(Nawal Kishore    Sinha), Respondent  No. 4 (Jiwanand Jha) and
three other (K.P. Gupta, since
73
deceased, N.A.    Haidari and  A.K. Singh,  who  later  became
approvers)  for     offences  under  ss.  420/466/471/109/120-B
I.P.C. and  under s.  5(1) (a),     5(1) (b)  and 5(1) (d) read
with s.     5(2) of  the Prevention  of Corruption     Act,  1947.
Inter  alia,   the  gravamen   of  the    charge    against     the
respondent No.    2 was  that at    all times  material  he     was
either a Minister or the Chief Minister of Bihar and in that
capacity by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing
his position  as a public servant, he in conspiracy with the
other accused and with a view to protect Nawal Kishore Sinha
in particular,    sought to  subvert criminal  prosecution and
surcharge  proceedings     against  Nawal     Kishore  Sinha     and
others, and either obtained for himself or conferred on them
pecuniary  advantage   to  the     detriment  of    Patna  Urban
Cooperative Bank,  its members, depositors and creditors and
thereby committed  the offence of criminal mis-conduct under
s. 5(1) (d) read with s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947  and in  that process committed the other offences
specified in  the charge-sheet,     including  the     offence  of
forgery under s. 466 I.P.C. cognizance of the case was taken
on  21st  November,  1979  by  the  learned  Chief  Judicial
Magistrate-cum-Special Judge  (Vigilance), Patna, who issued
process against     the accused  but before the trial commenced
the State  Government, at  the instance     of Respondent No.2,
who in    the mean  time had  come to power and had become the
Chief Minister, took a decision in February 1981 to withdraw
from the prosecution for reasons of State and Public Policy.
Though initially  Shri Awadhesh Kumar Dutt, Senior Advocate,
Patna High  Court, had    been appointed    as a  Special public
prosecutor by  the previous  Government for  conducting     the
said case,  the State  Government (now    headed by Respondent
No.  (2)  without  cancelling  Shri  Dutt’s  appointment  as
Special     Public      prosecutor,    on   24th   February,    1981
constituted a  fresh panel  of lawyers    for conducting cases
pertaining to  Vigilance Department  and Shri  Lalan  Prasad
Sinha, one  of the Advocates so appointed on the fresh panel
was  allotted    the  said  case     and  was  informed  of     the
Government’s said  decision and     on 26th  March 1981  he was
further requested  to take  steps for  the withdrawal of the
case after  he    had  considered     the  matter  and  satisfied
himself about it. On 17th June, 1981 Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha
made an application under s. 321 Cr.P.C. 1973 to the Special
Judge seeking permission to withdraw from the prosecution of
Respondent Nos.     2, 3  and 4  in the  case on  four grounds,
namely, (a)  Lack of  prospect of  successful prosecution in
the light of the evidence, (b) Implication of the persons as
a  result   of    political   and      personal   vendetta,     (c)
Inexpediency of the prosecution for the reasons of the State
and public policy
74
and  (d)   Adverse  effects  that  the    continuance  of     the
prosecution will  bring on  public interest  in the light of
the changed  situation; and the learned Special Judge by his
order dated  20th  June,  1981    granted     the  permission.  A
Criminal Revision  (No. 874/1981) preferred by the appellant
against the  said order     was dismissed in limine by the High
Court on  14th September,  1981. It  is this withdrawal from
the prosecution     permitted by  the learned Special Judge and
its confirmation by the High Court that are being challenged
in this appeal.
Counsel  for   the     appellant   raised  three  or    four
contentions in    support of the appeal. In the first place he
contended  that      the  impugned      withdrawal   was   utterly
unjustified on merits and also illegal being contrary to the
principles enunciated  by this    Court governing the exercise
of the    power under  s. 321  Cr. P.C.  According to  him the
decisions of  this Court  bearing on the nature and scope of
the  power  under  the    section     clearly  suggest  that     for
purposes  of   that  section   a  dichotomy  exists  between
political offences  and common    law offences  and  that     the
considerations of public policy, public interest, reasons of
State or political and personal vendetta may become relevant
in the    case the  former cateorgy  but are  irrelevant while
withdrawing from  the prosecution of common law offences and
since in  the instant  case  the  offences  with  which     the
accused and  particularly Respondent  No. 2 had been charged
were  common   law  offences,    namely,     bribery   (criminal
misconduct) and     forgery and  not with any political offence
the grounds at (b), (c) and (d) mentioned in the application
seeking     permission   for  withdrawal  were  irrelevant     and
extraneous and    non-germane  considerations  influenced     the
Public Prosecutor  as  also  the  Court     the  withdrawal  is
vitiated and  is bad  in law  and  as  regards    ground    (a),
namely, insufficiency  of evidence  or lack  of prospect  of
successful prosecution    the same was clearly untenable being
in teeth  of undisputed     and  genuine  documentary  evidence
including the  orders admittedly  passed by respondent No. 2
in his    own hand that was available to prove the charges; he
also urged  that in  a case  where the proof of the offences
was primarily based on documentary evidence, the genuineness
of which  was not  in dispute  no question  of political and
personal  vendetta   or      unfair   and     over    enthusiastic
investigation    could    arise;     therefore,   the   impugned
withdrawal  deserved   to  be    quashed.  Secondly,  counsel
contended that Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha was not the competent
officer to  apply for withdrawal from the prosecution of the
case under  s. 321 Cr P.C. inasmuch as that Shri A.K. Dutt’s
appointment as Special
75
public Prosecutor  made under  s. 24(8)     Cr. P.C. to conduct
this case had not been cancelled and as such the application
for permission to withdraw as well as the permission granted
thereon were unauthorised, incompetent and illegal. Thirdly,
it was urged that on the facts and circumstances of the case
Shri Lalan  Prasad Sinha did not function independently as a
free agent  but was  influenced     and  guided  by  the  State
Government’s  decision     in  the  matter  and  as  such     the
withdrawal at  the behest  of the  Government was  vitiated.
Counsel also  urged that  Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha’s decision
(if at    all it was his own) to withdraw from the prosecution
as well     as the Special Judge’s decision to grant permission
were vitiated by non-application of mind.
On the  other hand, Counsel for the Respondents refuted
all the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant. It was
denied that  the withdrawal  in question  was unjustified on
merits or  illegal or  contrary to  the principles governing
the exercise  of the  power s.    321; on the Contrary counsel
for the     Respondents urged  that the decisions of this Court
had clarified  the position that under the Code a withdrawal
from the prosecution was an executive function of the Public
Prosecutor or  that the     discretion  to     withdraw  from     the
prosecution was     that of the Public Prosecutor and none else
and that  he could  withdraw from the prosecution not merely
on the    ground of  paucity of evidence but on other relevant
grounds as well in order to further the broad ends of public
justice, public order and peace and the broad ends of public
justice     would    include     appropriate  social,  economic     and
political purposes,  and  what    was  more  in  granting     its
consent to  the withdrawal  the     Court    merely    performed  a
supervisory function  and in  discharging such    function the
Court was  not to  reappreciate the  grounds which  led     the
public prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution
but to    consider whether  the Public  prosecutor had applied
his mind  as a    free agent,  uninfluenced by  irrelevant  or
extraneous consideration.  It was  disputed that the grounds
(b), (c)  and  (d)  mentioned  in  the    application  seeking
permission to withdraw were irrelevant or extraneous or that
ground (a)  was     untenable.  According    to  Counsel  in     the
instant case  Shri Lalan  Prasad Sinha,     being in  charge as
well as in the conduct of the case was competent to make the
application  for   withdrawal  and  he    had  done  so  after
considering  all  the  relevant     factors  and  circumstances
bearing on the issue and satisfying himself about it and not
at  the     behest     of  the  Government  as  contended  by     the
appellant and  the learned  Special Judge also performed his
supervisory function in granting the requisite
76
permission on  relevant considerations. Counsel emphatically
denied that  either  the  public  prosecutor’s    decision  to
withdraw  from     the  prosecution  or  the  special  Judge’s
supervisory function  was  vitiated  by     non-application  of
mind. Lastly  it was  contended that  this Court  should not
interfere with    the impugned  orders of     the trial  Court as
well as     the High Court in exercise of its powers under Art.
136 of the Constitution and the appeal be dismissed.
Having regard  to the  aforesaid rival contentions that
were urged  before us  by the  learned Attorney     General and
Council on  either side     it is    clear that principally three
questions  arise  for  our  determination  in  this  appeal,
namely, (1)  what is  the true scope and nature of the power
under s.  321 of  Cr. P.C,  1973 ?  (2) whether     Shri  Lalan
Prasad Sinha  was competent  officer entitled  to apply     for
withdrawal  from  the  prosecution  and     if  so     whether  he
discharged his    executive function  independently as  a free
agent? And  (3) whether     the withdrawal from the prosecution
of respondents    2, 3 and 4 in Vigilance P. S. Case No. 9 (2)
78 was unwarranted and unjustified on facts as also in law ?
In other words, whether the executive function of the Public
Prosecutor and    or the supervisory function performed by the
Court was  vitiated on    account of extraneous considerations
or non    application of    mind etc  deserving interference  by
this Court ?
On     the  first  question  s.  321    in  terms  gives  no
guidance; it  merely says  that “the  Public  Prosecutor  in
charge of  a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any
time before  the judgment  is pronounced,  withdraw from the
prosecution of    any person either generally or in respect of
any one     or more  of the offences for which he is tried” and
goes on     to indicate  the  results  that  entail  upon    such
withdrawal, namely, either a discharge of the accused if the
withdrawal is  made  before  the  charge  is  framed  or  an
acquittal of  the accused if it is made after the charge has
been framed;  in other    words, it  gives  no  indication  or
guideline as to in what circumstances or on what grounds the
public    Prosecutor   may  apply      for  withdrawal  from     the
prosecution nor     the considerations on which the Court is to
grant its consent and hence the necessity to go to decisions
of this     Court for ascertaining the true scope and nature of
the power  contained in     it. In     this  behalf  quite  a     few
decisions of  this Court  both    in  regard  to    the  earlier
provision contained  in s. 494 Cr. P.C. 1898 and the present
provision contained  in s.  321 (both being substantially in
pari materia) were referred to by Counsel for the
77
parties but it is not necessary to deal with all of them and
a reference to four decisions, namely, State of Bihar v. Ram
Naresh Pandey,(1) State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra and
Ors.,(2) Balwant  Singh and ors. v. State of Bihar(3) and R.
K. Jain     v. The     State(4) having  a bearing  on the  aspects
under consideration  will suffice.  These  decisions,  apart
from enunciating  the  principles  which  would     govern     the
exercise of  the power    under  the  section,  emphasise     the
functional dichotomy  of the Public Prosecutor (who performs
an executive  function) and  the  Court     (which     performs  a
supervisory judicial function) thereunder.
In Ram  Naresh Pandey’s  case (supra)  the Court  while
dealing with s. 494 of the old Code observed thus.
“The section    is an  enabling one and vests in the
Public Prosecutor    the discretion to apply to the Court
for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution of any
person. The  consent, if granted, has to be followed up
by his discharge or acquittal, as the case may be …..
There can    be no  doubt, however,    that  the  resultant
order on the granting of the consent, being an order of
‘discharge’   or    ’acquittal’,   would   attract     the
applicability of correction by the High Court under ss.
435, 436  and 439    or  417     of  the  Code    of  Criminal
Procedure. The  function of  the Court,  therefore,  in
granting its consent may well be taken to be a judicial
function. It  follows that     in granting the consent the
Court must     exercise a judicial discretion …….. The
initiative is  that of  the Public     Prosecutor and what
the Court has to do is only to give its consent and not
to determine  any matter  judicially  ..  The  judicial
function,    therefore,   implicit  in  the    exercise  of
judicial discretion  for  granting     the  consent  would
normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself that
the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not
been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt
to interfere  with the  normal course  of    justice     for
illegitimate reasons  or purposes    .. ….     It (s. 494)
cannot  be      taken     to   place   on   the     Court     the
responsibility for     a prima  facie determination  of  a
triable
78
issue.  For   instance  the   discharge  that   results
therefrom need  not always     conform to  the standard of
‘no prima    facie case’ under ss. 209 (1) and 253 (1) or
of ‘ground lessens’ under ss. 209 (2) and 253 (2). This
is not  to say that a consent is to be lightly given on
the application  of the  Public Prosecutor,  without  a
careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds on which the
application for consent is made.” (Emphasis supplied).
In Chandrika Mohapatra’s case (supra) while setting out
the principles    that should  be kept in mind by the Court at
the  time   of    giving     consent  to   withdrawal  from     the
prosecution under s. 494 the Court observed thus;
“It  will  therefore,     be  seen  that     it  is     not
sufficient for the Public Prosecutor merely to say that
it is not expedient to proceed with the prosecution. He
has to  make out  some ground which would show that the
prosecution is  sought to    be withdrawn  because  inter
alia  the    prosecution  may  not  be  able     to  produce
sufficient evidence  to sustain  the charge or that the
prosecution does  not appear to be well founded or that
there are    other circumstances  which clearly show that
the object     of administration  of justice    would not be
advanced or furthered by going on with the prosecution.
The ultimate  guiding consideration  must always be the
interest of  administration of  justice and that is the
touchstone on  which the  question must  be  determined
whether  the   prosecution     should     be  allowed  to  be
withdrawn.”
It may    be stated  that Criminal  Appeal No. 310 of 1975 was
one of    the appeals  decided by     the Court  in that case. In
that  appeal  the  incident,  during  the  course  of  which
offences under    ss. 147,  148 149,  307 and  324 I.P.C. were
said to     have been  committed, had  arisen  out     of  rivalry
between two  trade unions and since the date of the incident
calm and  peaceful atmosphere  prevailed in  the  industrial
undertaking and     in those  circumstances the State felt that
it would not be conducive to interest of justice to continue
the  prosecution   against   the   respondents     since     the
prosecution  with  the    possibility  of     conviction  of     the
respondents  would   rouse  feelings   of   bitterness     and
antagonism and    disturb the  calm  and    peaceful  atmosphere
prevailing  in     the  industrial   undertaking     and   hence
permission to withdraw
79
was sought  and granted.  Upholding the permission the Court
observed thus:
“We cannot  forget that  ultimately every  offence
has a  social or  economic cause  behind it  and if the
state feels  that elimination  or    eradication  of     the
social or    economic cause    of the crime would be better
served by not proceeding with the prosecution the State
should clearly  be at  liberty  to     withdraw  from     the
prosecution.”
In Balwant Singh’s case (supra) the independent role of
the  Public   Prosecutor  in   making  an   application     for
withdrawal from the prosecution was emphasised and the Court
pointed out  that the  sole consideration which should guide
the Public Prosecutor before he decides to withdraw from the
prosecution was     the larger  factor of the administration of
justice and  not political  favours nor     party pressures nor
the like  considerations; nor  should he allow himself to be
dictated by  his administrative     superiors to  withdraw from
prosecution, but  that the  consideration which should weigh
with him must be whether the broader cause of public justice
will  be   advanced  or      retarded  by     the  withdrawal  or
continuance of    the prosecution.  The Court  also  indicated
some instances    where withdrawal  from prosecution  might be
resorted to  independently of  the merits  of the case where
the broader cause of public justice would be served:
“Of course,  the interests of public justice being
the paramount  consideration  they     may  transcend     and
overflow  the   legal   justice   of   the      particular
litigation. For instance, communal feuds which may have
been amicably settled should not re-erupt on account of
one or two prosecutions pending. Labour disputes which,
might have     given rise to criminal cases, when settled,
might probably  be another instance where the interests
of     public     justice  in  the  broader  connotation     may
perhaps warrant  withdrawal from the prosecution. Other
instances may also be given where public justice may be
served by    withdrawal even apart from the merits of the
case.”
In R.K.  Jain’s case (supra) after reviewing the entire
case  law   on    the  subject  this  Court  enunciated  eight
propositions as emerging
80
from the  decided cases     (page 996  of the  Report), out  of
which the  following six  would be material for the purposes
of the instant case:
“1.  The  withdrawal   from  the    prosecution  is      an
executive function of the Public Prosecutor.
2.      The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is
that of  the Public  Prosecutor and none else, and
so, he cannot surrender that discretion to someone
else.
3.      The  Government   may     suggest   to    the   Public
Prosecutor  that   he     may   withdraw      from     the
prosecution but none can compel him to do so.
4.      The  Public    Prosecutor  may     withdraw  from     the
prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of
evidence but    no other relevant grounds as well in
order to further the broad ends of public justice,
public order    and peace.  The broad ends of public
justice will certainly include appropriate social,
economic and,     we  add,  political  purposes    Sans
Tammany Hall Enterprises.
5.      The Court performs a supervisory function granting
its consent to the withdrawal.
6.      The  Court’s    duty  is  not  to  reappreciate     the
grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request
withdrawal from  the prosecution  but to  consider
whether the  Public Prosecutor applied his mind as
a  free  agent,  uninfluenced     by  irrelevant     and
extraneous considerations. The Court has a special
duty    in   this  regard  as  it  is  the  ultimate
repository of     legislative confidence     in granting
or withholding  its consent to withdrawal from the
prosecution.”
By way of elaborating proposition No. 4 above, the Court has
gone on to observe thus:
“We have  referred to the precedents of this Court
where it  has been said that paucity of evidence is not
the only  ground on  which the  Public  Prosecutor     may
withdraw from  the prosecution.  In the  past  we    have
often known  how expedient     and necessary    it is in the
public interest for
81
the Public     Prosecutor to    withdraw  from    prosecutions
arising  out   of    mass   agitations,  communal  riots,
regional  disputes,   industrial    conflicts,   student
unrest, etc.  Whenever issues  involve the emotions and
there is  a surcharge  of violence in the atmosphere it
has  often      been    found  necessary  to  withdraw    from
prosecutions in  order to    restore peace,    to free     the
atmosphere from  the surcharge  of violence,  to  bring
about a  peaceful settlement  of issues and to preserve
the calm  which may  follow the  storm. To persist with
prosecutions where     emotive issues     are involved in the
name of vindicating the law may even be utterly counter
productive.”
Similarly, by way of elaborating proposition No. 6 above the
Court has gone on to observe thus:
“We may  add  it  shall  be  the  duty  of     the  Public
Prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty
of the  Court to  apprise itself  of the  reasons which
prompt the     Public     Prosecutor  to     withdraw  from     the
prosecution. The Court has a responsibility and a stake
in the  administration of    criminal justice  and so has
the Public     Prosecutor, its ‘Minister of Justice’. Both
have a  duty to  protect the administration of criminal
justice  against    possible  abuse     or  misuse  by     the
Executive    by  resort  to    the  provisions     of  s.     321
Criminal  Procedure   Code.  The  independence  of     the
judiciary requires     that once the case has travelled to
the Court,     the Court  and its officers alone must have
control over  the case and decide what is to be done in
each case.”
From the  aforesaid enunciation  of the  legal position
governing the  proper exercise    of the power contained in s.
321, three  or four  things become amply clear. In the first
place though  it is  an executive  function  of     the  Public
Prosecutor for    which statutory discretion is vested in him,
the discretion    is neither  absolute nor unreviewable but it
is subject  to the  Court’s supervisory     function.  In    fact
being an  executive  function  it  would  be  subject  to  a
judicial review     on certain  limited grounds  like any other
executive action,  the authority with whom the discretion is
vested “must  genuinely address     itself to the matter before
it, must not act under the dictates of another body must not
do what it has been forbidden to do, must act in good faith,
must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not
82
be swayed  by irrelevant  considerations, must    not seek  to
promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the
legislation that  gives it  power to  act and  not must     act
arbitrarily or    capriciously These  several  principles     can
conveniently be     grouped in  two main  categories failure to
exercise a  discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary
power.    The   two  classes   are  not,     however,   mutually
exclusive.”   (vide    de   Smith’s   judicial     Review      of
Administrative Action 4th Edition pp. 285-86)
Secondly, since  the trial Court’s supervisory function
of either  granting or refusing to grant the permission is a
judicial function  the same  is liable    to correction by the
High Court under its revisional powers both under the old as
well  as   the    present     Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,     and
naturally  this     Court    would  have  at     least    co-extensive
jurisdiction with  the High  Court in an appeal preferred to
it by special leave or upon a certificate by the High Court.
Thirdly,  no   dichotomy  as   such  between  political
offences or  the like  on the one hand and common law crimes
on the    other could  be said to have been made by this Court
for purposes  of s. 321 as con-tended for by Counsel for the
appellant, for,     even in  what are called political offences
or the    like, committing  common law  crimes is implicit for
the withdrawal from the prosecution of which the power under
s. 321    has to    be resorted  to. But  the decisions  of this
Court do  lay down that when common law crimes are motivated
by  political    ambitions  or  considerations  or  they     are
committed  during   or    are  followed  by  mass     agitations,
communal frenzies,  regional disputes, industrial conflicts,
student unrest    or like     situations involving emotive issues
giving rise  to an  atmosphere surcharged  with violence the
broader cause  of public justice, public order and peace may
out weigh  the public  interest     of  administering  criminal
justice in  a particular  litigation and withdrawal from the
prosecution of    that litigation     would become  necessary,  a
certainty of  conviction notwithstanding  persistence in the
prosecution in    the name  of vindicating  the law  may prove
counter-productive. In other words, in case of such conflict
between the  two types    of public  interests,  the  narrower
public interest should yield to the broader public interest,
and therefore,    an onerous  duty is  cast upon    the Court to
weigh and  decide which     public interest  should prevail  in
each case while granting or refusing to grant its consent to
the  withdrawal      from    the  prosecution.  For,     it  is     not
invariably that     whenever crime     is politically motivated or
is committed  in or  is followed  by any explosive situation
involving emotive
83
issue that the prosecution must be withdrawn. An instance in
point would  be the  case of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination,
which was  in a sense politically motivated (due to transfer
of Rs.    55 crores to Pakistan) and was followed by explosive
situation involving  emotive issue  resulting in  widespread
violence, arson     and incendiarism against members of a class
in the    country     particularly  in  Maharashtra    but  no     one
suggested any withdrawal and the prosecution of the persons,
who also  included  a  political  personality,    was  rightly
carried to  its logical     end resulting    in conviction of the
guilty and  acquittal of the political personality. In other
words, in  each case of such conflict the Court has to weigh
and decide  judiciously. But  it is  obvious that unless the
crime  in  question  are  per  se  political  offences    like
sedition or are motivated by political considerations or are
committed  during   or    are  followed  by  mass     agitations,
communal frenzies,  regional disputes, industrial conflicts,
student unrest    or the    like  situations  involving  emotive
issues    giving     rise  to   an    atmosphere  surcharged    with
violence, no question of serving any broader cause of public
justice public order or peace would arise and in the absence
thereof     the   public  interest     of  administering  criminal
justice     in   a     given     case  cannot  be  permitted  to  be
sacrificed, particularly  when a  highly  placed  person  is
allegedly involved  in the  crime, as  otherwise the  common
man’s faith  in the  rule of law and democratic values would
be shattered.
