PETITIONER:
LAL CHAND (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RADHA KISHAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/12/1976
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
CITATION:
1977 AIR 789 1977 SCR (2) 522
1977 SCC (2) 88
CITATOR INFO :
E 1980 SC 315 (4)
R 1987 SC2205 (13)
ACT:
Civil Procedure Code-Sec. 11–Res judicata Whether
exhaustive-Rationale behind Order 41 rule 4 in case of
decree involving common grounds whether one of the defend-
ants can appeal–If right to sue to other defendant does not
survive.
Interpretation of statutes-Policy of statute–Advancing
remedy–Protection slum dwellers.
Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956–Sec.
19(1), 19(4), 37A–Whether a suit for eviction against a
tenant in slum area maintainable without prior permission
of the authority under the Act–Whether a decree of eviction
can be executed without such permission–Jurisdiction of
Civil Court barred to decide matters which the competent
authority is empowered to decide–
Delhi Rent Control Act 1958-Sec. 2(1)–Definition in
Delhi Rent Control Act whether applicable in Slum Clearance
Act.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent who owns a house let out 5 rooms on the
ground floor and 2 rooms on the second floor in the said
house to one Lal Chand. The respondent flied a suit in the
year 1958 in the Court of the Sub Judge for evicting Lal
Chand, Kesho Ram, Jhangi Ram, Nand Lal and Smt. Kakibai
alleging that Lal Chand had sublet the premises to four of
them. The eviction was sought on the ground of personal
requirement. reconstruction and arrears of rent. The pro-
ceedings ended by the judgment of the High Court which
granted a decree of eviction in respect of all 7 rooms in
favour of the respondent. Since the suit property is situ-
ated in a slum area the respondent filed an application
under section 19(2) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance Act, 1956 for permission of the competent
authority to execute the decree for possession obtained by
him against Lal Chand and others. The competent authority
after taking into account the factors mentioned in section
19(4) of that Act passed an order permitting the respondent
to execute the decree in respect of the 2 rooms situated on
the second floor only. The respondent was expressly refused
permission to execute the decree in regard to the 5 rooms
situate on the ground floor. An appeal filed by the re-
spondent to the Administrator failed. Pursuant to the said
order the possession of the 2 rooms on the second floor was
handed over to the respondent. Thereafter, the respondent
filed a Regular Suit in the year 1966 against Lal Chand,
Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram for possession of the remaining 5
rooms on the ground floor. The suit was decreed by the
Trial Court. Nandial and Kakibai were not impleaded because
they had surrendered possession of the two rooms on the
second floor. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court
Lal Chand, Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram filed an appeal.
During the pendency of the said appeal Lal Chand died where-
upon his widow and his son applied for being brought on
record in that appeal as his legal representatives. The
Appellate Court upheld the objection of the respondent
that in view of the ejectment decree Lal Chand had ceased to
be a tenant and, therefore, on his death the right to sue
did not survive to his heirs. The Court, therefore, dis-
missed the appeal. Kesho Ram, Jhangi Ram and the legal
representatives of Lal Chand filed a second appeal in the
High Court. The High Court upheld the decision of the
Appellate Court and held that on the death of Lal Chand
during the pendency of the first appeal the cause of action
did not survive to his legal representatives and that there
was nO one who could legitimately prosecute that appeal.
523
Allowing the appeal by Special Leave.
HELD: 1. The suit out of which the appeal before the
High Court arose was filed by the respondent not only
against Lal Chand but also against Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram
who were all in possession of the ground floor premises.
