Court Judgments

PETITIONER:
JABAR SINGH

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
GENDA LAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
20/12/1963

BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SARKAR, A.K.
WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:
1964 AIR 1200          1964 SCR  (6)     54
CITATOR INFO :
D        1968 SC 227     (6,7)
R        1972 SC 447     (12)
RF        1973 SC2077     (5,6,7,8)
E&R        1974 SC1032     (28)
R        1975 SC2182     (13)
D        1976 SC2184     (20)
R        1979 SC1617     (9)
F        1983 SC1311     (16,18)
D        1984 SC 304     (2)
F        1985 SC 150     (22,25,27,28,30,32,35)
O        1987 SC 831     (5,6,7,8,9,13,14)

ACT:
Representation    of  the     People Act (43 of  1951),  ss.     97,
100(1)(d) and 101(a) and Conduct of Election Rules, 1961  r.
57(1)-scope of.

HEADNOTE:
The  appellant    was ‘declared elected  having  defeated     the
respondent by 2 votes.    Thereafter, the respondent filed  an
election  petition.  The respondent challenged the  validity
of  the     appellant’s  election on  the    ground    of  improper
reception  of votes in favour of the appellant and  improper
rejection  of  votes in regard to himself.  His     prayer     was
that the appellant’s election should be declared void and  a
declaration  should  be made that the respondent  was  ‘duly
elected.
The appellant urged before the Tribunal that there had    been
improper  rejection of his votes and improper acceptance  of
the  votes  of    the respondent, and his     case  was  that  if
recounting and re-scrutiny was made, it would be found    that
he had secured a majority of votes.  The respondent objected
to  this course; his case was that since the  appellant     had
not  recriminated nor furnished security under s. 97 of     the
Act, it was not open to him to make this plea.    The Tribunal
rejected  the objection of the respondent and  accepted     the
plea of the appellant.    The Tribunal re-examined the  ballot
papers    of the respondent as well as the appellant and    came
to  the conclusion that 22 ballot papers cast in  favour  of
the  respondent had been wrongly accepted.  The     result     was
that  the  respondent had not secured a majority  of  votes.
The Tribunal declared that the election of the appellant was
void  and refused to grant a declaration to  the  respondent
that  he had been duly elected.     Both the appellant and     the
respondent  preferred appeals before the High Court  against
the decision of the Tribunal.  The High Court dismissed both
the  appeals  and the decision of  Tribunal  was  confirmed.
Hence the appeal.
Held:  (i) The scope of the enquiry in a case falling  under
s. 100 (1) (d) (iii) is to determine whether any votes    have
been improperly cast in favour of the returned candidate  or
any votes have been improperly refused or rejected in regard
to  any     other-candidate.  These are the  only    two  matters
which would be relevant in ‘deciding whether the election of
the returned candidate has been materially affected or    not.
At  this enquiry the onus is on the petitioner to prove     his
allegation.  Therefore, in the case of a petition where     the
only  claim  made  is  that the     election  of  the  returned
candidate  is  void,  the scope of the    enquiry     is  clearly
limited     by  the requirement of s. 100    (1)(d)    itself.      In
fact, s. 97(1) has no application to the case falling  under
s. 100(1)(d) (iii); the scope of the enquiry is limited     for
the simple reason that what
55
the clause requires to be considered is whether the election
of  the returned candidate has been materially affected     and
nothing else.
(ii) There are cases in which the erection petition makes  a
double    claim;    it claims that the election  of     a  returned
candidate is void and also -asks for a declaration that     the
petitioner  himself  or     some other  person  has  been    duly
elected.   It is in regard to such a composite case that  s.
100  as well as s. 100(1) would apply, and it is in  respect
of  the ,additional claim for a declaration that some  other
candidate has been duly elected that s. 97 comes into  play.
Section      97(1)     thus  allows  the  returned  candidate      to
recriminate  and  raise pleas in support of his     case.     The
result of s. 97(1) therefore, is that in dealing with a com-
posite election petition the Tribunal inquires into not only
the  case made out by the petitioner, but also the  counter-
claim  made by the returned candidate.    In  this  connection
the  returned  candidate  is required  to  comply  with     the
provisions  of    s. 97(1) and s. 97(2) of the  Act.   If     the
returned  candidate does not recriminate as required  by  s.
