PETITIONER:
S. A. VENKATARAMAN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE(and connected appeal)
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
03/12/1957
BENCH:
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
BENCH:
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
KAPUR, J.L.
CITATION:
1958 AIR 107 1958 SCR 1040
ACT:
Criminal trial-Public servant accused of criminal
misconduct-Dismissal from service before taking of
cognizance by Court-Sanction to Prosecute, if necessary-
Interpretation-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II Of
1947), ss. 5(2), 6.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant who was a public servant was dismissed from
service after departmental inquiry. Thereafter he was
charged with having committed the offence of criminal
misconduct under S. 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
and was convicted. No sanction under s. 6 of the Act was
produced, before the trial Court. It was contended that the
Court could not take cognizance of the offence without there
being a proper sanction to prosecute :
Held, that no sanction under s. 6 of the Act was necessary
for the prosecution of the appellant as he was not a public
servant at the time of the taking of cognizance of the
offence.
In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential
for a Court, in the first instance, to give effect to the
natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words
are clear enough. It is only in the case of any ambiguity
that a Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the
legislature. Where a general power to take cognizance of an
offence is vested in a Court, any prohibition to the
exercise of that power, by any provision of law, must be
confined to the terms of the prohibition. The words in s.
6(1) of the Act are clear enough and must be given effect
to. The more important words in cl. (c) of s. 6(1) are ” of
the authority competent to remove him from his office “. A
public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is not
a person removable from any office by competent authority.
The conclusion is inevitable that at the time a Court is
asked to take cognizance not only must the offence have been
committed by a public servant but the person accused must
still be a public servant removable from his office by a
competent authority before the provisions of s. 6 can apply.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 130 of
1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
May 12, 1955, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 52-D of 1954, arising out of the judgment and order
dated December 6, 1954, of the Court of the Special Judge at
Delhi in Corruption Case No. 1 of 1954.
1038
N. C. Chatterjee and C. V. L. Narayan, for the appellant
in Cr. A. No. 130 of 56.
Jai Gopal Sethi and Naunit Lal, for the appellant in Cr. A.
No. 25 of 56.
C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A.M. Chatterjee,
H. R. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent in both
the appeals.
1957. December 3. The following Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
IMAM J.-A question of law, common’ to these appeals by
special leave, requires determination; hence they were heard
together. Special leave in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956
was limited to the question whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence for want of
sanction under s. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 (11 of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956 was not so limited and
additional points were raised for our consideration, to
which reference will be made when that appeal is
specifically dealt with.
The question of law, common in both these appeals, is
whether there was any necessity for a sanction under s. 6 of
the Act before a court could take cognizance of an offence
under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code or s. 5(2) of the Act
or both, alleged to have been committed by a person who at
the time the court was asked to take cognizance was not a
public servant but was so at the time of the commission of
the offence.
In Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956, the appellant was
convicted under s. 5(2) of the Act and sentenced to six
months’ simple imprisonment by the Special Judge, Delhi. He
appealed against his conviction and sentence to the Punjab
High Court. That Court while admitting the appeal issued
notice upon the appellant to show cause why his sentence
should not be enhanced. The High Court ultimately dismissed
his appeal and enhanced the sentence of six months’
imprisonment to two years’ rigorous imprisonment. As in
this appeal special leave has been granted limited
1039
to the question already stated, it is unnecessary to set
out the prosecution case against the appellant.
In Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956 the appellant had applied
to the Allahabad High Court under s. 561A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for the quashing of the proceedings
pending against him before the Special Judge. The
application was dismissed. It is against the order
dismissing his application that this appeal has been filed
by the appellant.
It is admitted that at the time the Special Judges concerned
purported to take cognizance the appellants were not public
servants and that no order of sanction under s. 6 of the Act
by a competent authority was on the record. At the time
that the appellants are alleged to have committed the
offence they were public servants.