Fourthly, the  decision in     R.K.  Jain’s  case  (supra)
clearly shows  that when  paucity of  evidence    or  lack  of
prospect  of   successful  prosecution    is  the     ground     for
withdrawal the    Court has not merely the power but a duty to
examine the  material on  record without  which the validity
and propriety  of such    ground cannot be determined. In that
case this  Court disposed  of two sets of appeals, one where
the withdrawal from the prosecution against George Fernandes
and others  was on  the ground    that the  offences  were  of
political character  and the  other pertained  to withdrawal
from the  prosecution in  four cases  against Choudhry Bansi
Lal on the ground that the evidence available was meagre and
in one    out of    the four cases the complainant (Shri Manohar
Lal) had been suitably and profitable compensated. The Court
upheld the  grant of  permission for  withdrawal in both the
sets of     appeals-in the     first set  on the  ground that     the
offences alleged  to have been committed by George Fernandes
and  others  were  of  a  political  character,     the  motive
attributed to  the accused  being that they wanted to change
the Government led by Shrimati Gandhi and therefore with the
change in the Government
84
the broad  ends of  public justice justified the withdrawal,
while in  the  other  set  the    Court  examined     the  entire
material available on record and came to the conclusion that
the ground  put forward     had been made out and justified the
withdrawal. It    may be    stated that  in M.N.S,    Nair v. P.V.
Balakrishnan and  Ors (1)  the Sessions Court as well as the
High Court  had permitted withdrawal from the prosecution of
a case    involving offences of forgery, cheating, etc. On the
ground that  the dispute  was of  a civil nature, that there
had been  enormous delay in proceeding with a trial and that
securing of  evidence would  involve heavy  expenses for the
state as  witnesses were  in  far  off    places.     This  Court
allowed the appeal, set aside the permission granted for the
withdrawal and    directed the  trial to proceed in accordance
with the  law after holding that none of the grounds alleged
or even their cumulative effect would justify the withdrawal
from the  prosecution  in  particular  after  examining     the
material on  record this  Court came  to the conclusion that
the finding  of the  lower courts  that the dispute was of a
civil nature  was incorrect.  It is  thus  clear  that    when
paucity of  evidence  or  lack    of  prospect  of  successful
prosecution is    the ground for withdrawal this Court must of
necessity examine  the material     in order  to determine     the
validity or  propriety of  the ground. It is in the light of
the aforesaid legal principles that two questions arising in
this appeal will have to be decided.
The next  question raised    by Counsel for the appellant
was whether  Shri  Lalan  Prasad  Sinha     was  the  competent
officer entitled  to  apply  for  the  withdrawal  from     the
prosecution and     if so    whether he  discharged his  function
independently as a free agent ? In this behalf Counsel urged
that the  initial appointment  of  Shri     A.K.  Dutt  as     the
Special Public Prosecutor made by the State Government under
s. 24  (8) Cr.    P.C. On     26th February, 1979 to conduct this
case had  not been  cancelled, that  Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha
could  merely    be  regarded  as  one  of  the    four  Public
Prosecutors appointed  on the  fresh panel constituted under
Law (Justice)  Department’s letter  No.C/Mis-8-43/78 J dated
24th February, 1981 and that though this particular case had
been allotted  to him  by the  letter dated  25th  February,
1981, he  had no authority over the head of Shri A.K.Dutt to
apply for  withdrawal from  the prosecution  and as such the
application made  by him  would be  unauthorised and illegal
and consequently  the Court’s  order dated  20th June,    1981
would be  vitiated. Counsel further contended that the State
Government had already taken a decision to withdraw from the
prosecution in this
85
case on     grounds of  inexpediency of prosecution for reasons
of State  and public  policy, that  the     said  decision     was
communicated to Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha, who was directed to
take steps  in that  behalf and that it was pursuant to such
direction that he made the application and not independently
on his    own as    a free    agent and,  therefore, the executive
function on  the part  of the Public Prosecutor (assuming he
had the     authority to  make the     application) was improperly
performed. It  is not  possible to  accept either  of  these
contentions for the reasons we shall presently indicate.
It is  true that the appointment of Shri A.K. Dutt made
by the    previous Government as the Special Public Prosecutor
to conduct  this case  had not    been  cancelled,  though  in
fitness of things the new Government should have done so but
that did  not prevent  the new    Government to  make a  fresh
appointment of    a Public Prosecutor and to put him in charge
of the    case. Appointments  of Public  Prosecutors generally
fall under  s. 24(3)  but when the State Government appoints
Public Prosecutors  for the purposes of any case or class of
cases the appointees become Special Public Prosecutors under
s. 24(8)  and in  the instant  case under  the Law (Justice)
Department’s letter  dated 24th February, 1981 a fresh panel
of lawyers  consisting of  4 Advocates    including Shri Lalan
Prasad    Sinha    was  constituted   “for      conducting   cases
pertaining to  Vigilance Department  both at Headquarters at
Patna as  also outside    Patna” and,  therefore,     Shri  Lalan
prasad Sinha  will  have  to  be  regarded  as    having    been
appointed as  Special Public  Prosecutor under s. 24(8). But
apart from this aspect of the matter, on the facts obtaining
in the    case, it  cannot be disputed that Shri A.K. Dutt not
having appeared before the Special Judge at any stage of the
hearing was  never defacto  incharge of     the case nor in the
actual conduct    of the    case; on  the other  hand, after the
allotment of  this case     to him     Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha was
incharge of the case and was actually conducting the case he
having admittedly  appeared  in     the  case  at    least  on  4
occasions (on  6th, April,  21st April,     27th April and 26th
May, 1981)  before the Special Judge, and, therefore, in our
view, he  was the proper person who could make the necessary
application in    the matter of withdrawal. In this context it
will be     useful to  point out  that s.    494 of    the old Code
seemed to authorise “any Public Prosecuter” to withdraw from
the prosecution with the consent of the Court but this Court
in State of Punjab v. Surijit Singh & Anr. (1) had held that
“the reasonable interpretation
86
to be placed upon s. 494, in our opinion, is that it is only
the Public  Prosecutor, who is incharge of a particular case
and is actually conducting the prosecution, that can file an
application  under   that  section,  seeking  permission  to
withdraw from the prosecution.” The same view was reiterated
by this Court in the Case of M.N.S. Nair v. P.V. Balkrishnan
(supra). The  present  section    321  Cr.  P.  C.  has  given
legislative recognition     to the aforesaid view of this Court
inasmuch as it expressly provides that the Public Prosecutor
“incharge of  a case” may withdraw from the prosecution with
the consent  of the  Court. We    are satisfied that though he
was appointed  as the  Special Public  Prosecutor to conduct
this case  in February    1979  Shri  A.K.  Dutt    was  neither
incharge of the case nor was actually conducting the same at
the material  time and since Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha was not
merely incharge     of the case but was actually conducting the
case was the proper officer to apply for the withdrawal from
the prosecution.
Similarly, there is no substance in the contention that
Shri Lalan  Prasad Sinha  had sought the withdrawal from the
prosecution at    the behest  of the  State Government.  It is
true that the Government State had taken its own decision to
withdraw from  the  prosecution     in  the  case    against     the
respondents Nos.  2, 3    and 4  and it  is also true that the
said decision  was communicated     to Shri  Lalan Prasad Sinha
but if    the two     letters, one  dated 25th February 1981 from
the Law     Secretary to  the District Magistrate and the other
dated 26th  March 1981    from the  Addl. Collector,  Incharge
Legal Section  to the  Special Public  Prosecutor,  Incharge
Vigilance cases,  are carefully scrutinized it will be clear
that the  State Government  merely suggested  to Shri  Lalan
Prasad Sinha (which it was entitled to do) withdraw from the
prosecution but     at the     same time asked him to consider the
matter on his own and after satisfying himself about it make
the necessary  application which  he did  on 17th June, 1981
and there  is no material to doubt the recital that is found
in the    application that  he had himself considered relevant
materials connected  with the  case and     had come to his own
conclusion in  that behalf.  We are  not  impressed  by     the
argument that the appointment of Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha was
made only for applying for withdrawal and not for conducting
the case.  The appellants  contention, therefore,  has to be
rejected.
The   next      important   question     that    arises     for
consideration is whether the withdrawal from the prosecution
of Respondents Nos.
87
2, 3  and 4  in     Vigilance  P.S.  Case    No.  9    (2)  78     was
unwarranted, unjustified or illegal on facts as also in law.
In other  words, the  real question is whether the executive
function of  the public     prosecutor and     or the     supervisory
function of  the Trial    Court in granting its consent to the
withdrawal have been improperly performed or are vitiated by
reason    of  any     illegality  ?    This  will  necessitate     the
consideration of  the four  grounds on    which the withdrawal
was sought by the Public Prosecutor and granted by the trial
Court under  s. 321  Cr. P.C. As stated earlier, pursuant to
the suggestion of the State Government and after considering
the matter  for himself     Shri  Lalan  Prasad  Sinha  in     his
application dated  17th June,  1981 specifically set out for
grounds for  withdrawal from  the prosecution  in the namely
(a) lack  of prospect of successful prosecution in the light
of evidence,  (b) the implication of the persons as a result
of political  and personal vendetta, (c) the inexpediency of
the prosecution     for the  reasons of  the State     and  Public
policy and  (d) the adverse effects that the continuation of
the prosecution     will bring on public interests in the light
of the    changed situation.  Significantly enough the learned
Special Judge  after summarising  the  submissions  of    Shri
Lalan Prasad  Sinha, which  were in  terms of  the averments
made and  the grounds  set out    in the application, passed a
short reasoned order on 20th June, 1981 as follows:
Having considered  the legal position explained by
the Supreme Court (in R.K. Jain’s case) and submissions
made by the learned Special P.P. in charge of this case
and having     perused the  relevant records of the case I
am satisfied  that it  is a fit case in which prayer of
the learned  Special P.P. to withdraw should be allowed
and it is, therefore, allowed. Consequently the special
P.P. Shri    Lalan Prasad  Sinha is permitted to withdraw
from the prosecution and in view of section 321 (a) Cr.
P. C. the accused persons are discharged.”
In other  words, the  learned Special Judge accepted all the
grounds on  which withdrawal  was  sought  and    granted     the
permission  to     withdraw  from     the  prosecution  on  those
grounds. The  question is  whether Vigilance P.S. Case No. 9
(2) 78 was such as would attract the grounds and even if the
grounds were  attracted was  withdrawal from the prosecution
justified ?
Out of  the four  grounds set  out above,    I shall deal
with grounds (b), (c) and (d) first and ground (a) later. In
the light of
88
the legal  principles discussed     above it cannot be disputed
that grounds  like the    inexpediency of     the prosecution for
the reasons  of State  or public  policy, implication of the
accused persons     out of     political and    or personal vendetta
and adverse  effects which  the continuance  of     prosecution
will have  on public  interests     in  the  light     of  changed
situation are  appropriate and have a bearing on the broader
cause of public justice, public order and peace, which might
in a  given case  outweigh or  transcend the narrower public
interest of  administering criminal  justice in a particular
litigation necessitating  the withdrawal of the latter, but,
as observe  dearlier, no  question of  serving    and  broader
cause of  public justice,  public order     or peace  can arise
unless the  crimes allegedly  committed are per se political
offences  or   are  motivated    by  political  ambitions  or
considerations or  are committed  during or  are followed by
mass  agitations,   communal  frenzies,     regional  disputes,
conflicts, student  unrest or  like situations which involve
emotive issues    giving rise  to a  surcharged atmosphere  of
violence. Admittedly, the offences of bribery (criminal mis-
conduct) and  forgery which  are said to have been committed
by Respondent No. 2 in conspiracy with the other accused are
ordinary common law crimes and were not committed during nor
were they  followed by any mass agitation or communal frenzy
or regional dispute or industrial conflict or student unrest
or the    like explosive situation involving any emotive issue
giving    rise  to  any  surcharged  atmosphere  of  violence;
further it  cannot be  disputed that  these are     not per  se
political offences  nor     were  they  committed    out  of     any
political motivation  whatsoever;  in  fact  the  motivating
force behind  them was    merely to  give     protection  to     and
shield Shri  Nawal  Kishore  Sinha,  a    close  friend,    from
criminal as  well as civil liability-a favouritism amounting
to criminal  misconduct allegedly  indulged in by Respondent
No. 2  by abusing  his position     as a  Minister or the Chief
Minister of Bihar. If therefore the offences did not partake
of  any     political  character  nor  were  committed  in     nor
followed by  any explosive situation involving emotive issue
giving rise  to any  surcharged atmosphere  of    violence  no
question serving any broader cause of public justice, public
order or  peace could  arise and  in absence  there  of     the
public interest     of administering  criminal justice  in this
particular case     could not  be permitted to be sacrified. In
other words,  this being an ordinary criminal case involving
the commission    of common  law crimes of bribery and forgery
in ordinary normal circumstances with self-aggrandisement or
favouritism as    the motivating    force, grounds    (b), (c) and
(d)  were   irrelevant    and   extraneous  to  the  issue  of
withdrawal and since admittedly these were
89
the  considerations   which  unquestionably  influenced     the
decision of  the public prosecutor in seeking the withdrawal
as well     as the     decision of  the trial     Court to  grant the
permission, the     impugned withdrawal  from  the     prosecution
would stand vitiated in law.
Counsel for  the respondents  urged that as a result of
the elections  there was  a change  in the  situation,    that
Respondent No.    2′s party  had received the peoples’ mandate
and voted  to power,  that Respondent  No. 2  had become the
Chief Minister of the State and that the prosecution against
the head  of the  State would  have had     adverse effects  on
public    interest  including  public  order  and     peace    and,
therefore, its    continuation was regarded as inexpedient for
reasons of State and public policy. I fail to appreciate the
contention: for,  what    has  the  change  in  the  situation
brought about  by the  elections putting  one or  the  other
party  in   power  got     to  do     with  the  continuation  of
prosecution  for  ordinary  common  law     crimes     of  bribery
(criminal-mis-conduct)    and   forgery  especially  when     the
offences were  not  actuated  by  any  political  motivation
whatsoever nor had they been committed in or followed by any
explosive situation  involving    emotive     issue?     No  emotive
issue was  or is involved whatsoever. Surely, in the absence
of  the     aforesaid,  aspects  no  result  of  any  election,
howsoever sweeping, can be construed as the peoples’ mandate
to condone  or compound     the  common  law  crimes  allegedly
committed by  those who have been returned to power; in fact
such interpretation  of the mandate would be contrary to all
democratic canons,  Success at    hustings is  no     licence  to
sweep  all   dirt  under   the    carpet     and  enjoy   fruits
nonchalantly.  Moreover,   the    apprehension   that   public
interest including public order and peace would be adversely
affected by  the continuation  of the  prosecution of common
law crimes  (which do not partake of any political character
or are    not  committed    in  or    followed  by  any  explosive
situation involving  emotive issue)  against the head of the
State is  ill-founded, for,  all that  can  happen  is    that
Respondent No.    2 will    have to     step down and nothing more.
Any fear  of destabilisation  of the  Government is entirely
misplaced.  On     the  other   hand,  withdrawal      from     the
prosecution of such offences would interfere with the normal
course of  administration  of  criminal     justice  and  since
Respondent No.    2 is  placed in     a high position the same is
bound to  affect the  common man’s  faith in the rule of law
and administration of justice. Besides, as I shall point out
later, if  the proof  of the  offences    said  to  have    been
committed by  Respondent No.  2 in conspiracy with the other
accused was  based on  documentary evidence, the genuineness
of which is not in dispute, no
90
question of  political and  personal vendetta  or unfair and
overzealous investigation  would arise.     In my    view, in all
the facts  and circumstances,  grounds (b), (c) and (d) were
not attracted  to the  instant case  and were irrelevant and
extraneous to  the  issue  of  withdrawal  and    since  these
grounds had  influenced the executive function of the Public
Prosecutor as  well as    the supervisory judicial function of
the trial  Court  the  performance  of    these  functions  is
vitiated. The  High Court  has simply  put its    seal on     the
trial Court’s  order accepting    these grounds.    The impugned
withdrawal as  permitted by the trial Court and confirmed by
the High  Court in  so far  as it  is based on these grounds
would be bad in law.
I shall  now proceed  to deal  with the ground (a) that
was put     forward for  withdrawal from  the  prosecution.  In
substance the  ground was  that there  were  no     chances  of
successful prosecution    in view     of paucity  of evidence  to
prove the charges. As stated earlier when such is the ground
it is  the duty     of the     Court to  examine the    material  to
ascertain whether  the ground  was valid  one or whether the
available material  was sufficient to make out a prima facie
case against  the accused  to put him on trial ? And I shall
approach the problem strictly from this angle.
The facts giving rise to the launching of the aforesaid
prosecution against  respondent Nos.  2, 3  and 4  and three
others may  be stated: The Patna Urban Co-operative Bank was
registered in  May 1970     and commenced    its banking business
with Nawal  Kishore Sinha as its Chairman, K.P. Gupta as its
Honorary Secretary,  M.A. Haidari  as its  Manager and    A.K.
Singh as a Loan Clerk (who also worked as the care-taker and
Personal Assistant  to N.K.  Sinha).  A     Loan  Sub-Committee
consisting of  N.K.  Sinha  the     Chairman,  K.P.  Gupta     the
Secretary and  one Shri Purnendu Narain, an Advocate used to
look after  the sanctioning and granting of loans. Under its
bye-laws the  Chairman was  the ultimate authority in regard
to all    the functions of the Bank and the Honorary Secretary
along with  the Chairman had to exercise supervisory control
over all  the activities  of the  Bank while the Manager was
concerned with    its day     to  day  working.  Dr.     Jagan    Nath
Mishra,     then  an  M.L.C.  and    who  subsequently  became  a
Minister and  the Chief Minister in the Bihar Cabinet helped
the Bank  and its  Chairman  (N.K.  Sinha  being  his  close
associate  and     confidant)  in      several   ways   including
mobilisation of resources for the Bank. Separate audits into
the working of the Bank were conducted by
91
the Reserve  Bank of  India as    well as     by the Co-operative
Department of the Bihar Government for the years 1972-73 and
1973-74 during    the  course  of     which    a  large  number  of
irregularities (such  as non-maintenance  of cash books in a
proper manner,    grant of over-draft facility without current
account etc  ), illegal     practices, acts of defalcations and
malversation  of  funds     of  the  Bank    came  to  light;  in
particular the    Audit Reports  disclosed that  huge  amounts
running into lakhs of rupees had been squandered away by (a)
giving loans  to non-members,  (b) giving loans even without
application, agreement    or pronote, (c) giving loans without
hypothecations, (d)  giving  short  term  loans     instead  of
realising cash on sale proceeds even for hypothecated goods,
(e) giving  loans to the same persons in different names and
(f) giving  loans to  fictitious  persons  and    non-existing
firms or  industries etc.  and the audit team of the Reserve
Bank in     its report came to the conclusion that the Chairman
Shri Nawal  Kishore Sinha  and others  were responsible     and
accountable for     ‘bad loans’ to the tune of Rs. 12 lakhs and
‘mis-appropriation and    embezzlement’ to  the tune of Rs. 25
lakhs. On  the basis  of these audit reports at the instance
of the    Reserve Bank  the management of the Bank through its
Board of  Directors was     superseded on    10th of     July,    1974
under the  orders of  the Registrar, Co-operative Societies,
and Nawal  Kishore Sinha the Chairman and other Directors on
the Board  were removed     and an     officer of the Co-operative
Department,  Government     of  Bihar,  was  appointed  as     the
Special Officer to look after the affairs of the Bank.
On the  strength of  the aforesaid     Audit    Reports     the
Registrar, Co-operative     Societies, agreeing  with the Joint
Registrar, put    up a  note dated 4.11.1974 to the Secretary,
Co-operative   saying     that    prima    facie    charges      of
defalcations, conspiracy,  etc. were  made out    against     the
officials of the Bank and legal action be taken against them
after taking  the opinion  of  the  Public  Prosecutor;     the
Secretary by  his note dated 7.11.1974 sought the opinion of
the Law Department on 18.11.1974 the Law Department recorded
its opinion  in the  relevant file (being File No. IX/Legal-
9/75 of     the Department     of Co-operation)  that     a  case  of
conspiracy and    criminal breach     of trust  against the loans
and office  bearers of the Bank was prima facie made out. On
16.12.1974 a  draft complaint  was prepared by the Assistant
Public Prosecutor,  Patna for  being filed  before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate,  Patna; on the same day (16.12.1974) an
office noting  was made by Shri Bimal on the file suggesting
that the  Law Department’s  advice on the draft complaint be
obtained,  which  course  of  action  was  approved  by     the
Secretary, Co-operation on 16.12.1974, by the Minister for
92
Co-operative (Shri  Umesh Prasad  Verma) on  1.1.1975 and by
the  then  Chief  Minister  (Shri  A.  Gaffoor)     on  2.1.75.