The case of the respondent in the earlier round of litiga-
tion that Lal Chand had sublet the premises to Kesho Ram and
Jhangi Ram was not pursued. The ejectment decree did not
rest on the ground of alleged -subletting. [526C-D]
2. Since the suit was filed against Lal Chand alongwith
Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram and since they were as much
aggreived by the ejectment decree as Lal Chard himself and
since they were entitled to equal protection of the Slum
Clearance Act, the appeals could not have been dismissed by
the first Appellate Court and the High Court on the ground
that Lal Chand had died without leaving a heritable inter-
est. Even if it .is assumed that Lal Chand left no surviv-
ing cause of action to his heirs, the two other appellants
Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram had a real and substantial inter-
est in prosecuting the appeal in their own right. Under’
Order 41 rule 4 of the C.P.C. where there are more plain-
tiffs or more defendants than one in a suit and the decree
appealed from proceeds on any grounds common to all the
plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of t e plain-
tiffs or defendants can appeal from the whole decree and
thereupon the appellate Court may reverse or vary the de-
cree’ in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants as the
case may be. [526E-H, 527A-C]
3. The observation of the High Court that Kesho Ram and
Jhangi Ram were sub-tenants and they had, therefore, no
independent right to continue the appeal, is without any
basis. [527-G]
4. Under Section 19(1) of the Slum Areas (Improvement
and Clearance) Act, 1956, notwithstanding anything con-
tained in any other law for the time being in force no
person shall except with the previous permission in writing
of the competent authority institute any suit or proceeding
for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in
a slum area after the 1964 amendment and where any decree or
order is obtained before the 1964 amendment it cannot be
executed without the previous permission in writing of the
competent authority. A tenant against whom a decree of
eviction is passed under the Delhi Rent Control Act is also
a tenant within the meaning of section 19 of the Slum Clear-
ance Act. The word “tenant has not been defined in the
Slum Clearance Act. Under Sec. 2(1) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, a tenant does not include any person
against whom any order of decree for eviction has been
made. However, the Slum Clearance Act has not adopted that
definition. Since clause (b) of section 19(1) of the Slum
Clearance Act prohibits the execution of a decree for
eviction it is clear that a person against whom a decree for
eviction is obtained also continues to be a tenant. The
rule is well settled that where the same expression is used
in the same statute at different places, the same meaning
ought to be given to that expression as far as possible.
The Slum Clearance Act was passed, inter alia, for the
protection of tenants in slum areas from eviction. The
policy of the Slum Clearance Act being that the slum
dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommoda-
tion is available to him, the word tenant in section
19(1)(a) must for the purposes of advancing the remedy
provided by the Statute be construed to include a person
against whom a decree or order for eviction has been passed.
[528D-E, 529A-D, H, 530A-D]
Bardu Ram Dhanna Ram v. Ram Chander Khibru, A.I.R. 1972
Delhi 34, followed.
Lakshmi Chand v. Kauran Devi, [1966] 2 SCR 544, distin-
guished.
5. Since the respondent did not obtain permission of the
competent authority for instituting the present suit for
obtaining a decree for eviction of Chand and since Lal
Chand must be held to be a tenant for the purposes of sec-
tion 19(1)(a) the suit was incompetent. [531-B]
6. The suit is also barred by section 37A of the Slum
Clearance Act which takes away the jurisdiction of a Civil
Court in respect of any matter which the
524
competent authority or any other person is empowered by. or
under the Act to determine. [531-C-D]
7. The present suit filed by the respondent is also
barred by a principle analogous to res judicata. The
respondent after obtaining a decree for eviction against Lal
Chand and his alleged sub-tenants applied for permission of
the competent authority to execute the decree. Permission
was granted to him to execute the decree in respect of the 2
rooms or. the second floor only and in pursuance of that
permission he obtained possession of these 2 rooms. By the
present suit the respondent is once again asking for the
relief which was included in the larger relief sought by him
in the application filed by him under the Slum Clearance Act
and which was expressly denied to him. The fact that
section 11 of C.P.C. cannot apply on its terms since the
earlier proceeding before the competent authority was not a
suit, is no answer to the extension of the principle
underlying section 11 to the instant case. Section 11 is
not exhaustive and the principle which motivates that sec-
tion can be extended to cases which do not fall strictly
within the letter of the law. The issues involved in the
two proceedings are identical, those issues arise as between
the same parties and thirdly the issue now sought to be
raised was decided finally by a competent quasi-judicial
Tribunal. The principle of res judicata is conceived in the
larger public interest which requires that all litigation
must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle is
also founded on equity, justice and good conscience which
require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue
should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of
proceedings involving determination of the same issue.
[532-A-E]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 636 of 1975.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree
dated the 30-9-1974 of the Delhi High Court in R.S.A. No.
316 of 1967).
N.C. Sikri and A. D. Sikri, Advocates for the appellants.
