PETITIONER:
JAGDISH SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NATTHU SINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT25/11/1991
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 1604 1991 SCR Supl. (2) 567
1992 SCC (1) 647 1991 SCALE (2)1363
ACT:
Specific Relief Act, 1963: Section 21 (2), (4) &
(5)—Proviso.
Suit for specific performance–Acquisition of suit
properties during the pendency of second appeal–Effect
of–Nature of relief available to plaintiff–Power of Court
to grant compensation–Held where the contract becomes
impossible of performance for no fault of
plaintiff—–Court can award compensation in lieu and
substitution of specific performance–Measure of compensa-
tions by the standards of Section 73 of the Contract
Act–Scope of the Proviso explained–Distinction between
Indian Law and English law discussed.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 100
Second Appeal–High Court–Power to reappreciate evi-
dence and disturb concurrent findings of fact—-Held find-
ings of fact vitiated by nonconsideration of relevant evi-
dence can be reversed.
General Clauses Act, 1897: Section 27.
Suit for specific performance—Notice issued by plain-
tiff–Refusal to accept by defendant-Notice returned un-
served—Held notice must be presumed to have been
served–Averments in the Notices could be treated as part to
the plaint.
HEADNOTE:
By an agreement dated 3.7.1973 the respondent sold two
plots to the appellant for a consideration of Rs. 15,000. By
another agreement, entered into between the parties on the
same day, the appellant agreed to reconvey the said proper-
ties to the respondent against payment of Rs. 15,000 within
two years. Within the stipulated period the respondent
(Plaintiff) instituted a suit for specific performance
alleging that despite offer of performance and tendering the
price, the Appellant (Defendant) refused reconveyance of the
properties.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit by holding that the
Respondent was not ready and willing to perform the con-
tract, and
568
that the time was essence of the reconveyance agreement. The
first Appellate Court dismissed the respondent’s appeal.
The respondent preferred second appeal before the High
Court. Relying upon the two notices issued by the Respondent
to the appellant before filing of the suit which contained
the averments that he was willing and ready to perform the
contract, the High Court reversed the findings of the two
courts below and allowed the appeal and held that Respond-
ent-Plaintiff was willing to perform the contract and that
the Appellant was the party in breach. Accordingly it passed
a decree of specific performance of an agreement for sale of
land.
During the pendency of the Second Appeal, suit proper-
ties were acquired by the State for public purposes and the
High Court rejected the plea that after the land has been
acquired by the State corpus of the Land had ceased to exist
and no decree for specific performance can be granted.
In defendant’s appeal to this Court it was contended on
his behalf (1) that the High Court erred in reappreciating
the evidence in second appeal and in disturbing the concur-
rent findings of fact that Respondent was not willing and
ready to perform the contract; (2) that in view of the
acquisition of the suit-properties the contract itself
became incapable of specific performance and to such a case
the power to give compensation as an alternative to specific
performance did not extend.
Modifying the decree of the High Court, this Court,
HELD:1. Where the findings by the Court of facts are
vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an
essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court
is not precluded from recording proper findings. [572-H]
1.1 The notices issued by the respondent to the appel-
lant containing the averments that he was ready and willing
to perform the contract which were not actually served on
the appellant because of his refusal to accept them must be
presumed to have been served as contemplated by Section 27
of the General Clauses Act..Therefore the High Court was
right in relying upon the averments in the notices which
could be treated as part to the plaint. Accordingly the
finding of the High Court that Respondent was willing and
ready to
569
perform the contract and that it was the Appellant who was
in breach is accordingly confirmed. [572 F-G, 578 H, 579-A]
2. Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 enables
the Plaintiff in a suit for specific performance also to
claim compensation for its breach either in addition to or
in substitution of, such performance. However, when the
plaintiff by his option has made specific performance impos-
sible, Section 21 does not entitle him to seek damages. That
position is common under the English and Indian Law namely
under Section of Lord Cairn’s Act, 1858 and Section 21 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963. But under the Indian Law the
explanation to sub-section (5) of Section 21 makes a specif-
ic departure and the jurisdiction to award damages remains
unaffected by the fact that without any fault of the plain-
tiff, the contract becomes incapable of specific perform-
ance. [574-D, 577, H-C]
Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 915, distin-
guished and held inapplicable.