Accordingly, the  file was  sent to the Law Department which
reiterated its    earlier advice for launching the prosecution
and on    the file  being     received  back     on  18.1.1975,     the
Secretary Co-operation    endorsed the  file on  21.1.1975  to
A.P.P. Shri  Grish Narain Sinha for necessary action i.e. to
file the  prosecution (vide the several notings made in File
No.IX/Legal-9/75-relied upon  by the  respondents). In other
words by  21.1.1975  the  stage     was  set  for    launching  a
criminal prosecution  against the loanees and the members of
the Board  of Directors of the Bank with Nawal Kishore Sinha
as the    principal accused  and a  complaint petition in that
behalf duly  approved by  the Law  Department and  signed by
Shri Jagdish  Narain Verma,  District Co-operative  Officer,
Patna on  25.1.1975 was also ready with the A.P.P. for being
filed in  the Court.  But before  the A.P.P.  could file the
complaint, Respondent  No.2 (Jagan  Nath Mishra, Agriculture
and Irrigation    Minister)  wrote  a  buff-sheet     note  dated
24.1.1975 asking  the Secretary,  Co-operation to  send     the
concerned file    along with  Audit Reports  to him before the
institution  of      the  Criminal      case.     Accordingly,  after
obtaining the approval of the then Co-operative Minister and
the then  Chief Minister  for sending the file to respondent
No. 2, the Secretary recalled the file and other papers from
the A.P.P. on 28.1.1975 and on 24.2.1975 he sent the file to
the Law Minister en route the then Chief Minister. It may be
stated that  under the    Notification dated  30th April, 1974
issued under Art. 166 (3) of the Constitution read with Rule
5 of  the Rules of Executive Business of the State of Bihar,
the then  Chief Minister  Shri Abdul  Gaffoor was inter alia
holding the  portfolio of  Law also  but  according  to     the
affidavit of  Shri Neelanand  Singh dated 19th October, 1982
filed on behalf of Respondent No.1 before us Shri A. Gaffoor
as per    his note  dated 29-8-1974  addressed  to  the  Chief
Secretary and  circulated to various departments had, with a
view to     lessen his heavy burden, requested Respondent No. 2
(Jagan Nath  Mishra) to     look after  the  work    of  the     Law
Department and    as such     endorsing the file on 24.2.1975 ‘to
the Law     Minister en-route  the Chief  Minister’ would    mean
that the  file must  have gone    to respondent No. 2 as there
was no    other person holding the Law portfolio excepting the
Chief Minister    himself under  the Notification     dated    30th
April, 1974.  It is claimed by the appellant that Respondent
No. 2  sat tight  over the file for over two and half months
till he became the Chief Minister whereas it is suggested on
behalf of  the Respondents  that though     the file was called
for by
93
Respondent No.    2 on 24-1-1975 it did not actually reach him
till middle  of May,  1975. However,  ignoring the aforesaid
controversy,  the  fact     remains  that    the  filing  of     the
complaint got  postponed from  24-1-1975 (the  date of Buff-
sheet order  of Respondent  No. 2)  till middle of May, 1975
and in    the meantime  on 11.4.1975 Respondent No. 2 replaced
Shri A.     Gaffoor as  the Chief Minister and in the middle of
May 1975  as the  Chief Minister Respondent No. 2 passed two
orders which are very eloquent.
On 16-5-1975  in the  File No. IX/Legal-9/75 respondent
No. 2 wrote out an order in his own hand in Hindi concerning
the action  to be  taken against  Nawal     Kishore  Sinha     and
others, the  English rendering    of which,  according to     the
respondents, runs thus:
“Much time  has passed.  On perusal of the File it
appears that  there is  no     allegation  of     defalcation
against the  Chairman and    the Members  of the Board of
the Bank.    Stern action should be taken for realisation
of loans from the loanees and if there are difficulties
in realisation  from the  loanees surcharge proceedings
should be initiated against the Board of Directors. The
normal condition  be restored in the Bank after calling
the Annual General Meeting and holding the election.
(Sd) Jagan Nath Mishra
16-5-1975
In     the  margin  opposite    the  above  order  the    seal
containing the despatch entry originally showed 16-5-1975 as
the date  on which  the file  was despatched  from the Chief
Minister’s Secretariat    to the Co-operative Department after
Respondent No.    2 had made the above order. It is clear that
the first  part of  the above  order regarding    the criminal
involvement is    in teeth of the Audit Reports of the Reserve
Bank and  the Co-operative  Department and  contrary to     the
opinion of  the Law  Department     it  thwarted  the  criminal
prosecution against  Shri Nawal     Kishore Sinha    and  others,
while under  the latter     part it still exposed them to civil
liability by  way of  surcharge proceedings  to     be  adopted
against them in default of realisations from the loanees but
as even     the loans  had been  advanced mostly  in fictitious
names and  were     actually  utilised  by     the  office-bearers
themselves the    prospect of  civil  liability  loomed  large
before    them.  Realising  this    position  Respondent  No.  2
irregularly-there being     no endorsement nor any seal showing
inward receipt of
94
the File  by Chief  Minister’s Secretariat-got    hold of     the
File again  and passed    another order in his hand on a piece
of paper in Hindi under his signature but bearing an earlier
date 14.5.1975    and had     it pasted  over the  earlier  order
dated 16.5.1975     in the     File  so  as  to  efface  the    same
completely, and the date of despatch 16.5.75 in the despatch
seal appearing    in the    margin was  altered to    14 5.1975 by
over writing;  an English  rendering of     this second  order,
addressed to the Minister for Co-operation, runs thus:
“Please  issue  order     for  restoring     the  normal
condition in  the Bank  after  holding  Annual  General
Meeting.
(Sd) Jagan Nath Mishra
14-5-1975″
It  is    undisputed  that  Respondent  No.  2  did  pass     the
aforesaid two  orders in his own hand in Hindi, the first on
16-5-1975 and  the second  subsequently in point of time but
ante-dated it  to 14-5-1975 and had it pasted over the first
order completely  effacing that     order. Such  conduct on his
part has  been explained only on the basis that as the Chief
Minister he  had the authority and power to revise or review
his  earlier  order  and  that    it  is    the  usual  practice
prevailing in  the Patna Secretariat that whenever any order
passed earlier    is sought  to be  revised or reviewed by the
same officer  or Minister it is done by pasting it over by a
piece of  paper containing the revised orders (Para 8 of the
counter affidavit of Shri Bidhu Shekhar Banerjee dated 17-3-
1982 filed  on behalf  of respondent  No. 1). Even with this
explanation the     admitted position  that emerges is that the
aforesaid two  orders were  passed by respondent No. 2, that
the second  order was  ante-dated to  14-5-1975 and that the
same was  pasted on  the file so as to efface completely the
earlier order.    In other  words in substance and reality the
entire order  passed by     Respondent No.     2 in  the concerned
file on     16-5-1975 which  contained 4  directions; (a) there
being no allegation of defalcation against the Chairman, the
Members of  the Board no criminality was involved, (b) stern
action for  realisation of  the loans  from the     loanees  be
taken, (c)  failing which  surcharge proceedings against the
Board of  Directors be    initiated  and    (d)  restoration  of
normal condition  in the  Bank be  brought about  by calling
Annual General    Meeting and  holding the election, was wiped
out and     completely substituted     by the     second order  which
merely retained     the last  direction (item (d) above) of the
first order.  In effect     under the  second  order  both     the
criminal as  well as  civil liability of Nawal Kishore Sinha
and others
95
were given  a go-bye,  notwithstanding the  Audit Reports of
the  Reserve   Bank  and  the  Co-operative  Department     and
Respondent No.    2 merely  directed that the normal condition
in the Bank be restored and this result was brought about by
the second  order which     was  ante-dated  with    the  obvious
fraudulent intent  of nullifying  or rendering    nugatory any
action that  could have     been or might have been taken (even
if not actually taken) pursuant to the first order after the
file had left the Chief Minister’s Secretariat on 16.5.1975,
that being the most natural consequence flowing from the act
of ante-dating    the second  order. It  is not necessary that
the fraudulent    intent should  materialise; it    is enough if
act of    ante-dating is done with the fraudulent intent. This
being a     case of  inter-departmental orders, the first order
dated 16th  May, 1975  passed by  Respondent  No.  2  became
operative as  soon as  the concerned  file  left  the  Chief
Minister’s Secretariat and as such the same could be revised
or reviewed  by Respondent No. 2 by officially and regularly
calling     back    the  file  and    by  passing  a    fresh  order
subsequent in  point of     time modifying     or  cancelling     the
earlier order  but surely not by the crude method of pasting
the subsequent order over the first so as to efface the same
completely and    in no  event by     ante-dating it.  It is true
that mere  ante-dating a  document or  an  order  would     not
amount to  an offence  of forgery but if the document or the
order is  antedated with oblique motive or fraudulent intent
indicated above (without the same actually materialising) it
will be forgery.
The   aforesaid    undisputed   documentary    evidence
comprising the    Audit Reports,    the relevant  notings in the
concerned file    and the     two  orders  of  Respondent  No.  2
clearly makes  out a  prima facie  case of the commission of
two common  Law offences of criminal mis-conduct s. 5(1) (d)
of Prevention of Corruption Act) and forgery (s. 466 I.P.C.)
by Respondent  No. 2 without needing any further material to
establish the  same. The  ingredients of  the former  can be
said to     be prima facie satisfied in that by passing the two
orders Respondent  No. 2  by corrupt  or illegal means or by
otherwise  abusing   his  position  as    the  Chief  Minister
subverted the criminal prosecution and surcharge proceedings
against Nawal  Kishore Sinha  and others  and had thereby at
any rate  obtained  for     them  pecuniary  advantage  to     the
deteriment  of     the  Bank,   its  members,  depositors     and
creditors. This is apart from the aspect as to whether while
doing so he obtained pecuniary advantage for himself or not,
for which  further material by way of confessional statement
of the    approvers would     be required  to  be  considered  or
appreciated but ignoring such further material
96
the ingredients of s. 5 (1) (d) get satisfied prima facie as
indicated above. As regards the latter though Respondent No.
2 had  the authority  and power     to pass the second order in
substitution of     the first,  by ante-dating the second order
with fraudulent     intent the  ingredients  of  forgery  again
prima  facie   satisfied.  In  other  words,  the  aforesaid
material is  clearly sufficient     to put     Respondent No    2 on
trial  for,  if     the  said  material  remains  unrebutted  a
conviction would clearly ensue.
It      was    strenuously   contended      by   Counsel     for
respondents, particularly  by counsel  for Respondent  No. 2
that if     the aforesaid two orders passed by Respondent No. 2
are properly understood it cannot be said that the effect of
either of these two orders was to thwart or to scuttle or to
subvert the  criminal prosecution  and surcharge proceedings
against Nawal  Kishore Sinha  and others and that the effect
of the    second order  was certainly  not to  countermand the
directions contained  in the  first order in regard to items
(b) and     (c) above  but in fact the effect was to facilitate
recourse to surcharge proceedings against the office-bearers
without the hurdle of being required to make the recovery of
loans from  the loanees     first, which  was the import of the
first order  dated 16-3-1978.  It was further contended that
instead of  stifling the  criminal prosecution against Nawal
Kishore Sinha and other office bearers Respondent No. 2 at a
subsequent stage  had directed prosecution of office bearers
including Nawal     Kishore Sinha and actually the Co-operative
Department had    taken steps  to adopt  surcharge proceedings
even against  Nawal Kishore  Sinha  by    issuing     show  cause
notice    to  him     and  therefore,  the  charges    of  criminal
misconduct and    forgery against     the  Respondent  No.  2  in
conspiracy  with   others  were     clearly  unsustainable     and
withdrawal  from   the    prosecution  sought  by     the  public
prosecutor was proper and justified. In my view, however, as
I shall     presently indicate, the further materials on record
do not    bear out or support these submissions of counsel for
the respondents.
On the  question as  to whether the effect of either of
the aforesaid  two orders  was to thwart; scuttle or subvert
criminal prosecution  and surcharge  proceedings or  not and
what was  intended by  Respondent No. 2 when he passed those
orders would  be clear    from his further conduct evidence by
subsequent notings and orders passed by him till he went out
of power in 1977 and in this behalf it would be desirable to
delineate the  course which  the subsequent  events took  in
regard to criminal prosecution as well as surcharge
97
proceedings separately.     As regards criminal prosecution, it
appears that  the Co-operative Department wanted to go ahead
with it     and in     that behalf  by his next noting dated 28-6-
1975 the  then Minister     for Co-operation  sought directions
from the Chief Minister as to what should be the next course
of  action  in    the  matter  of     filing     the  complaint     and
Respondent No.    2 as the Chief Minister passed the following
order on  the file  on 30-6-1975: “Discussion has been held.
There is no need to file the prosecution.” This clearly show
what Respondent     No. 2    intended by his aforesaid two orders
in the    matter of  criminal prosecution     and  the  direction
clearly runs  counter to  the suggestion  that    he  did     not
thwart, scuttle     or subvert the criminal prosecution against
Nawal Kishore  Sinha and  others. It further appears that in
July, 1975  there were    questions and call attention motions
in the Bihar Legislative Assembly during the course of which
the propriety  of non-prosecution  of the culprits concerned
in the    Bank fraud,  despite Law  Department’s    advice,     was
discussed, that     the Speaker  referred    the  matter  to     the
Estimates Committee  of the  House, that  in June,  1976 the
Estimates  Committee   submitted  its    Report    recommending
prosecution of Nawal Kishore Sinha and others, that in July,
1976  a      debate  took     place    in   the  Assembly   on     the
recommendations     contained   in     the  said  Report  and     the
Government  was     forced     to  agree  to    launch    prosecutions
against the culprits. In the wake of these events Respondent
No. 2  as the Chief Minister passed an order on 4-8-1976 for
launching criminal  prosecutions but  even there he directed
that prosecutions  be launched    against some  of the office-
bearers and  loanees of the Bank including Shri K. P. Gupta,
the Hony, Secretary, Shri M.A. Haidary, the Manager and Shri
K.P. Gupta,  the Loan  Clerk but  not against  Nawal Kishore
Sinha who  was excluded     from being  arraigned as an accused
and accordingly     23 criminal  cases were  filed against     the
aforesaid office-bearers  and loanees. This order is another
indication that     even with  all the  furore which  the Banks
affairs had  created Respondent     No. 2    wanted    to  and     did
protect and  save Shri    Nawal Kishore  Sinha  from  criminal
prosecution by    excluding him  from  the  array     of  accused
persons. As  regards the 23 criminal cases filed against the
other office bearers and the loanees of the Bank there is on
record in  the Co-operative  Department File  No.  12/Legal-
31/77 a Buff-Sheet order dated 2-2-1977 passed by Respondent
No. 2  to the  following effect:  “In order  to recover     the
money from  some of  the loanees  of  the  Patna  Urban     Co-
operative Bank, criminal cases were instituted against them.
Action should be taken immediately for the withdrawal of the
cases against  those loanees  who have    cleared the  loan in
full, and proper instalments for
98
payment of  loans should  be fixed against those who want to
repay the  loan but due to financial handicaps are unable to
make payment  at a  time, and  thereafter necessary  further
action should  be taken.”  It appears  that pursuant to this
order after verifying that loans from three parties (Plastic
Fabricators, Climaz  Plastic Udyog and K.K. Boolan) had been
cleared the  criminal cases against them were directed to be
withdrawn immediately. However, the protection given to Shri
Nawal Kishore  Sinha against  criminal prosecution continued
to benefit him.
In the  meanwhile in April, 1976 the Banking Licence of
the Patna  Urban Co-operative  Bank  was  cancelled  by     the
Reserve Bank  of India    and further  at the  instance of the
Registrar, Co-operative     Societies, the     Bank was ordered to
be liquidated.    It appears  that Shri T. Nand Kumar, I.A.S.,
Liquidator of  the Bank     addressed a  communication  to     the
Registrar, Co-operative     Societies suggesting  that  besides
the other  office-bearers Sri  Nawal Kishore  Sinha, the ex-
Chairman of  the Bank  also deserve  to     be  prosecuted     for
offences of  embezzlement, forfery,  cheating, etc.  but the
matter was  kept pending for report of the Superintendent of
Police (Co-operative Vigilance Cell); the S.P. (Co-operative
Vigilance Cell)     after collecting  facts and evidence got it
examined by  Deputy Secretary  (Law) in C.I.D., obtained the
opinion that a criminal case was fully made out against Shri
Nawal Kishore  Sinha and proposed that a fresh criminal case
as per    draft F.I.R.  be filed    and that  Shri Nawal Kishore
Sinha should  also be  made co-accused    in a number of cases
already     under     investigation,      the    S.P.   (Co-operative
Vigilance Cell)     obtained the  approval of D.I.G., C.I.D. on
his said  proposal and    submitted the same to the Secretary,
Co-operation, for  obtaining Chief Minister’s permission. In
view of     the Chief  Minister’s earlier order restricting the
filing of  criminal cases against some of the office-bearers
and loanees  only the S.P’s noting categorically stated that
the draft  F.I.R. (against  N.K. Sinha)     had been  vetted by
D.I.G. C.I.D. as well as by I.G.. of Police. After examining
the entire  material carefully    and obtaining clarifications
on certain  points Shri     Vinod Kumar  Secretary Co-operation
put up    a lengthy  note dated  15-1-1977 to the Minister for
Co-operation in which he specifically placed the proposal of
S.P.  (Co-operative   Vigilance     Cell)    for  lodging  F.I.R.
against Shri  Nawal Kishore  Sinha for his approval and also
suggested that    the Hon’ble  Minister may  also     obtain     the
approval  of  the  Chief  Minister.  The  Minister  for     Co-
operation in  his turn endorsed the file on 20-1-1977 to the
Chief Minister    for the     latter’s  approval.  The  file     was
received by  the Chief    Minister’s Secretariat    on 30-3-1977
and
99
Respondent No.    2 as  the Chief Minister on 9-4-1977 instead
of indicating  his mind either way merely marked the file to
“I.G. of  Police.” which was meaningless as the prior noting
had clearly indicated that a draft F.I.R. had been vetted by
both,  D.I.G.,    C.I.D.    and  I.G.  of  Police.    Counsel     for
Respondent No.    2 submitted that the endorsement made by the
Chief Minister    meant that  he had  approved the  action  as
proposed. It is impossible to accept the submission. Had the
Chief Minister    merely put his signature or initials without
saying anything     it might have been possible to suggest that
he had    approved the proposal, but to mark the file to “I.G.
of Police” without saying ‘as proposed’ or something to that
effect cannot  mean that  the Respondent  No. 2 had approved
the proposal.  In fact,     with the knowledge that the I.G. of
Police had approved and vetted the draft F.I.R. against N.K.
Sinha, merely  marking the file to “I.G. of Police” amounted
to putting  off the  matter  Meanwhile    Respondent  No.     2′s
Government went     out of power and under the President’s Rule
the matter  was dealt  with by    the Governor Shri Jagan Nath
Kaushal (the  present Union  Law Minister)  who granted     the
approval on  16-5-1977 as  a result  whereof a criminal case
(being F.I.R.  Case No.     97 (5)     77) ultimately     came to  be
filed at  Kadam Kuan  Police Station  on  30-5-1977  against
Nawal Kishore  Sinha, for which Respondent No. 2 cannot take
any credit  whatsoever. On  the other  hand, the  subsequent
events show  that  so  long  at     it  lay  within  his  power
Respondents No.     2 made     every effort  to protect  and    save
Nawal Kishore Sinha from criminal prosecution by abusing his
official position-a  criminal  prosecution  which  had    been
proposed by  independent bodies     like the  Reserve  Bank  of
India and  the Co-operative Department, agreed to by the Law
Department,  recommended  by  the  Estimates  Committee     and
ultimately approved by the Governor Shri Jagan Nath Kaushal.
As regards     the surcharge    proceedings the     position is
very  simple.  As  discussed  earlier,    the  two  directions
contained in  the first     order dated  16-5-1975     for  taking
stern action  to realise  loans     from  the  loanees  and  in
default to  initiate surcharge proceedings against the Board
of Directors  were wiped  out by  the subsequent  ante-dated
order 14-5-1977,  and  thereby    Respondent  No.     2  thwarted
surcharge proceedings  and attempted to give a go bye to the
civil liability     of Nawal  Kishore Sinha  and other  office-
bearers of  the Bank. This conduct on the part of Respondent
No 2  has been    explained in  the counter  affidavit of Shri
Vinod Kumar  Sinha dated  8-10-1982  filed  before  us,     and
counsel for Respondent No. 2 pressed it into service
100
during his  arguments and the explanation is that a separate
file titled “Surcharge Proceedings” being File No. 3 of 1975
maintained in  the office  of Deputy Registrar, Co-operative
Societies, Patna Division shows (a) that by his letter dated
30-4-1975 the  Deputy Registrar informed the joint Registrar
that discussions  had already  been held  with the Registrar
and that surcharge proceedings would be initiated as soon as
possible (b)  that on  10-6-1975 the  necessary proposal for
surcharge was drafted and filed by the District Co-operative
Officer before    the Registrar under sec. 40 of the Bihar and
Orissa    Co-operative   Society    Act   and  (c)    on  1-7-1975
Surcharged Case No. 3 of 1975 had been started against Nawal
Kishore Sinha  and others  by directing     issuance  of  show-
cause-notice to     them  and  that  in  view  of    these  facts
Respondent No.    2 could     not be     said to have counter-manded
the Surcharge  proceedings, it    is further  urged  that     the
order dated  16-5-1975 directing  surcharge proceedings was,
therefore,  unnecessary      and  irrelevant   as    the   proper
authority, namely,  the Registrar  had    already     decided  to
start surcharge     proceedings which  were started by issuance
of show-cause notice to Nawal Kishore Sinha and others on 1-
7-1975 and, in fact, if the struck-out order dated 16-5-1975
had remained without being replaced by the order dated 14-5-
1975 the  surcharged proceedings  which were  filed on 10-6-
1975 would have been delayed and the effect of recalling the
first order  dated 16-5-1975  (incidentally recalling of the
first  order  by  the  second  order  is  admitted)  was  to
facilitate  the     surcharge  proceedings     (which     were  being
processed at  that time     in the     office of Deputy Registrar)
without being  required to  adopt recovery  proceedings from
the loanees  first. Counsel for Respondent No. 2 strenuously
urged that  instead of    thwarting or  stalling the surcharge
proceedings the subsequent order dated 14-5-1975 removed a -
hurdle. The explanation to say the least is disingenuous for
two  or      three     reasons  and  cannot  be  accepted.  First,
admittedly and    this was  fairly  conceded  by    counsel     for
Respondent No.    2, that     there is  no material    on record to
show that  File No. 3/75 pertaining to surcharge proceedings
was sent  to the  Chief Minister  (Respondent No.  2) or was
seen by     him prior to 16-5-1975,indeed, it was never sent to
him at    all with  the result  that Respondent  No. 2  had no
knowledge of either the notings and orders contained therein
or  what  was  being  done  in    the  office  of     the  Deputy
Registrar, Co-operative     Societies, when he passed either of
the two orders dated 16-5-1975 and 14-5-1975 and the
explanation, therefore,     that Respondent  No. 2     facilitated
the filing of the surcharge proceedings by the office of the
Deputy Registrar, without the necessity of proceeding
against the loanees first, is not candid. Secondly, the
proposal for surcharge proceeding itself was submitted and
101
filed by  the District    Co-operative Officer  against  Nawal
Kishore Sinha  and others  on 10-6-1975     and  the  surcharge
proceedings actually could be said to have been initiated on
1-7-1975, when    show cause  notice was directed to be issued
and served  on    Nawal  Kishore    Sinha  on  15-7-1975,  while
thwarting of the surcharge proceedings against Nawal Kishore
Sinha  and   others  was   already  complete,    having    been
accomplished by Respondent No. 2 by his ante-dated order 14-
5-1975. Thirdly     it is    obvious that Respondent No. 2 cannot
take credit  for the  action that was taken in the matter of
surcharge proceedings against Nawal Kishore Sinha and others
by   the   Office   of     Registrar,   Co-operative   Society
independently of  and in  spite of Respondent No. 2′s action
of subverting the surcharge proceedings.