97,  then he cannot make any attack against the     alternative
claim  made by the petitioner.    In other words the  returned
candidate  will not be allowed to lead any evidence  because
he is precluded from raising any pleas against the  validity
of the claim of the alternative candidate.
(iii) The pleas of the returned candidate under s. 97 of the
Act,have to be tried after a declaration has been made under
s. 100 of the Act.  The     first     part  of  the    enquiry      in
regard to the validity of the election    of   the    returned
candidate must be tried within the narrow limits  prescribed
by  s.    100(1)(d) (iii) and the latter part of    the  enquiry
which  is governed by s. 101(a) will have to be tried  on  a
broader     basis    permitting the returned     candidate  to    lead
evidence in support of the pleas which he may have taken  by
way of recrimination under s. 97(1).  But ,even in cases  to
which  s.  97 applies, the enquiry necessary  while  dealing
with  the dispute under s. 101(a) will not be wider  if     the
returned candidate has failed to recriminate, and in a    case
of  this type the duty of the Election Tribunal will not  be
to count and scrutinise all the votes cast at the  election.
As  a  result of r. 57, the Election Tribunal will  have  to
assume    that every ballot paper which had not been  rejected
under  r.  56 constituted one valid vote and it is  on    that
basis  the  finding will have to be made  under     s.  101(a).
Therefore,  it    is clear that in holding an  enquiry  either
under s. 100(1)(d) (iii) or under s. 101 where s. 97 has not
been  complied with it is not competent to the    Tribunal  to
order a general recount of the votes preceded by a  scrutiny
about their validity.
Inayatullah  Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R.  219     and
Lakshmi     Shankar Yadav v. Kunwar Sripal Singh, 22 E.L.R.  47
overruled.
Bhim Sen v. Gopali and Ors. 22 E.L.R. 288, relied on.
Vashist     Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra, [1955] 1 S.C.R.    509,
Hari  Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, [1955]  1  S.C.R.
1104 and
56
Keshav    Laxman Borkar v. Dr. Devrao Laxman Anande, [1960]  1
S.C.R. 902, ‘discussed.
Per  Ayyangar  J.-(i) Section 100 of the Act  casts  on     the
election   petitioner  the  onus  of  establishing  to     the
satisfaction  of  the  Tribunal     that  “the  result  of     the
election  was materially affected by the improper  reception
or rejection of particular votes”, but from this it does not
follow that the returned candidate is powerless to establish
to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that notwithstanding the
improper  reception  or rejection of  the  particular  votes
alleged     by  the  petitioner  his  election  has  not    been
materially  affected.  If the key words of the provision  on
the fulfillment of which alone the Tribunal is invested with
jurisdiction  to set aside an election are taken to  be     the
words  “the  result  of the  election  has  been  materially
affected”;  it    is  not beyond the  power  of  the  returned
candidate  to establish this fact which he might do  in     any
manner    he likes.  The returned candidate might do  this  by
establishing that though a few votes were wrongly counted as
in  his favour, still a large number of his own     votes    were
counted     in  favour of the petitioner or  that    votes  which
ought  to  have     been counted as cast  for  him,  have    been
improperly counted as cast in favour of defeated  candidates
other than the petitioner.  Without such a scrutiny it would
manifestly not be possible to determine whether the election
of  the returned candidate has been materially    affected  or
not.   There  is nothing in cl. (iii)  which  precludes     the
returned candidates from establishing this.  As this  clause
does  not speak of the person in whose favour or as  against
whom  the improper reception or rejection has  taken  place,
its content and significance have to be ascertained from the
purpose     of  which  the     provision  is    intended  viz.,      to
determine  from     a  counting of the voting  papers  after  a
scrutiny whether the election of the returned candidate     has
been materially affected.  The expression “any vote” in this
clause    has  to     be read as meaning “any vote  cast  in     the
election with which this petition is concerned” and not “any
vote cast in the favour of the returned candidate”.
