PETITIONER:
KAJORI LAL AGARWAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
17/12/1965
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
WANCHOO, K.N.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
RAMASWAMI, V.
SATYANARAYANARAJU, P.
CITATION:
1966 AIR 1538 1966 SCR (3) 141
ACT:
West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act (2 of
1948), 8(2)-Application for reference to Court-Period of
limitation whether prescribed.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant’s lands were acquired under the provisions of
the West Bengal Land (Requisition and ACquisition) Act,
1948. The Land Acquisition Officer made an award on 5th
February 1951. The appellant accepted the compensation
amount on 21st March 1951, under protest, and on 2nd
February 1953, filed an application under s. 8 of the Act
that a reference should be made to the Court regarding his,
claim for a larger amount of compensation. The Land
Acquisition Officer rejected the application on the ground
that it was barred by time. The High Court, ‘in its
revisional jurisdiction, remanded the case to the Land
Acquisition Officer for disposal according to law, with the
observation, that, though no limitation-had been prescribed
for making an application for reference, such an application
should nevertheless be made Within a reasonable time and
Chat whether the appellant moved within a reasonable time or
not should be determined. The Land Acquisition Officer held
that the appellant did not move Within reasonable time and
rejected the application, and the High Court refused to
interfere with- the order’
In appeal to this Court.
HELD: Section 8(2) of the West Bengal Act, read with s.
18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, specifically
prescribes the period of limitation for making such
applications, and having regard to these provisions, the by
time It was therefore not necessary to consider the
appellant’s plea that the application was made within a
reasonable time.[148 B-C]
The fact that s. 8(1) of the West Bengal Act imposes an
obligation on the Collector to refer the matter to the
decision of the Court does not preclude the application of a
provision for limitation prescribed in regard to the making
of an application for reference. Section 8(2) of the West
Bengal Act’ makes the provisions of the Central Act
applicable mutatis mutandis in respect of any reference made
to the court under sub-s. (1). In the context, the clause
“in respect of any reference made to the Court” does not
mean that the provisions of the Central Act have to apply
only after a reference is made, but it includes all cases
where reference is intended, or proposed, or asked, to be
made, and that means that if a party wants to make an
application for reference, he is no doubt entitled to
require the Collector to make such a reference, but his
application in that behalf must be made within the period of
limitation prescribed by s. 18(2) of the Central Act.
Further, the amended s. 8(2) of the West Bengal Act, which
makes s. 18(2) of the Central Act expressly applicable, also
uses the same clause “in respect of any reference made to
the Court and that also lends support to this view. [144 G;
146 F; 147 G-H]
142
Kajori Lal Agarwal v. The Union of India, 59 C.W.N. 936,
overruled.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 666 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated
July 6, 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No.
3886 of 1956.
Anoop Singh, for the appellant.
D. N. Mukherjee and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 1.
P. K. Chatterjee and P. K. Bose, for respondents Nos. 2
and 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J. The appellant Kajori Lal Agarwal was
the owner-in-khas of 37.85 acres of land in Mouza Shibnath
Das J. L. No. 110 and Mouza Kholai Singh J. L. No. 112 in
Siliguri Town in the district of Darjeeling. The said lands
were acquired by the Union of India, and the State of West
Bengal, respondents 1 & 2 respectively, under the relevant
provisions of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and
Acquisition) Act, 1948 (No’ 2 of 1948) (hereinafter called
‘the Act) for the Assam Rail Link Project. Respondent No. 3
is the Land Acquisition Officer, Darjeeling. In those
proceedings, the appellant claimed compensation at a flat
rate of Rs. 100 per cottah amounting to Rs. 2,27,100. He
also put in a claim for Rs. 8,000 on account of the
severance and other grounds. Respondent No. 3 made an award
under s. 7 of the Act on the 5th February, 1951 directing
the payment of Rs. 22,074 to the appellant in lieu of his
lands at the rate of Rs. 600 per acre. After the award was
pronounced, a notice was served on the appellant under s.
12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (No. 1 of 1894)
(hereinafter called ‘the Central Act’). On the 21st March,
1951, the appellant accepted the said amount as compensation
money under protest.
Thereafter, the appellant filed an application before
respondent No. 3 on the 2nd February, 1953 and claimed that
a reference should be made by him to the Court for decision
of his claim for a larger amount of compensation under s. 8
of the Act. The appellant alleged in his application that
having regard to the market value of the land at the
relevant time, the amount awarded to him by respondent No. 3
was grossly inadequate. Respondent No. 3 rejected the
appellant’s application for reference on the ground that it
was barred by time.
143
The appellant challenged the validity of this order by
moving the Calcutta High Court in its revisional
jurisdiction (Civil Revision Case No. 676 of 1954). On the
16th June, 1955, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
allowed the appellant’s revisional application and sent the
case to respondent No. 3 with a direction that the
appellant’s application for reference should be dealt with
in accordance with law. In remitting the case to respondent
No. 3, the High Court observed that though, in its opinion,
no limitation had been prescribed for making an application
for reference, such an application must nevertheless be made
within a reasonable time. On that view, the High Court left
it to respondent No. 3 to consider whether the appellant had
moved for reference within a reasonable time (vide Kajori
Lal Agarwal v. The Union of India & Ors.) (1).