Section 6 of the Act states:
“6. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution (1) No
court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under
section 161 or section 164 or section 165 of the Indian
Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), or under sub-section (2) of
section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a
public servant, except with the previous sanction,
(a)in the case of a person who is employed in connection
with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the Central
Government, of the Central Government,
(b)in the case of a person who is employed in connection
with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the State Government,
of the State Government,
(c)in the case of any other person, of the authority
competent to remove him from his office.
(2)Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether
the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1)
should be given by the Central or State Government or any
other authority, such sanction shall be given by that
Government or authority which
132
1040
would have been competent to remove the public servant from
his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have
been committed.”
There is no dispute that if at the time when a court
purports to take cognizance of offences punishable under s.
161, 164 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code or s. 5(2) of
the Act committed by a public servant and that person is a
public servant, cognizance cannot be taken by a court unless
a sanction by the competent authority has been previously
accorded. The real controversy in these appeals is whether
such a sanction is required before a court can take
cognizance in the case of a person who is not a public
servant at the time the court is asked to take cognizance,
although the offence alleged against him was committed by
him as a public servant. To determine this question s. 6 of
the Act requires to be interpreted.
In substance, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that
on a proper interpretation of s. 6 of the Act the status of
the accused at the time of the commission of the offence
alleged against him was the essence of the matter and not
his status at the time the court was asked to take
cognizance of the offence, in which case a sanction under s.
6 of the Act was necessary before a court could take
cognizance although at that stage the accused had ceased to
be a public servant.
On the other band, the Solicitor-General contended that on a
proper interpretation of the provisions of s. 6 of the Act
not only an offence mentioned therein must be committed by a
public servant but that that person is still a public
servant removable from his office by a competent authority
at the time a court was asked to take cognizance of the
offence.
Before we proceed to construe the provisions of s. 6 of the
Act it is necessary to refer to some of the submissions made
by the learned Counsel for the appellants. It was said that
in construing the provisions of a statute a court must
attempt to ascertain the intention of the legislature and it
must do this not only from the language of the statute, but
also from the
1041
consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to
it, and of the mischief which it was intended to remedy. It
must supplement the written word so as to give force and
life to the intention of the legislature. Reliance was also
placed upon certain decisions construing the provisions of
s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Reference was
also made to Art. 361 of the Constitution and s. 197A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure in aid of the construction which
the learned Counsel contended for with reference to the
words used in s. 6 of the Act.
In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential
for a court, in the first instance, to give effect to the
natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words
are clear enough. It is only in the case of any ambiguity
that a court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the
legislature by construing the provisions of the statute as a
whole and taking into consideration other matters and the
circumstances which led to the enactment of the statute.
Observations of Denning L. J. as he then was, in the case of
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1) were relied upon by
Mr. Chatterjee. It is, however, clear that the observations
of the learned Judge were made with reference to the
provision of a statute which was ambiguous. We cannot
construe the observations to mean that where the language of
a statute was free from ambiguity a duty was cast upon the
court to do anything more than to give effect to the words
used. Although reference was made to Art. 361 of the
Constitution and s. 197A of the Code by Mr. Sethi, we are
unable to see how the words used therein assist us in -con-
struing the provisions of s. 6 of the Act.
Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Nagpur High
Court in the case of S. Y. Patil v. Vyankatswami (2 ) and
the decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of
Sind in the case of Suganchand v. Seth Naraindas (3), in
support of the submission that even if a person had ceased
to be a public servant before the prosecution started, such
a person was
(1)(1949) 2 K. B. 481, 498. (2) I. L. R. (1939) Nag. 419.
(3)A. I. R. (1932) Sind. I77.
1042
protected by the provisions of s. 197 of the Code and a
sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance.
