PETITIONER:
MUNSHI RAM & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, HARYANA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/12/1978
BENCH:
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
BENCH:
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
CITATION:
1979 AIR 588 1979 SCR (2) 846
1979 SCC (1) 471
ACT:
Punjab Security of Lands Tenure Act, 1953- s. 2(3)
scope of-”Permissible area” how computed-Appellants sons of
a displaced person from Pakistan-S. 2(3) if applicable to
heirs of a deceased displaced person-Banjar land if should
be excluded in computing “permissible area”.
HEADNOTE:
In relation to a land-owner or a tenant, the term
“permissible area” as defined in s. 2(3) of the Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 means thirty standard
acres and where such thirty standard acres on being
converted into ordinary acres exceed sixty acres such sixty
acres, Clause (ii) (b) of the proviso enacts that if a
displaced person who has been allotted land in excess of
thirty standard acres but less than fifty standard acres,
the permissible area shall be equal to his allotted area.
The Explanation states that for the purposes of determining
the permissible area of a displaced person the provisions of
proviso (ii) shall not apply to the heirs and successors of
the displaced person to whom land is allotted.
The appellants’ father, a displaced person, owned
considerable agricultural land in West Pakistan. After his
migration to India and subsequent death, in lieu of the land
abandoned in Pakistan 124 standard acres were allotted in
his name. Mutation of the property was sanctioned in favour
of the appellants and permanent rights were conferred in
their names.
Alleging that they were ‘small land-owners’ as defined
in the Act, and that they required the land for self-
cultivation they applied for ejectment of the respondent No.
2 who at that time was in possession of the land.
The Assistant Collector, rejected their request, their
appeal to the Collector was dismissed and revision
application to Commissioner and Financial Commissioner were
also rejected.
In their writ petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution they contended that if the “permissible area”
is computed under proviso (ii) to s. 2(3) of the Act, the
holding of each of them would be below the permissible limit
of thirty standard acres; that since the allotment was made
in standard acres, the ‘permissible area’ of each of them
would be 30 standard acres notwithstanding that on
conversion into ordinary acres it exceeds sixty ordinary
acres. A single Judge of the High Court dismissed their writ
petition.
On appeal, the Full Bench of the High Court held that
since the appellants were not displaced persons, the
concession of an enhanced permissible area under proviso
(ii) to s. 2(3) was not available to them and their
permissible area would be sixty ordinary acres, each, and
since the holding of each of them exceeded sixty ordinary
acres they were not ‘small land-owners’ and so could not
seek ejectment of the tenant.
847
On further appeal to this Court it was contended, (1)
that the words “such thirty standard acres” in the
definition exclude conversion into ordinary acres where the
area already held in standard acres falls below thirty
standard acres; (2) that they were small land owners because
each of them was holding only 24 standard acres and the
Explanation to s. 2(3) had no application to them because
the land was allotted to their father who was a displaced
person; and (3) that while computing the “permissible area”
uncultivated Banjar land which does not fall within the
definition of “land” for the purposes of the 1953 Act had
wrongly been included.
Rejecting contentions (1) and (2),
^
HELD: 1. The language of s. 2(3) proclaims in no
uncertain terms the legislative imperative that no land
owner or tenant shall hold land exceeding 30 standard acres
or 60 ordinary acres. The words “such thirty acres”
occurring in the definition cannot be construed to limit the
conversion into ordinary acres only to a case where the
holding is thirty standard acres and not less. The concept
of standard acre being “a measure of area convertible into
ordinary acres of any class of land according to the
prescribed scale with reference to the quantity of yield and
quality of soil” has been introduced in the definition of
“permissible area” to emphasise the qualitative aspect of a
landholding and the maximum limit of sixty acres delineates
its quantitative aspect. [850 G, F]
2. The appellants were not displaced persons within the
meaning of proviso (ii) to s. 2(3). They were heirs of a
displaced person who died after his migration of India.
Therefore, proviso (ii) had no application to the
appellants. The Explanation clearly excludes application of
proviso (ii) to their case, which is fully covered by the
substantive part of the definition of “permissible area”
under which the maximum they could hold was sixty ordinary
acres. At the material time, each of them was holding land
in excess of the sixty ordinary acres and therefore, they
were not ‘small land owners.’ [851 D-F]
Accepting the third contention and allowing the appeal
and remitting the case to the Collector concerned. [852 F].
HELD that 3. (a) Banjar Qadim and Banjar Jadid cannot
be taken into account while computing the surplus area under
the Act because, not being occupied or let for agricultural
purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture, it does not
fall within the purview of ‘land’ under the Act. [852 B-C]
Nemi Chand Jain v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab,
AIR 1964 Punj. 373; approved.
(b) The Assistant Collector should ascertain the extent
of the Banjar Qadim and Banjar Jadid and Gair Mumkin area of
the appellants at the relevant date and recompute their
permissible area after excluding such areas. [852 G].
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 277 of
1969.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 30-8-67 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 50/67.
Naunit Lal for the Appellants.