Mohamad Abdul Jabbar & Ors. v. Lalmia & Ors., A.I.R.
(34) 1947 Nagpur 254, disapproved.
Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sessoon, A.I.R. 1928 Privy
Council 208, explained.
3. However, so far as the proviso to sub-section (5) of
Section 21 is concerned, two positions must to kept clearly
distinguished. If the amendment relates to the relief of
compensation in lieu of or in addition to specific perform-
ance where the plaintiff has not abandoned his relief of
specific-performance the Court will allow the amendment at
any stage of the proceeding. That is a claim for compensa-
tion failing under section 21 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 and the amendment is one under the proviso to sub-
section (5). But different and less liberal standards apply
if what is sought by the amendment is the conversion of a
suit for specific performance into one for damages for
breach of contract in which case Section 73 of the Contract
is invoked. This amendment is under the discipline of Rule
17, Order 6, C.P.C. The fact that sub-section (4), in turn,
invokes Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act for the prin-
ciples of quanlification and assessment of compensation does
not obliterate this distinction. [575 B-C]
570
3.1 In the instant case, assuming that the Respondent
had not specifically sought for compensation in lieu of
specific performance the amendment is permitted in order
that complete justice is done. [578-B]
3.2 The measure of the compensation is by the standards
of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act. Here the English
Rule in Bain v. Fothergill that the purchaser, on breach of
the contract, cannot recover for the loss of his bargain is
not applicable. [578-C]
Bain v. Fothergill, 1874 L.R. 7 House of Lords 158, held
inapplicable.
Pollock & MuHa on Contract (10th edn.) p.663; Nagardas
v. Ahmedkhan, (1895) 21 Bom. 175, referred to.
3.3 In the instant case, the quantum of the compensation
is ascertainable with reference to the determination of the
market value in the land acquisition proceedings. The com-
pensation awarded may safely be taken to be the measure of
damages subject, of course, to the deduction therefrom of
money value of the services, time and energy expended by the
appellant in pursuing the claims of compensation and the
expenditure incurred by him in the litigation culminating in
the award. [578-G]
4. Accordingly there will be a decree awarding to the
Respondent compensation in lieu and substitution of one for
specific performance which but for the acquisition Respond-
ent would have been entitled to; the quantum and the measure
of the compensation being the entire amount of compensation
determined for the acquisition of the suit-properties to-
gether with all the solatium, accrued interest and all other
payments under the law authorising the acquisition less a
sum of rupees one lakh fifty thousand only which shall go to
the Appellant towards his services, time and amounts spent
in pursuing the claims for compensation as well as the
consideration stipulated for reconveyance. [579 E-F]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4916 of
1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.4.1991 of the Alla-
habad High Court in Second Appeal No. 3395 of 1978.
Manoj Swarup and Ms. Lalita Kohli for the Appellants.
571
B.S. Nagar for Goodwill Indeevar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATACHALIAH, J. Special leave ‘is granted and the
appeal taken-up for final hearing and disposed of by this
judgment. We have heard Sri Manoj Swamp, learned counsel for
the Appellant and Shri Goodwill Indeevar for the Respondent.
2. Appellant was Defendant in a suit for specific
performance. He seeks special leave to appeal to this Court
from the judgment and order dated 5.4.1991 of the High Court
of Allahabad in Second Appeal No.3395 of 1978 decreeing, in
reversal of the decrees of dismissal entered by the two
courts below, specific performance of an agreement for sale
of land..
3. On 3.7.1973 Respondent-Natthu Singh sold Plot No.195
measuring 5 bighas and 18 biswas and Plot No.196 measuring 9
bighas and 8 biswas of Gulistapur Village, Pargana Dadri to
the appellant for a consideration of Rs. 15,000. On the very
day, i.e., 3.7.1973, another agreement was entered into
between the parties whereunder Appellant agreed to reconvey
the said properties to the Respondent against payment of Rs.
15,000/- within two years.
On 2.6.1975, well within the period of two years stipulated
for the performance of the agreement to re-sell, Respondent
instituted the suit for specific performance alleging that
despite offer of performance and tendering the price, Appel-
lant, with the dishonest intention of appropriating the
properties to himself refused reconveyance. The Appellant
contested the suit principally on the ground that Respondent
was never ready and willing to perform the contract and that
Respondent himself was in breach.