After the appellant’s application was thus remanded to
respondent No. 3, he filed an affidavit on the 27th August,
1956 and explained in detail the reasons for the delay made
by him in filing his application for reference. On the 10th
September, 1956 respondent No. 3 rejected the appellant’s
application on the ground that he had neglected to move for
reference within a reasonable time.
This order was challenged by the appellant again by moving
the Calcutta High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution
read with s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule
No. 3886 of 1956). On the 6th July, 1959, this case was
heard by a Division Bench of the said High Court and the
application made by the appellant was dismissed on the
ground that the High Court saw no reason to interfere with
the order passed by respondent No. 3. It is against this
order that the appellant has come to, this Court by special
leave.
On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Anoop Singh contends that
the High Court was in error in not reversing the decision of
respondent No. 3; and in support of his argument, he has
relied on the fact that on the 12th January, 1953, the
Calcutta High Court had ruled in the case of Birendra Nath
Ray Sarkar & Another v. Union of India & Another (2) (Civil
Rule No. 2940 of 1951) that there was no prescribed period
of limitation for an application for reference under s. 8 of
the Act, and it was only after the appellant knew about this
decision that he was advised to make his present application
for reference. Mr. Anoop Singh argues that this fact should
have been taken into account by the Calcutta High Court
(1) 59 C.W.N. 1936.
(2) 57 C.W.N. 283.
144
and on that ground, the decision of respondent No. 3
rejecting the appellant’s application should have been
reversed.
Before we deal with this argument, however, it is necessary
to consider the basic question as to whether the Calcutta
High Court is right in holding that no period of limitation
is prescribed by S. 8 of the Act for making an application
for reference. If we hold that S. 8 prescribes a period of
limitation, then the question as to whether the appellant
moved respondent No. 3 within a reasonable time, will not
fall to be considered; and so, we must first consider this
question.
Section 8 of the Act reads thus
“Reference to Court.
8. (1) The Collector shall in every case–
(a) where any person aggrieved by an award
made under sub-section (2) of section 7 makes
an application requiring the matter to be
referred to the Court;
or
(b) where there is any disagreement with
regard to the compensation payable under sub-
section (3) of section 7 between the Collector
and the person to whom possession of any land
is delivered under section 6 refer the matter
to the decision of the Court.
(2) The provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (No. 1 of 1894), shall mutatis
mutandis apply in respect of any reference
made to the Court under sub-section (1)”.
We have already noticed that when the appellant moved the
Calcutta High Court on an earlier occasion, the Calcutta
High Court had ruled that no limitation had been prescribed
by s. 8, though it had added that an application had
nevertheless to be made within a reasonable time. Mr. Anoop
Singh naturally supports this decision.
It is plain that S. 8(2) makes the provisions of the Central
Act applicable mutatis mutandis in respect of any reference
made to the Court under sub-s. (1). The Calcutta High Court
has held that the effect of the provisions prescribed by
this sub-section is to make the relevant provisions of the
Central Act applicable to proceedings subsequent to the
making of the reference. This view proceeds on the basis
that when sub-s. (2) refers to any reference made to the
Court, it emphasises the fact that up to
145
the making of the reference the provisions of the Central
Act have no application. In other words, this provision
does not permit the application of the relevant provisions
of the Central Act in relation to all proceedings which take
place prior to the making of the reference. When a
reference has been made under s. 8 ( 1 ), a stage is reached
for the application of the provisions of the Central Act.
This provision does not allow the application of the
relevant provisions of the Central Act at any stage prior to
the making of the reference. One cannot extend backwards
the said provisions. That is how the matter has been
succinctly put by the High Court in holding that the period
of limitation prescribed by s. 1 8 (2) of the Central Act
cannot apply to an application for reference made under s.
8(1) of the Act.
Section 18 of the Central Act reads thus
“ 18. (1) Any person interested who has not
accepted the award may, by written application
to the Collector, require that the matter be
referred by the Collector for the
determination of the Court, whether his
objection be to the measurement of the land,
the amount of the compensation, the persons to
whom it is payable, or the apportionment of
the compensation among the persons
interested..
(2) The a application shall state the
grounds on which objection to the award is
taken
(a) if the person making it was present or
represented before the Collector at the time
when he made his award, within six weeks from
the date of the Collector’s award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the
receipt of the notice from the Collector under
section 12, subsection (2), or within six
months from the date of the Collector’s award,
whichever period shall first expire’.
There is no doubt that if the provisions of s. 18 (2) can be
said to apply to an application made for reference under s.
8 of the Act, the periods of limitation prescribed by sub-s.
(2) of s. 1 8 of the Central Act would be attracted; and if
they apply, the appellant’s application originally made to
respondent No. 3 for reference is barred by time.
