Court Judgments

PETITIONER:
RANGNATH

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
DAULATRAO AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1974

BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
BHAGWATI, P.N.

CITATION:
1975 AIR 2146          1975 SCR  (3)     99
1975 SCC  (1) 686
CITATOR INFO :
D        1977 SC 567     (23)
F        1977 SC 757     (36)
R        1977 SC1673     (9)
R        1980 SC1255     (11)
RF        1980 SC2056     (65)
RF        1985 SC 781     (16)
R        1986 SC2105     (17)
R        1990 SC1607     (20)

ACT:
Natural      justice-Speaking  order-State      Government   while
disposing a statutory appeal whether  bound to give personal
hearing and to pass a speaking order.
Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash grants Act, 1954.
Whether     tenancy  comes to an end on service  of  notice  of
termination-Practice-Whether a ground contrary to one  taken
all  throughout can be allowed to be raised at the stage  of
arguments-Res judicata.

HEADNOTE:
The  appellant was the Inamdar and respondent no. 1 was     the
tenant    of  the suit land when the  Hyderabad  Abolition  of
Inams  and Cash Grants Act, 1954 was made applicable to     the
suit  ‘land.   By  virtue of the  said    Abolition  Act,     the
appellants Inam was abolished and it vested in the State.
Before the Inam was abolished. the appellant terminated     the
tenancy     of  first  respondent    by  a  notice  and  filed  a
proceeding for eviction of the tenant Under the Tenancy Act.
The  said  application was rejected by    the  Naib  Tahsildar
before, the Inam was abolished.     However, after the Inam was
abolisbed  on  an appeal the Deputy  Collector    allowed     the
appellant  to  resume the suit land.  The  Revenue  Tribunal
allowed the revision of respondent No. 1 on the ground    that
after the abolition and vesting of the appellant’s Inam, the
first respondent as a tenant in possession acquired all     the
rights     of  an     occupant  tinder  the    Act.    During     the
proceedings under the Inam Abolition Act, the      appellant
contended  that     the respondent no.  1 did  not     become     the
occupant  of   the   land.   The  Tahsildar   decided    that
respondent no.    1 was a tenant in  possession        and,
therefore,   acquired  the  rights  of    an  occupant.     The
appellant filed an appeal before the State Government  under
the   Abolition     Act  against  the  said  decision  of     the
Tahsildar.   The State Government dismissed the said  appeal
without     passing  a  speaking order  and  without  giving  a
personal  hearing to the appellant.  The appellant  filed  a
writ petition against the said order of the State Government
which was dismissed- by the High Court.     The appellant filed
a  writ     petition against the said judgment. of     the  Bombay
High  Court.  It was contended before this Court,  (i)    that
the  State  Government was not justified ‘in  rejecting     the
appellant’s  statutory appeal without giving him  a  hearing
and  without passing any reasoned order. (ii) that the    inam
in  question  was a service Inam and hence in  view  of     the
provision of Law contained in section 102A(c) of the Tenancy
Act the said Act was not applicable to the land in question;
respondent  no.1  could therefore never be a tenant  of     the
land. (iii) that the proceedings initiated by the  appellant
for resumption of land under the Tenancy Act were all  ultra
vires and without jurisdiction, there being no    relationship
of landlord and tenant between the parties under the Tenancy
Act.   Jurisdiction could not be conferred by  an  erroneous
stand  of  the appellant that the first respondent  was     his
tenant.     (iv)  In  any view of the matter  the    tenancy     was
terminated by service of a notice under s. 44 and the filing
of  the     application  under s. 32(2)  of  the  Tenancy    Act,
against respondent no. 1. He was. therefore, not a tenant in
possession  of the land on 1-7-1960 the date of     vesting  of
the  Inam.  (v)     The High Court has committed  an  error  in
holding     that its judgment in Special Petition No.  1881  of
1962 operated as res-Judicata on the question of  respondent
no. 1 acquiring the eight of an occupant under section    6(1)
of tile      Abolition of Inams Act.