(ii) Section   101(a)  provides     that  there  cannot  be   a
declaration  in     favour     of the claimant to  a    seat  merely
because     the  election of the returned    candidate  has    been
declared  void    but  he must in addition  have    secured     the
majority  of the lawful votes cast.  It is obvious that     for
this purpose the Tribunal ought to scrutinise not merely the
ballot papers of the claimant and the returned candidate but
also of the other candidates.  When the Tribunal has reached
the  conclusion     after scrutiny of votes that  the  claimant
has,  in  fact, received the majority of  valid     votes,     the
Tribunal embarks on the further enquiry as to whether  there
are any reasons why he should not be declared elected And it
is  at this stage that the provisions of s. 97 in regard  to
recrimination came into play.  If no recrimination is  filed
then  on  the  terms  of s. 101(a)  the     claimant  would  be
immediately  declared elected but if there is  recrimination
the provision of s. 101(b) is attracted.  This    construction
would harmonise the provision of ss. 97, 100(1)(d) and    101.
and would lead to a rational result.
57
(iii) Rule 57(1) means that so far as the returning  officer
is concerned and for the purpose of enabling him to  declare
the  result the ballot papers which are not rejected are  to
be  deemed as valid.  It is manifest that if  that  validity
held good even at the stage of the election petition and for
the  conduct of the enquiry before the Tribunal     that  could
really be no scrutiny of the ballot papers and s.  100(1)(d)
(iii) would become meaningless.     The validity of the  Ballot
Paper  can  be    challenged in Election    Petition  by  making
proper    pleadings  and the Tribunal can declare     any  ballot
paper  as improperly received.    Rule 57 does not  bear    upon
the construction of s. 100(1)(d) (iii) or of s. 101(a).

JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1042 of 1963.
Appeal    by special leave from the judgment and    order  dated
May  3,     1963,    of the Madhya Pradesh High  Court  in  First
Appeal No. 46 of 1962.
S.   K.     Kapur,     B.  L. Khanna and B.  N.  Kirpal,  for     the
appellant.
Homi  Daji, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, M. K. Ramamurthi     and
D. P. Singh, for the respondent.
December 20, 1963.  The Judgment of P. B. Gajendragadkar, A.
K.  Sarkar,  K.     N. Wanchoo and K. C.  Das  Gupta,  JJ.     was
delivered  by  Gajendragadkar J. N. Rajagopala    Ayyangar  J.
delivered a separate opinion.
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The question of law which this  appeal has
raised    for  our decision is in relation to the     nature     and
scope  of the enquiry contemplated by sections 97,  100     and
101  of     the Representation of People Act, 1951 (No.  43  of
1951)  (hereinafter  called the Act).  The  appellant  Jabar
Singh and the respondent Genda Lal, besides five others, had
contested  the    election to the Madhya Pradesh    Assembly  on
behalf of the Morena Constituency No. 5. This election    took
place  on  the    21st February, 1962.   In  due    course,     the
scrutiny of recorded votes took place and counting  followed
on  the 27th February, 1962.  As a result of  the  counting,
the appellant was shown to have secured 5,671 votes, whereas
the respondent 5,703 votes.  It is not necessary to refer to
the votes secured by the other candidates.  After the result
of the counting was thus ascertained, the appellant  applied
for recounting of the votes and thereupon,
58
recounting  followed as a result of which the appellant     was
declared elected having defeated the respondent by 2  votes.
The recounting showed that the appellant secured 5,656 votes
and the respondent 5,654.  Thereafter, the respondent  filed
an  election petition from which the present appeal  arises.
By  his petition the respondent challenged the    validity  of
the   appellant’s  election  on     the  ground’  of   improper
reception  of votes in favour of the appellant and  improper
rejection  of  votes in regard to himself.   The  respondent
urged before the Tribunal either for the restoration of     the
results     in accordance with the calculations initially    made
before    recounting,  or a re-scrutiny of the  votes  by     the
Tribunal  and  declaration of the result  according  to     the
calculations  which the Tribunal may make.  His     prayer     was
that the appellant’s election should be declared to be    void
and  a    declaration should be made that the  respondent     was
duly elected.
The Election Tribunal found that 10 ballot papers in  favour
of  the     respondent had been improperly rejected and  4     had
been  improperly accepted in favour of the appellant.    That
led  to     a difference of 12 votes and the  position  of     the
votes was found to be the respondent 5,664 and the appellant
5,652 votes.