It will appear clear from the above discussion that the
documentary evidence  mentioned above,    the  genuineness  of
which cannot  be doubted,  clearly makes  out a     prima facie
case against Respondent No. 2 sufficient to put him on trial
for the     offence of  criminal misconduct  under s. 5 (1) (d)
read with  s. 5     (2) of     the Prevention     of Corruption    Act,
1947. Similar  is the position with regard to the incidental
offence of  forgery under  s. 466,  I.P.C. said to have been
committed by  him, for,     ante-dating of     the second order by
him is    not disputed;  and it is on record that in regard to
such ante-dating  no explanation  was offered  by him during
the investigation  when he  was questioned  about it  in the
presence of his lawyers and there has been no explanation of
any kind  in any  of the counter-affidavits filed before us.
But during  the course    of arguments his counsel offered the
explanation that  could only  be ascribed  as  a  bona    fide
mistake or slip (vide written arguments filed on 14.10.1982)
but such  explanation does  not bear scrutiny, having regard
to the    admitted fact  that after  the ante-dated  order was
pasted over  the first    order the despatch date appearing in
the margin  was required  to be     and  has  been     altered  to
14.5.1975 by over-writing and if over-writing is required to
be done     there cannot  any bona     fide mistake  or slip.     The
ante-dating in    the  circumstances  would  be  with  oblique
intent to  nullify any    possible action     that could  have or
might have  been taken pursuant to the first order as stated
earlier, that  being the  most natural    consequence  flowing
from it     which in  must in law be presumed to have intended.
It would, of course, be open to him to rebut the same at the
trial but  at the  moment there     is no material on record-by
way of    rebuttal. In  the circumstances     it is impossible to
accept the  paucity of    evidence  or  lack  of    prospect  of
successful
102
prosecution as    a  valid  ground  for  withdrawal  from     the
prosecution.  On   the    aforesaid   undisputed     documentary
evidence no  two views    are possible  in the  absence of any
rebuttal material,  which, of  course, the  respondent No. 2
will have  the opportunity  to place before the Court at the
trial. What  is more  the so-called  unfair or    over-zealous
investigators were  miles away    when the  aforesaid evidence
came into existence.
As far  as Respondent  No. 3  (Nawal Kishore Sinha) and
Respondent No.    4 (Jiwanand  Jha) are concerned it cannot be
forgotten that they have been arraigned alongwith Respondent
No. 2  on a  charge  of     criminal  conspiracy  in  pursuance
whereof the several offences are said to have been committed
by all    of them.  Further it  is obvious  that the principal
beneficiary of    the offence  of criminal  misconduct said to
have been  committed by     Respondent No. 2 under s. 5 (1) (d)
read with s. 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 has
been Respondent     No. 3    and so    far as    Respondent No.    4 is
concerned it  cannot be     said that  there is  no material on
record suggesting  his complicity.  Admittedly, he  has been
very close  to    Respondent  No.     2  for     several  years     and
attending to  his affairs-private  and party affairs and the
allegation  against  him  in  the  F.I.R.  is  that  he     was
concerned with    the deposit of two amounts of Rs. 10,000 and
Rs. 3,000  on 27.12.1973  and 1.4.1974    in the    Savings Bank
Account of  Respondent No  2 with the Central Bank of India,
Patna Dak Bungalow Branch, which sums, says the prosecution,
represented some  of the  bribe amounts     said to  have    been
received by  respondent No.  2 and  the tangible documentary
evidence in  proof of  the two    deposits having been made in
`Respondent No.     2′s account consists of two pay-in slips of
the concerned  branch of  Central Bank of India. Whether the
two amounts  came from    the funds  of the  Patna  Urban     Co-
operative Bank    or not    and whether they were really paid as
bribe amounts  or not  would be aspects that will have to be
considered at the trial. However, as pointed out earlier the
offence under  s. 5 (1) (d) would even otherwise be complete
if pecuniary  advantage     (by  way  of  scuttling  the  civil
liability of surcharge) was conferred on Nawal Kishore Sinha
and others. If Respondent No.2 has to face the trial then in
a case    where conspiracy  has been charged no withdrawal can
be permitted  against Respondent No. 3 and Respondent No. 4.
In arriving  at the  conclusion that  paucity of evidence is
not a  valid ground  for withdrawal  from the prosecution in
regard to  Respondents Nos.  2, 3 and 4. I have deliberately
excluded from  consideration  the  debatable  evidence    like
confessional statements of the approvers
103
etc. (credibility  and effect whereof would be for the trial
court  to  decide)  said  to  have  been  collected  by     the
allegedly   over-zealous    investigating   officers   after
Respondent No. 2 went out of power in 1977.
There is  yet another  legal infirmity attaching to the
executive function  of the  Public Prosecutor as well as the
supervisory judicial function of the trial court which would
vitiate the  final order.  As  per  the     charge-sheet  filed
against them  respondents Nos.    2, 3 and 4 were said to have
committed offences  under ss.  420/466/417/109/120-B, I.P.C.
and under  ss. 5  (1) (a),  (b) and 5 (1) (d) read with s. 5
(2) of    the Corruption    of Prevention Act, 1947 and gravaman
of the    charge against    the respondent    No 2 was that in his
capacity either as a Minister or the Chief Minister of Bihar
by corrupt  of illegal    means or  by otherwise    abusing     his
position as  a public  servant he,  in conspiracy  with     the
other accused and with a view to protect Nawal Kishore Sinha
in particular,    sought to  subvert criminal  prosecution and
surcharge proceedings against Nawal Kishore Sinha and others
and  either  obtained  for  himself  or     conferred  on    them
pecuniary advantage  to the  detriment of Patna Co-operative
Bank, its Members, depositors and creditors; in other words,
the principal charge against Respondent No. 2 was in respect
of the    offence of  criminal misconduct     under s.  5 (1) (d)
read with s. 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and
the offence  under s.  5 (1)  (c) was  nowhere mentioned  or
referred to.  The difference  between s.  5 (1) (d) (bribery
amounting to  criminal mis-conduct) and s. 5 (1) (c) (breach
of trust  amounting to criminal mis-conduct) is substantial,
each having different ingredients but in the application for
withdrawal filed  by Shri  Lalan Prasad     Sinha on 17th June,
1981 he     stated that  withdrawal  from    the  prosecution  in
Vigilance Case No. 9 (2) 78 was sought in respect of several
offences including the offence of criminal mis-conduct under
s. 5  (1) (c)  read with  s. 5    (2)  of     the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act    and through out the application there was no
reference to  the offence of criminal mis-conduct under s. 5
(1) (d)     read with s. 5 (2) of the said Act. In other words,
an offence  under s. 5 (1) (c) read with s. 5 (2) with which
Respondent No.    2 had  never been  charged was mentioned and
the offence under s. 5 (1) (d) read with s. 5 (2) with which
he was principally charged was completely omitted. Obviously
submissions contained  in the  application as  well as those
that were  made at  the hearing     before the  Court  were  in
relation to  the offence  of s.     5 (1)    (c) and not s. 5 (1)
(d). Similarly the learned Special Judge while granting the
104
requisite permission  has also referred to the offence under
s. 5  (1) (c)  and not    s. 5  (1) (d)  of the  Prevention of
Corruption Act    in his    order and  obviously the  permission
granted must  be regarded as having been given in respect of
an offence with which Respondent No. 2 had not been charged,
completely ignoring  the offence  under s.  5 (1)  (d)    with
which he  had mainly  been charged.  This state     of  affairs
brings out  a clear and glaring non-application of mind both
on the    part of     the Public  Prosecutor as  also the learned
Special Judge while dealing with the issue of withdrawal; in
the  High   Court  also     there    is  no    improvement  in     the
situation. This     must lead  to the  quashing of the impugned
withdrawal from the prosecution.
Having regard  to the  aforesaid discussion it is clear
that the  impugned withdrawal  was not    justified either  on
merits or  in law  and being  illegal has  to be  quashed. I
would, therefore,  allow the appeal set aside the withdrawal
order and  direct that    Vigilance P. S. Case No. 9 (2) 78 be
proceeded with the disposed of in accordance with law.
BAHARUL ISLAM, J. This is an appeal by special leave by
Shri Sheonandan     Paswan, who  intervened in  an     application
under Section  321 of  the Code     of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter `the  Code’) pending  before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate-cum-Special Judge, Patna. The material background
facts may be narrated thus:
2. The  appellant is  a member of the Bihar Legislative
Assembly and belongs to the Lok Dal Party. Respondent No. 2,
Dr. Jagannath  Mishra, is  currently the  Chief Minister  of
Bihar ;     and Respondent     No. 4,     Shri Jiwanand    Jha  at     the
relevant time  was a  close associate  of Respondent  No. 2.
Respondent No.    3, Shri Naval Kishore Sinha, who started the
Patna Urban  Cooperative Bank  (hereinafter `the  Bank’) and
became its  Chairman, had been a colleague of Respondent No.
2 in  the Legislative  Council of Bihar. In 1972, respondent
No. 2  became Minister    for Cooperation     and Agriculture. On
June  18,   1974,  the    Sub  Divisional     Co-operative  Audit
Officer, Patna,     submitted his    audit report  of the Bank in
respect     of   the  year      1972-73  alleging   a     number      of
irregularities in  the affairs    of the    Bank. The report was
submitted to the Co-operative Department whereupon the Joint
Registrar, Cooperative    Audit Department,  recommended legal
action    against      the  Directors  of  the  Bank.  The  legal
assistant of the Department submitted a
105
draft prosecution  report prepared  by the Public Prosecutor
with a    suggestion that     the Registrar    of  the     Cooperative
Department should  obtain the  opinion of the Law Department
on the    draft prosecution  report. The    Registrar agreed  to
send the  draft prosecution report to the law Department but
expressed  desire   that  the  Minister     in  charge  of     the
Cooperative Department    should see  the report.     Accordingly
the file  was endorsed    to the    Minister in  charge  of     the
Cooperative Department.     The then Chief Minister, Shri Abdul
Gafoor, signed    it by way of agreement with the Registrar to
obtain the  advice of  the Law    Department and    approved the
First  Information   Report  (FIR).  The  Secretary  of     the
Cooperative Department    then requested the Public Prosecutor
to amend  the draft FIR which was sent to the Law Department
for opinion.  The Law  Department returned  the file  to the
Cooperative Department stating that it had already given its
opinion and  that it was not its duty to file complaint. The
file was  then endorsed     to the Additional Public Prosecutor
for necessary  action. Respondent No. 2 who was the Minister
in charge  of Irrigation  and Agriculture also wanted to see
the file  along with  the audit     report before the complaint
was actually  filed. The  Cooperation Minister    endorsed the
file to     the Chief  Minister, Shri Gafoor, with his comments
that the  file might be sent to the Irrigation Minister. The
Secretary,  Cooperative,  requested  the  Additional  Public
Prosecutor  to    release     the  file,  with  the    endorsement,
“filing of  complaint may  await further  instructions”. The
Additional Public Prosecutor sent the file to the Secretary,
Co-operative, through  a special messenger with a request to
return the  file after    perusal by  the Chief Minister (Shri
Gafoor). The  Secretary, Cooperative  Department,  sent     the
file to     the Minister of Cooperation with his remarks, inter
alia, “para 4:-Law Deptt. have tendered their advice at page
13/N that  criminal case  made out against the Secretary and
other Directors of the bank should be filed.”
“Para 5: Chief Minister and Minister (Law) have desired
to see the file before complaints are actually lodged”. As a
result the  file was  recalled from  the  Additional  Public
Prosecutor.
The above    movement of  the file  was between  January,
1975 to February 24, 1975.
3. On  April 11,  1975,  there  was  a  change  in     the
Ministry  of   Bihar.  Chief  Minister,     Abdul    Gafoor,     was
replaced by Respondent
106
No. 2  as Chief     Minister and one Dr. Jawahar Hussain became
the Minister  of Cooperation. On May 16, 1975, the aforesaid
file was  put up  before the Chief Minister, who ordered for
taking strict  steps for  realisation of  the loans, failing
that for  starting surcharge  proceedings,  and     to  restore
normal conditions in the Bank after convening annual general
meeting and holding election.
Subsequently, the    said order  was covered by pasting a
piece of  paper containing  a fresh  order to which we shall
refer later.  On June  28, 1975     the Minister of Cooperation
wrote  to   the     Chief     Minister  that     the  buff-sheet  of
correspondence showed  that the     former Chief Minister (Shri
Gafoor) postponed  the filing of the complaint and wanted to
see the     file; and  as the  former Chief Minister had passed
the said  orders, it  was for  the  new     Chief    Minister  to
indicate the  next course  of action in the case. Respondent
No. 2  wrote on     the file that discussions had been held and
that there  was no need to file any case. On August 4, 1976,
the Chief Minister ordered for the prosecution of the office
bearers and  loanees of     the  bank  including  its  honorary
Secretary, Shri     K.P.  Gupta,  Manager,     Shri  M.A.  Haidari
(hereinafter `Haidari’) and the loan clerk.
4. There was a mid-term poll to the Lok Sabha in March,
1977. In  that poll,  the Congress  (I)     Government  at     the
Centre was  voted out of power and the Janata Government was
installed with    Shri Morarji Desai as the Prime Minister and
Chaudhury Charan  Singh     as  the  Home    Minister.  In  April
following, the    Patna  Secretariat  Non-gazetted  Employees’
Association submitted  a  25  point  representation  against
Respondent No. 2 to the Prime Minister and the Home Minister
of the Union Government apprising them of the irregularities
of the    Bank. In June following, the Congress (I) Government
of Bihar  headed by  Respondent No. 2 was replaced by Janata
Government  headed   by     Shri    Karpoori  Thakur.  The    said
Employees’ Association    on July     9, 1977 submitted a copy of
the representation  to the new Chief Minister, Shri Karpoori
Thakur, with  a request     for  making  an  enquiry  into     the
allegations by an Enquiry Commission. The representation was
endorsed by  the State    Government to  the Inspector General
(Vigilance)  for   a  preliminary   probe.  Eventually     the
preliminary  inquiry   was  entrusted    to  the     then  Joint
Secretary, Shri D.N. Sahay.
5. The  Union Home     Minister, Chaudhury  Charan  Singh,
wrote a     D.O. letter  to the  Chief Minister  of Bihar, Shri
Karpoori
107
Thakur, saying    that as per Code of Conduct, 1964, the Prime
Minister had  to look  into  a    complaint  against  a  Chief
Minister or  an ex-Chief Minister and obtain comments of the
Chief Minister    in the    first instance    and then  decide the
course of  action. On  25.7.1977, Joint Secretary, Shri D.N.
Sahay, submitted his preliminary report and recommended that
the Home  Ministry of  the Government  of  India  should  be
informed of the proposed course of action and suggested that
before ordering     detailed inquiry,  it was essential to take
concurrence of    the Union Home Minister. The Chief Minister,
however, on  23.8.1977, discussed  the matter with the Chief
Secretary `at  20.08 p.m.’  and ordered full enquiry without
the consent of, or intimation to, the Union Home Ministry.
On 1.9.1977, Joint Secretary, Shri D.N. Sahay, wrote to
the Special  Secretary    regarding  the    charge    No.  8    that
related to  the Bank  that as  a Commission  of Enquiry     had
already been  instituted, he  doubted the  desirability of a
vigilance inquiry. The Chief Minister, Shri Karpoori Thakur,
opined    that   the  materials  collected  by  the  Vigilance
Department would  be used  by the  Commission. On 20.9.1977,
the Joint  Secretary, Shri D.N. Sahay, again referred to the
Conduct Rules  of 1964 for Ministers and Chief Ministers and
suggested that    necessary notes     by Chief Minister should be
sent to     the Union  Home Minister  for necessary  orders for
inquiry. Then  on 17.10.1977,  Chief Minister, Shri Karpoori
Thakur, who  had written a D.O. letter to the Home Minister,
Chaudhury  Charan  Singh,  regarding  the  allegations    with
regard    to   the  Bank     again    suggested  that     although  a
Commission of  Enquiry had  been  appointed,  the  Vigilance
inquiry     might    continue,  as  the  materials  collected  by
vigilance might be used by the Commission.
In October,  1977, Shri S.B. Sahay was posted as D.I.G.
(Vigilance) by    the Chief Minister, Shri Karpoori Thakur. On
7.11.1977, Shri S.B. Sahay ordered for inquiry on all points
without obtaining  consent of  the Union  Home Ministry     and
without waiting for further orders.
In November,  1977, one  Shri D.P.     Ojha was  posted as
S.P., Vigilance,  by the Chief Minister, Shri Thakur and the
inquiry was endorsed to Shri Ojha.
6. It  has been  alleged by  the  respondents  that  in
January, 1978,    some Inspectors     of the     CID  like  Raghubir
Singh, Sharda
108
Prasad Singh,  Ram Dahin  Sharma and others were transferred
to Vigilance  Department and  they were     responsible for the
investigation of the major portions of the case in question,
and that  all the  criminal cases  investigated     by  D.S.Ps.
(CID), Bihar,  relating to  the     Bank  were  transferred  to
Vigilance Department  and placed  under the  charge  of     the
Inspector, Shri     Raghubir Singh. Haidari, aforesaid, who had
been an accused of Kadam Kuan P.S. case and arrested and who
had made  a confessional  statement was     rearrested  by     the
investigating officer,    Shri Raghubir  Singh  on  22.1.1978.
Haidari made  a second confession implicating Respondent No.
2 for  the first time. On 26.1.1978, A.K. Sinha who was also
rearrested made     a  confession.     On  28.1.1978.     D.P.  Ojha,
aforesaid,  submitted    his  inquiry   report    recommending
institution of    criminal cases    against Respondent No. 2 and
others. Similar     recommendations were also made by Shri S.B.
Sahay, aforesaid,  and also  by the I.G. Vigilance. The file
was  then  referred  to     the  Advocate    General,  Shri    K.D.
Chatterjee, appointed  by the Karpoori Thakur Government. On
31.1.1978, the Chief Minister, Shri Thakur, approved it with
the direction  to hand over the file to Shri S.B. Sahay, who
in turn, endorsed it to Shri D.P. Ojha for investigation and
institution of    the case.  On 1.2.1978,     Shri Ojha  directed
Shri R.P.  Singh, Additional S.P. to institute a case. After
having obtained     sanction of  the Governor,  a criminal case
was instituted    on 1.2.1978  by the  Vigilance Police and on
19.2.1979  a   charge-sheet  was   submitted   against     the
respondents and others.
7.     On   26.2.1979,  one    Shri  Awadesh    Kumar  Datta
(hereinafter `A.K.  Datta’), a    Senior Advocate of the Patna
High Court  was appointed  Special Public  Prosecutor by the
Karpoori Thakur     Government to    conduct     the  two  vigilance
cases against Respondent No. 2.
8. On  21.11.1979, the  Chief Judicial  Magistrate-cum-
Special Judge, Patna, took cognizance of the case.
9. Shortly thereafter, there was a change of Government
in Bihar  and Respondent  No. 2     became the  Chief  Minister
again. On  10.6.1980, the  State Government  took  a  policy
decision that  criminal cases  launched     “out  of  political
vendetta”  in    1978-79     and  cases  relating  to  political
agitation be withdrawn.
10. On  24.2.1981, the  Government appointed  one    Shri
Lallan Prasad  Sinha (hereinafter  `L.P. Sinha’)  as Special
Public Prosecutor
109
along with  three others vide letter No. C./Mis-8-43 J dated
24.2.1981.
On the  following day (25.2.1981), the Secretary to the
Government  of     Bihar    wrote    a  letter  to  the  District
Magistrate informing  him about     the policy  decision of the
Government to  withdraw from  prosecution of  two  vigilance
cases including     the case  in hand,  namely, Vigilance    P.S.
Case No.  9(2)78. The  letter is at page 85 of Vol. I of the
Paper Book and reads thus:
“Letter No. MW 26-81, J.
Government of Bihar,
Law (Justice) Department
From
Shri Ambika Prasad Sinha,
Secretary to Government, Patna.
To
The District Magistrate,
Patna.
Patna, dated 25th February, 1981.
Subject:    The withdrawal    of Vigilance  P.S. Case     No.
9(2)78
and Case No. 53(8)78 in connection with
Sir,
I am    directed to  say that  the State  Government
have decided  to withdraw    from prosecution  the above-
mentioned    two   criminal    cases    on  the     grounds  of
inexpediency of  prosecution for  reasons of  State and
public policy.
You are, therefore, requested to direct the public
Prosecutor to  pray the Court after himself considering
for the withdrawal of the above mentioned two cases for
the above    reasons under  Section 321  of the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure.
Please acknowledge  receipt of the letter and also
intimate this Department about the result of the action
taken.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/- Illegible
110
Secretary to Government,
Patna.
Memo No. MW 26/81, 1056 J.
Patna, dated 25th February, 1981.
Copy forwarded to Vigilance Department for information.
Sd/- Illegible
Secretary to Government, Bihar.
Patna”. (emphasis added)
11. Accordingly, on 17.6.1981, Shri L.P. Sinha filed an
application under section 321 of the Code.
On 20.6.1981,  the Special     Judge passed  the  impugned
order giving his consent to withdraw the case.
12. It  may be  noted at  this stage  that     before     the
impugned  order      was  passed,     the  appellant      filed      an
application under  section 302    of the    Code and the learned
Judge held  that the  appellant had  no locus  standi in the
matter. The  appellant then filed a criminal revision before
the  High  Court  and  the  High  Court     after    hearing     the
appellant,  by    its  order  dated  14.9.1981,  rejected     the
revision petition  and    affirmed  the  order  of  withdrawal
passed by the Special Judge.
13. Hence    this appeal  by special     leave    against     the
order of the High Court in the criminal revision.
14. Shri  Venugopal, learned  counsel appearing for the
appellant formulated three points before us:
(1)  That the  permission accorded by the Special Judge
to withdraw the case in question was contrary to a
series  of   decisions  of   this  Court   and  is
unsustainable.
(2)  That Shri  L.P. Sinha who had made the application
under section     321 of     the Criminal Procedure Code
was not  the Public  Prosecutor in  charge of     the
case.
(3)  That in  the facts  and circumstances of the case,
Shri L.P.  Sinha could  not and  did not  function
independently.
111
Shri Prasaran, learned Solicitor General, appearing for
Respondent No.    1, the    State of  Bihar, on  the other hand,
submitted,
(1)  that the institution of the case was the result of
political vendetta  and the  vendetta had vitiated
the investigation of the case;
(2)  that Shri  L.P. Sinha was the Public Prosecutor in
charge of  the case  and was competent to make the
application under section 321 of the Code and that
his appointment cannot be collaterally challenged;
and
(3)  that the  impugned order  of the Special Judge was
legally valid.