HELD : (1) It was not necessary for the State Government  to
give   a   personal  hearing  to  the    appellant   or     his
representative.     When in order is
100
liable    to  be    challenged under Arts. 226 and    227  of     the
Constitution,  courts  insist  that an appeal  ought  to  be
disposed  of  by  a speaking order  giving  reasons  in     its
support.  It may not be possible in all cases to say that  a
non-speaking  order is bad or invalid.    On the facts of     the
case, the High Court rightly did not set aside the order  of
the  State Government and remit back the appellant’s  appeal
on  that ground.  No determination or adjudication of  facts
was involved. [103A-D]
(2)  Mere service of the notice terminating the tenancy and
filing    an application for possession does not bring an     end
to  the     tenancy.   Until  and    unless    the  possession     was
directed  to  be delivered to the land    holder’     the  tenant
continued  in possession as a tenant.  The decision  of     the
full  bench of Bombay High Court-reported in 67     Bombay     Law
Reporter 521 doubted. [104-F-G; 105-A-B]
(3)  The appellant all along contended that the Inam was not
a service Inam.     The said contention is contrary to the case
of the appellant throughout. [103-F]
(4)  The  appellant cannot contend that respondent no. 1  is
not  a tenant.    The appellant all along     treated  respondent
no.   1 as a tenant.  The appellant did not even  assert  in
the  Statement    of  case  or  the  additional  grounds    that
respondent no.    1 is not a tenant.  Respondent no.  1 was in
cultivating possession and was paying rent to the appellant.
It could not be in any capacity other than a tenant.  [103H-
104B]
(5)  The  High Court rightly held that issue as     to  whether
respondent  no.     1 acquired the right as an occupant or     not
was barred on the principles of res judicata in view of     the
decision of the High Court in the earlier petition, [105-E]

JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 30 of 1968.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated     the
14th  October, 1966 of the Bombay High Court in W.P.  (Spl.
C. Appln. of 1019 of 1965).
B.   N. Lokur and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the Appellant.
S.   T. Desai and R. B. Datar, for Respondent No. 1.
M.   N. Shroff, for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA,  J.-In this appeal filed by special leave of    this
Court it would be noticed that the appellant has endeavoured
on  one     ground     or the other to get the  15  acres  and  14
Gunthas     of land in Osmanabad which at one time formed    part
of  the erstwhile State of Hyderabad and eventually came  to
be a part of the State of Maharashtra.    The disputed land is
comprised in Survey No. 206/B.    There is no dispute that the
appellant  was    the  Inamdar of this  land.   The  Hyderabad
Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act, 1954 being Hyderabad
Act  No. VIII of 1955 (hereinafter called the  Abolition  of
Inams  Act,)  came  into force on  its    publication  in     the
gazette on the 20th July, 1955.     The Abolition of Inams     Act
was amended by the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams     (Amendment)
Act,  1956 and was further amended by Bombay Act 64 of    1959
which came into force on 1st July, 1960.  It is no longer in
controversy   that  the     Abolition  of    Inams    Act   became
applicable to the appellant’s Inam by virtue of the  amended
provisions on 1-7-1960 as a result of which under Section  3
appellants Inam was abolished and vested in the State.    Upon
its  vesting,  certain consequences followed which  will  be
adverted to hereinafter in this judgment.
101
The  first  round  of litigation started  by  the  appellant
against     respondent no. 1 treating him as his  tenant  under
the  Hyderabad    Tenancy     and Agricultural  Land     Act,  1950,
Hyderabad  Act    No.  XXI of  1950  (hereinafter     called     the
Tenancy     Act)  was  started by the appellant  by  serving  a
notice on the first respondent under section 44 of the    said
Tenancy Act.  The appellant claimed in that proceeding    that
he bonafide required the land for cultivating it  personally
and  hence after service of notice purporting  to  terminate
the tenancy by the 31st day of December, 1958 him  proceeded
to  file an application on 18-3-1959 for possession  of     the
land  under  section  32(2) of the Tenancy  Act.   The    Naib
Tehsildar,  Land Reforms, Osmanabad rejected the  resumption
application  of the appellant by his order dated  22-10-1959
holding     against him on merits that he has made out no    case
for  termination of the tenancy.  The appellant went  up  in
appeal    which  was  allowed by    the  Deputy  Collector    Land
Reforms Osmanabad by his order dated 25-5-1962.     The  Deputy
Collector allowed the appellant to resume the disputed lands
in  Survey  No.     206  holding  in  his    favour    on   merits.