At this stage, the appellant urged before the Tribunal    that
there had been improper rejection of his votes and  improper
acceptance of the votes of the respondent, and his case     was
that  if  recounting and re-scrutiny was made, it  would  be
found  that  he     had  secured  a  majority  of    votes.     The
respondent objected to this course; his case was that  since
the  appellant had not recriminated under s. 97 of the    Act,
it  was not open to him to make the plea that  a  recounting
and  re-scrutiny should be made on the ground that  improper
votes  had  been accepted in favour of    the  respondent     and
valid votes had been improperly rejected when they were cast
in favour of the appellant.  The respondent’s contention was
that in order to justify the claim made by the appellant  it
was  necessary    that  he  should  have    complied  with     the
provisions of the proviso to s. 97(1) of the Act and  should
have  furnished security as required by it.  The failure  of
the appellant in that behalf precluded him from raising such
a contention.
59
The  Tribunal rejected the respondent’s contention and    held
that  in order to consider the relief which  the  respondent
had  cliamed in his election petition, it was necessary     for
it  to decide whether the respondent had in fact received  a
majority  of votes under s. 101 of the Act, and so,. he     re-
examined the ballot papers of the respondent as well as     the
appellant  and came to the conclusion that 22 ballot  papers
cast in favour of the respondent had been wrongly  accepted.
The result was that the respondent had, in fact, not secured
a  majority of votes.  As a consequence of  these  findings,
the Tribunal declared that the election of the appellant was
void  and refused to grant a declaration to  the  respondent
that he had been duly elected.
This decision led to two cross-appeals before the High Court
of  Madhya  Pradesh,  No.  46 of 1952  and  No.     1  of    1963
respectively.    The appellant challenged the  conclusion  of
the Tribunal that his election was void, whereas the respon-
dent  disputed    the  correctness  of  the  decision  of     the
Tribunal that no declaration could be granted in his  favour
that  be had been duly elected.     In these appeals. the    main
question which was agitated before the High Court was  about
the  nature  and  scope of  the     enquiry  permissible  under
sections  100  and  101 of the Act.  In     dealing  with    this
question,  the High Court based itself upon its own  earlier
decision  in  Inayatullah  Khan v.  Diwanchand    Mahajan     and
Ors.(1)., as well as the decision of this Court in Bhim     Sen
v.  Gopali and Ors. (2) and held that the grievance made  by
both  the parties in their respective appeals was not  well-
founded and that the decision of the Tribunal was right.  In
the result, both the appeals were dismissed and the decision
of  the Tribunal was confirmed.     Against this decision,     the
appellant  has come to this Court by special  leave.   Later
on, the respondent filed an application for leave to  appeal
to  this  Court, but the said application was  filed  beyond
time.  When the said application came on for hearing  before
this  Court, the delay made by the respondent in  preferring
his application for special leave was not condoned, and     so,
the  decision of the High Court against the  respondent     has
become final and is not
(1) 15 E.L.R. 219.
(2) 22 E.L.R. 288
60
longer    open to challenge in this Court.  When the  applica-
tion  for  leave  filed     by the     appellant  was     argued     and
admitted  by this Court, it was urged by Mr. Kapoor  on     his
behalf that the observations made by this Court in the    case
of Bhim Sen(1) on which the High Court substantially  relied
required  reconsideration.  That is why the appeal has    been
placed before a Bench of five Judges for final hearing.
In dealing with the question raised by Mr. Kapoor before us,
it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Act in re-
gard  to  the  presentation of election     petitions  and     the
prayers     that the petitioners can make therein.     Section  81
provides  that an election petition calling in question     any
election  on  one or more of the grounds specified  in    sub-
section     (1)  of s. 100 and s. 101 may be presented  to     the
Election  Commission by any candidate or any elector  within
the  time specified by the said section.  It is     thus  clear
that when a person presents an election petition, it is open
to  him to challenge the election of the returned  candidate
under  s. 100 (1) and claim a declaration that the  returned
candidate’s  election is void.    He can also claim a  further
declaration that he himself or any other candidate has    been
duly  elected.     In other words, if  the  election  petition
contents itself with claiming a simple declaration that     the
election of the returned candidate should be declared to  be
void,  the  petition  falls under s. 100  and  the  Election
Tribunal can either grant the said declaration in which case
the petition is allowed, or refuse to grant it in which case
the  petition  is dismissed.  It is also possible  that     the
election  petition may claim two reliefs, one under  s.     100
(1), and the other under s. 101.  In this category of cases,
the  Tribunal first decides the question as to    whether     the
election  of the returned candidate is valid or not, and  if
it  is    found  that the said election is void,    it  makes  a
declaration  to that effect and then deals with the  further
question whether the petitioner himself or some other person
can  be     said to have been duly elected.  The scope  of     the
enquiry     which the Tribunal has to hold in such cases  would
obviously  depend upon the nature of the reliefs claimed  by
the petition.