S.K. Mehta, K.R. Nagaraja and P.N. Puri, Advocates for
respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, J.—The respondent Radha Krishan who owns
house No. 142, Katra Mashru, Delhi let out a portion thereof
consisting of five rooms on the ground floor and two rooms
on the second floor to one Lal Chand. He filed suit No. 42
of 1958 in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Delhi for evicting
Lal Chand and four others Kesho Ram, Jhangi Ram, Nand Lal
and Smt. Kakibai, alleging that Lal Chand had sublet the
premises to them. The eviction of these persons was sought
by the respondent on the grounds that (1) he required the
premises for his own use and occupation; (2) he wanted to
provide certain essential amenities for himself necessitat-
ing re-construction; and (3) that the tenant was in
arrears of rent. By his judgment dated June 6, 1959 the
learned Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi decreed the suit on
the first ground only and rejected the other two conten-
tions. In an appeal filed by the defendants, the learned
Senior SubJudge, Delhi confirmed the finding of the Trial
Court that the accommodation at the disposal of the respond-
ent was insufficient, but he thought ‘that the needs of the
respondent would be met adequately if he were given posses-
sion of the two rooms on the second floor only. Feeling
however that there was no provision in the Delhi and Ajmer
Rent Control Act, 1952, under which the suit was filed, for
giving possession of a part of .the demised premises to the
landlord, the learned Judge confirmed the decree of the
Trial Court. The Circuit
525
Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi upheld that judgment
on February 6, 1962 in Civil Revision No. 609-D of 1960 on
the ground that the landlord required the entire premises
for his personal use and occupation.
Since the suit property is situated in a slum area, the
respondent fled an application under s. 19(2) of the Slum
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 96 of 1956, for
permission of .the competent authority to execute the decree
for possession obtained by him against Lal Chand and others.
The competent authority after taking into account the
factors mentioned in s. 19(4) of that Act, passed an order
permitting the respondent to execute the decree in respect
of the two rooms situated on the second floor only. Re-
spondent was expressly refused permission to execute the
decree in regard to the premises situated on the ground
floor.
Aggrieved by that order, the respondent filed an appeal
to the Administrator under s. 20 of the Slum Clearance Act,
1956. The appeal was heard by the Chief Commissioner of
Delhi who confirmed’ the order of the competent authority.
Pursuant to his order, the defendants handed over possession
of the two rooms on the second floor to the respondent.
This, however, was not the end of the matter. Having
obtained possession of a part of the premises, the respond-
ent embarked upon a fresh round of litigation giving rise to
this appeal. He filed a regular Civil Suit No. 435 of 1966
against Lal Chand, Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram for possession
of the remaining rooms on the ground floor. That suit was
decreed by the Trial Court on May 4, 1967. Nand Lal and
Kakibai were not impleaded to the suit presumably because
they had surrendered possession of the two rooms on the
second floor in pursuance of the order passed in appeal
under the Slum Clearance Act.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, Lal Chand,
Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram filed Civil Appeal No. 35 of 1967
in the Court of the Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi.
During the pendency of that appeal Lal Chand died on June
13, 1967 whereupon, his widow Bhiranwan Bai and his son Khem
Chand applied for being brought on the record of the appeal
as his legal representatives. That application was contest-
ed by the respondent on the ground that by reason of the
ejectment decree Lal Chand had ceased to be a tenant ,and
upon his death during the pendency of the appeal, the right
to sue did not survive to his heirs. This contention was
upheld by the learned appellate, Judge who by his judgment
dated November 18, 1967 dismissed the appeal as also the
application filed by Lal Chand’s widow and son for being
brought .on the record as his legal representatives.
These legal representatives and the two other defend-
ants, Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram, filed second appeal No. 316
of 1967 in the High COurt of Delhi against the judgment of
the learned Additional Senior Sub-Judge. A learned Single
Judge of the High Court held by his judgment dated September
30, 1974 that On the ‘death of Lal Chand during the pendency
of the first appeal, the cause of action did not survive to
his legal representatives to continue the appeal and
526
that therefore there was no one who could legitimately
prosecute that appeal. The learned Judge, accordingly,
confirmed the judgment of the first appellate Court and
dismissed the second appeal. This appeal by special leave
is filed by the legal representatives of Lal Chand as
also by Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram.