Respondent no. 1 went up in revision.  The Revenue  Tribunal
allowed     the revision of respondent no. 1 by its order    made
on 15-10-1962.    It took the view accepting a new stand taken
on  behalf  of the tenant respondent,no.  1 that  after     the
abolition  and    vesting     of the appellant’s  Inam  the    said
respondent who was in possession of the land covered by     the
Inam  as a tenant holding from the Jnamdar had acquired     all
the  rights  of an occupant in respect of  such     land  under
section     6  (1    )(a) of the Abolition  of  Inams  Act.     The
appellant  moved the High Court of Bombay under Article     227
of  the Constitution of India in Special  Civil     Application No.
1881 of 1962.  Agreeing with the view of  the  Revenue
Tribunal the Special Civil Application was dismissed by     the
High Court on 26-9-1963.
The second round of fight culminating in the present  appeal
started     between the parties when proceedings under  section
2A  which  was introduced in the Abolition of Inams  Act  by
section     6 of Bombay Act, 64 of 1959 were  initiated  before
the  Officer  authorised by the State Government  to  decide
certain     questions relating to Inams. The Tehsildar  gave  a
notice    to respondent no. 1 for payment of price in lieu  of
his having acquired the right of an occupant in the land  in
accordance  with  section 6 of the Abolition of     Inams    Act.
The   appellant     filed    his  objection    and  asserted    that
respondent  no.     1 had not become the occupant of  the    land
under  the, provisions of law aforesaid.  Various  questions
were raised by him.  The Deputy Collector decided the matter
in  the     first instance by his order dated  30-11-1962.      He
held  that  the land was granted to the     appellant  for     his
service     as Mahajan; it could, therefore, be deemed to be  a
Watan land.  He further held that the provisions of  section
6 of Abolition of Inams Act were applicable and the date of
vesting     of the Inam was 1st July, 1960 and not     20th  July,
1955.    Since he was not the Officer to decide the  question
of  possession under section 6(1) of the Abolition of  inams
Act, he remained content by saying in his order dated 30-11-
1962  “The land in question being the Watan land,  shall  be
resumed     and vested in Government with effect from 1st    July
1960 and the person
102
in  possession of the land at the time of vesting  shall  be
entitled to occupancy right under section 6(1) of the Act in
respect     of the said land.” He finally directed that a    copy
of this order be sent to the Tehsildar Osmanabad for further
necessary  action.  The Tehsildar by his order    dated  15-7-
1963  decided the matter in favour of the first     respondent’
and held him to be a tenant in possession of the land on the
date of vesting of the Inam and hence a person acquiring the
rights of an occupant under section 6(1).  The objection  of
the appellant was rejected by the Tehsildar.
The  appellant filed an appeal before the  State  Government
under  section 2A(2) of the Abolition of Inams Act from     the
decision of the Tehsildar.  The rejection of the appellant’s
appeal by the State Government was communicated to him by  a
letter    dated 27th November, 1964 of the Under Secretary  to
the   Government   of  Maharashtra,   Revenue    and   Forest
Department.  The appellant challenged the order of the State
Government  in    Special Civil Application No. 1019  of    1966
under  Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India  in
the Bombay High Court.    A Bench of the High Court  dismissed
his Writ Application by its judgment and order dated 1.4-10-
1966.  The appellant presented this appeal by special  leave
of this Court.
Mr.  B.     N. Lokur, learned counsel for    the  appellant    made
following submissions in support of the appeal
1.    That   the    State  Government  was     not
justified      in   rejecting   the     appellant’s
statutory     appeal without giving him       a
hearing  and  without  passing  any   reasoned
order.
2.    That the Inam in question was a  service
Inam and hence in view of the provision of law
contained     in section 102A(c) of    the  Tenancy
Act  the    said Act was not applicable  to     the
land  in    question; respondent  no.   1  could
therefore never be a tenant of the land.
3.    That  the proceedings initiated  by     the
appellant     for  resumption of land  under     the
Tenancy  Act were all ultra vires and  without
jurisdiction,  there being no relationship  of
landlord and tenant between the parties  under
the  Tenancy res-judicata on the    question  of
respondent no. 1 acquiring the of an  occupant
under   section 6(1) of the Abolition of    Inam
Act.
4.   In    any view of the matter    the  tenancy
was  terminated by service of a  notice  under
section  44 and the filing of the     application
under  section  32(2)  of     the  Tenancy  Act,,
against respondent no. 1. He, was,  therefore,
not a tenant in possession of the land on     1-7-
1960 the date of vesting of the Inam.