It is true that so far as s. 197 of the Code is concerned
these two decisions do lend support to the submission made
by the learned Counsel for the appellants. It is, however,
to be noticed that the decision of the Nagpur High Court,
which was of a single Judge, was overruled by a Division
Bench of that Court in the case of The State v. Hifzul
Rahman (1), where it was held that the person accused must
be a public servant at the time of the accusation and s. 197
of the Code afforded no protection to a public servant if he
had ceased to hold office. In the case of Prasad Chandra
Banerji v. Emperor(2), the Calcutta High Court held that the
protection given by s. 197. of the Code applied only to a
person who is still a public servant at the time the
prosecution is launched and does not extend to a person who
is no longer a public servant at that time but was in office
when the offence charged was alleged to have been committed.
Accordingly, no sanction under s. 197 of the Code was
necessary in order to prosecute a person who had ceased to
be a public servant at the time of the launching of the
prosecution. A similar view was taken by the Bombay High
Court in the case of Imperator v. Joshi (3), and by a single
Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Emperor v.
Suraj Narain Chaube (4). It would thus appear that the High
Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allababad and Nagpur are agreed
that s. 197 of the Code affords no protection to a person
who is not a public servant at the time he is accused of an
offence before a court although at the time he committed the
offence he was a public servant. The decision of the Punjab
High Court in the case of The State v. Gurcharan Singh (5),
was brought to our notice wherein it was held that in view
of the form of wording in the two sections, namely s. 197 of
the Code and a. 6 of the Act, the same principles would
apply to them, having regard to the decisions of the
Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and the protection afforded
by s. 197 of
(1)I. L. R. (1951) Nag. 764. (2) 1. L. R. (1944) 1 Cal. 113.
(3) I. L. R. (1947) Bom. 706. (4) 1. L. R. (1938) All. 776.
(5) A. I. R. (1952) Pun.89.
1043
the Code was available to a person who was a public servant
while still in office but was not available to him when he
had already been discharged from service before he was
prosecuted. These cases may render assistance in
understanding the reason why a public servant, while he is a
public servant, cannot be prosecuted without a previous
sanction for offences, committed by him as a public servant
and thus may, be of some indirect help in construing the
words used in s. 6 of the Act. Section 6, however, must be
construed with reference to the words used therein
independent of any construction which may have been placed
by these decisions on the words used in s. 197 of the Code.
Before an attempt is made to construe the words contained
in s. 6 of the Act some reference may be made to the power
vested in a court to take cognizance of an offence. Section
190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers a general
power on a criminal court to take cognizance of offences,
but the exercise of such power in certain cases is
prohibited by the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 of the Code
unless the conditions mentioned therein are complied with.
Under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952),
Special Judges are appointed to try offences under s. 161,
162, 163, 164, 165 or s. 165A of the Indian, Penal Code or
s. 5(2) of the Act. They are authorized to take cognizance
of these offences without the accused person being committed
to them for trial. The exercise of this general power to
take cognizance by them is prohibited with respect to
offences committed under s. 161, 164 or s. 165 of Indian
Penal Code or under s. 5(2) of the Act by a public servant
without the previous sanction of a competent authority. In
our opinion, if a general power to take cognizance of an
offence is vested in a court, any prohibition to the
exercise of that power, by any provision of law, must be
confined to the terms of the prohibition. In enacting a law
prohibiting the taking of cognizance of an offence by a
court, unless certain conditions were complied with, the
legislature did not purport to condone the offence. It was
primarily concerned to
1044
see that prosecution for offences in cases coveted by the
prohibition shall not commence without complying with the
conditions contained therein, such as a previous sanction of
a competent authority in the case of a public servant, and
in other cases with the consent of the authority or the
party interested in the prosecution or aggrieved by the
offence. There can be little doubt that in the case of a
public servant the Central Government or the State
Government or the authority competent to remove him from
service is vitally interested in the matter of his
prosecution. Such authority is directly concerned in the
matter as it has to decide whether to accord or not to
accord its sanction for the prosecution of one of its
servants. The authority concerned may refuse to accord such
sanction on the ground that the prosecution is frivolous or
vexatious or on the ground that in the public ;Interest it
would be inexpedient to do so. Without some safeguard of
this kind a public servant may find it impossible to carry
on his official duties efficiently.