15. The  first point  for decision is whether Shri L.P.
Sinha was  the Public  Prosecutor in  charge of     the case as
required by Section 321 of the Code. Section 321 of the Code
reads (material portion only):
“321.     Withdrawal   from  prosecution-The   Public
Prosecutor  or   Assistant  Public  Prosecutor  in
charge of  a case  may, with    the consent  of     the
Court,  at   any  time   before  the    judgment  is
pronounced, withdraw    from the  prosecution of any
person either     generally or  in respect of any one
or more  of the  offences for     which he  is tried;
and, upon such withdrawal.-
(a)  if it  is  made    before    a  charge  has    been
framed, the  accused shall  be discharged  in
respect of such offence or offences;
(b)  if it is made after a charge has been framed,
or  when      under     this    Code  no  charge  is
required, he shall be acquitted in respect of
such offence or offences:
Provided that……………….
Three of the essential requirements of section 321 are:
(1)  that    a  Public  Prosecutor  or  Assistant  Public
Prosecutor  is   the    only   competent  person  to
withdraw from the prosecution of a person;
(2)  that he must be in charge of the case;
112
(3)  that the  withdrawal is  permissible only with the
consent of  the Court     (before which    the case  is
pending).
As stated    above, Shri A.K. Datta was appointed Special
Public Prosecutor  for conducting  the case in question vide
order under  letter No.     C/Special/04/79  which     reads    thus
(material portion only):
“Letter No. C/Special/04/79
Government of Bihar
Law (Justice) Department
From
Shri Yogehwar Gope,
Under Secretary to the Government of Bihar.
To
Shri R.N. Sinha,
District Magistrate, Patna.
Patna, dated February, 1979.
Subject:  Appointment for conducting Vigilance P.S.
Case No.     9 (2) 78 and 53 (8) 78 State Versus
Dr. Jagannath Mishra, ex-Chief Minister and
others.
Sir,
I am    directed to  say that  the State  Government
have   been pleased  to  appoint  Shri  Awadhesh  Kumar
Datta,   Senior Advocate,    Patna High Court, as Special
Public   Prosecutor for  conducting vigilance P.S. Case
Nos. 9  (2) 78  and 53  (8) 78  in which  Dr. Jagannath
Mishra, ex-Chief  Minister, is the main accused.
2. The  order for  appointing Junior Advocates for
assisting Shri Datta will be issued later.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-Yogeshwar Gope
Memo No. 1313, J, Patna dated 26th February, 1979
Copy    forwarded  to  Shri  Awadhesh  Kumar  Datta.
Senior Advocate, Patna High Court/Cabinet (Vigilance)
113
Deptt., Government     of Bihar, Patna for information and
necessary action.
Sd/-Yogeshwar Gope
Under Secretary to Government of
Bihar”.
Later on, in pursuance of para 2 of the said letter No.
C/Special 04/79     dated 26th  February, 1979,  by letter     No.
C/Misc.-8-43/78 J  dated 24th February, 1981, the Government
constituted a  panel of     lawyers to conduct vigilance cases.
This letter reads (material portion only):
“Letter No. C/Mis-8-43/78 J.
Government of Bihar,
Law (Justice) Department.
From
Shri Ambika Prasad Sinha,
Secretary to Government, Bihar
To
The District Magistrate, Patna
Patna, dated February 24, 1981.
Subject:    Constitution of     the panel  of    lawyers     for
conducting  cases   pertaining  to  Vigilance
Department.
Sir,
I am    directed to  say that  for  conducting    case
pertaining      to   Vigilance   Department,     the   State
Government,  by   cancelling  the     panel    of   lawyers
constituted under    Law (Justice)  Department letter No.
5240  J.    dated  19.8.1978,   have  been     pleased  to
constitute a  panel of  the following  four lawyers  in
place of the previous panel.
(1)  Sri Ramjatan Singh,
Salimpur Ahra, Patna-3.
(2)  Sri Bindeshwari Prasad Singh, Advocate,
Lalji Tola, Patna-1.
114
(3)  Sri Kamla Kanta Prasad, Advocate Road
No. 2D, Rajendranagar, Patna.
(4)  Sri Lalan Prasad Sinha, Advocate, Sarda
Sadan, Saidpur, Nala Road, Patna-4.
2…………..
3.      This    order  shall  be  effective  with  immediate
effect.
4………..
Yours faithfully.
Sd/-Illegible
Secretary to Government.
Memo No. 1043 J., Patna dated 24th February, 1981.
Copy forwarded  to Sri  Ram Jatan Singh, Advocate,
Salimpur, Ahra,  Patna-3, Sri Bindeshwari Prasad Singh,
Advocate, Lalji  Tola, Patna-1, Sri Kamla Kanta Prasad,
Advocate, Road  No. 2D,  Rajendra Nagar,  Patna-16, Sri
Lallan Prasad  Sinha, Advocate,  Sharda Sadan, Saidpur,
Nala Road, Patna for information and necessary action.
2.     Cabinet  (Vigilance)  Department  is  requested  to
inform the lawyers of the old panel about this order.
Sd/-Illegible
Secretary to Government, Bihar”.
It is  evident from  the last quoted letter that Shri L
P. Sinha was appointed a Public Prosecutor.
16. The  State Government    may appoint a Special Public
Prosecutor under  sub-section (8)  of Section 24 of the Code
for the     purpose of  any case  or classes  of cases.  Public
Prosecutor has been defined under clause (u) of Section 2 of
the Code as:
“2(u)-”Public Prosecutor”    means any  person  appointed
under Section     24, and  includes any person acting
under the directions of a Public Prosecutor,,
In the  case of  State of    Punjab v.  Surjit Singh     and
another,(1) a  Bench of five Judges of this Court considered
the provisions of
115
Section 492  to     495  of  the  old  Code  dealing  with     the
appointment of Public Prosecutor. The Court observed:
“Public  Prosecutors   are     appointed   by     the   State
Government under section 492(1) or by the District
Magistrate or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, under
sub-section (2)  of section  492. The appointment,
under sub-section  (1) of  section 492  can  be  a
general appointment  or for  a particular case, or
for any  specified class  of cases,  in any  local
area. Under  this provision  more than one officer
can be  appointed as    Public    Prosecutors  by     the
State     Government.   Under  sub-section  (2),     the
appointment of  the Public  Prosecutor is only for
the purpose of a single case. There is no question
of a general appointment of the Public Prosecutor,
under sub-section (2). Therefore, it will be seen,
that a  Public Prosecutor  or Public    Prosecutors,
appointed either  generally, or  for any  case, or
for any  specified classes  of cases,     under    sub-
section (2),    are all Public Prosecutors under the
Code”.
There cannot  be any  doubt, therefore, that Shri L.P. Sinha
was a  Public Prosecutor validly appointed under sub-section
(8) of section 24 of the Code.
But what  was submitted  by the appellant was that Shri
L.P. Sinha  could  not    be  appointed  a  Public  Prosecutor
without the  appointment of  Shri  A.K.     Datt,    having    been
terminated first. It was not the contention of the appellant
that the  appointment  of  Shri     L.P.  Sinha  was  otherwise
invalid.
17. The  answer to     this contention  is this, Shri A.K.
Datta had  at no  point of  time come  forward to  make     any
grievance  at    any  stage   of     the  case,  either  at     the
appointment of    Shri L P. Sinha as Special Public Prosecutor
or in  the latter’s conduct of the case; nor Shri L.P. Sinha
whose appointment  and right  to make  an application  under
section 321  of the Code have been challenged, is before us.
His   appointment   cannot   be      collaterally     challenged,
particularly in     an application     under Article    136  of     the
Constitution.
The  appointment    of  Shri   L.P.     Sinha    without     the
termination of    the appointment of Shri A.K. Datta, might at
best be     irregular or  improper, but  cannot be     said to  be
legally invalid. The doctrine
116
of de  facto jurisdiction which has been recognised in India
will operate in this case. In the case of Gokaraju Rangaraju
etc. v.     State of  Andhra Pradesh  (1) to  which one  of  us
(Baharul Islam, J.) was a party, it has been held:
“The doctrine     is now     well established  that ‘the
acts of  the Officers de facto performed by them within
the scope    of their  assumed official authority, in the
interest the  public or third persons and not for their
own benefit,  are generally as valid and binding, as if
the were the acts of officers de jure”.
The judgment  referred, with approval, to the following
observations-made in  the case    of New Zealand and Norton v.
Shelby Country decided by the United States Supreme Court-
“Where an  office exists under the law, it matters
not how  the appointment  of the  incumbent is made, so
far as  the validity  of his  acts are concerned. It is
enough that  he is     clothed with  the insignia  of     the
office, and  exercises its     powers and  function..     The
official acts  of such  persons are recognised as valid
on grounds     of public policy, and for the protection of
these having official business to transact”.
This Court     in Gokaraju’s case (supra) also quoted with
approval the following passage from Colley’s ‘Constitutional
Limitation’:
“An intruder    is one    who attempts  to perform the
duties of    an office  without  authority  of  law,     and
without the support of public acquiscence-
No one is under obligation to recognise or respect
the acts  of an  intruder, and  for all  legal purposes
they are absolutely void. But for the sake of order and
regularity, and  to prevent confusion in the conduct of
public business  and in  security of private right, the
acts of  officers de  facto  are  not  suffered  to  be
questioned because     of  the  want    of  legal  authority
except by    some direct  proceeding instituted  for     the
purpose by the State or by some one claiming the
117
office de    jure, or  except  when    the  person  himself
attempts  to   build  up  some  right,  or     claim    some
privilege or  emolument, by reason of being the officer
which he  claims to  be. In all other cases the acts of
an Officer     de facto  are as valid and effectual, while
he is  suffered to retain the office, as though he were
an officer     by right,  and the  same legal consequences
will flow    from them  for the  protection of the public
and of  third parties. There is an important principle,
which finds  concise expression in the legal maxim that
the acts  of officers  de facto  cannot  be  questioned
collaterally”.
18. The next question is whether Shri L.P. Sinha was in
charge of  the case  as required by section 321 of the Code.
Shri L.P. Sinha was entrusted with and put in charge of, the
case in     question, namely,  Vigilance Case No. 9(2) 78, vide
Letter No.  1829 dated    25th February,    1981.  The  relevant
portion of the letter reads:
“Letter No. 1829
Bihar Government,
Cabinet (Vigilance) Department.
From
Shri Shivaji Sinha,
Special Secretary to Government.
To
Shri Lallan Prasad Sinha, Advocate,
Sharda Sadan, Sendpur,
Nala Road, Patna.
Patna, dated 25th February, 1981
Subject:- Panel  of Advocates  for—-cases  pertaining
to Vigilance Department.
Sir,
You have  also  been    appointed  as  Panel  Lawyer
relating to  the above  subject vide  letter  No.    1943
dated 24.2.1981  of the  Law Department. In many cases,
charge sheets have been submitted in the Court of Chief
Judicial
118
Magistrate-cum-Special Judge.  Out of  these cases     the
following cases  are allotted  to you  to work  for the
prosecution-
1.      Vigilance P.S. Case No. 9(2)78
2.      .   .      .   .      .   .      .
3.      .   .      .   .      .   .      .
4.      .   .      .   .      .   .      .
5.      .   .      .   .      .   .      .
Please take  necessary action     for the prosecution
in the  cases on  being  acquainted  with    the  present
position from the court.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-            Shivaji               Sinha
25.2.1981.
Special Secretary to Government”.
(emphasis added).
Shri L.P. Sinha had been appointed a Government counsel
on 24.2.1981 to conduct vigilance cases as stated above. The
application for withdrawal was made by him on 17.6.1981-more
than four  months later.  After having been appointed Public
Prosecutor, and     having been  put in charge of the Vigilance
P.S. Case  No. 9(2)78,    he appeared  in the  case  on  seven
dates, namely,    6.4.1981, 21.4.1981,  27.4.1981,  26.5.1981,
3.6.1981, 19.6.1981 and 20.6.1981. It has been stated in the
affidavit filed     by the     Secretary, Law     Department  of     the
State of  Bihar that  the order     disclosed that “no one else
appeared for  the prosecution” except Shri L.P. Sinha. There
is nothing on record to show whether in fact Shri A.K. Datta
did at    all accept  the appointment  as a Public Prosecutor.
The record  does not  show that     he took any steps at all in
the case.  Shri L.P.  Sinha could not have appeared on seven
different dates     during the course of 3 1/2 months and taken
steps in  it had he (A.K. Datta) been in charge of the case.
The learned  Special Judge  also has  found as a fact in his
judgment that  the application under section 321 of the Code
was made  “by  Shri  Lallan  Prasad  Sinha,  Special  Public
Prosecutor, in    charge of this case” (emphasis added). There
is, therefore, absolutely no doubt that at the relevant time
Shri L.P.
119
Sinha was in charge of the case, and not Shri A.K. Datta, as
submitted by the appellant. Shri L.P. Sinha was both de jure
and de facto Public Prosecutor in the case.
It     was  factually     wrong    that  Shri  L.P.  Sinha     was
appointed  only     to  withdraw  the  case,  as  submitted  by
appellant’s counsel.  Even if  he were,     there    was  nothing
illegal in  it (also  see 1931 Cal. 607). If Shri L.P. Sinha
fulfilled the  two conditions  as required by section 321 of
the Code,  namely, that     (i) he     was a Public Prosecutor and
(ii) was  in charge  of the  case, he was competent to apply
for withdrawal    of the    case, even  if he were appointed for
that purpose only.
19. The next question for decision is whether Shri L.P.
Sinha functioned  independently. The  appellant’s submission
is that     Shri L.P. Sinha acted as directed by the Government
to make     the application  for withdrawal and himself did not
apply his mind.
Section 321  of the  Code enables the Public Prosecutor
or Assistant  Public Prosecutor     in  charge  of     a  case  to
withdraw from the prosecution with the consent of the Court.
The appellant submits, in our opinion correctly, that before
an application    is made     under section    321 of the Code, the
Public Prosecutor  has to apply his mind to the facts of the
case independently  without being  subject  to    any  outside
influence; and    secondly, that    the Court  before which     the
case is     pending cannot give its consent to withdraw without
itself applying     its mind  to the  facts of the case. But it
cannot be  said that  a Public    Prosecutor’s action  will be
illegal if he receives any communication or instruction from
the Government.
Let us  consider the  point from the practical point of
view. Unlike  the Judge,  the Public  Prosecutor is  not  an
absolutely independent    officer. He  is an  appointee of the
Government, Central  or State (see ss. 24 and 25 Crl. P.C.),
appointed for  conducting in  Court any prosecution or other
proceedings on    behalf of the Government concerned. So there
is the relationship of counsel and client between the Public
Prosecutor and    the Government.     A Public  Prosecutor cannot
act  without   instructions  of      the  Government  a  Public
Prosecutor cannot  conduct a  case absolutely on his own, or
contrary to  the instruction  of  his  client,    namely,     the
Government. Take  an extreme  hypothetical  case,  in  which
Government is  the prosecutor, and in which there is a prima
facie case
120
against an  accused, but  the Government feels on the ground
of public  policy, or  on the ground of law and order, or on
the  ground   of  social   harmony,  or     on  the  ground  of
inexpediency of     prosecution for  reasons of State, the case
should    not  be     proceeded  with;  the    Government  will  be
justified  to  express    its  desire  to     withdraw  from     the
prosecution and     instruct  the    Public    Prosecutor  to    take
necessary legal     steps to  withdraw  from  the    prosecution.
Section 321  of the  Code does not lay any bar on the Public
Prosecutor to  receive any  instruction from  the Government
before he  files an  application under    that section. If the
Public Prosecutor  receives such  instructions, he cannot be
said to act under extraneous influence. On the contrary, the
Public Prosecutor  cannot file an application for withdrawal
of  a    case  on   his    own  without  instruction  from     the
Government.
Now in  the above    hypothetical case, if the Government
gives instructions  to a  Public Prosecutor to withdraw from
the prosecution     of a  case, the  latter has  the  following
courses open to him:
(i)  He can  blindly file the petition without applying
his mind  to the  facts of  the case.     This is not
contemplated by Section 321 of the Code;
(ii) He may,  himself, apply  his mind  to the facts of
the case,  and may  agree with the instructions of
the Government  and file  the petition stating the
grounds   of     withdrawal.   This   is   what      is
contemplated by  the section    and has been done in
this case; or
(iii)He may tell the Government, “It is a good case for
the prosecution;  conviction is almost sure; and I
do not  agree with  you that    the case  should  be
withdrawn, I    am not    going to file a petition for
withdrawal.” In  that event, the Public Prosecutor
will have  to return    the  brief  and     perhaps  to
resign. For,    it is the Government, not the Public
Prosecutor, who  is in the know of larger interest
of the State.
20. Let  us now see if Shri L.P. Sinha applied his mind
to the    facts of the case before he made the application. He
made the following application before the Court:
“IN THE COURT OF THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE,
PATNA
Withdrawal Case No.—-of 1981
121
In Vigilance P.S. Case No. 9(2)78.
The  humble  petition     on  behalf  of     the  Public
Prosecutor for withdrawal of the Vigilance of P.S. Case
No. 9(2)78     under section    321 of    the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
Most respectfully shewth :
1.   That this is an application for withdrawal of
Vigilance P.S. Case No. 9(2)78 which has been
charge-sheeted under sections 466/120B/109 of
the Indian  Penal Code  and sections 5(1)(a),
5(1)(b), 5(1)(c)     read with  section 5(2)  of
the Prevention  of Corruption Act against Dr.
J.N.  Mishra,  Shri  Jivanand  Jha  and    Shri
N.K.P. Sinha.
2.   That  since   the  prosecution  of  the    case
involves the  questions of  momentous  public
policy of  the Government, which may have its
consequences of    wide magnitude affecting the
larger issue  of public    interest  also,     the
desirability  of      the  continuance   of     the
prosecution was    broadly examined both by the
State Government     and also  by me. Keeping in
view  (a)  lack    of  prospect  of  successful
prosecution in the light of evidence, (b) the
implication of  the persons  as a  result  of
political  and  personal     vendetta,  (c)     the
inexpediency  of      the  prosecution  for     the
reasons of  the State  and public policy, (d)
the adverse  effects that the continuation of
the  prosecution      will     bring     on   public
interests  in   the  light   of    the  changed
situation,   and       after   giving    anxious
considerations and  full deliberations, I beg
to file this application to withdraw from the
prosecution of  all the    persons involved  in
the aforesaid case:
3.   That I have, therefore, gone through the case
diary and  the relevant    materials  connected
with the case and have come to the conclusion
that in    the circumstances  prevailing at the
time of    institution  of     the  case  and     the
investigation thereof,  it appears  that     the
case  was   instituted  on   the     ground      of
political vendetta and only to defame
122
the fair     image of  Dr. J.N.  Mishra, who was
then the     leader of the opposition and one of
the  acknowledged  leaders  of  the  Congress
party in the country. The prosecution was not
launched in  order to advance the interest of
public  justice.      I  crave  leave  to  place
materials in  support of the above submission
and conclusion  at the  time of    moving    this
petition.
4.   That  it     is  in     public     interest  that     the
prosecution which has no reasonable chance of
success and  has been launched as a result of
political  vendetta   unconnected  with     the
advancement of  the cause  of public  justice
should not  proceed further.  More so, as the
same is    directed against  the  head  of     the
Executive in  whom not  only  the  electorate
have put     their faith and confidence, but who
has been elected leader of the majority party
in the  legislature, both  events have  taken
place after the institution of the case.
It is, therefore, prayed that your honour would be
pleased  to  grant     permission  to     withdraw  from     the
prosecution of  the persons  accused in  case and    your
honour may further be pleased to pass further orders in
conformity with section 321 of the Code of the Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
And for this the petitioner shall ever pray.”
A mere  perusal of     the  above  application  abundantly
shows that  Shri L.P.  Sinha did apply his mind to the facts
of the    case ;    he perused  “the Case Diary and the relevant
materials connected  with  the    case”  before  he  made     the
application. He     did not  blindly quote     from the Government
letter No.  M/26-81 J.    dated 25th  February,  1981  (quoted
above) which contained only one ground namely, “inexpediency
of prosecution    for reasons  of State  and public policy”. A
comparison of  the contents of this letter with the contents
of the    application under section 321 of the Code completely
negatives the  appellant’s contention  that Shri  L.P. Sinha
did not himself apply his mind independently to the facts of
the  case   and     that    he  blindly   acted  on      extraneous
considerations.
123
As a proof of non-application of the mind of the Public
Prosecutor, learned counsel pointed out that Shri L.P. Sinha
mentioned in  his petition  inter alia    Section     5(1)(c)  in
place of  Section 5(1)(d)  of the  Prevention of  Corruption
Act. In     our opinion,  in the  background of the case, it is
too insignificant an error to be taken note of.
21.  The appellant then submits that the Court erred in
giving its  consent for     withdrawal as    there was  a triable
case before  it. The  submission is  misconceived. What     the
Court has  to do  under section     321 is     to see     whether the
application discloses  valid ground  of withdrawal-valid  as
judicially laid down by this Court.
Learned counsel  cited the     following decisions of this
Court reported    in State  of Bihar  v. Ram Naresh Pandey(1),
State of  Punjab v. Surjit Singh and Ors.(2), M.N.S. Nair v.
P.V. Balakrishnan  & Ors.(3),  Bansi Lal  v. Chandan Lal(4),
State of  Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra and Ors.(5), Balwant
Singh and  Ors. v. State of Bihar(6), Rajindera Kumar Jain’s
case(7).
We need  not refer     to all     these decisions  except  to
Rajindra Kumar    Jain’s case (supra), hereinafter referred to
as “George  Fernandes’ Case”,  in as  much as, this decision
has considered all the earlier decisions, and summarised the
observations as under :
“Thus from the precedents of this Court; we gather,
(1)  Under the  Scheme of  the Code prosecution of
an  offender   for  a   serious    offence      is
primarily   the      responsibility   of     the
Executive.
(2)  The withdrawal  from the     prosecution  is  an
executive function of the Public Prosecutor.
(3)  The   discretion      to   withdraw      from     the
prosecution is  that of the Public Prosecutor
and none else, and
124
so, he  cannot surrender     that discretion  to
someone else.
(4)  The Government  may  suggest  to     the  Public
Prosecutor that    he  may     withdraw  from     the
prosecution but none can compel him to do so.
(5)  The Public  Prosecutor may  withdraw from the
prosecution  not     merely     on  the  ground  of
paucity of  evidence but     on  other  relevant
grounds as well in order to further the broad
ends of    public    justice,  public  order     and
peace. The  broad ends of public justice will
certainly   include    appropriate    social,
economic and  we add, political purposes Sans
Tammany Hall enterprise.
(6)  The Public  Prosecutor is  an officer  of the
Court and responsible to the Court.
(7)  The Court  performs a supervisory function in
granting its consent to the withdrawal.