S. K. Bisaria for Respondent No. 2.
848
Appeal set down ex-parte for RR 1 and 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J.-This appeal on certificate is directed
against a Full Bench judgment of the High Court at
Chandigarh, rendered on November 22, 1968 in Letters Patent
Appeal No. 47 of 1967. It arises out of these facts:
Bishan Das was a displaced person from West Pakistan,
where he owned a considerable area of agricultural land. He
died on April 11, 1948, after his migration to India,
leaving behind his five sons, who are the appellants before
us.
After Bishan Das’s death, the Rehabilitation Department
allotted 124 standard acres and 1/4 unit of evacuee land in
his (Bishan Das) name on August 26, 1949. Permanent rights
in regard to this allotted land were conferred by the
Managing Officer on behalf of the President of India under
the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Act, in the names of the sons of Bishan Das
on January 2, 1956. Prior to it, a mutation was allowed by
the Rehabilitation Authorities on February 17, 1953 in
favour of the appellants, herein, showing each of them
entitled to 24 standard acres and 13 units of land.
Ram Dhan, respondent 2, was in possession of the land
as a tenant. The appellants applied under Section 9(1) (i)
of the Punjab Security of Lands Tenure Act, 1953
(hereinafter called the Act) for his ejectment on the ground
that each of them is a ‘small land-owner’ as defined in
Section 2(2) of the Act; and that they require the land for
self-cultivation.
The Assistant Collector, Hissar, rejected their
application. Their appeal was dismissed by the Collector, on
January 4, 1965. Their Revision was rejected by the
Commissioner of Ambala Division on October 26, 1965. Their
further Revision to the Financial Commissioner, also, met
the same fate on May 17, 1966.
The appellants then moved the High Court by a writ
petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution,
alleging that the aforesaid orders of the Assistant
Collector, Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner, were
illegal, without jurisdiction and ultra vires the provisions
of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Their contention
was that the land had been allotted to them in lieu of the
land abandoned by their father, Bishan Das, in Pakistan, and
consequently, the permissible area of each of them is to be
computed under Proviso
849
(ii) to Section 2(3) of the Act, and so computed, the
holding of each of the five would be well below the
permissible limit of 30 standard acres prescribed
thereunder. It was further contended that since the
allotment was made in standard acres, and not in ordinary
acres, the ‘permissible area’ of each of the appellants
would be 30 standard acres, notwithstanding the fact that on
conversion into ordinary acres, it exceeds 60 ordinary
acres. On these grounds, the appellants claimed that each of
them is a ‘small land-owner’ and as such, entitled to move
for eviction of the tenant under Section 9(1) (i) of the
Act.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed
the writ petition.
Munshi Ram and his four brothers filed Letters Patent
Appeal, which was eventually heard by a Full Bench. The
Bench held that since the appellants were not ‘displaced
persons’ within the meaning of the East Punjab Displaced
Persons (Land Resettlement) Act, 1949, the concession of an
enhanced permissible area under Proviso (ii) to sub-section
(3) of Section 2 of the Act was not available to them, and
their permissible area would be 60 ordinary acres, each;
that since the holding of each of the appellants exceeds
that limit, they are not ‘small land-owners’, and as such,
were not competent to seek ejectment of the tenant. With
this reasoning, the Full Bench dismissed the appeal.
Before considering the contentions canvassed, let us
have a look at the definition of ‘permissible area’ in
Section 2(3) of the Act. This definition reads as under :
” ‘Permissible area’ in relation to a landowner or
a tenant, means (thirty standard acres) and where such
thirty standard acres on being converted into ordinary
acres exceeds sixty acres such sixty acres;
Provided that-
(i) ………..
(ii) for a displaced person-
(a) who has been allotted land in excess of
fifty standard acres, the permissible
area shall be fifty standard acres or
one hundred acres, as the case may be;
(b) who has been allotted land in excess of
thirty standard acres, but less than
fifty standard
850
acres, the permissible area shall be
equal to his allotted area;
(c) who has been allotted land less than
thirty standard acres the permissible
area shall be thirty standard acres,
including any other land or part
thereof, if any, that he owns in
addition.
Explanation.- For the purposes of determining the
permissible area of a displaced person, the provisions
of proviso (ii) shall not apply to the heirs and
successors of the displaced person to whom land is
allotted.”
The first contention of Mr. Naunit Lal is that the
words “such thirty standards acres” in the substantive part
of the definition clearly exclude conversion into ordinary
cases, where the area held in standard acres falls below 30
standard acres. In short, the point sought to be made out is
that the definition ensure an irreducible minimum of 30
standard acres to a land holder.
The contention does not stand a close examination. The
flaw in the proposition propounded by the counsel is that it
takes into account only one aspect of the definition while
ignoring the other.
As rightly observed by the High Court, in devising this
formula for computing the permissible area, the Legislature
was concerned to put limits on the holdings of land both in
its qualitative and quantitative aspects.