4. The trial court framed the necessary and relevant
issues stemming from the pleadings and on its own apprecia-
tion of the evidence on record came to find against the
Respondent that he was ready and willing to perform the
contract; and that the agreement, being one of reconveyance,
time was of its essence. The suit was accordingly dismissed.
Respondent’s first appeal before the learned IInd Additional
District Judge, Bulandshahar was also unsuccessful.
5. However, in Respondent’s second appeal, the High
Court reversed the findings of the two courts below and
allowing the appeal held that Respondent-Plaintiff was ready
and willing to perform the contract; that the Appellant was
the party in breach; and that, therefore, Respondent was
entitled to a decree. This decree is assailed in this ap-
peal.
572
6. Sri Manoj Swarup appearing in support of the appeal
urged two contentions; the first is that the High Court was
in error in embarking upon a re-appraisal of the evidence in
a second-appeal to distrub concurrent findings of fact that
Respondent was-not willing and ready to perform the con-
tract. The second contention is that contract itself became
incapable of specific performance in view of the fact that
during the pendency of second appeal the State had initiated
proceedings for compulsory acquisition of the suit-proper-
ties and the subject-matter of the suit itself ceased to be
available. Counsel says the power to give compensation as an
alternative to specific performance did not extend to a case
in which the relief of specific performance had itself
become impossible.
7. On the first question, as to the readiness of the
Respondent to perform his obligations, the High Court no-
ticed that on 30th January, 1974 even before institution of
the suit Respondent and his brother had sold another proper-
ty belonging to them for a price of Rs. 30,000 and that
Respondent had the necessary wherewithal to perform his part
of the bargain. The High Court held:
“…Thus, the plaintiff admittedly had re-
ceived Rs. 15,000/- on 30.1. 1974 and soon
thereafter the first notice was issued to the
defendant asking him to indicate a date for
executing the saledeed and also expressing his
readiness and willingness. There is no evi-
dence on the record that between 30.1.1974 and
the date of suit or thereafter the plaintiff
had parted with this money.”
The High Court also noticed that the two notices dated
23.3. 1974 and 6.5. 1975 respectively issued by the Respond-
ent to the Appellant before the suit contained the averments
that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. The
notices were, no doubt, not actually served on the appellant
as they had come back unserved upon the alleged refusal by
the appellant to accept them. The High Court relied upon the
averments in the notices which could be treated as a part to
the plaint having been referred to and relied upon therein.
8. In our opinion, the High Court was right in its
view. The notices must be presumed to have been served as
contemplated by Section 27 of the General .Clauses Act. As
to the jurisdiction of the High Court to reappreciate evi-
dence in a second appeal it is to be observed that where the
findings by the Court of facts is vitiated by non-considera-
tion of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous
approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from
recording proper findings. We find no substance in the first
contention.
573
9. The second contention is, however, not without its
interesting aspects. During the pendency of the second
appeal, the properties were acquired by the State for a
public purpose. This is not disputed. It would appear that a
compensation of Rs. 4 lakhs or thereabouts has been deter-
mined. That sum, along with the generous solatium and the
rates of interest provided by the statute would now be a
much larger amount. Before the High Court, Appellant sought
to rely upon the decision of this Court in Piarey Lal v.
Hori Lal, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 915. That was a case where in
proceedings of consolidation the subject-matter of an agree-
ment to sell was allotted to a person other than the vendor,
the relief of specific performance was held not to survive.
The High Court rightly held that pronouncement was distin-
guishable and inapplicable to the present controversy.
As to the relief available to a plaintiff where the
subject matter was acquired during the pendency of a suit
for specific-performance the High Court said:
“…The learned counsel for the respondent has
vehemently urged that after the land has been
acquired its corpus has ceased to exist and no
decree for specific performance can now be
granted. In my opinion with the acquisition
of)the land plaintiffs rights do not get
extinguished in totality. The appellate court
always suitably mould the relief which the
circumstances of the case may require or
permit. The power in this regard is ample and
wide enough…
However, in the present case the property has
not been totally lost. What happens in the
case of the acquisition is that for the
property compensation payable in lieu there of
is substituted…”
The High Court issued these consequential
directions:
“If the decree for specific performance of
contract in question is found incapable of
being executed due to acquisition of subject
land, the decree shall stand suitably substi-
tuted by a decree for realisation of compensa-
tion payable in lieu thereof as may be or have
been determined under the relevant Act and the
plaintiff shall have a right to recover such
compensation together with solatium and inter-
est due thereon. The plaintiff shall have a
right to recover it from the defendant if the
defendant has already realised these amounts
and in that event’ ;the defendant shall be
further liable to pay interest at the rate
574
of twelve per cent from the date of realisa-
tion by him to the date of payment on the
entire amount realised in respect of the
disputed land.”