There is another fact which it is necessary to bear in    mind
in dealing with the controversy before us in the present ap-
(1)  22 E.L.R. 288.
61
peal.    When  elections are held, the  declarations  of     the
results are governed by the statutory rules framed under the
Act.   The counting of votes is dealt with in  the  relevant
rules  under  Part V. Rule 55 deals with  the  scrutiny     and
opening     of  ballot  boxes.  Rule 56(1)     requires  that     the
ballot papers taken out of each ballot box shall be arranged
in convenient bundles and scrutinised.    R. 5 6 (2)  provides
when the returning officer has to reject a ballot paper; the
grounds     for rejection are specified in clauses (a) to    (h).
Rules  56(3),  (4)  and     (5)  prescribe     the  procedure     for
rejecting  ballot papers.  When the ballot papers have    been
taken  out  of the ballot boxes and have  been    scrutinised,
counting  follows  and that is dealt with by r. 57  and     the
following Rules.  R. 63 provides for recounting of votes; R.
63(1) lays down that after the counting has been  completed,
the  returning officer shall record in the result  sheet  in
Form  20 the total number of votes polled by each  candidate
and  announce the same.     R. 63(2) permits an application  to
be made for a recounting and if that application is allowed,
a  recounting  follows.     If a recounting is made,  then     the
result    is declared once again on the sheet in Form 20.      In
pursuance of the result of counting thus announced, the     re-
sult  of  the  election     is  declared  under  r.  64  and  a
certificate   of  election  is    granted     to   the   returned
candidate.   It is significant that r. 57(1)  provides    that
every  ballot paper which is not rejected under r. 56  shall
be  counted  as one valid vote, which means that  after     the
ballot    papers have been scrutinised and invalid papers     are
rejected  under r. 56(2), all voting papers which have    been
taken  into the counting by the returning officer  shall  be
deemed    to  be valid under r. 57(1).   Similarly,  when     the
scrutiny  of the nomination papers is made by the  returning
officer     under    s. 36 of the Act and as     a  result,  certain
nomination  papers are accepted, s. 36(8) provides that     the
said  acceptance  shall be presumed to be valid.   In  other
words, when an election petition is filed before an Election
Tribunal  challenging  the validity of the election  of     the
returned candidate, prima facie the acceptance of nomination
papers    is presumed to be valid and the voting papers  which
have  been  counted  are also presumed    to  be    valid.     The
election  petition may challenge the validity of  the  votes
counted, or the validity of the acceptance or rejection of a
nomination
62
paper;    that  is a matter of proof.  But the  enquiry  would
commence  in  every  case with prima  facie  presumption  in
favour    of  the validity of the acceptance or  rejection  of
nomination  paper and of the validity of the  voting  papers
which  have been counted.  It is necessary to bear  in    mind
this aspect of the matter in dealing with the question about
the  scope and nature of the enquiry under sections 100     and
101 of the Act.
Let  us now read the three relevant sections with  which  we
are concerned in the present appeal.  Section 97 provides :
“(1)   When   in    an   election    petition   a
declaration that any candidate other than     the
returned    candidate has been duly     elected  is
claimed,    the returned candidate or any  other
party  may  give evidence to  prove  that     the
election    of  such candidate would  have    been
void if he had been the returned candidate and
a     petition  had    been  presented     calling  in
question his election.
Provided    that the returned candidate or    such
other party as aforesaid shall not be entitled
to  give such evidence unless he    has,  within
fourteen days from the date of commencement of
the trial, given notice to the Tribunal of his
intention     to  do so and has  also  given     the
security and the further security referred  to
in sections 117 and 118 respectively.