In taking the view that the legal representatives of Lal
Chand had no right to continue the appeal after Lal Chand’s
death, the High Court relied on a decision of this Court in
Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalvanji Pedhi(1). It
was held in that case that on the determination of the
contractual tenancy the :tenant becomes a statutory tenant
having no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him
and that the right of the statutory tenant to remain in
possession after the determination of the contractual tenan-
cy being personal to him is not capable of being transferred
or assigned and cannot devolve on his. death on his heirs or
legal representatives. While-relying on this
decision, .the High Court overlooked an important considera-
tion. The suit out of which the appeal before the High
Court and this appeal arise was flied by the respondent not
only against Lal Chand but against Kesho Ram and Jhangi
Ram also, who were all in possession of the ground floor
premises. The case of the respondent in the earlier round
of litigation that Lal Chand had sublet the premises to
Kesho Ram, Jhangi Ram, Nand Lal and Kakibai remained in the
realm of mere allegations and was not pursued. Naturally,
the ejectment decree did not rest on the ground of sub-
letting and came to be passed on the sole ground that .the
respondent required the premises for his personal. use and
occupation. Since two out of the five defendants against
whom the ejectment decree was passed were impleaded as
defendants in the present suit alongwith Lal Chand and since
they had flied the appeal jointly with Lal Chand, they had
the right of prosecuting the appeal no less than Lal Chand
himself had. Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram were as much ag-
grieved by the ejectment decree as Lal Chand himself and
they were entitled alongwith Lal Chand to an equal protec-
tion of the Slum Clearance Act. They were parties .to the
application which was filed by the respondent before the
competent authority for permission to execute the decree for
possession and the refusal of that authority to allow the
respondent to execute that decree in regard to the prem-
ises situated on the ground floor must necessarily
ensure for their benefit as much for the benefit of
Lal Chand himself. Therefore, whether Lal Chand was a
statutory tenant or not and whether the ratio in Anand
Niwas’s case would apply to the present proceedings which
arise out of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958, the appeals
could not have been dismissed by the first appellate Court
and the High Court on the ground that Lal Chand had died
without leaving a heritable interest and therefore his legal
representatives had no right to continue the appeal. Assum-
ing that Lal Chand, being a statutory tenant, left no sur-
viving cause of action to his heirs, the two other appel-
lants, Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram, had a real and substantial
interest in prosecuting the appeal in their own
(1) A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 414=(1964) 4 S.C.R. 892.
527
right, particularly in view of the findings of the Chief
Commissioner of Delhi in the appeal filed under s. 20 of the
Slum Clearance Act.
Not only was it erroneous to treat the appeal as having
abated on the death of Lal Chand but the first appellate
Court as well as the High Court ought to have applied the
provisions of Order XLI r. 4, Code of Civil Procedure, under
which where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants
than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on
any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the de-
fendants, any one of the plaintiffs or defendants may appeal
from the whole decree, and thereupon the appellate Court may
reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs
or defendants, as the case may be. In the earlier suit for
eviction filed by the respondent under the Delhi and Ajmer
Rent Control Act, Lal Chand and his alleged sub-tenants were
all impleaded to the suit as defendants. The decree for
eviction was eventually passed in that suit in favour of the
respondent and against the defendants jointly. All of these
defendants contested the proceeding before the competent
authority under the Slum Clearance Act and they succeeded in
obtaining an order therein that it was not open to the
respondent to execute the decree in respect of the premises
on the ground floor. In order to overcome the effect of
that order respondent brought the present suit and in the
very nature of things he had to implead Kesho Ram and Jhangi
Ram to that suit as party-defendants alongwith Lal Chand.
On the death of Lal Chand during the pendency of the first
appeal the other appellants, who were as much interested in
the success .of the appeal as Lal Chand, were before the
Court and the appeal could not nave been dismissed for the
mere reason that Lal Chand had no longer any interest or
estate in the property. The eviction decree being joint and
indivisible, the dismissal of the appeal in so far as Lal
Chand was concerned could conceivably result in inconsistent
decrees being passed in the event of the appeal of Kesho Ram
and Jhangi Ram being allowed. Therefore, the first appel-
late Court ought to have heard the appeal on merits and
decided the question whether the provisions of the Slum
Clearance Act operated as a bar to the maintainability of
the suit brought by the respondent.