5.    The High Court has committed an error in
holding that its judgment in Special  Petition
No. 1881 of 1962 operated the res-judicata  on
the question of respondent no. 1 acquiring the
103
In  our judgment none of the points urged on behalf  of     the
appellant is fit to succeed.
It  was     not necessary for the State Government     to  give  a
personal   hearing  to    the  appellant    or  his      authorised
representative    before disposal of his appeal.    As has    been
repeatedly  pointed out by this Court the  State  Government
ought  to  have     disposed of the  statutory  appeal  of     the
appellant  filed  under section 2A(2) of  the  Abolition  of
Inams  Act by a speaking order.     It may not be    possible  in
all cases to say that a nonspeaking order is bad or  invalid
on  that  account alone but when an order is  liable  to  be
challenged under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution  of
India, Courts do insist that an appeal of the kind filed  by
the  appellant should be and ought to have been disposed  of
by a speaking order giving some reasons in its support.     But
on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the    High
Court did not feet persuaded, and in our opinion rightly, to
set  aside the order of the State Government and remit    back
the  appellants appeal to them merely on that  account.      No
determination  or  adjudication of facts  was  involved     The
decision of the case rested on the points of law.  The    High
Court did examine the question as to whether respondent     no.
1  could  not be a tenant of the appellant  because  of     the
reason    that the Inam had been held to be a Watan  Inam     and
consequently  according     to the appellant it was  a  service
Inam.  In the present proceeding the High Court pointed     out
that  respondent  no.    1  was    admittedly  the     appellant’s
tenant.      Mere    service of notice under section     44  of     the
Tenancy Act had not terminated the tenancy.  The  proceeding
for  resumption     of the land under the Tenancy    Act  finally
terminated   against  the  appellant  on  the  ground    that
respondent  no.      1  could no longer be evicted     as  he     had
acquired the right of an occupant under the Abolition of 1
On the finding recorded by the Deputy Collector in his order
dated 30-11-1962 that the appellant held the Inam as a Watan
for  the purpose of this case we shall assume in his  favour
that  it was a service Inam and hence the provisions of     the
Tenancy Act were not applicable.  But such a stand is wholly
contrary to the appellant’s case in the previous proceedings
for resumption of land.     Every where the appellant  asserted
that respondent no. 1 was his tenant, so much so that in his
Special     Civil Application No. 1881 of 1962 a copy of  which
was  given  to us by Mr’ S. T. Desai,  learned    counsel     for
respondent  no.     1, he had stated in paragraph 7  “That     the
learned Member of the Tribunal has failed to apply his    mind
to the provisions of Sec. 102(c) which was in force prior to
the  substitution of new Section 102-A(c) of  the  Hyderabad
Tenancy     and Agricultural Lands Act.  It does not  apply  to
the case in question as the suit land is an Inam land not  a
service     Inam,    so  the Tenancy Act  is     applicable  to     the
present case.” It is not open to the    appellant to  change
his stand and then assert that the previous proceedings started
by him for resumption of the land was ultra vires and  without
jurisdiction  as the Tenancy Act was not applicable  to     the
land.  The appellant than tried to urge that respondent     no.
1  could not be and was not a tenant of the land.  But    this
contention  is also not open to the appellant.    No where  it
has been.
104
asserted  by the appellant not even in the statement of     the
case  and the additional grounds filed in this Court  except
in the argument put forward by his learned counsel that     the
Inamdar     of  the  kind the appellant Was, had  no  right  to
induct    any tenant on the Inam land.  The fact remains    that
respondent no.    1 was in cultivating possession of the    land
in  question paying rent to the appellant since long  before
the  vesting  of  the  Inam.  It could not  but     be  in     his
capacity  as a tenant of the appellant.     It is not  open  to
the  appellant to assert that the order made by the  Revenue
Tribunal or as a matter of that in his earlier Special Civil
Application by the Bombay High Court was in a proceeding  in
which there was inherent lack of jurisdiction in the  first
authority and consequently the order was also a nullity.
There  is no substance in the 4th submission of     Mr.  Lokur.