(2)   Every notice referred to in     sub-section
(1) shall be
accompanied  by the statement and     particulars
required    by  section  83 in the    case  of  an
election    petition  and shall  be     signed     and
verified in like manner”.
Section 100, sub-section (1) reads as under:-.
(1)   Subject to the provisions of  subsection
(2) if the Tribunal is of opinion-
(a)   that  on  the  date of  his     election  a
returned candidate, was not qualified, or     was
disqualified,  to be chosen to fill  the    seat
under the Constitution or this Act; or
63
(b)   that  any  corrupt    practice  has    been
committed     by  a    returned  candidate  or     his
election agent or by any other person with the
consent    of  a  returned     candidate  or     his
election agent; or
(c)   that any nomination has been  improperly
rejected; or
(d)   that  the result of the election, in  so
far  as it concerns a returned candidate,     has
been materially affected-
(i)   by     the  improper    acceptance  of     any
nomination, or
(ii)  by any corrupt practice committed in the
interests     of  the returned  candidate  by  an
agent other than his election agent, or
(iii) by    the improper reception,     refusal  or
rejection of any vote or the reception of     any
vote which is void; or
(iv)  by any noncompliance with the provisions
of  the Constitution or of this Act or of     any
rules or orders made under this Act,
the Tribunal shall declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void”.
Section 101 provides that:
“If any person who has lodged a petition    has,
in   addition  to     calling  in  question     the
election of the returned candidate, claimed  a
declaration  that     he  himself  or  any  other
candidate     has  been  duly  elected  and     the
Tribunal is of opinion-
(a)   that  in  fact the petitioner.  or    such
other  candidate    received a majority  of     the
valid votes, or
(b)   that  but for the votes obtained by     the
returned    candidate by corrupt  practices     the
petitioner or such other candidate would    have
obtained a majority of the valid votes,
the   Tribunal  shall  after   declaring     the
election of the returned candidate to be    void
declare    the   petitioner   or    such   other
candidate,  as the case may be, to  have    been
duly elected”.
64
Mr.  Kapoor contends that in dealing with the cases  falling
under  s.  100    (1)  (d)  (iii),  section  97  can  have  no
application  and so, the enquiry contemplated in  regard  to
cases  falling    under that class is not     restricted  by     the
prohibition  prescribed by s. 97(1).  He suggests that    when
the  Tribunal  decides whether or not the  election  of     the
returned  candidate  has  been materially  affected  by     the
improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote, or the
reception  of any vote which is void, it has to examine     the
validity  of all votes which have been counted in  declaring
the returned candidate to be elected, and so, no  limitation
can  be imposed upon the right of the appellant     to  require
the  Tribunal  to consider his contention  that     some  votes
which  were  rejected  though cast in his  favour  had    been
improperly  rejected and some votes which were    accepted  in
favour    of  the     respondent had     been  improperly  accepted.
Basing himself on this position, Mr. Kapoor further contends
that  when s. 101 requires that the Tribunal has to come  to
the  conclusion     that in fact the petitioner or     such  other
candidate  received a majority of the valid votes, that     can
be  done  only    when a recount    is  made  after     eliminating
invalid votes, and so, no limitations can be placed upon the
scope  of the enquiry contemplated by s. 101 (a).  Since  s.
100(1)(d)(iii)    is  outside the purview of S. 97,  it  would
make  no difference to the scope of the enquiry even if     the
appellant has not recriminated as required by s. 97(1).
On  the other hand, Mr. Garg who has addressed to us a    very
able  argument on behalf of the respondent, urged  that     the
approach  adopted  by  the appellant  in  dealing  with     the
problem posed for our decision in the present appeal is     in-
appropriate.   He contends that in construing  sections     97.
100  and 101, we must bear in mind one important  fact    that
the returned candidate whose election is challenged can face
the challenge under s. 100 only by making pleas which can be
described  as  pleas  affording him  a    shield    of  defence,
whereas     if  the election petition besides  challenging     the
validity  of the returned candidate claims that     some  other
person    has  been duly elected, the  returned  candidate  is
given    an  opportunity     to  recriminate  and  by   way      of
recrimination  he can adopt pleas which can be described  as
weapons     of attack against the validity of the    election  of
the other person.