The High Court observes in its judgment that Kesho Ram
and Jhangi Ram were sub tenants and they had therefore no
independent right to continue the appeal. We see no justi-
fication for this observation because in the earlier suit,
though the respondent had alleged that Lal Chand had sublet
the premises to the other defendants including Kesho Ram and
Jhangi Ram, the ejectment decree was passed on the sole
ground that the respondent required the premises for his
personal use and occupation. In fact, in that suit the
allegation of sub-tenancy though made in the plaint was at
no stage pursued and the judgment of the Trial Court did not
deal with that, allegation at all. No issue Was framed and
no ‘finding recorded on the question of sub-letting.
The High Court seems to have been impressed by the
contention that the suit was not maintainable by reason of
the provisions of .s.
528
37A of the Slum Clearance Act, but it thought that Lal Chand
having died there was no one before the Court who could
legitimately contend that the suit was not maintainable.
As stated before this was an erroneous approach to the
problem, which makes it necessary for us to examine the
merits of the contention as regards the maintainability of
the suit.
The main contentions raised by Lal Chand, Kesho Ram and
Jhangi Ram by their written statements in the present suit
are that they are tenants within the meaning of the Slum
Clearance Act despite the passing of the ejectment decree
against them, that the suit brought by the respondent was
not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Slum
Clearance Act and that the respondent was estopped from
bringing the suit since he had already obtained possession
of the two rooms on the second floor in pursuance of the
permission granted by the competent authority. The first
two of these contentions have to be answered in the light of
the relevant provisions of the Slum Clearance Act to which
we must now turn.
Section 19 (1 ) of the Slum Clearance Act
reads thus:
“19. Proceedings for eviction of tenants
not to be taken without permission of the
competent authority.–(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, no person shall, except
with the previous permission in writing of the
competent authority,–
(a) institute, after the commencement
of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)
Amendment Act, 1964, any suit or proceeding
for obtaining any decree or order for the
eviction of a tenant from any building or land
in a slum area; or
(b) where any decree or order is ob-
tained in any suit or proceeding instituted
before such commencement for the eviction of a
tenant from any building or land in such area,
execute such decree or order.”
Arising out of this provision, the question for decision is
whether the present suit is barred for the reason that
before instituting it, respondent had not obtained permis-
sion of the competent authority. ‘It being common ground
that such a permission was not obtained and that the build-
ing in question is situated in a slum area, the decision of
this question turns on the consideration whether in spite of
the fact that an ejectment decree was passed against Lal
Chand in the earlier suit, he continued’ to be a ‘tenant’
for the purposes of the Slum Clearance Act, especially
within the meaning of s. 19(1)(a) thereof. The Trial Court
held that Lal Chand ceased to be a tenant after the passing
of the ejectment decree and therefore the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court to entertain the suit for possession against
him was not barred under any of the provisions of the Slum
Clearance Act. This question, as stated earlier, has not
been dealt with either by the first appellate
529
Court or by the High Court in second appeal since they took
the view that on Lal Chand’s death during the pendency of
the first appeal, the proceedings had abated.
The word ‘tenant’ has not been defined in the Slum
Clearance Act but s. 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 59
of 1958, defines it thus:
“2 (1 ) “tenant” means any person by
whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of
any premises is, or but for a special contract
would be, payable and includes a subtenant
and also any person continuing in possession
after the termination of his tenancy but shah
not include any person against whom any order
or decree for eviction has been made;”
This definition has been amended by Act 18 of 1976 but the
amended definition also provides by s. 2(1) (A) that the
word ‘tenant’ shall not include any person against whom an
order or decree for eviction has been made, except where
such decree or order for eviction is liable to be re-opened
under the proviso to section 3 of the Amending Act of 1976.
It is thus clear that in so far as the Delhi Rent Control
Act is concerned, a person against whom an order or a decree
for eviction has been passed cannot generally, be regarded
as a tenant. The question which requires consideration is
whether the definition of ‘tenant’ contained in the Delhi
Rent Control Act can be extended to proceedings under the
Slum Clearance Act, or, in other words, whether the word
‘tenant’ which occurs in cl.(a) of s. 19(1) of the Slum
Clearance Act bears the same meaning which it has under the
Delhi Rent Control Act.