The concept of ‘standard acre’, being ‘a measure of
area convertible into ordinary acres of any class of land
according to the prescribed scale with reference to the
quantity of yield and quality of soil’, has been introduced
in the definition of ‘permissible area’ to emphasise the
qualitative aspect of a land-holding, and the maximum limit
of 60 ordinary acres delineates its quantitative aspect.
The language of sub-section (3) of Section 2 is plain
and unambiguous. It proclaims in no uncertain terms, the
legislative imperative that no land-owner or tenant shall
hold land exceeding 30 standard acres or 60 ordinary acres.
By no stretch of imagination, therefore, the words “such
thirty acres” occurring in the definition can be construed
to limit the conversion into ordinary acres only to a case
where the holding is 30 ‘standard acres’, and not less.
Mr. Naunit Lal next contended that since the land was
allotted in the name of Bishan Das deceased, who was a
displaced person, the EXPLANATION will not be attracted,
with the result that the per-
851
missible area of each of his five sons would be 30 standard
acres in accordance with Clause (c) of Proviso (ii) of sub-
section (3) of Section 2. Since each of them was holding
only about 24 standard acres, they were small land-owners.
The argument rests on the fallacy that the land was
allotted to a ‘displaced person’. The true position is that
it was allotted to the sons of Bishan Das, who were not
‘displaced persons’ within the contemplation of the
aforesaid Proviso (ii). Section 2(11) of the Act says:
“Displaced person” has the meaning assigned to it in the
East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement) Act, 1949
(Act XXXVI of 1949). According to the definition of the term
in East Punjab Act XXXVI of 1949, a ‘displaced person’ means
“a landholder in the territories now comprised in the
Province of Punjab in Pakistan or a person of the Punjab
extraction who holds land in the (West Pakistan) and who has
since the 1st day of March 1947, abandoned or has been made
to abandon his land in the said territories on account of
civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, or the
partition of the country.” Now, the sons of Bishan Das never
owned or abandoned any land in West Pakistan. Evidently,
they were not ‘displaced persons’ within the meaning of
Proviso (ii) to Section 2(3). They are merely “heirs of a
displaced person” who died after his migration to India.
Proviso (ii) therefore, does not apply to the case of the
appellants who, and not their father, were the persons to
whom the land in dispute has been allotted. The EXPLANATION
appended to Section 2(3), therefore, clearly excludes the
application of Proviso (ii), to their case. Their case is
fully covered by the substantive part of the definition of
‘permissible area’ according to which the maximum which they
could hold is 60 ordinary acres. Each of them was holding,
at the material date, in excess of that area and as such,
they were not ‘small land-owners’.
The last contention of Mr. Naunit Lal is that in
computing the ‘permissible area’ of each of the appellants,
the Collector had illegally and wrongfully included
uncultivated area of Banjar Jadid, Banjar Qadim and Gair
Mumkin land as on April 15, 1953, and had also through some
oversight, failed to allow deduction for the dimunition in
their holdings resulting from consolidation. The argument is
that Banjar land does not fall within the definition of
‘Land’ for the purpose of Punjab Security of Land Tenures
Act, 1953. In support of this contention, reference has been
made to several decisions of the High Court at Chandigarh.
According to sub-section (8) of Section 2 of the Act,
“Land” shall have the same meaning as is assigned to it in
the Punjab Tenancy
852
Act, 1887. Section 2(c) of that Act defines ‘Land’ to mean
“land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a
town or village and is occupied or has been let for
agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to
agriculture, or for pasture, and includes the sites of
buildings and other structures on such land”.
In Nemi Chand Jain v. Financial Commissioner,
Punjab(1), H. R. Khanna, J. speaking for a Division Bench of
the High Court, held that Banjar Qadim and Banjar Jadid land
cannot be taken into account while computing the surplus
area, under the Act, because not being occupied or let for
agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to
agriculture, it does not fall within the purview of ‘Land’
under the Act. This ruling has been consistently followed by
the High Court in its subsequent decisions, some of which
are reported as Sadhu Ram v. Punjab State(2), Amolak Rai v.
Financial Commissioner, Planning, Punjab(3) and Jaggu v.
Punjab State(4) and Jiwan Singh v. State of Punjab(5).
In our opinion, this view taken by the High Court
proceeds on a correct interpretation of the statutory
provisions as it stood at the relevant time.
Learned counsel for the tenant-respondent also, does
not question the soundness of this view. He, however, does
not accept the particulars of the areas of Banjar and Gair
Mumkin Land supplied by Mr. Naunit Lal, in the form of a
Goshwara.
We will, therefore, while upholding the view taken by
the High Court in regard to the interpretation and
application of Section 2(3) Proviso (ii) of the Act, allow
this appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court and
the impugned orders of the Assistant Collector, Collector,
and the Commissioner and remit the case to the Collector
concerned of Hissar District with the direction that he
should ascertain the extent of the Banjar Qadim and Banjar
Jadid and Gair Mumkin land of the appellants-allottees at
the relevant date and recompute their permissible area after
excluding such Banjar and Gair Mumkin land; then dispose of
the applications of the appellants under Section 9(1)(i)
afresh. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no
order as to costs.
N.V.K. Appeal allowed.
853