65
His argument is that though s. 100(1)(d)(iii) is outside  s.
97. it does not mean that in dealing with a claim made by an
election petition challenging the validity of his  election,
a  returned  candidate can both defend the validity  of     his
election and assail the validity of the votes cast in favour
of the petitioner or some other person.     It is in the  light
of  these two rival contentions that we must now proceed  to
decide ‘what the true legal position in the matter is.
It  would  be  convenient if we take a    simple    case  of  an
election petition where the petitioner makes only one  claim
and  that is that the election of the returned candidate  is
void.  This claim can be made under s. 100.  Section  100(1)
(a),  (b) and (c) refer to three distinct grounds  on  which
the  election of the returned candidate can  be     challenged.
We are not concerned with any of these grounds.     In  dealing
with  the challenge to the validity of the election  of     the
returned  candidate under s. 100(1)(d), it would be  noticed
that what the election petition has to prove is not only the
existence  ,of one or the other of the -rounds specified  in
clauses     (i)  to (iv) of s. 100(1)(d), but it  has  also  to
establish  that     as a result of the existence  of  the    said
ground, the result of the election in so far as it  concerns
a  returned candidate has been materially affected.   It  is
thus  obvious that what the Tribunal has to find is  whether
or  not the election in so far as it concerns  the  returned
candidate has been materially affected, and that means    that
the only point which the Tribunal has to decide is: has     the
election of the returned candidate been materially affected?
And no other enquiry is legitimate or permissible in such  a
case.    This  requirement  of s.  100  (1)  (d)     necessarily
imports limitations on the scope of the enquiry.   Confining
ourselves to clause (iii) of s. 100(1)(d), what the Tribunal
has  to     consider  is whether there  has  been    an  improper
reception of votes in favour of the returned candidate.      It
may  also  enquire  whether  there has    been  a     refusal  or
rejection  of any vote in regard to any other  candidate  or
whether there has been a reception of any vote which is void
and this can only be the reception of a void vote in  favour
of the returned candidate.  In other words, the scope of the
enquiry     in  a case failing under s.  100(1)(d)(iii)  is  to
determine  whether  any votes have been improperly  cast  in
favour    of  the returned candidate, or any votes  have    been
improperly refused or re
134-159 S.C.-5.
66
sected in regard to any other candidate.  These are the only
two matters which would be relevant in deciding whether     the
election  of  the  returned candidate  has  been  materially
affected  or  not.   At this enquiry, the  onus     is  on     the
petitioner  to    show  that  by    reason    of  the     infirmities
specified in s. 100(1)(d) (iii), the result of the  returned
candidate’s election has been materially affected, and that,
incidentally, helps to determined the scope of the  enquiry.
Therefore,  it seems to us that it, the case of     a  petition
where  the  only  claim made is that  the  election  of     the
returned  candidate  is void, the scope of  the     enquiry  is
clearly     limited by the requirement of s. 100(1)(d)  itself.
The  enquiry is limited not because the     returned  candidate
has  not recriminated under s. 97(1); in fact, s. 97(1)     has
no application to the case falling under s.  100(1)(d)(iii);
the,  scope of the enquiry is limited for the simple  reason
that  what the clause requires to be considered     is  whether
the  election of the returned candidate has been  materially
affected and nothing else.  If the result of the enquiry  is
in  favour of the petitioner who challenges the election  of
the   returned    candidate,  the     Tribunal  has    to  make   a
declaration  to that effect, and that declaration brings  to
an end the proceedings in the election petition.
There  are,  however, cases in which the  election  petition
makes a double claim; it claims that the election of the re-
turned    candidate is void, and also asks for  a     declaration
that  the petitioner himself or some other person  has    been
duly elected.  It is in regard to such a composite case that
s. 100′ as well as s. 101 would apply, and it is in  respect
of  the additional claim for a declaration that     some  other
candidate has been duly elected that s. 97 comes into  play.