Section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act furnishes intrinsic
evidence to show that the definition of the word ‘tenant’ as
contained in the Delhi Rent Control Act cannot be extended
for construing its provisions. By el. (b) of s. 19(1) no
person can, except with the previous permission in writing
of the competent authority, execute any decree or order
obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before the
amending Act of 1964 for the eviction of a “tenant” from any
building land in a slum area. Sub-section (2) of s. 19
provides that a person desiring to obtain permission of the
competent authority shall make an application in the pre-
scribed form. By sub-s.(4), the competent authority is
required to take in to account certain factors while grant-
ing or refusing to grant the permission asked for. The
first of such factors which is mentioned in cl. (a) of sub-
s. (4) is “whether alternative accommodation within the
means of the tenant would be available to him if he were
evicted.” It is evident that the word ‘tenant’ is used in
s. 19(4)(a) to include a person against whom a decree or
order for eviction has already been passed because, that
provision applies as much to the permission sought for
executing a decree or order of eviction referred to in s.
19(1)(b) as to the institution of a suit or proceeding for
obtaining a decree or order for eviction referred to in s.
19(1)(a). If a person against whom a decree or order of
eviction has been passed is not to be included within the
meaning of
530
the word ‘tenant’, s. 19(4)(a) could not have used the
language which it uses, namely, whether alternative accommo-
dation within the means of the ‘tenant would be available to
him if he were evicted. In the absence of compelling cir-
cumstances and in order to better effectuate the object of
the Slum Clearance Act, we see no reason why the .word
‘tenant’, should not bear the same meaning in s. 19(1)(a) as
ms. 19(4)(a). The rule is well settled that where the same
expression is used in the same statute .at different places
the same meaning ought to be given to that expression, as
far as possible. In the instant case the word ‘tenant’ has
been used at more than one place in s. 19 itself and it is
only reasonable to construe it in the same sense throughout.
The Slum Clearance Act was passed, inter alia, for the
protection of tenants in slum areas from eviction. As
observed by this Court in Jyoti Parshad v. The Administra-
tor for the Union Territory of Delhi(1), the Slum Clear-
ance Act looks at the problem of eviction of tenants from
slum areas not from the point of view of the landlord and
his needs but from the point of view of tenants who have no,
alternative accommodation and who would be stranded in the
open if they were evicted. The policy or the Slum Clearance
Act being that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless
alternative accommodation is available to him, we are of the
view that the word ‘tenant’ which occurs in s. 19(1) (a)
must for the purpose of advancing the remedy provided by the
statute be construed to include a person against whom a
decree or order for eviction has been passed. We might
mention that a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Bardu
Ram Dhanna Ram v. Ram Chander Khibru(2) has taken the same
view, namely, that the word ‘tenant’ in s. 19 of the Slum
Clearance Act includes a person against whom a decree or
order of eviction has been passed.
Learned counsel for the respondent relied very strongly
on a decision of this Court in Lakhmi Chand v. Kauran
Devi(3) in support of his submission that the word ‘tenant’
must bear the same meaning in the Slum Clearance Act as in
the Delhi Rent Control Act. We are unable to appreciate how
the judgment in that ease supports the contention of the
respondent. All that was decided therein was that a person
against whom an order for eviction is passed cannot be a
tenant within the meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act and
that the definition of the word ‘tenant’ as contained in
that Act would not be affected by anything contained in s.
19 of the Slum Clearance Act. The question which arose in
that case was whether s. 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act
barred the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a
suit in relation to any premises to which that Act applied,
for eviction of a ‘tenant’ therefrom. Not only that no
question arose in that case as to whether the definition of
‘tenant’ as contained in the Delhi Rent’ Control Act should
be extended to the Slum Clearance Act, but the Court ob-
served expressly that: “No question as to what the rights of
a tenant against whom a decree in ejectment has been passed
in view of Section 19 of the Slum Areas Act are, arises in
this appeal”, and .that the Court was not concerned in the
appeal before it “with any question as to the protection
given
(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 125. 2 AIR 1972 Delhi 34
(3) [1966] 2 S.C.R.
531
by the Slum Areas Act. to tenants” …. The question
before us is not whether a person against whom a decree for
eviction is passed is a tenant for the purposes of the Delhi
Rent Control Act but whether he is a tenant for the purposes
of s. 19 of the Slum Clearance Act. .Lakhmi Chand’s (supra)
case does not deal with this problem at all.
Since the respondent had not obtained permission of the
competent authority for instituting the present suit for
obtaining a decree for eviction of Lal Chand from a building
situated in the slum area and since Lal Chand must be held
to be a tenant for the purposes of s. 19(1) (a) it must
follow that the suit is incompetent and cannot be enter-
tained.