(8)  The Court’s  duty is  not to reappreciate the
grounds which  led the  Public Prosecutor  to
request withdrawal  from the  prosecution but
to consider  whether  the  Public  Prosecutor
applied     his   mind   as   a   free   agent,
uninfluenced  by     irrelevant  and  extraneous
considerations. The  Court has a special duty
in  this      regard  as   it  is  the  ultimate
repository  of    legislative  confidence      in
granting     or   withholding  its     consent  to
withdraw     from  the  prosecution”.  (emphasis
added).
The Court in the above decision has also observed :
“Wherever issues involve the emotions and there is
a surcharge  of violence in the atmosphere it has often
been found     necessary to  withdraw from prosecutions in
order to  restore peace to free the atmosphere from the
surcharge    of  violence,  to  bring  about     a  peaceful
settlement of issues and to preserve the calm which may
follow the     storm. To  persist with  prosecutions where
emotive issues  are involved in the name of vindicating
the law  may  even     be  utterly  counterproductive.  An
elected Government, sensitive and
125
responsive to  the feelings and emotions of the people,
will be  amply justified if for the purpose of creating
an atmosphere  of goodwill     or for     the purpose  of not
disturbing a calm which has descended it decides not to
prosecute the  offenders involved    or  not     to  proceed
further with  prosecutions already     launched.  In    such
matters who  but the  Government, can and should decide
in the  first instance, whether it should be baneful or
beneficial to  launch or  continue prosecutions. If the
Government decides     that it  would     be  in     the  public
interest to  withdraw  from  prosecutions    how  is     the
Government to go about this task”.
The Court further observed :
“But where  such large  and  sensitive  issues  of
public policy  are     involved,  he    (Public     Prosecutor)
must, if  he is  right minded, seek advice and guidance
from the  policymakers. His  sources of information and
resources are  of a very limited nature unlike those of
the policy-makers. If the policy-makers themselves move
in the  matter in    the first  instance, as indeed it is
proper that  they should  where  matters  of  momentous
public policy  are involved,  and if  they     advise     the
Public Prosecutor    to withdraw from the prosecution, it
is not  for the  Court to    say that the initiative came
from the Government and therefore the Public Prosecutor
cannot be    said to     have exercised a free mind. Nor can
there be any quibbling over words”. (emphasis added).
This decision  is a  complete answer  to the contention
raised by  learned counsel  of the  appellant that a triable
case cannot be withdrawn. Paucity of evidence is only one of
the grounds of withdrawal.
22. Faced    with this decision learned counsel submitted
that the  case in  hand was  a    case  involving     common     law
offences while    George Fernandes  case (supra)    was  dealing
with political    offences, which     offences only, according to
counsel, can  be permitted to be withdrawn from prosecution.
We are unable to accept the submission. (Section 321 has not
dichotomised  into   common  law   offences  and   political
offences. The  Court held  in George Fernandes case (supra),
with respect  rightly, “to  say that  an  offence  is  of  a
political character is not to absolve the offenders of
126
the offence.  But the  question is, is it a valid ground for
the Government    to advise  the Public Prosecutor to withdraw
from the  prosecution”. (emphasis  added). The reason of the
absence of  any dichotomy in section 321 of the Code appears
to us  to be  the very    object of  the section.     What is the
necessity of this section. An offence is an offence. A trial
will end  in conviction     or acquittal of the accused. If the
offence is  compoundable, it  may be  compounded. But if the
offence     is  not  compoundable,     why  should  the  trial  be
withdrawn ?  How are offences under sections 121-A, 120-B of
the Penal  Code, and  sections 4,  5 and  6 of the Explosive
Substances Act,     1908 and  sections 5(3)  (b) and  12 of the
Indian Explosives  Act, 1884  (as in George Fernande’s case)
less    heinous        than     offences      under        sections
420/466/471/109/120B of     the Penal  Code and  5(1) (a), 5(1)
(b) and     5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (as in
this case) ? Are offences relating to security of State less
serious than  corruption ?  In our  view, the answers are in
the negative. The reverse appears to be truer.
In our  opinion, the  object of  section 321  Cr.    P.C.
appears to  be to  reserve power to the Executive Government
to withdraw  any criminal  case on  larger grounds of public
policy such  as inexpediency  of prosecutions for reasons of
State; broader    public interest     like maintenance of law and
order; maintenance  of public  peace  and  harmony,  social,
economic  and    political;  changed   social  and  political
situation;  avoidance    of  destabilization   of  a   stable
Government and    the like.  And such powers have been, in our
opinion, rightly  reserved for    the Government; for, who but
the Government    is  in    the  know  of  such  conditions     and
situations prevailing  in a  State or  in the  country ? The
Court is not in a position to know such situations.
23. In  George Fernandes, case (supra), the allegations
against     Shri  George  Fernandes,  who    later  on  became  a
Minister of  the Union    Government during the Janata regime,
where that  after the  proclamation of Emergency on June 25,
1975, Shri George Fernandes, Chairman of the Socialist Party
of India,  and Chairman     Railwaymen’s Federation,  sought to
arouse    resistence   against  the   said  Emergency  and  to
overthrow the  Government and that he committed various acts
in  pursuance  of  that     object.  The  investigating  agency
submitted a  charge sheet against Shri Fernandes and twenty-
four others  for offences  under section 121-A, 120-B, Penal
Code, read  with sections  4,  5  and  6  of  the  Explosive
Substances Act,     1908 and  sections 5(3)  (b) and  12 of the
Indian Explosives
127
Act, 1884.  Two of  the accused     persons had  been  tendered
pardon. They  had, therefore, to be examined as witnesses in
the  Court  of    the  Magistrate     taking     cognizance  of     the
offences  notwithstanding   the     fact    that  the  case     was
exclusively triable  by the  Court of Sessions. The evidence
of the    approver was recorded on March 22, 1977 and the case
was adjourned  to March 26, 1977 for further proceedings. At
that stage,  on March  26, 1977,  Shri N.S.  Mathur, Special
Public Prosecutor  filed an application under section 321 of
the Code,  for permission  to withdraw from the prosecution.
The application reads :
“It is  submitted on    behalf of the State as under
:-
1.     That  on   24.9.1976,    the  Special  Police
Establishment after necessary investigation had filed a
charge sheet  in this Hon’ble Court against Shri George
Mathew Fernandes  and twenty  four others    for offences
u/s 121A  IPC, 120B  IPC r/w sections 4, 5 and 6 of the
Explosive Substances  Act, 1908  and sections  5(3) (b)
and 12  of the  Indian Explosives    Act, 1884 as well as
the substantive offences.
2.   That besides the accused who were sent up for
trial, two     accused, namely,  Shri Bharat    C. Patel and
Rewati Kant  Sinha were  granted pardon  by the Hon’ble
Court and    were examined  as approvers  u/s 306 (4) Cr.
P.C.
3.  That out of 25 accused sent up for trial cited
in the  charge sheet,  two accused     namely, Ladli Mohan
Nigam and Atul Patel were declared proclaimed offenders
by the Hon’ble Court.
4.     That  in   public  interest   and   changed
circumstances the    Central Government  has     desired  to
withdraw from the prosecutions of all the accused.
5.  It is therefore prayed that this Hon’ble Court
may accord     consent to  withdraw from  (?) 26th  March,
1977.
Sd/-
(N.S. Mathur)
Special Public Prosecutor for
the State, New Delhi”
128
It is  seen that  the only     ground for  withdrawal     was
“public interest  and changed circumstances” as mentioned in
para 4 of the petition.
The Chief    Metropolitan Magistrate     granted his consent
for withdrawal    from the  prosecution on  the ground that it
was ‘expedient    to  accord  consent  to     withdraw  from     the
prosecution”, (emphasis     added). In revision, the High Court
affirmed the Magistrate’s order. The appeal by Special Leave
was dismissed  by this Court. In other words, an application
stating Government’s  desire to withdraw from prosecution on
the grounds of ‘public interest’ and ‘changed circumstances’
was held to be valid under section 321 Cr. P.C.
24. The  next question  for examination  is whether the
permission was    given by  the Special  Judge in violation of
law as    laid down  by this  Court in  this regard.  We    have
already referred  to the  decisions cited  by the appellant.
The law     laid down  by this Court in the series of decisions
referred to  above, inter  alia, is  (1) that the withdrawal
from the  prosecution is an executive function of the Public
Prosecutor and    that the  ultimate decision to withdraw from
the prosecution     is his; (2) that the Government may suggest
to the    public prosecutor  that a particular case may not be
proceeded with,     but nobody  can compel     him to     do so ; (3)
that not  merely inadequacy  of evidence, but other relevant
grounds such as to further the broad ends of public justice,
economic and  political; public     order and  peace are  valid
grounds for  withdrawal. The exercise of the power to accord
or withdraw  consent  by  the  Court  is  discretionary.  Of
course, it  has to  exercise the  discretion judicially. The
exercise of the power of the Court is judicial to the extent
that the Court, in according or refusing consent, has to see
(i) whether  the grounds  of withdrawal     are valid; and (ii)
whether the application is bona fide or is collusive. It may
be remembered  that the     order passed  by  the    Court  under
section 321  of the  Code, either  according or     refusing to
accord consent,     is not     appealable. A    mere perusal  of the
impugned order    of the    Special     Judge    shows  that  he     has
applied his  mind to  the facts of the case and also applied
his mind  to the  law laid  down by  this  Court  in  Geroge
Fernandes case    that has  summarised the  entire law  on the
point, and correctly applied them to the facts of this case.
It is  therefore not correct to say that the decision of the
Special Judge  was contrary  to the  law laid  down by    this
Court.
129
25. The  only other submission of the appellant is that
there is  a prima  facie case for trial by the Special Judge
and that this Court should send it back to him for trial. We
have held  above that  a criminal  proceeding with  a  prima
facie case  may     also  be  withdrawn.  Besides,     the  normal
practice of this Court in a criminal appeal by Special Leave
under Article  136 of  the Constitution     directed against an
order of conviction or acquittal is that this Court does not
peruse the  evidence on     record and re-appreciate it to find
whether findings  of facts  recorded by the Courts below are
correct or  erroneous, far  less does  it peruse  the Police
Diary to  see whether  adequate materials  were collected by
the investigating  agency. It  accepts the  findings of     the
Courts below  unless it     is shown  that the findings are the
results of  a wrong application of the principles of the law
and  that   the     impugned   order  has     resulted  in  grave
miscarriage of justice.
26. An  order under  section 321  of the  Code, in     our
opinion, does  not have     the same  status  as  an  order  of
conviction or  acquittal recorded  by a     trial or  appellate
Court in  a criminal prosecution, inasmuch as the former has
not been  made appealable. An order under section 321 of the
Code has  a narrower scope. As an order under section 321 of
the Code  recorded by  the trial  Court is judicial what the
trial Court  is expected  to  do  is  to  give    reasons     for
according or  refusing its  consent to    the  withdrawal.  As
stated above,  the duty     of the     Court is  to see  that     the
grounds of  withdrawal are legally valid and the application
made by     the Public  Prosecutor is  bona  fide    and  is     not
collusive. In  revision of an order under section 321 of the
Code, the  duty of  the     High  Court  is  to  see  that     the
consideration by  the trial  Court of  the application under
section 321  was not  misdirected and  that the     grounds  of
withdrawal are    legally valid. In this case, the trial Court
elaborately considered    the grounds  of withdrawal and found
them to     be valid  and accordingly  accorded its consent for
withdrawal. In revision the High Court affirmed the findings
of the trial Court.
We find  no justification    in this     appeal     by  Special
Leave to disturb the findings of the Courts below and peruse
the statements    of witnesses  recorded    or  other  materials
collected by the investigating officers during the course of
investigation.
27. Although  it does not arise out of the three points
formulated by  Mr. Venugopal  at the  start of his argument,
nor does it arise
130
out of the appellant’s petition opposing withdrawal, learned
counsel submitted  that there  was a  prima facie  case     for
trial by  the Special  Judge and the case should be remanded
to him    for trial. Let us examine that aspect also as it has
been argued at length.
Learned counsel  fairly concedes  that he does not take
much reliance  on oral evidence but takes strong reliance on
two pieces of documentary evidence, namely, alleged creation
of forged  documents by     Dr.  Mishra  and  the    confessional
statement of Haidari implicating Dr. Mishra.
Elaborate arguments were advanced by learned counsel of
the parties  on the  piece of  documentary  evidence  which,
according to the appellant’s counsel would form the basis of
conviction of  Respondent No.  2. That    documentary evidence
was that  Respondent No. 2 as Chief Minister passed an order
on 16-5-1975  in Hindi.     English translation  of this  order
reads as follows :
“Much time  has passed. On perusal of the file, it
appears that  there is  no     allegation  of     defalcation
against the  Chairman and    the Members  of the Board of
the Bank.    Stern action should be taken for realisation
of loans from the loanees and if there are difficulties
in realisation  from the loanees, surcharge proceedings
should be initiated against the Board of Directors. The
normal condition  be restored in the Bank after calling
the Annual General Meeting and holding the elections.”
According to  the appellant, Respondent No. 2 wrote the
following fresh order -
“Please issue     orders     for  restoring     the  normal
condition in  the Bank  after  holding  Annual  General
Meeting.
Sd/- Jaganath Mishra
14-5-75″
and pasted it over the earlier order.
According    to   the  appellant,  Respondent  No.  2  by
overwriting ’4′     (in (Hindi) on the original Hindi digit ’6′
changed the  date 16-5-1975  to 14-5-1975.  These facts have
not been denied by Respondent No. 2 before us.
131
The appellant’s submission was that by the above act of
antedating  by    over-writing.  Respondent  No.    2  committed
forgery, and  by pasting over the earlier order committed an
offence under  section    5  (1)    (d)  of     the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act    as by  that latter act he obtained pecuniary
advantage  to  Shri  Nawal  Kishore  Respondent     No.  3,  by
stopping the surcharge proceedings.
28. Before     proceeding  further,  it  is  pertinent  to
mention that  in his  application before  the Special Judge,
the appellant  did not find fault with any of the grounds of
withdrawal in the application filed by the Public Prosecutor
under section  321. His     only contention was that an attempt
was being  made by the Public Prosecutor to scuttle the case
and that  the Court should apply its independent mind before
according consent  to the  withdrawal and  that he should be
heard in  the matter.  He made    no mention of any forgery by
antedating or  by pasting  of any  earlier order and thereby
making any  attempt at    shielding of  any culprit.  He thus,
prevented the  Special Judge  and the High Court from giving
any finding on alleged forgery on the allegations of pasting
and antedating    and  thereby  depriving     us  also  from     the
benefits of such findings of the Courts below. This question
of fact     has now  been sought to be brought to the notice of
this Court  during the course of argument by learned counsel
of the    appellant in  this appeal.  A question    of fact that
needs investigation  cannot be    allowed to be raised for the
first time  in an  appeal by Special Leave under Article 136
of the Constitution.
29. Be  that as  it may, let us examine the contention.
But this  will not  be treated    as a  precedent. The  pasted
order containing the following:
(i)   The Chief  Minister’s finding  that there  was no
allegation of defalcation against the Chairman and
Members of the Board;
(ii) Direction  to take stern action for realisation of
the loans from the loanees;
(iii)Directions to     initiate surcharge  proceedings  in
case of difficulties in realisation;
(iv) Direction  to call  the annual  General Meeting of
the Bank and hold election in order to restore the
normal condition of the Bank.
132
Only the  portions against  (i), (ii)  and (iii)  above have
been covered  by pasting  the fresh  order which is but (iv)
above. The  appellant’s submission  is that  by covering the
first three directions, Respondent No. 2 shielded Respondent
No. 3  and others  from realizing  the due from the culprits
including Respondent  No. 3  or     from  initiating  surcharge
proceedings against  them. The    answer to  the contention is
three-fold:
(i) The  order of    surcharge by  the Chief     Minister is
unwarranted by    law. Section  40 of  the  Bihar     Cooperative
Societies Act,    1935 gives  power only    to the    Registrar to
initiate surcharge  proceedings. An  appeal  lies  from     his
order to  the State  Government     under    sub-section  (3)  of
section     40.   In  fact,   admittedly  Deputy  Registrar  of
Cooperative Societies  issued notices  of surcharge  against
Respondent No. 3 on 31-12-1975 when Respondent No. 2 himself
was the     Chief Minister).  If the  Chief Minister found that
his first  order was  unwarranted by  Law, it  was but right
that he cancelled his first order
(ii) On  a second    thought any  authority may bona fide
change his  mind and  decide that  restoration of the normal
condition of  the Bank by calling the annual General Meeting
and election  should be attended to first and realization of
the loans and surcharge proceedings later. Bona fide scoring
out the     order retaining  the last part, would constitute no
offence by  Respondent No. 2. Pasting an order by a piece of
paper  containing   another  order   prima   facie   appears
suspicious, but     pasting is the common practice in the Chief
Minister’s Secretariate     as revealed  by the  file  produced
before us.
(iii)  Antedating     simpliciter  is   no  offence.     Mr.
Venugopal advanced  an argument     on the     possible motive  of
antedating and    submitted that    the motive was to obliterate
any possible  action on     the first  order, The submission is
highly speculative and cannot be accepted.
In any  view, if  two interpretations are possible, one
indicating  criminal   intention  and  the  other  innocent,
needless to  say that  the interpretation  beneficial to the
accused must be accepted.
30. Confessional Statement of Haidari
As stated above, there was another vigilance case known
as Kadam  Quan P.S.  Case No.  97 (5)  J7  relating  to     the
officers of the
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Bank. It  was being  investigated by  the  Officers  of     the
Cooperative   Department but  abruptly it was transferred to
the Vigilance Department on 16-1-1978. In this case Haidari,
aforesaid, was    one of    the accused.  He was also one of the
accused in  the case  in hand,    but later  on, on  grant  of
pardon, he  turned an  approver     and  became  a     prosecution
witness. He was also being prosecuted in several other cases
on the    basis of  orders passed     by Respondent No. 2 on 4-8-
1976. In  the Kadam  Kuan case,     Haidari made a confessional
statement on  4-11-1976 but did not implicate Respondent No.
2. He  was re-arrested    on 22-1-1978  whereafter he  made  a
second    confessional   statement  on  24-1-1978,  this    time
implicating Respondent    No. 2  for the    first time  for     the
alleged offence     said to  have been  committed in  the years
1973 75.  As the Kadam Kuan case also related to the affairs
of the    Bank and  Haidari had  already made  a    confessional
statement, there  was no  need for  him     to  make  a  second
confessional statement    on 24-1-1978.  It may  be remembered
that on     that date,  Vigilance Case No. 9 (2) 78 had not yet
been registered     and Haidari was not an accused in this case
and therefore  it  cannot  be  said  that  the    confessional
statement on  which great  reliance has     been placed  by the
appellant was  a confessional  statement made by an accused.
This case  was registered at the Vigilance Police Station in
the morning  on     1-2-1978  and,     therefore,  to     give  legal
validity to the confessional statement it was shown recorded
in  Kadam  Kuan     case  No.  97    (5)  77.  This    confessional
statement is said to be the second confessional statement of
Haidari in  the same  Kadam Kuan  case. Haidari’s  so-called
confessional  statement      therefore  is      not  only   not  a
confessional statement    of a  co-accused but  it inspires no
confidence. On    the top     of it,     it was     the statement of an
accomplice turned approver, and is worthless.
31. The submission of the respondents that the criminal
case against  Respondent No.  1 is  the result    of political
vendetta has also to be considered.
(i)  The    first  circumstance   pointed  out   by     the
respondents in this regard is the unusual hurry in which the
file was moved. It has been stated in the affidavit filed on
behalf of the State of Bihar by Shri Bidhu Shekhar Banerjee,
Deputy     Superintendent      of   Police,     Cabinet   Vigilance
Department, that within the period of four days
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the inquiries  were completed,    advice obtained     and  orders
passed for instituting the case as follows:
“(i) The  Kadamkuan P.S.  Case No.  97 (5)  77 was
transferred to  Vigilance Department  by an order dated
9-1-1978 passed by Shri Karpoori Thakur, the then Chief
Minister.                       16-1-78
(ii) Confessions  of Shri  M.A.  Haidari  who     was
being prosecuted  in other cases on the order passed by
Dr. Mishra     in August,  1976 and  of Shri A.K. Singh, a
subordinate clerk    as well     as appointee  of Shri    M.A.
Haidari, were  recorded after  their re-arrest,  in the
present  case  on    22-1-78     and  26-1-78  respectively.
24-1-78
28-1-78
(iii) Enquiries Report submitted         28-1-78
(iv) Report  forwarded by  the D.I.G. of Police to
the I.G.                         29-1-78
(v) The  same was forwarded to the Chief Secretary
30-1-78
(vi) The Chief Secretary forwarded it to the
Advocate General.                     30-1-78
(vii) The Advocate General returned the file to
the Chief Secretary                 31-1-78
(viii) The  Chief Secretary  sent the     file to the
Chief Minister (Shri Karpoori Thakur)         31-1-71
(ix)    The   Chief  Minister    passed     order     for
prosecution of Dr. Mishra.                 31-1-78
(x) The case was registered.             1-2-78″
(ii)  The     second     circumstance  pointed    out  is     the
political bitterness  between  Respondent  No.    2  and    Shri
Karpoori Thakur.  From the  facts narrated at the beginning,
it is  seen that  there was  animosity between the appellant
and Shri  Karpoori Thakur,  the former Chief Minister of the
Janata Government on
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the one     hand and  Respondent No. 2. Dr. Mishra, the present
Congress (I) Chief Minister of Bihar, on the other.
It has  been stated that Respondent No. 2 is one of the
prominent leaders of the Congress Party that was politically
opposed to  the     Janata     Party    Government  headed  by    Shri
Karpoori Thakur     at the time of the institution of the case.
In  1977   when     Respondent   No.  2   headed  the  Congress
Government, a  warrant of  arrest was  issued  against    Shri
Karpoori Thakur     for  his  arrest  and    detention,  for     his
alleged anti-Government     activities and that Karpoori Thakur
was absconding    for long.  It has  been suggested  that Shri
Karpoori Thakur was nursing grudge against Respondent No. 2.
The suggestion appears to have substance. Shri D.P. Ojha was
a Superintendent  of Police  in Bihar. It has been stated in
the counter-affidavit  filed by     Respondent No.     4  that  he
(Ojha) has  been indicted  by Justice  Mathew in  his report
submitted on  9.5.1975 relating     to the     murder of Shri L.N.
Mishra, brother     of Respondent    No. 5. Justice method in his
report held:
“The direct  responsibility  for  making  security
arrangements  under  the  security     instructions  dated
13-9-1971 issued  by the  Central Government devolve on
the head of the Police (Shri D.P. Ojha). The Commission
finds that     the S.P. Samastipur failed to discharge the
duty  enjoined   upon  him     by  the  instruction  dated
13.9.1971 issued  by the  Central Government.  The S.P.