Section 44(1) of the Tenancy Act reads as follows :
44(1)  “Notwithstanding anything contained  in
section 6 or 19 but subject to the  provisions
of  sub-sections (2) to (7),  landholder    (not
being  a    landholder  within  the     meaning  of
Chapter IV-C) may) after giving notice to     the
tenant   and   making   an   application     for
possession  as  provided    in  subsection    (2),
terminate     the  tenancy of any  land,  if     the
landholder  bonafide  requires  the  land     for
cultivating it personally.  ”
Section 32 prescribes the procedure of taking possession  of
the  land  and    sub-section  (2)  says    ”Save  as  otherwise
provided  in  subsection (3A), no  landholder  shall  obtain
possession  of any land or dwelling house held by  a  tenant
except    under an order of the Tehsildar, for which he  shall
apply  in the prescribed form within a period of  two  years
from  the date of the commencement of the Hyderabad  Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1957, or the date on
which the right to such possession accrued to him  whichever
is later.” Reading the wordings of sections 44(1) and  32(2)
of  the     Tenancy  Act  it was not  possible  to     accept     the
contention  put forward on behalf of the appellant  that  by
mere  service  of notice and the filing of  application     for
possession the tenancy had some to an end.  Until and unless
possession was directed to be delivered to the landholder by
the competent authority, the tenant continued in  possession
and  continued    to be so as a tenant.  A full Bench  of     the
Bombay    High Court in Dattatraya Sadashiv Dhond     v.  Ganpati
Raghu Gaoli(1) expressed the view at page 529 “The manner in
which  a tenancy is to be terminated is, however, laid    down
in  section 44.     Under this section the     tenancy  terminates
when after giving the requisite notice the landholder  makes
an application for possession to the Tehsildar.      Thereafter
the tenant’s possession is not unlawful, but it is not    held
by  him as a tenant.  He has an estate in possession,  which
he  will lose if the Tehsildar makes an order in  favour  of
the  landholder.   If, however, the  Tehsildar    rejects     the
application of the landholder, the termination of tenancy by
the-landholder    will become ineffective.  The  tenancy    will
revive and the tenant will continue in
(1)  67 Bombay Law Reporter, 521.
105
possession  as    if  his tenancy had  not  been    terminated.”
Although the view so expressed by the Bombay High Court     may
not be quite, accurate and the better view to take may be to
say  that the process of termination of tenancy     started  by
the service of notice and the filing of the application     for
possession by the landholder is not complete until an  order
for  possession     is  made by the  competent  authority    and,
therefore, there is no termination of tenancy until an order
for  possession     follows in the process, the  matter  become
beyond the pale of controversy in view of rule 28(5) of     the
Hyderabad  Tenancy  and     Agricultural Lands  Rules  made  in
accordance  with sub-section (10) of section 44 of the    Act.
Sub-section (10) empowers the State Government to provide by
rules  the  time when the termination of tenancy  will    take
effect    and  rule  28(5) says that on the  granting  of     the
application   for   possession    the  tenancy   shall   stand
terminated  from the commencement of the year following     the
year in which the application is granted.  It is, therefore,
clear  that the tenancy did not come to an end by  the    mere
service     of notice and the filing of the application by     the
appellant  against respondent no.  1 under the Tenancy    Act.
He was a tenant when the Inam of the appellant vested in the
State  on  the 1st of July, 1960.  Indisputably, he  was  in
possession  of    the  land on  that  date.   Consequently  he
acquired the rights of an occupant under section 6(1) of the
Abolition of Inams Act. There was no error committed by the
High Court in deciding this question against the appellant.
The  High Court was also right in holding that the issue  as
to  the     acquiring by respondent no.  1 of the right  of  an
occupant  was  barred on the principles of res    judicata  in
view  of the previous decision in the earlier Special  Civil
Application.   Neither    the Revenue Tribunal  nor  the    High
Court in the earlier proceeding went into the merits of     the
appellant’s  claim for resumption of the land.    It  defeated
him on the ground that since respondent no.  1 had  acquired
the right of an occupant on the abolition and the vesting of
the Inam the application under section 32(2) of the  Tenancy
Act  had got to fail.  The issue directly and  substantially
fell for determination in the earlier case.  It was  decided
against the appellant and he cannot re-agitate the very same
question in this proceeding.
For  the  reasons  stated  above the  appeal  fails  and  is
dismissed with costs to Respondent No. 1 above.
P.H.P.                    Appeal dismissed.
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