The object of the Act was to suppress bribery and
corruption. Its provisions are severe. Certain
presumptions of guilt of offences committed under ss. 161
and 165A of the Indian Penal Code were enjoined by s. 4 of
the Act unless the contrary was proved by the accused.
Section 5 of the Act created the offence if criminal
misconduct on the part of a public servant, an offence
unknown to any of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code
dealing with bribery or corruption. Sub-section (2) made
such an offence punishable with imprisonment which may
extend to a term of 7 years, or with fine, or with both.
Under sub-s. (3) a court shall presume that the accused was
guilty of misconduct if it was proved that he or any other
person on his behalf was in possession, for which the
accused person could not satisfactorily account, of
pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his
known sources of income. These provisions of the Act indi-
cate that it was the intention of the legislature to treat
more severely than hitherto corruption on the part of a
public servant and not to condone it in any manner
whatsoever. If s. 6 had Dot found a place in
1045
the Act it is clear that cognizance of an offence under
s.161, 164 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under
s.5(2) of the Act committed by a public servant could be
taken by a court even if he had ceased to be a public
servant. The mere fact that he had ceased to be a public
servant after the commission of the offence would not
absolve him from his crime. Section 6 certainly does
prohibit the taking of cognizance of his offence, without a
previous sanction, while he is still a public servant but
does that prohibition continue after he has ceased to be a
public servant ? It is to determine that question which
requires us to examine and construe the provisions of s. 6
of the Act and to express our opinion thereon.
When the provisions of s. 6 of the Act are examined it is
manifest that two conditions must be fulfilled before its
provisions become applicable. One is that the offences
mentioned therein must be committed by a public servant and
the other is that that person is employed in connection with
the affairs of the Union or a State and is not removable
from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central
Government or the State Government or is a public servant
who is removable from his office by any other competent
authority. Both these conditions must be present to
preventa court from taking cognizance of an offence
mentioned in the section without the previous sanction of
the Central Government or the State Government or the
authority competent to remove the public servant from his
office. If either of these conditions is lacking, the
essential requirements of the section are. wanting and the
provisions of the section do not stand in the way of a court
taking cognizance without a previous sanction. An offence
under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code can be committed by a
public servant or by a person expecting to be a public
servant, but s. 6 of the Act refers only to an offence
committed by a publicservant under that section. If,
therefore, at the time a court was asked to take cognizance
of an offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code, the
accused is a public servant but was not so at the time that
the offence was committed, but at which time he was
1046
merely expecting to be a public servant, a previous sanction
would be unnecessary before a court could take cognizance.
as the provisions of the section would be inapplicable.
Conversely, if an offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal
Code was committed by a public servant, but, at the time a
court was asked to take cognizance of the offence, that
person had ceased to be a public servant one of the two
requirements to make s. 6 of the Act applicable would be
lacking and a previous sanction would be unnecessary. The
words in s. 6(1) of the Act are clear enough and they must
be given effect to. There is nothing in the words used in
s. 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was
necessary before a court could take cognizance of the
offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had
ceased to be a public servant at the time the court was
asked to take cognizance, although he had been such a person
at the time the offence was committed. It was suggested
that el. (c) in s. 6(1) refers to persons other than those
mentioned in cls. (a) and (b). The words ” is employed ”
are absent in this clause which would, therefore, apply to a
person who had ceased to be a public servant though he was
so at the time of the commission of the offence. Clause (c)
cannot be construed in this way. The expressions ” in the
case of a person ” and “in the case of any other person ”
must refer to a public servant having regard to the first
paragraph of the sub-section. Clauses (a) and (b),
therefore, would cover the case of a public servant who is
employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a
State and is not removable from his office save by or with
the sanction of the Central Government or the State
Government and el. (c) would cover the case of any other
public servant whom a competent authority could remove from
his office. The more important words in cl. (c) are “of the
authority competent to remove him from his office”. A
public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is not
a person removable from any office by a competent authority.