The suit is also barred under s. 37A of the Slum Clear-
ance Act which reads thus:
“37A. Bar of jurisdiction.—Save as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no
civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect
of any matter which the competent authority
or any other person is empowered by or under
this Act, to determine and no injunction shall
be granted by any court or other authority in
respect of any action taken or to be taken in
pursuance of any power conferred by or under
tiffs Act.”
The competent authority is empowered under s. 19( 3 ) to
determine the question’ whether permission should be granted
or refused for instituting a suit for obtaining a decree or
order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a
slum area. Consequently, no civil court can have jurisdic-
tion in respect of that matter, namely, in respect of the
question whether a tenant of a building in a slum area
should or should not be permitted to be evicted therefrom.
As a result of the combined operation of s. 19(3) and s. 37A
of the Slum Clearance Act, that jurisdiction is exclusively
vested in the competent authority and the jurisdiction in
that behalf of civil courts is expressly taken away.
Only one more aspect of the matter needs is to be ad-
verted to. The respondent after obtaining a decree for
eviction against Lal Chand and his alleged sub tenants
applied for permission of the competent authority to exe-
cute that degree. Permission was granted to him to execute
the decree in respect only of the two rooms on the second
floor and in pursuance of that permission he obtained pos-
session of those two rooms. We are unable to ,understand
how after working out his remedy under the ’Delhi Rent
Control Act as modified by the Slum Clearance ‘Act, it is
competent to the respondent to bring a fresh suit for evict-
ing the appellants from the premises on the ground floor.
The authorities under the Slum Clearance Act who are exclu-
sively invested with the power to determine whether a decree
for eviction should be permitted to be executed and, if so,
to what extent, had finally decided that question, refusing
to allow the respondent to execute the decree in respect of
the ground floor premises. By the present suit, the re-
spondent is once again asking for
532
the relief which was included in the larger relief sought by
him in the application filed under the Slum Clearance Act
and which was expressly denied to him. In the circumstances,
the present suit is also barred by the principle of res
judicata. The fact that s. 11 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure cannot apply on its terms, the earlier proceeding
before the competent authority not being a suit, is no
answer to the extension Of the principle underlying-that
section to the instant case. Section 11, it is long since
settled, is not exhaustive and the principle which motivates
that section can be extended to cases which do not fall
strictly within the letter of the law. The issues involved
in the two proceedings are identical, those issues arise as
between the same parties and thirdly, the issue now sought
to be raised was decided finally by a competent quasi-
judicial tribunal. The principle of res judicata is con-
ceived in the larger public interest which requires that all
litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The
principle is also founded on equity, justice and good con-
science which require that a party which has once succeeded
on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a
multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the
same issue. Were it permissible to bring suits of the
present nature, the beneficial jurisdiction conferred on the
competent authority by the Slum Clearance Act would become
illusory and meaningless for, whether the competent authori-
ty grants or refuses permission to execute a decree for
eviction, it would always be open to the landlord to enforce
the ejectment decree by filing a substantiative suit for
possession. Verily, the respondent is executing the evic-
tion decree by instalments, now under the garb of a suit.
Apart from the fact that the suit is barred on account of
principles analogous to res judicata, it is plainly in
violation of the injunction contained in s. 19 (1)(b) of the
Slum Clearance Act, if regard is to be had to the substance
and not for the form of the proceedings.
Lal Chand’s widow died after the decision of the second
appeal by the High Court and before the filing of this
appeal. Learned counsel for the respondent wants to utilise
that event to highlight his argument that the cause of
action cannot survive at least after her death, in view by
the amendment made to s. 2( 1 ) of the Delhi Rent Control
Act by Amending Act 18 of 1976. We cannot accept this
argument either. The suit filed by the respondent being
incompetent and the Civil Court not having jurisdiction to
entertain it, the decree passed by it is non-est. The nulli-
ty of that decree can be set up at least by Kesho Ram and
Jhangi Ram who are entitled to defend and protect their
possession by invoking the provisions of the Slum Clearance
Act.
In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the judg-
ment of the High Court and direct that the respondent’s suit
for possession shall stand dismissed. The respondent shall
pay to the appellants the costs of this appeal.
P.H.P. Appeal allowed.
533