We are afraid the approach of the High Court is perhaps
somewhat an over-simplification of an otherwise difficult
area of law as to the nature of relief available to a plain-
tiff where the contract becomes impossible of specific
performance and where there is no alternative prayer for
compensation in lieu or substitution of specific perform-
ance. While the solution that has commended itself to the
High Court might appear essentially just or equitable, there
are certain problems both of procedure and of substance in
the administration of the law of specific relief particular-
ly in the area of award of an alternative relief in lieu or
substitute of specific performance that require and compel
consideration, especially in view of some pronouncements of
the High Courts which have not perceived with precision, the
nice distinctions between this branch of the law as adminis-
tered in England and in India.
10. Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 corre-
sponding to Section 19 of 1877 Act enables the plaintiff in
a suit for specific performance also to claim compensation
for its breach either in addition to or in substitution of,
such performance. Sub-sections (2), (4) and (5) of Section
21 are material and they provide:
“(2). If, in any such suit, the Court decides that specif-
ic performance ought not to be granted, but that there is a
contract between the parties which has been broken by the
defendant, and that the plaintiff is entitled to compensa-
tion for that breach, it shall award his such compensation
accordingly.
(3) [ Omitted as unnecessary.]
(4) In determining the amount of any compensation awarded
under this section, the Court shall be guided by the princi-
ples specified in Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872, 9 of 1872.
(5) No compensation shall be awarded under this section
unless the plaintiff has claimed such compensation in his
plaint:
Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such
compensation in the plaint, the Court shall, at any stage of
the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms
as may be just, for including a claim for such compensation.
Explanation-The circumstance that the contract has become
575
incapable of specific performance does not preclude the
Court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this
section.”
(emphasis added)
So far as the proviso to sub-section (5) is concerned,
two positions must be kept clearly distinguished. If the
amendment relates to the relief of compensation in lieu of
or in addition to specific performance where the plaintiff
has not abandoned his relief of specific-performance the
court will allow the amendment at any stage of the proceed-
ing. That is a claim for compensation failing under Secion
21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the amendment is
one under the proviso to sub-section (5). But different and
less liberal standards apply if what is sought by the amend-
ment is the Conversion of a suit for specific performance
into one for damages for breach of contract in which case
Section 73 of the Contract Act is invoked. This amendment is
under the discipline of Rule 17 Order 6, C.P.C. The fact
that sub-section (4), in turn, invokes Section 73 of the
Indian Contract Act for the principles of quantification and
assessment of compensation does not obliterate this distinc-
tion.
The provisions of Section 21 seem to resolve certain
divergencies of judicial opinion in the High Courts on some
aspects of the jurisdiction to award of compensation. Sub-
section (5) seeks to set at rest the divergence of judicial
opinion between High Courts whether a specific claim in the
plaint is necessary to grant the compensation. In England
Lord Cairn’s (Chancery Amendment) Act, 1858 sought to confer
jurisdiction upon the Equity Courts to award damages in
substitution or in addition to specific performance. This
became necessary in view of the earlier dichotomy in the
jurisdiction between common law and Equity Courts in the
matter of choice of the nature of remedies for breach. In
common law the remedy for breach of a contract was damages.
The Equity Court innovated the remedy of specific perform-
ance because the remedy of damages was found to be an inade-
quate remedy. Lord Cairn’s Act, 1858 conferred jurisdiction
upon the Equity Courts to award damages also so that both
the reliefs could be administered by one court. Section 2 of
the Act provided:
“In all cases in which the Court of Chancery
has jurisdiction to entertain an application
for specific performance of any covenant,
contract or agreement it shall be lawful for
the same Court if it shall think fit to award
damages to the party injured either in addi-
tion to or in substitution for such specific
performance and such damages may be assessed
as the Court shall direct.”