Section 2 of the Act states that a public servant, for the
purpose of the Act, means a public servant as defined in s.
21 of the Indian Penal Code. Under
1047
cl. (c), therefore, any one who is a public servant at the
time a court was asked to take cognizance, but does not come
within the description of a public servant under cls. (a)
and (b), is accused of an offence committed by him as a
public servant as specified in s. 6 would be entitled to
rely on the provisions of that section and object to the
taking of cognizance without a previous sanction. To read
cl. (c) in the way suggested on behalf of the appellants,
would be to give a meaning to this clause which is not
justified by the words employed therein. It was further
suggested that the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 6 indicate
that it was the status of the accused at the time of the
commission of the offence which was relevant rather than his
status at the time a court was asked to take cognizance.
This sub-section was inserted into the Act by the Prevention
of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, and it purported
to finally settle any doubts which may arise as to which
authority should grant the sanction in the case of a public
servant who had committed an offence mentioned in s. 6(1)
and who at the time the court was asked to take cognizance
is still a public servant. For example, it is not difficult
to imagine cases where a public servant employed by a State
Government is subsequently employed by the Central
Government and a question arises as to which of the two
Governments is to grant the sanction for his prosecution.
This sub-section resolves the difficulty by directing that
where a doubt arises, the authority which was to grant the
sanction was the one which was competent to remove him from
his office at the time of the commission of the offence. If
the provisions of sub-s. (1) bear the construction which we
place upon them, there is nothing in sub-s. (2) which is in
conflict with that construction. Besides, there is nothing
in the language of sub-s. (2) which carries the meaning
suggested on behalf of the appellants or which assists us in
construing the provisions of sub-s. (1). We cannot construe
the words ” is employed ” and ” is not removable” in cls.
(a) and (b) and “competent to remove him from his office” in
cl. (c) as “was employed” and ” was not removable “ and ”
would have been
I33
1048
competent to remove him from his office “. To do so would be
to substitute our own words for the words of the statute as
contained in these clauses.
In Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 1954, dealt with by another
judgment, where a similar question bad been raised, the
appellant had suggested that two defects appearing in s. 197
of the Code of Criminal Procedure were intended to be
remedied by the Act: (1) that s. 197 did not apply to a
public servant who had ceased to be a public servant at the
time of the taking of cognizance of an offence and (2) that
an offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code committed
by a public servant was not covered by s. 197 of the Code,
as such offence could not be said to have been committed by
him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty, having regard to the decisions of the
courts in India and of the Privy Council. We cannot see how
this assists us in construing s.6 of the Act. Whatever the
phraseology of s.197 of the Code may have been in the past,
the decisions of the courts in India that s. 197 of the
Codedoes not apply to a person who had ceased to be a
public servant at the time a court was asked to take
cognizance were based upon the words used in that section at
the time the judgments were pronounced. These decisions
laid emphasis on the words ” when any person who is a judge
within the meaning of s. 19 of the Indian Penal
Code…………………… or when any public servant who
is not removable from his office …………… “ It was
held in these decisions that these words meant that the
person must be a public servant at the time a court was
asked to take cognizance, although be may have been a public
servant at the time of the commission of the offence. It is
true that unlike s. 197 of the Code, s. 6 of the Act does
not contain the words ” while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duty “. We have to construe s.
6 of the Act as we find it and the absence of these words
from the section renders us no assistance in its
construction.
In our opinion, in giving effect to the ordinary meaning
of the words used in s. 6 of the Act, the conclusion
1049
is inevitable that at the time a court is asked to take
cognizance not only the offence must have been committed by
a public servant but the person accused is still a public
servant removable from his office by a competent authority
before the provisions of s. 6 can apply. In the present
appeals, admittedly, the appellants had ceased to be public
servants at the time the court took cognizance of the
offences alleged to have been committed by them as public
servants. Accordingly the provisions of s. 6 of the Act did
not apply and the prosecution against them was not vitiated
by the lack of a previous sanction by a competent authority.