In our opinion, the High Court was in error in reading the
clause “in respect of any reference made to the Court” in s.
8 (2) of the Act as referring to cases where reference has
already been
146
made. In the context, what the clause means is that the
provisions of the Central Act shall mutatis mutandis apply
in respect. of any reference intended, proposed, or asked,
to be made, and not in respect of any reference already
made. Having regard to the scheme of s. 8, considered in
the light of the other provisions of the Act, it seems to us
clear that the object of the Legislature in making the
relevant provisions of the Central Act applicable to
references was to take in all the relevant provisions of the
Central Act which had reference to the making of reference;
and naturally, these provisions would begin with s.18 of the
Central Act which is the first section in Part III of the
Central Act dealing with reference to Court and procedure
thereon. It would,. we think, be unreasonable to hold that
until a reference in made, the said provisions do not apply
and it is only after the reference is made that the said
provisions begin to operate.
It is true that S. 8(1) of the Act uses the mandatory words
“the Collector shall refer the matter to the decision of the
Court”; but that does not mean that it necessarily excludes
the application of the provision as to limitation. Section
18(1) of the Central Act, though somewhat differently
worded, has in law the same effect. It provides that any
person interested who has not accepted the award may, by
written application to the Collector, require that the
matter be referred by the. Collector for the determination
of the Court. This provision also, in substance, is
mandatory. If an application is made by a person entitled
to make such application, the Collector has no option in the
matter; he has to refer it to the Court; but even this
provision is subject to the limitation prescribed by sub-
section (2). The position with regard to the mandatory
provision contained in s. 8(1) of the Act is exactly
similar. Therefore, the fact that s. 8(1) uses the word
“shall” and imposes an obligation on the Collector to refer
the matter to the decision of the Court, does not preclude
the application of a provision for limitation prescribed in
regard to the making of an application for reference.
On principle, it seems extremely unlikely that the Act
which deals with acquisition and requisition of properties,
could have intended to leave it to the sweet-will of the
parties to make an application for reference at any time
they like. The High Court no doubt realised the anomalies
which would result in adopting such a construction; and so,
while it upheld the appellant’s contention that there was no
limitation prescribed for the making of an application for
reference under s. 8 of the Act, it added the corollary that
even though no limitation is prescribed, the applica-
147
tion must nevertheless be made within a reasonable time.
In, our opinion, it is unnecessary to invoke such a general
consideration, because s. 8(2) of the Act, in terms, makes
s. 18(2) of the Central Act applicable, and there is no
occasion to consider whether a particular application has
been made within a reasonable time or not.
It is somewhat remarkable that if the view accepted by the
Calcutta High Court about the construction of s. 8(2) of the
Act is correct, even the amendment subsequently made by the
Bengal Legislature would be ineffective. It appears that
presumably as a result of the decision of the Calcutta High
Court, s. 8 (2) of the Act has been amended by Act VIII of
1954. The amended provision reads. thus :-
“8. (2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of
section 18 and of sections 19 to 22 and of
sections 25 to 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, and the principles set out in sub-
section (1) and in clause (a) of sub-section
(2) of section 7 of this Act, shall, so far as
they may be applicable, apply in respect of
any reference made to the Court under sub-
section (1)”.
It would be noticed that this amended provision has taken
the, precaution of expressly referring to section 18(2) of
the Central Act along with other sections as sections which
are applicable to the proceedings under the provisions of
the Act. Even so, the clause that these provisions will
apply “in respect of any reference made to the Court under
sub-section (1)” still occurs in the amended provision; and
if it is held that the words “any reference made to the
Court” speak about the proceedings that follow the making of
the reference, then the same difficulty may arise as to the
application of s. 18(2) of the Central Act to an application
made for reference under s. 8(1) of the Act. This amended
provision lends support to the view that the clause “in
respect of any reference made to the Court” does not mean
that the provisions have to apply after such a reference is
made, but that it includes all cases where reference is
intended, or proposed, or asked, to be made; and that means
that if a party wants to make an application for reference,
he is no doubt entitled to require the Collector to make
such a reference, but his application in that behalf must be
made within the limitation prescribed by s. 18(2) of the
Central Act. In our opinion, in regard to the application
of s. 18(2) of the Central Act in respect of applications
made for reference under s. 8(1) of the Act, no amendment
was really
148
necessary; but, of course, the Legislature thought it
necessary to make the amendment in view of the decision of
the Calcutta High Court on the application made by the
appellant on the earlier occasion to that High Court.
Since we hold that the application originally made by the
appellant to respondent No. 3 under s. 8(1) of the Act on
the 2nd February, 1953 for reference, was barred by time, it
is not necessary to consider the appellant’s plea whether it
was made within a reasonable time. Section 8(2) of the Act
read with S. 18(2) of the Central Act specifically
prescribes limitation for the making of such applications;
and there is no doubt that having regard to the said
provisions, the appellant’s application is barred by time.
The result is, the appeal fails, and the order passed by the
High Court is confirmed, though on different grounds. There
would be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
149