576
This is the historical background to the provisions of
Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and its prede-
cessor in Section 19 of the 1877 Act.
11. In Mohamad Abdul Jabbar & Others v. Lalmia &Others.
A.I.R (34) 1947 Nagpur 254 specific performance of an agree-
ment of sale dated 16th January, 1934, was sought by the
institution of a suit on 15th January, 1937. During the
pendency of the suit, on 20th April, 1937, the provincial
Government started land acquisition proceedings respecting
the subject-matter of the suit and the same was acquired.
The High Court upheld the dismissal of the suit for specific
performance and referred an amendment for award of damages.
On the obvious impermissibility of specific performance the
Nagpur High Court said:
“We accordingly conclude that specific per-
formance is now impossible and we cannot
decree it for “equity like nature does nothing
in vain.” We cannot hold the plaintiffs-appel-
lants entitled to the compensation money into
which the property was converted because they
had no right or interest in that property….”
Refusing the amendment for the relief for
payment of money the High Court held:
“We would not allow amendment also because on
the facts found by the trial Court (with which
we see no reason, whatever, to differ) we
would have refused specific performance, and
the claim for damages on this account would
also have been negatived because damages could
have been awarded only if specific performance
could rightly have been claimed. The appeal,
therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.”
.llm0
Support for these conclusions was sought
from the oft quoted, but perhaps a little
misunderstood, case of Ardeshir H. Mama v.
Flora Sassoon A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council 208.
The passage in Sassoon’s case relied upon by
the Nagpur High Court is this:
“In a series of decisions it was consistently
held that just as its power to give damages
additional was to be exercised in a suit in
which the Court had granted specific perform-
ance, so the power to give damages as an
alternative to specific performance did not
extend to a case in which the plaintiff had
debarred himself from claiming that form of
relief, nor to a case in which that relief had
become impossible.
577
The case of 52 Bombay 597 fell within the
first category of cases described above under
the alternative relief of damages. This case
fails within the second part where the relief
of specific performance has become
impossible.”
(emphasis supplied)
The second part of the observation of the Nagpur High
Court, with great respect to the learned Judges proceeds on
a fallacy resulting from the non-perception of the specific
departure in the Indian law. In Lord Cairn’s Act. 1858
damages could not be awarded when the contract had, for
whatever reason, become incapable of specific performance.
But under the Indian law the explanation makes a specific
departure and the jurisdiction to award damages remains
unaffected by the fact that without any fault of the plain-
tiff, the contract becomes incapable of specific perform-
ance. Indeed, Sassoon’s case is not susceptible of the
import attributed to it by the Nagpur High Court. Sassoon’s
case itself indicated the departure made in Indian Law by
the Explanation in Section 19 of the 1877 Act, which is the
same as the Explanation to Section 21 of the 1963 Act. The
Judicial Committee, no doubt, said that Section 19 of the
1877 Act “embodies the same principle as Lord Cairn’s Act
and does not, any more than did the English Statute enable
the court in a specific performance suit to award ‘compensa-
tion for its breach’ where at the hearing the plaintiff
debarred himself by his own action from asking for a specif-
ic decree”‘, But what was overlooked was this observation of
Lord Blanesburgh,
“except as the case provided for in the expla-
nation us 10 which there is introduced an
express divergence from Lord Cairn’s Act as
expanded in England”
(emphasis supplied )
Indeed the following illustration of the
Explanation appended to Section 19 of Specific
Relief Act, 1877 makes the position clear”
“Of the Explanation-A, a purchaser, sues B,
his vendor, for specific performance of a
contract for the sale of a patent. Before the
hearing of the suit the patent expires. The
Court may award A compensation for the
non–performance of the contract, and may, if
necessary, amend the plaint for that purpose
When the plaintiff by his option has made specific
performance impossible, Section 21 does not entitle him to
seek damages. That position is common to both Section 2 of
Lord Cairn’s Act, 1858 and Section 21 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963. But in Indian Law where the contract,
578
for no fault of the plaintiff, becomes impossible of per-
formance section 21 enables award of compensation in lieu
and substitution of specific performance.
We, therefore, hold that the second contention of Sri
Manoj Swarup is not substantial either.
12. Learned counsel were not specific on the point
whether the Respondent had actually asked for compensation
in lieu of specific performance. We may assume that it was
not so specifically sought. In order that formality in this
behalf be completed, we permit the amendment here and now so
that complete justice is done.