Samastipur was  guilty of    derelication of duty in this
respect. The officer who failed to discharge their duty
or were  negligent of  the performance of same could be
directly responsible  to the  State Government  and the
State  Government     to  be      the  agency    for   taking
appropriate action against them.”
It     has  been  stated  in    affidavit  that     the  Janata
Government at  the Centre  had accepted the said findings of
the Mathew Commission. But the Government of Bihar headed by
Shri Karpoori  Thakur, not  only exonerated  Shri D.P. Ojha,
but transferred     him to the Vigilance Department and all the
cases relating    to the    Patna Co-operative Bank (the bank in
question) were    transferred to    the Vigilance  Department in
charge of  Ojha. The  Respondent’s allegations    are that not
only  Chief  Minister  Shri  Karpoori  Thakur  had  his     own
political animosity  against Dr. Mishra but Shri Ojha had to
work under  the influence of the Chief Minister. It has been
suggested that he has been instrumental in directing the
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investigation in such a way that a case was made out against
Dr. Mishra  and others    by collecting  false  evidence.     The
suggestion cannot be ruled out as frivolous or unreasonable.
Shri Karpoori  Thakur, the  then Chief    Minister ignored the
wholesome  suggestion  of  the    then  Union  Home  Minister,
Chaudhury Charan  Singh, that a former Chief Minister, could
be proceeded  against only  after obtaining clearance of the
Prime Minister    according to the Code of Conduct of 1964. He
also ignored  the suggestion  in this  regard of  Shri    D.N.
Sahay that  before proceeding  against an  ex-Chief Minister
clearance from    the Prime Minister and the Home Minister was
necessary. He also ignored the suggestion of Shri D.N. Sahay
that no Vigilance Enquiry was necessary as there was already
a Commission  of Enquiry  into the Bank matter, and directed
the  investigation.  This  shows  active  interest  of    Shri
Karpoori Thakur in the prosecution of Respondent No. 2.
(iii)  The     third    circumstance  pointed  out  is    that
although Respondent  No. 4  has been  made  an    accused,  no
allegation against him has been pointed out.
32. It is common place that the prosecution is to prove
the guilt  of the  accused beyond  reasonable doubt and that
the accused  need not  prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt     his
defence, if  any. If the defence is probable and reasonable,
and its considerations creates doubt in the creditability of
the prosecution     case, the  accused will get the benefit and
shall have  to be acquitted. In the instant case, as we have
observed, the  entire investigation has been vitiated and no
person can be convicted on the basis of evidence procured by
such investigation.
33. The  following circumstances  also need to be taken
into account  in considering whether the case merits sending
back to     the Special  Judge for     trial as  proposed  by     the
appellant, assuming  and only  assuming, there    is  a  prime
facie case for trial:
(i) The  occurrence took  place as early as 1970; it is
already more than twelve years.
(ii) Respondent  No. 2  is the  Chief Minister  in     his
office. Knowing     human nature,    as it  is, it  can hardly be
expected that  the witnesses,  most of    whom are  officials,
will come forward and depose against a Chief Minister.
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(iii) Even after the assumption of office by Respondent
No. 2 the Chief Minister, in the Court of the Special Judge,
the prosecution     was pending on several dates but the Public
Prosecutor, Shri  A.K. Datta,  did not    take any interest in
the case  at all.  It  cannot  be  expected  that  a  Public
Prosecutor appointed  by the  Government in  power, will now
take  interest     and  conduct  the  case  so  as  to  secure
conviction of  his own    Chief Minister. Remand for trial, if
made, will  be a  mere exercise     in futility; and it will be
nothing but  an abuse  of the process of the Court to remand
the case to the trial Court.
34. As  a result  of  the    foregoing  discussions,     the
appeal is dismissed.
MISRA,  J.      I  have  the    privilege  of  perusing     the
differing judgments  of     brothers  Tulzapurkar    and  Baharul
Islam JJ.  While I  respectfully  agree     with  some  of     the
findings  reached   by    brother     Tulzapurkar,  I  regret  my
inability to concur with some of the findings. I, therefore,
propose to give my own reasons for the same.
The present  appeal by  special leave is a sequel to an
application under  s.321 of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred  to as  the `Code’) made by the Public
Prosecutor for    permission of  the Court  for withdrawal  of
Vigilance Case    No. 9  (2) 78  filed by     the State  of Bihar
against Respondent  No. 2. (Dr. Jagannath Mishra, Respondent
No. 3 (Nawal Kishore Sinha), Respondent No. 4 (Jiwanand Jha)
and three  others (K.P.     Gupta, since deceased, M.A. Haidari
and A.K.  Singh) who  later became  approvers, for  offences
under ss.  420/466/471/109/120-B Indian Penal Code and under
s.5 (1)     (a), 5     (1) (b)  and 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act,     1947.    Material  facts     have  already    been
detailed in  the two  judgments and, therefore, it is no use
repeating the same over again.
In order  to appreciate  the contention  raised by     the
counsel for  the parties it is essential to read the grounds
taken in the application. Para 2 of the application reads:
“That since  the prosecution    of the case involves
the  question   of     momentous   public  policy  of     the
Government, which    may have  its consequences  of    wide
magnitude affecting  the large issue of public interest
also, the desirability
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of the  continuance  of  the  prosecution    was  broadly
examined both  by the  State Government and also by me.
Keeping in     view (a)  lack of  prospect  of  successful
prosecution  in   the  light   of    evidence,   (b)     the
implication of the persons as a result of political and
personal  vendetta,   (c)    the   inexpediency  of     the
prosecution for  the reasons  of the  State and  public
policy, (d)  the adverse  effects that the continuation
of the prosecution will bring on public interest in the
light of  the changed  situation, and  after giving  my
anxious considerations and full deliberations, I beg to
file this    application to withdraw from the prosecution
of all the persons involved in the aforesaid case.”
Para 3 of the application states:
“That I have therefore gone through the case diary
and the  relevant materials connected with the case and
have come    to the    conclusion that in the circumstances
prevailing at  the time  of institution of the case and
the investigation thereof, it appears that the case was
instituted on the ground of political vendetta and only
to defame    the fair  image of  Dr. J.N. Mishra, who was
then the  leader of  the  opposition  and    one  of     the
acknowledged leaders  of  the  Congress  Party  in     the
country. The  prosecution was  not launched in order to
advance the interest of public Justice.”
Para 4 reads:
“That     it   is  in   public  interest      that     the
prosecution which    has no    reasonable chance of success
and has been launched as a result of political vendetta
unconnected with the advancement of the cause of public
justice should  not proceed  further. More     so, as     the
same is  directed against    the head of the Executive in
whom not  only the     electorate have put their faith and
confidence but  whom has  been elected  leader  of     the
majority party  in the  legislature, both    events    have
taken place after the institution of the case.”
The application  was opposed on a variety of grounds by
the appellant,    which I shall deal with in the later part of
the judgment in detail.
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The application  was, however,  allowed  by  the  Chief
Judicial  Magistrate-cum-Special   Judge  Vigilance  and  he
accorded his  consent by his speaking order dated 20th June,
1981.
The appellant  took up  the matter     in revision  to the
High Court  which also    confirmed the  order  of  the  trial
court. The  appellant has  now come to this Court by special
leave. The grounds taken on behalf of the appellant are four
fold:
1.      (a) For  the purposes     of s. 321 of the Code there
exists a  dichotomy between political offences and
offences under common law. While the former can be
withdrawn on    grounds     of  public  policy,  public
interest or  reasons of state even though there is
certainty of    obtaining a  conviction, no question
of public  policy, public  interest or  reasons of
State could  every arise  in a  prosecution for  a
Common Law  offence or a common case of bribery or
forgery.
(b)  Similarly,   no    question   of  political  or
personal vendetta  would arise in a case where the
proof     of   the  offence  is    based  primarily  on
documents, the  genuineness of  which     is  not  in
dispute.  Thus  three     of  the  grounds  on  which
withdrawal from  prosecution is  based viz. public
policy, public  interest, reasons  of     State,     and
public  or   personal     vendetta   are      irrelevant
grounds, if  it is,  established that     the offence
under s. 466 of the I.P.C. and s. 5 (1) (d) of the
Prevention of     Corruption Act primarily based upon
indisputed documentary  evidence make     out a prime
facie case.
2.      If the  Court     chooses  to  give  consent  to     the
withdrawal of     a criminal  case on  the ground  of
paucity of  evidence or  absence of  a  successful
prosecution, the court has to examine the material
or evidence  already recorded for deciding whether
withdrawal is     an abuse of or an interference with
the normal course of justice.
3.      The Public  Prosecutor who  applied for withdrawal
of the  case was  not competent  to withdraw as he
was not  incharge of    the case, and in any case he
acted at
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the behest of the Government and did not apply his
own mind.
4.      The documentary evidence on the record prima facie
makes out  a case of forgery (s. 466 IPC) and s. 5
(1) d)  (criminal misconduct) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act.
Before dealing  with the points raised on behalf of the
appellant it is appropriate at this stage to know the nature
and scope of s. 321 of the Code.
A bare  perusal of     the section  shows that it does not
prescribe any  ground nor  does it put any embargo or fetter
on the    power of  the Public  Prosecutor  to  withdraw    from
prosecuting a particular criminal case pending in any court.
All that  it requires  is that    he can    do so  only with the
consent of  the court  where the case is pending. This Court
has, however,  laid down  certain guiding principles for the
exercise of  the power    of withdrawal  under this section by
the Public  Prosecutor or by the court according its consent
to such     withdrawal. It     is in the light of those guidelines
that the  propriety or    the legality  of the  withdrawal  of
criminal proceeding has to be judged.
In this  country the  scheme of criminal justice places
the prime  responsibility of prosecuting serious offences on
the executive  authority. The  investigations, collection of
requisite evidence and the prosecution for the offences with
reference  to    such  evidence    are  the  functions  of     the
executive. The    function of  the court    in this respect is a
limited one  and intended  only to  prevent the     abuse.     The
function of the court in according its consent to withdrawal
is, however,  a judicial  function. It,     therefore,  becomes
necessary for  the court  before whom  the  application     for
withdrawal is  filed by     the Public  Prosecutor to apply its
mind  so  that    the  appellate    court  may  examine  and  be
satisfied that    the court  has not accorded its consent as a
matter of  course but  has applied  its mind  to the grounds
taken  in   the     application   for  withdrawal     by   Public
Prosecutor.
The  guiding   principles    laid  down  by    the  various
decisions of  this Court may now be referred to. In State of
Bihar v.  Ram Naresh Pande(1) this Court had the occasion to
consider the scope of the
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corresponding s.  494 of  the unamended     Code, which  was in
pari materia  with the    present section 321, and observed as
follows:
“The magistrate’s  functions in  these matters are
not only  supplementary, at a higher level, to those of
the  executive  but  are  intended     to  prevent  abuse.
Section 494  requiring the     consent of  the  Court     for
withdrawal by  the      Public Prosecutor  is more in line
with this    scheme, than with the provisions of the Code
relating to  inquiries and     trials     by  the  Court.  It
cannot  be      taken     to   place   on   the     Court     the
responsibility for     a prima  facie determination  of  a
triable issue,  for instance the discharge that results
therefrom need  not always     conform to  the standard of
“no prima    facie case” under ss. 209 (1) and 253 (1) or
of “groundlessness” under ss. 209 (2) and 253 (2).
“…the  function  of     the  Magistrate  in  giving
consent is     a judicial  one open to correction. … the
application for consent may legitimately be made by the
Public Prosecutor    for  reasons  not  confined  to     the
judicial prospects of the prosecutions. …If so, it is
clear that,  what the  Court has  to determine, for the
exercise of  its discretion  in granting or withholding
`consent’ is not a triable issue on judicial evidence.”
Again in  M.N.S. Nair v. P.V. Balkrishnan(1) this Court
after reviewing     various cases    from different    High  Courts
laid down the following guidelines:
“Though the  section is  in general terms and does
not circumscribe the powers of the Public Prosecutor to
seek permission  to withdraw  from the  prosecution the
essential consideration  which is implicit in the grant
of the  power is  that it    should be in the interest of
administration of    justice which  may be either that it
will not  be able    to produce  sufficient    evidence  to
sustain  the  charge  or  that  subsequent     information
before prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution
evidence or any other similar circumstances which it is
difficult to  predicate as     they are dependent entirely
on     the   facts  and   circumstances  of    each   case.
Nonetheless it is
142
the duty  of the  Court also  to see  in furtherance of
justice that  the permission  is not  sought on grounds
extraneous to  the interest of justice or that offences
which are    offences against  the  State  go  unpunished
merely because  the Government  as a  matter of general
policy of    expediency  unconnected     with  its  duty  to
prosecute offenders  under the  law, directs the Public
Prosecutor to  withdraw from  the prosecution  and     the
Public Prosecutor merely does so at its behest.”
“It appears  to us     that the  wide and  general  powers
which are    conferred  under  Sec.    494  on     the  Public
Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution though they
are subject  to the  permission of the Court have to be
exercised    by   him  in   relation     to  the  facts     and
circumstances of  that case  in furtherance  of, rather
than as  a hindrance  to the  object  of  the  law     and
justified    on   the  material   in      the    case   which
substantiate the  grounds alleged, not necessarily from
those gathered  by the  judicial method  but  on  other
materials    which  may  not     be  strictly  on  legal  or
admissible evidence.  The Court  also while considering
the request  to grant permission under the said Section
should not     do so as a necessary formality-the grant of
it for  the mere  asking. It  may do  so only  if it is
satisfied on  the materials  placed before     it that the
grant of it subserves the administration of justice and
that permission  was not  being sought covertly with an
ulterior purpose  unconnected with     the vindication  of
the law which the executive organs are in duty bound to
further and maintain.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The same  principle was  reiterated again    in State  of
Orissa v. C. Mohapatra(1) in these words:
“The ultimate  guiding consideration must always be the
interest of  administration of  justice and that is the
touch-stone on  which the    question must be determined.
No hard  and fast    rule can  be laid  down nor  can any
categories of  cases be defined in which consent should
be granted or refused. It must ultimately depend on the
facts and    circumstances of  each case  in the light of
what is necessary in
143
order to  promote the  ends of  justice,  because,     the
objective    of   every  judicial  process  must  be     the
attainment of justice.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Balwant Singh v. State of Bihar(1) this Court laid down:
“The statutory  responsibility for  deciding    upon
withdrawal squarely  vests on the public prosecutor. It
is non-negotiable and cannot be bartered away in favour
of those  who may    above him on the administrative side
..the consideration  which     must  weigh  with  him     is,
whether the  broader cause     of public  justice will  be
advanced or  retarded by  the withdrawal or continuance
of the prosecution.”
The last  in the  series is  the case of Rajendra Kumar
Jain v.     State(2). After review of the various cases of this
Court, the Court laid down the following propositions:
“1.  Under the  scheme of    the Code  prosecution of  an
offender for    a serious  offence is  primarily the
responsibility of the Executive.
2.      The  withdrawal   from  the    prosecution  is      an
executive function of the Public Prosecutor.
3.      The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is
that of  the Public  Prosecutor and none else, and
so, he cannot surrender that discretion to someone
else.
4.      The  Government   may     suggest   to    the   Public
Prosecutor  that   he     may   withdraw      from     the
prosecution but none can compel him to do so.
5.      The  Public    Prosecutor  may     withdraw  from     the
prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of
evidence but    on other relevant grounds as well in
order to further the broad ends of public justice,
public order    and peace.  The broad ends of public
justice will certainly include appropriate social,
economic and,     we  add,  political  purposes    Sans
Tammany Hall enterprise.
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6.      The Public  Prosecutor is  an officer of the Court
and responsible to the Court.
7.      The  Court  performs    a  supervisory    function  in
granting its consent to the withdrawal.
8.      The  Court’s    duty  is  not  to  reappreciate     the
grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request
withdrawal from  the prosecution  but to  consider
whether the  Public Prosecutor applied his mind as
a  free  agent,  uninfluenced     by  irrelevant     and
extraneous considerations. The Court has a special
duty    in   this  regard  as  it  is  the  ultimate
repository of     legislative confidence     in granting
or withholding  its consent to withdrawal from the
prosecution.”
In view  of the  principles laid  down in the aforesaid
cases, I  have to  examine whether  the grounds taken by the
appellant are tenable.
I take  up the  first ground  raised on  behalf of     the
appellant that    for the     purpose of  s. 321  Cr. P.C.  there
exists dichotomy between the political offences and offences
at Common  Law and while political offences can be withdrawn
on grounds of public policy, public interest, or for reasons
of the    State, even though there is certainty of obtaining a
conviction, no    such consideration  could ever    arise  in  a
prosecution for     a Common  Law offence    or a  common case of
bribery or forgery.
This argument  proceeds on     the assumption     that in the
cases cited  above, permission    was granted  only  in  cases
relating to  political    offences  and  not  with  regard  to
offences at Common Law. I am afraid, this will not be a fair
reading     of  the  decisions  mentioned    above.    One  of     the
principles laid     down in  the aforesaid     cases is  that     the
Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not only
on the    ground of  paucity of evidence but on other relevant
grounds as  well in  order to further broad aims of justice,
public order  and peace.  Broad aims  of public justice will
certainly include appropriate social, economic and political
purposes. In
145
M.N.S. Nair’s  case (supra)  this  Court  after     enumerating
certain grounds further observed:
“.any other  similar    circumstances  which  it  is
difficult to  predicate as     they are dependent entirely
on the facts and circumstances of each case.”
Likewise in  C. Mohapatra’s  case (supra)  this Court  again
observed:
“No hard  and fast  rule can    be laid down nor can
any categories  of cases  be defined  in which  consent
should be granted or refused.”
In face of these observations it will be difficult to accept
the contention    that  withdrawal  from    prosecution  can  be
permitted only    in political  offences and not in Common Law
offences. In  the past    there have  been cases    where crimes
motivated  by    political  ambitions  or  considerations  or
committed  during   mass  agitations,    communal   frenzies,
regional disputes,  industrial conflicts,  student unrest or
the like  situations involving emotive issues giving rise to
an atmosphere  surcharged with violence, have been permitted
to be  withdrawn in  the interest of public order and peace.
But on    that account  it will  not be  correct to  say    that
permission to withdraw can be granted by the Court only when
offences as enumerated above are involved. Section 321 is in
very wide  terms and in view of the decisions cited above it
will not  be possible  to con  fine grounds only to offences
which may  be  termed  as  political  offences    or  offences
involving emotive  issues. To  interpret the  section in the
way as    desired by the counsel for the appellant will amount
to re-writing  section 321  of the  Code. The  only  guiding
factor which  should weigh  with the public prosecutor while
moving    the   application  for     withdrawal  and  the  court
according its  permission for  withdrawal is  to see whether
the  interest    of  public   justice  is  advanced  and     the
application for     withdrawal is not moved with oblique motive
unconnected with the vindication of cause of public justice.
If     once  it  is  accepted     that  the  application     for
withdrawal from     the prosecution  can  be  made     on  various
grounds and  it is  not confined  to political offences, the
contention raised  on behalf  of the  appellant that grounds
Nos.  (b),   (c),  (d)    mentioned  in  the  application     for
withdrawal are    irrelevant in  the instant  case will not be
tenable. The  Indian Penal  Code or  the  Code    of  Criminal
Procedure  does      not  make  any  such    distinction  between
political
146
offences and  offences other than political ones. Even if it
is accepted  that political  offences  are  not     unknown  to
jurisprudence  and   other  Acts  do  contemplate  political
offences, the  fact remains  that s.  321 Cr.  P.C.  is     not
confined only  to political offences or social offences, but
it applies  to all kinds of offences and the application for
withdrawal can    be made     by the Public Prosecutor on various
grounds. The  only safeguard  that should be kept in mind by
the Public  Prosecutor is  that it  should  not     be  for  an
improper or  oblique  or  ulterior  consideration,  and     the
guiding consideration  should  be  that     of  vindication  of
public justice.
In the  application for withdrawal from prosecution the
public Prosecutor  has given four reasons and he has applied
his own     mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. In
para 3    of his application he has clearly stated that he has
gone through  the case    diary  and  the     relevant  materials
connected with    the case and has come to the conclusion that
in the    circumstances prevailing  at the time of institution
of the    case and  the investigation  thereof it appears that
the case was instituted on the grounds of political vendetta
and only to defame the fair image of Dr. J.N. Mishra who was
then  the   leader  of     the  opposition   and    one  of     the
acknowledged leaders of the Congress Party in the country.
The Court while according the consent to the withdrawal
has only  to  see  that     the  Public  Prosecutor  has  acted
properly and  has not been actuated by oblique or extraneous
considerations. It  is not the function of the Court to make
a fresh     appraisal of  the evidence  and  come    to  its     own
conclusion on  the question whether there is a triable issue
to be investigated by the Court.
First I  take up  ground No.  (b)    in  para  2  of     the
application for     withdrawal, that  is,    the  implication  of
respondent No.    2, as  a result     of personal  and  political
vendetta. In  the opinion  of  the  Public  Prosecutor,     the
prosecution  was   motivated  by   personal  and   political
vendetta. The  aforesaid criminal case was instituted during
the period of Janata Party Government by an order dated 31st
of January  1978 passed     by Shri  Karpoori Thakur,  the then
Chief Minister,     who was  the party  leader of the appellant
Sheonandan Paswan,  who was  also the  State Minister of the
Janata Party Government.
From the  materials placed     on the record it is evident
that respondent No. 2 is one of the prominent leaders of the
party
147
politically opposed  to the Janata Party which was the party
in power led by Shri Karpoori Thakur at the relevant time of
the institution     of the     prosecution. Respondent  No. 2     had
been a    bitter critic of the principles and policies of Shri
Karpoori Thakur.  In 1977  when respondent No. 2 was heading
the government    a warrant  of arrest was issued against Shri
Karpoori Thakur for his arrest and detention. The appellant,
formerly  a  Deputy  Magistrate,  was  posted  as  Assistant
Secretary in  the Chief Minister’s Secretariat of respondent
No. 2.    He was    removed from  the Secretariat  to some other
department by respondent No. 2. The appellant joined the Lok
Dal and     fought election  on Lok  Dal ticket after resigning
his job.  When he became a State Minister in the Ministry of
Shri Karpoori  Thakur, he  came to  occupy  a  big  official
bungalow at  Bailly Road,  Patna. In  1980 when the party to
which respondent No. 2 belongs came to power, respondent No.
2 became  the Chief  Minister. The  appellant ceased to be a
State Minister    and was asked to hand over possession of the
official residence.  Since the    appellant refused to vacate,
the State  Government ultimately   resorted to extreme legal
step for  dispossessing him.  This made     the appellant    feel
aggrieved. He vindicated his right by filing a writ petition
in the    High Court  which  was    eventually  decided  in     his
favour. The  fact, however,  remains that  there was no love
lost between the appellant and respondent No. 2.