Criminal Appeal 25 of 1956.
In this appeal apart from the question that the court
could not take cognizance of the offence alleged against the
appellant without a previous sanction of a competent
authority, additional points had been taken for quashing the
prosecution pending against him. The appellant was
appointed Deputy Assistant Director Enforcement in the
Ministry of Industry and Commerce on March 25, 1949 and was
promoted to the office of Assistant Director on July 14,
1949. It was alleged that he accepted on September 11,
1951, a sum Rs. 10,000 as bribe in part payment out of an
agreed amount of Rs. 30,000. An enquiry under r. 55 of the
Civil Service Rules took place and thereafter he was
dismissed from service on September 25, 1953. In the
meantime, it appears that correspondence bad ensued between
the appellant and the Government. On September 18, 1952, a
final report was submitted to the court under s. 173 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure wherein it was stated that
although a prosecution was recommended, the order of the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry was that the appellant
would be dealt with departmentally. On September 19, 1952,
the Magistrate, by his order, approved of the closing of the
investigation, discharged the appellant from his bail and
directed that the sum of Rs. 10,000 seized from him, was to
be returned to the complainant. The prosecution of the
appellant was,
1050
however, recommenced on February II,, 1954, on the same
materials and same allegations but on a fresh complaint.
It, was contended on behalf of the appellant, that once a
sanction had been refused then that was the end of the
prosecution for all times. If once the sanction was refused
it could not ever be granted later on. If the prosecution
had been dropped, then it could not be revived in a case
where a. sanction was necessary prior to a prosecution, and
a promise not to prosecute prevented a reconsideration of
the matter. Lastly, it was urged that in the circumstances
of the case it was an abuse of the process of the court to
allow a prosecution to be recommenced after it had been
withdrawn.
We have examined the correspondence which has been
referred to in the petition for special leave and which is
to be found on the record of this case. There is nothing in
them to establish the allegation that a sanction for the
prosecution of the appellant was positively refused. All
that is indicated is that the Government chose to proceed
against the appellant departmentally. It can hardly be said
that in doing so the Government had positively refused to
grant sanction for the prosecution of the appellant.
Indeed, it may be legitimately said that the Government
preferred to &wait the result of a departmental enquiry. If
that enquiry exonerated the appellant the occasion for
granting a sanction may not arise. If, on the other band,
the departmental enquiry established the allegation against
the appellant, the Government might find itself in
possession of more material than that disclosed by the
police investigation on which to decide whether a sanction
should or should not be granted. We cannot read into the
correspondence, as was suggested on behalf of the appellant,
that there was a promise on the part of the Government not
to prosecute the appellant.
It is true that there was a final report and a withdrawal
of the case before a Magistrate. At the stage when the
withdrawal took place the appellant was still a public
servant and the court could not take
1051
cognizance of the offence under s, 161 of the Indian Penal
Code and under s. 5(2) of the Act without a previous
sanction. The withdrawal of the case at that stage meant no
more than this that the appellant was discharged. A
withdrawal of a case resulting merely in a discharge does
not prevent the prosecution being recommenced on a fresh
complaint. On February 11, 1954, when the fresh complaint
was filed the appellant was not a public servant and
therefore the court could take cognizance without a previous
sanction.
It is unnecessary for us to say whether once a sanction
is positively refused a fresh sanction cannot be granted,
because we are satisfied, on the materials before us, that,
in fact, there was no positive refusal to sanction the
prosecution of the appellant.
We are also satisfied that the circumstances do not
establish that there had been any abuse of the process of
the court and the provisions of s. 561A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure do not apply.
As the points urged in these appeals have failed, the
appeals must, accordingly, be dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
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