13. The measure of the compensation is by the standards
of Section 73 of the Indian Contract. Here again the English
Rule in Bain v. Fothergill, (1874) L.R. 7 House of Lords 158
that the purchaser, on breach of the ,contract, cannot
recover, for the loss of his bargain is not applicable. In
Pollock & Mulla on Contract (10th Edn.) the law on the
matter is set out thus :
“Where, therefore, a purchaser of land claims
damages for the loss of his bargain, the
question to be decided is whether the damages
alleged to have been caused to him ‘naturally
arose in the Usual course of things from such
breach’; and in an ordinary case it would be
difficult to hold otherwise.” [p. 663]
Learned Authors adopt the following observation of
Farran C.J. in Nagardas v. Ahmedkhan, (1895) 21 Bom. 175 :
“The Legislature has not prescribed a differ-
ent measure of damages in the case of con-
tracts dealing with land from that laid down
in the case of contracts relating to commodi-
ties”
In the present case there is no difficulty in assessing
the quantum of the compensation. That is ascertainable with
reference to the determination of the market value in the
land acquisition proceedings. The compensation awarded may
safely be taken to be the measure of damages subject, of
course, to the deduction therefrom of money value of the
services, time and energy expended by the appellant in
pursuing the claims of compensation and the expenditure
incurred by him in the litigation culminating in the award.
14. We accordingly confirm the finding of the High Court
that Respondent was willing and ready to perform the con-
tract and that it was the
579
Appellant who was in breach. However, in substitution of
the decree for specific performance, we make a decree for
compensation, equivalent to the amount of the land acquisi-
tion compensation awarded for the suit lands together with
solatium and accrued interest, less a sum of Rs.1,50,000
(one lakh fifty thousand only) which, by a rough and ready
estimate, we quantify as the amount to be paid to the appel-
lant in respect of his services, time and money expended in
pursuing the legal-claims for compensation.
15. We may here notice one other submission of Sri Manoj
Swarup. He found fault with the operative part of the judg-
ment of the High Court, Which, according to Sri Manoj Swa-
rup, had not even provided for the payment to the appellant
of Rs. 15,000 the stipulated consideration for reconveyance.
There is this apparent omission in the operative part of the
High Court’s judgment. But this is only a technicality. The
operative part granting relief should be read with the
relevant prayers in the plaint itself. But that is not of
any practical significance here in as much as we have also
taken this amount of Rs. 15,000 into account in somewhat
generously quantifying the litigation-expenses at Rs.
1,50,000 as payable to the appellant out of the sums awarded
for the acquisition. Therefore, there is no need for Re-
spondent to pay the sum of Rs. 15,000 additionally.
16. In the result there will be a decree awarding 10 the
Respondent compensation in lieu and substitution of one for
specific performance which but for the acquisition Respond-
ent would have been entitled to the quantum and the measure
of the compensation being take entire amount of compensation
determined for take acquisition of the suit. properties to
gather with all the solatium, accrued interest and all
other payments under the law authorising the acquisition,
less a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand
only) which shall go to the Appellant towards his services,
time and amounts spent in pursuing the claims for compensa-
tion as well as the consideration stipulated for reconvey-
ance ….
The sum of Rs.1,50,000 is allowed to be.. paid to the
Appellant on his assurance that he has not received any part
of the compensation earlier. If any amount has been received
by the Appellant out of compensation awarded for the acqui-
sition, such sums shall go in reduction of the sum of
Rs.1,50,000, the difference being for the benefit of and be
paid to the Respondent additionally.
This order shall be sufficient authority for the land
acquistion authorities or the Courts wherever the matter may
be pending for the apportionment and payment of the compen-
sation for the acquisition of the suit
580
property between the Appellant and the Respondent in the
manner indicated above. These directions shall, of course,
not affect or prejudice the claim of other claimants, if
any, whose claims are to be determined in the said land
acquistion proceedings, the assumption implicit in this
apportionment being. that there are no other claimants in
the land acquisition proceedings. If such apportionment and
withdrawal is not possible, the decree in terms of this
judgment shall be worked out in execution proceedings.
The decree under appeal is modified accordingly. No costs.
T.N.A. Decree
modified.
581