When Shri    Karpoori Thakur became the Chief Minister in
the Janata  Party regime, the quickness with which the files
moved when  a decision was taken to prosecute respondent No.
2 is  very significant.     From the  affidavit of     Shri  Bidhu
Sekhar Banerjee,  Deputy Superintendent     of Police,  Cabinet
Vigilance Department,  it is apparent that within the course
of a few days the inquiries were  completed, advice obtained
and orders  passed for    instituting  the  case.     On  9th  of
January 1978  all the  criminal cases  investigated  by     Dy.
S.Ps. CI,  Bihar, relating to Patna Urban Co-operative Bank,
including  P.S.      Case    No.   97(5)77  were  transferred  to
Vigilance Department  by order    of Shri Karpoori Thakur, the
then Chief  Minister and  placed under    the Inspector,    Shri
Reghubir Singh.     On 22nd January, 1978 M.A. Haidari and A.K.
Sinha, accused    of Kadam Kuan P.S. Case No. 97(5)77 were re-
arrested by  Shri Raghubir  Singh, Inspector  and the second
confession of  Shri M.A.Haidari was secured in which for the
first time  he brought    allegations against  Dr. Mishra. The
confession of  Shri A.K.  Sinha was  secured .    on  26th  of
January, 1978. On 28th January 1978 Shri D.P. Ojha.
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S.P. Vigilance    submitted his  inquiry    report    recommending
institution of criminal cases against Dr. Mishra and others.
On 29th     of January  1978 Shri S.B. Sahay DIG Vigilance also
recommended the     institution of     a criminal case. On 30th of
January      1978,       I.G.Vigilance   also       recommended     the
prosecution. On     the same  day    the  file  was    referred  to
Advocate General  Shri K.D. Chattarjee appointed as Advocate
General by  Shri Karpoori  Thakur. On  31st of January, 1978
the Chief  Secretary sent  the file to the Chief Minister of
Bihar. On the same day the Chief Minister, Bihar approved it
and handed  over the file direct to Shri S.B. Sahay, DIG. On
1st  of     February,  1978  the  file  was  endorsed  by    S.P.
Vigilance, Shri     D.P.Ojha to  Addl.  S.P.,  R.P.  Singh     for
instituting the     case. On  1st of February, 1978 a Vigilance
Criminal case  was instituted in Police Station at 0600 hrs.
At 8.50     hrs. the  Case was  discussed by  I.G.with DIG Shri
S.B. Sahay  and Shri  D.P. Ojha     and decision  was taken  to
search houses  of Dr.  Mishra at Patna, Balua Bazar, and his
relations. On  the same day request to issue search warrants
was made  and search  warrants were  issued. On the same day
Inspectors M/s.     Sharda     Nanda    Singh,    Raghubir  Singh     and
Ramdehia Sharma were got transferred from CID to Vigilance.
The speed    with which  the file  of the  criminal    case
moved from  one place  to another and orders obtained itself
indicates that    it was    not to vindicate the cause of public
justice but  it was  only to  feed their  grudge that such a
keen interest  was exhibited  by the  Chief Minister and the
appellant  also     actuated  by  his  personal  and  political
vendetta sought to oppose the application for withdrawal. In
these circumstances it is doubtful whether the appellant was
truly representing the public interest.
To say  that unless  the crime  allegedly committed are
per se    political offences  or are  motivated  by  political
ambition or  consideration or  are committed mass agitation,
communal frenzies, regional disputes, no question of serving
a broader cause of public justice. public order or peace can
arise is to put limitation on the broad terms of section 321
of the Code.
The Public     Prosecutor was of the view that as a result
of election  there was    a change in the situation in as much
as Respondent  No 2′s party received the peoples mandate and
voted to  power and  Respondent No.  2 had  become the Chief
Minister of  the State    and that the prosecution against the
head of     the State  would have    had adverse effect on public
interest, including public order and peace
149
and, therefore,     he thought  it inexpedient  for reasons  of
State and  public policy to proceed with the case. It is the
Public Prosecutor  who has been given the exclusive power to
apply for withdrawal and if he in his discretion thinks that
it would  be inexpedient  to proceed with the case the Court
cannot reconsider  the matter  afresh and  come to  its     own
conclusion different  from  the     one  taken  by     the  public
prosecutor unless  the Court  comes to a conclusion that the
public prosecutor  has done  so with  an improper or oblique
motive.
In my  opinion the decision of the public prosecutor to
withdraw from  the case     on the     grounds given by him in his
application for     withdrawal cannot be said to be actuated by
improper or oblique motive. He bona fide thought that in the
changed circumstances of the case it would be inexpedient to
proceed with  the case    and it    would be  sheer     wastage  of
public money  and time    to drag     on with  the  case  if     the
chances for  conviction are  few and  far  between.  In     the
circumstances instead of serving the public cause of justice
it will be to the detriment of public interest.
The statutory  responsibility for    deciding  withdrawal
squarely rests    upon  the  public  prosecutor.    It  is    non-
negotiable and    cannot be bartered away. The Court’s duty in
dealing     with  the  application     under    s.  321     is  not  to
reappreciate the  grounds which led the public prosecutor to
request withdrawal  from the  prosecution  but    to  consider
whether the  public prosecutor    applied his  mind as  a free
agent uninfluenced  by irrelevant  and extraneous or oblique
considerations as  the Court  has a  special  duty  in    this
regard    inasmuch   as  it  is  the  ultimate  repository  of
legislative  confidence      in  granting    or  withholding     its
consent to  withdrawal from prosecution. The Court’s duty is
to see    in furtherance of justice that the permission is not
sought on grounds extraneous to the interest of justice.
The Public     Prosecutor applied  his mind and on perusal
of case     diary and  other materials  he was satisfied in the
interest of public justice to withdraw from the case.
The Court    also passed a speaking order while according
its consent  to the  withdrawal. The relevant portion of its
order is in the following terms:
“Having considered the legal position explained by
the Supreme  Court and  the  submissions  made  by     the
learned
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Special Public  Prosecutor in-charge  of this case, and
having perused  the relevant  records of  the case I am
satisfied that  it is a fit case in which the prayer of
the learned.  Special  Public  Prosecutor    to  withdraw
should be allowed and it is therefore allowed.”
Normally the  observation made    by the    Court  that  it     has
perused the  relevant records of the case should be presumed
to be  correct unless  a very  strong case  is made  out for
holding that it did not do so and the vaunted remark made by
the Court  that it  has done  so is  incorrect. In a similar
situation  this      Court     in   C.  Mohapatra’s  case  (supra)
observed:
“..according    to  the     prosecution,  the  evidence
collected during  investigation was  not sufficient  to
sustain the  charge  against  the    respondent  and     the
learned Magistrate was satisfied in regard to the truth
of this averment made by the Court Sub-Inspector. It is
difficult for us to understand how the High Court could
possibly observe  in its  order that the Magistrate had
not perused  the case  diary when    in terms the learned
Magistrate has stated in his order that he had read the
case diary     and it     was after reading it that he was of
the opinion  that the  averment of the prosecution that
the evidence was not sufficient was not ill-founded
An attempt     has been made on behalf of the appellant to
show that  the case diary was not with the Court and that it
was lying  elsewhere  and,  therefore,    he  could  not    have
perused the  case diary     and his  observation is  not  quite
correct. This  contention cannot  be accepted  at  its    face
value in view of the observations made by the court.
Now I  take up  ground No.     (a) of     the application for
withdrawal from     the case.  This ground     relates to  lack of
prospect  of  a     successful  prosecution  in  the  light  of
evidence. The  counsel for  the appellant has contended that
in the    instant case  on the  documentary  evidence  itself,
which is  not in  dispute, an  offence under  s. 466  of the
Indian Penal  Code and    s. 5  (1) (d)  of the  Prevention of
Corruption Act    is prima  facie     made  out  and     the  Public
Prosecutor was    not justified  in moving the application for
withdrawal on  this ground. He referred to the antedating of
an order. Dr. J.N.
151
Mishra, Respondent  No. 2, after becoming the Chief Minister
passed an  order in  his handwriting  on 16th  May, 1975  in
Hindi, the English rendering whereof is given below:
“Much time  has passed.  On perusal of the file it
appears that  there is  no     allegation  of     defalcation
against the  Chairman and    the Members  of the Board of
the Bank.    Stern action should be taken for realisation
of     the  loans  from  the    loanees     and  if  there     are
difficulties in  realisation from the loanees surcharge
proceedings should     be initiated  against the  Board of
Directors. Normal    conditions be  restored in  the Bank
after calling  the Annual    General Meeting     and holding
elections.
Sd/- Jagan Nath Mishra
16.5.1975.”
It appears  that this order was replaced by another order in
Hindi, the English rendering of which is:
“Please issue     orders     for  restoring     the  normal
condition’s in  the Bank  after holding  Annual General
Meeting.
Sd/-Jagan Nath Mishra
16.5.1975.”
by pasting  this order    over the  order dated 16th May, 1975
and by    antedating the latter order as 14th of May, 1975 and
this clearly  in the  opinion of  the learned counsel brings
out an    offence of  criminal misconduct under s.5 (1) (d) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act and of forgery under s. 466
IPC. A    lot of    argument was advanced that the pasting of an
order over  the order dated 16th May, 1975 by a letter order
itself creates    a suspicion.  This  was     rather     an  unusual
method adopted    by Dr.    J.N. Mishra  to erase  the  previous
order and to replace it by another order of the same date by
antedating it  as 14th    may 1975  by  pasting  it  over     the
earlier order.    The method of replacing one order by another
by pasting  over the  earlier one  appears  to    be  a  well-
recognised practice  in the  Secretariat of Bihar Government
and Solicitor  General    Shri  K.  Parasaran  showed  various
similar orders    which had  been replaced by another order by
pasting over  the earlier one. So, that part of the argument
loses all its force on examination of various similar orders
by adopting the same method. The question, however, is
152
whether this antedating of the latter order as 14th May 1975
by pasting  it    over  the  earlier  order  would  amount  to
criminal misconduct  within the     meaning of  s. 5 (1) (d) of
the Prevention    of Corruption  Act and    forgery     within     the
meaning of s. 466 of the Indian Penal Code. Insofar as it is
material for  the purpose  of this case, s. 5 (1) (d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act reads:
“5. (1)  A Public  servant is     said to  commit the
offence of criminal misconduct-
(a) ………………………
(b) ………………………
(c) ………………………
(d)  if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise
abusing his  position as  public servant,  obtains
for himself  or for  any other person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage.”
The contention  on behalf    of the    appellant is that by
changing the  order dated  16th May,  1975, respondent No. 2
obtained for  Nawal  Kishore  Sinha,  respondent  No.  3,  a
pecuniary advantage  inasmuch as  by antedating     the  second
order respondent  No. 2 had absolved Nawal Kishor Sinha from
the surcharge proceedings. The factum of change has not been
disputed by  respondent No.  2 and therefore, prima facie an
offence under  s. 5(1) (d) is made out and no other evidence
be looked  into. In  the circumstances the Public Prosecutor
was not justified in coming to the conclusion that there was
no prospect of conviction of respondent No. 2.
I am  afraid this    contention cannot  be  accepted     for
obvious reasons.  The earlier  order dated 16th May, 1975 no
doubt contemplated four things:
(1)  that there is no allegation of defalcation against
the Chairman and Members of the Board of the Bank;
(2)  stern action    should be  taken for  realisation of
the loans from the loanees;
(3)  if there  are difficulties in the realisation from
the  loanees     surcharge  proceedings      should  be
initiated against the Board of Directors, and
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(4)  normal conditions  be restored  in the  Bank after
calling the  annual general  meeting    and  holding
elections.
By the    second order,  which is said to have been antedated,
only the fourth part of the order has been maintained. There
seems to  be no     earthly reason     for antedating     the  latter
order by  putting the  date as    14th of     May, 1975.  It     was
always open  to the  Minister to  have changed his order and
pass another  order. The same purpose could have been served
by  Respondent    No.  2,     if  he     really     wanted     to  absolve
Respondent No.    3 from the liability by passing the order on
the 16th  of May, 1975 by replacing the earlier order by the
subsequent order.  Rather that    purpose of Respondent No. 2,
if at all, could have been served better by keeping the date
of the    second order  as 16th  May, or    any subsequent date.
Secondly, the  second antedated     order dated  14th May, 1975
could  not   stand  in     the  way  of  initiating  surcharge
proceedings against  Respondent No.  3 and  other members of
the Board of the Bank. Date 14th May, 1975, for all we know,
may have  been on  account of some accidental slip The other
reason    as  suggested  by  the    Solicitor  General  is    that
surcharge proceedings  could be     initiated only     by the     Co-
operative Department under s. 40 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-
operative Societies Act, 1935. It reads:
“40, Where  as a result of an audit under s. 33 or
an enquiry     under s. 35, or an inspection under ss. 34,
36 or  37, or the winding up of a Society it appears to
the Registrar that any person who has taken part in the
organisation or  management of  the society or any past
or present     officer of  the society  has been guilty of
the fact or omission mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c)
or (d)  the Registrar  may enquire     into the conduct of
such persons  or officers and after giving such officer
or person    an opportunity of being heard, make an order
for surcharge.”
Therefore, in  view of    the aforesaid provisions of s. 40 of
the Cooperative     Societies Act, taking steps for a surcharge
is not    within the jurisdiction of the State Executive. This
may have  been another    reason for  dropping the proceedings
for surcharge,    if at all, against the officers of the bank.
There is yet another reason. The second antedated order does
not say     a word     about dropping     the  surcharge     proceedings
ordered by  Respondent No.  2  in  the    earlier     order    and,
therefore, it  is difficult to say that Respondent No. 2 had
actually   dropped   the   surcharge   proceedings   against
Respondent No. 3 and
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other offers  of the  Co-operative Bank.  Indeed,  surcharge
proceedings had     been initiated.  Surcharge files  regarding
surcharge  case      No.  3   of  1975  proves  that  surcharge
proceedings were  proposed initially by the Deputy Registrar
on 30th     of April  1975 and  were in fact taken on 1st June,
1975 and  the show  cause notice was issued on 1st July 1975
and surcharge  order was  made against    Shri  Nawal  Kishore
Sinha and  others on 31st December, 1975. This shows clearly
that no     benefit or  advantage was  given to  Nawal  Kishore
Sinha or  others by  the order    of 14th     May, 1975. From the
affidavit of  Jiwanand Jha, Respondent No. 4 it appears that
an amount  of Rs.  33,96,024.90 was  given as  loans to     180
persons. Out  of the  total amount  given by way of loans an
amount of  Rs. 25,64,682.23  has already  been realised from
106 persons.  The unrealised  amount is only Rs. 8,31,337.67
for which decrees have been passed against 64 persons and as
against the remaining 10 persons proceedings for realisation
are going on.
About the offence of forgery under s. 466 of the Indian
Penal Code  also I  have my  grave doubts.  Forgery has been
defined under  s. 463 as “making any false document”. Making
of false  document is  defined in  s. 464.  According to the
counsel for  the appellant the present case falls within the
scope of  “who dishonestly  or fraudulently makes a document
or part of a document …at a time at which he knows that it
was  not   made,  signed,   sealed  or    executed”  The    word
“dishonestly” has  been defined in s. 24 of the Indian Penal
Code as “whoever does anything with the intention of causing
wrongful gain  to one  person or  wrongful loss     to  another
person     is   said   to      do   that   thing   “dishonestly.”
“Fraudulently” has  been defined  in s.     25 as    ”a person is
said to     do a  thing fraudulently if he does that thing with
intent to defraud but not otherwise.” The precise contention
raised on  behalf of  the appellant is that Respondent No. 2
changed the  order which  has been  earlier passed  with the
intention of  causing wrongful loss to the Bank by reason of
the fact  that by  the order passed surcharge proceeding was
countermanded.
On the  materials on  record I  am not satisfied that a
prima facie  case under     s. 5  (1) (d)    of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and of forgery under s. 466 Indian Penal Code
are made out.
The facts    have many  faces. If  the view of the Public
Prosecutor is one, which could in the circumstances be taken
by any    reasonable man,     the Court cannot substitute its own
opinion for  that of  the Public  Prosecutor. If  the Public
Prosecutor has applied his mind
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on the    relevant materials  and his opinion is not perverse,
and which  a reasonable     man could have arrived at, a roving
inquiry into  the evidence  and materials  on the record for
the purpose  of finding     out whether  his  conclusions    were
right or  wrong would  be incompetent.    That would virtually
convert this  Court  into  an  Appellate  Court     setting  on
judgment.
The contention raised by the counsel for appellant that
the Public  Prosecutor Shri  Lallan  Prasad  Sinha  was     not
competent to  apply for     withdrawal has not been accepted by
my  brothers   Tulzapurkar  and     Baharul  Islam     JJ.  and  I
respectfully agree with them.
If the  Public Prosecutor    thought that the continuance
of the prosecution in the circumstances would only end in an
exercise in  futility, he  was fully justified in moving the
application for     withdrawal. The only question is whether he
has applied  his  mind    and  he     was  not  actuated  by     any
extraneous consideration  or improper  motive. It was sought
to be  argued on  behalf of  the appellant  that the  Public
Prosecutor has    acted at the behest of the Government and he
did not apply his own mind. Reference was made to the letter
sent by     the Government to the Public Prosecutor. The letter
did not     indicate that    the  Government     wants    him  not  to
proceed with  the case    but the     letter gave full freedom to
the Public  Prosecutor to  apply his own mind and to come to
his own     conclusion. In     view of  the various authorities of
this Court, consultation with the Government or high officer
is not    improper. But the Public Prosecutor has to apply his
own mind  to the  facts and circumstances of the case before
coming to  the conclusion  to withdraw from the prosecution.
From the  materials on    the record  I am  satisfied that the
Public Prosecutor  has applied    his own mind and came to his
own conclusions.
The last  but not the least in importance was the point
raised on  behalf of  the appellant  that the  sanction     for
prosecution  had  already  been     given    by  the     then  Chief
Minister, Abdul     Gafoor and  the complaint  was going  to be
filed but  it was  postponed on     account of Respondent No. 2
who by    that time  overtook as    the Chief Minister of Bihar.
The argument is that firstly he tried to delay the filing of
the complaint; and secondly that he ordered for not pro
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secuting the  officers of  the bank including Respondent No.
2, Shri Jagan Nath Mishra.
It appears     from the  notes on dates given on behalf of
the Respondent    that the  file went  to the  Chief Minister,
Respondent No.    2 because  of an earlier noting dated Ist of
January 1975  by Shri  Omesh Prasad  Verma  that  the  Chief
Minister may  also like     to see. A further noting dated 31st
of January  1975 by Shri R.K. Shrivastava in the Ministry of
Co-operation was to the following effects:
“Chief Minister  and Minister     of Law have desired
to see  the file before complaints are actually lodged.
As per  their directions,    the file  has been  recalled
from  the     Additional  Public   Prosecutor.   In     the
circumstances narrated  above Minister of Law and Chief
Minister would  like to  accord their  approval to     the
filing of the complaint.”
A subsequent  note of  Shri R.    K. Shrivastava dated 27th of
January 1975 is in the following terms:
“The Chief  Minister has  desired that if the said
complaint has  not been  filed should  await till he is
able to  see the  file. Another  buff  sheet  has    been
received from  the Minister  of Agriculture  also.     The
file may  kindly be  recalled and    filing of complaints
may await till further clearance of the C.M.”
It appears  that the previous Chief Minister was replaced by
that time Dr. J.N. Mishra. It is in these circumstances that
the file  was sent  to Respondent  No. 2  in his capacity as
Chief Minister    in pursuance  of the  earlier desire  of the
then Chief  Minister, Shri  Abdul  Gafoor,  and     passed     the
following orders:
“In order  to recover     the money  from some of the
loanees of     the Patna  Urban Co-operative Bank criminal
cases were     instituted against  them. Action  should be
taken immediately    for  the  withdrawal  of  the  cases
against those loanees who have cleared the loan in full
and proper     instalments for  payment of loans should be
fixed against  those who want to repay the loan but due
to financial incapacity
157
are unable     to make  payment at  a time  and thereafter
necessary further action should be taken.”
In this     state of  affairs it cannot be said that Respondent
No. 2 was out to obstruct the criminal proceedings.
The facts    that the prosecution, if ordered, will start
after a gap of about eight years cannot be lost sight of. In
the view  taken by  me in  the earlier    part of the judgment
that no     prima facie  case in  my opinion  has been made out
under s.  466 of  the Indian  Penal Code and s. 5 (1) (d) of
the Prevention    of Corruption Act and the fact that the High
Court in  revision agreed with the view of the Special Judge
giving consent to the withdrawal from the prosecution on the
application of    the Public  Prosecutor under s. 321 Cr. P.C.
this Court  cannot make     a fresh  appraisal of    evidence and
come to     a different  conclusion. All that this Court has to
see is    that the  Public  Prosecutor  was  not    actuated  by
extraneous  or    improper  considerations  while     moving     the
application for     withdrawal from the prosecution. Even if it
is possible  to have  another view  different from  the     one
taken by  the Public Prosecutor while moving the application
for  withdrawal      from    prosecution  this  Court  should  be
reluctant to interfere with the order unless it comes to the
conclusion that     the Public  Prosecutor has  not applied his
mind to     the facts  and circumstances  of the  case, and has
simply acted  at the  behest of     the Government     or has been
actuated by  extraneous and  improper considerations. On the
facts and  circumstances of  the case it is not possible for
me to  hold that  the  Public  Prosecutor  was    actuated  by
oblique or improper motive.
In view  of my  finding that  the criminal case against
Respondent No.    2 and  others was  instituted on  account of
personal or  political vendetta     at  the  instance  of    some
disgrunted political  leaders, that  no prima  facie case of
forgery or  misconduct is  made out  on the materials on the
record, that  the Court’s  jurisdiction in  dealing with the
application under  s. 311 of the Code is only to see whether
the Public  Prosecutor had  applied for     withdrawal  in     the
interest of  Public Justice,  or he  has done so actuated by
improper or  oblique motive,  that a  substantial amount  of
loan has  already been realised, that the continuance of the
criminal case in the circumstances of this case will be only
an exercise  in futility  at the  cost of  public money     and
time, that the trial court as well as the High Court
158
were satisfied    with the grounds for withdrawal taken by the
Public Prosecutor, the view taken by the trial court as well
as the    High Court  in my  opinion does     not suffer from any
infirmity and is a just and proper one.
For the reasons given above the appeal must fail and it
is accordingly dismissed.
S.R.                         Appeal allowed.
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