Section      97(1)     thus  allows  the  returned  candidate      to
recriminate and raise pleas in support of his case that     the
other person in whose favour a declaration is claimed by the
petition  cannot  be said to be validly elected,  and  these
would  be  pleas  of  attack and it would  be  open  to     the
returned  candidate  to take these pleas,  because  when  he
recriminates,    he  really  becomes   a      counter-petitioner
challenging the validity of the election of the     alternative
candidate.   The  result of s. 97(1) therefore, is  that  in
dealing     with  a composite election petition,  the  Tribunal
enquires into not only the case made out by the     petitioner,
but also the counter-claim made by the returned
67
candidate.   That being the nature of the  proceedings    con-
templated  by  s.  97(1),  it is  not  surprising  that     the
returned candidate is required to make his recrimination and
serve  notice  in that behalf in the manner and     within     the
time  specified by s. 97 (1) proviso and s. 97 (2).  If     the
returned  candidate does not recriminate as required  by  s.
97,  then he cannot make any attack against the     alternative
claim  made  by the petition.  In such a  case,     an  enquiry
would  be  held under s. 100 so far as the validity  of     the
returned  candidate’s  election is concerned, and  if  as  a
result    of the said enquiry a declaration is made  that     the
election  of  the  returned  candidate    is  void,  then     the
Tribunal will proceed to deal with alternative claim, but in
doing  so,  the returned candidate will not be    allowed     to,
lead  any evidence because he is precluded from raising     any
pleas  against the validity of the claim of the     alternative
candidate.
It is true that s. 101(a) requires the Tribunal to find that
the  petitioner or such other candidate for the     declaration
of whose election a prayer is made in the election  petition
has  in fact received a majority of the valid votes.  It  is
urged by Mr. Kapoor that the Tribunal cannot make a  finding
that  the  alternative    candidate has  in  fact     received  a
majority of the valid votes unless all the votes cast at the
election are scrutinised and counted.  In our opinion,    this
contention  is    not well-founded.  We have  already  noticed
that as a result of rule 57, the Election Tribunal will have
to  assume  that  every     ballot paper  which  had  not    been
rejected under r. 56 constituted one valid vote and it is on
that  basis that the finding will have to be made  under  s.
101(a).      Section 97(1) undoubtedly gives an opportunity  to
the returned candidate to dispute the validity of any of the
votes  cast  in favour of the alternative  candidate  or  to
plead for the validity of any vote cast in his favour  which
has   been  rejected;  but  if    by  his     failure   to    make
recrimination within time as required by s. 97 the  returned
candidate  is  precluded from raising any such plea  at     the
hearing     of  the election petition, there would     be  nothing
wrong  if  the Tribunal proceeds to deal  with    the  dispute
under s. 101(a) on the basis that the other votes counted by
the  returning    officer were valid votes and that  votes  in
favour    of  the     returned  candidate,  if  any,     which    were
rejected.
68
were invalid.  What we have said about the presumed validity
of the votes in dealing with a petition under s. 101 (a)  is
equally      true     in  dealing  with  the     matter      under      s.
100(1)(d)(iii)    We  are, therefore, satisfied that  even  in
cases  to which s. 97 applies, the enquiry  necessary  while
dealing     with the dispute under s. 101(a) will not be  wider
if the returned candidate has failed to recriminate.
If  the returned candidate has recriminated and     has  raised
pleas  in  regard  to  the  votes  cast     in  favour  of     the
alternative  candidate or his votes wrongly  rejected,    then
those  pleas  may have to be tried after a  declaration     has
been  made under s, 100 and the matter proceeds to be  tried
under  s.  101(a).  In other words, the first  part  of     the
enquiry     in  regard to the validity of the election  of     the
returned  candidate must be tried within the  narrow  limits
prescribed  by s. 100(1)(d)(iii) and the latter part of     the
enquiry which is governed by s. 101(a) will have to be tried
on a broader basis permitting the returned candidate to lead
evidence in support of the pleas which he may have taken  by
way  of     recrimination    under s. 97  (1).  If  Mr.  Kapoor’s
construction  of s. 100 (1) (d) (iii) is accepted, it  would
either    make  s.  97  otiose and  ineffective  or  make     the
operation  of s. 101 read with s. 97 inconsistent  with     the
operation  of  S.  100    (1) (d)     (iii).      We  are  therefore
satisfied  that     the High Court was right in coming  to     the
conclusion  that the Tribunal was in error in  holding    that
“it was an authority charged with the duty of  investigating
the  validity of votes for and against the  petitioning     and
returned  candidate  or     for  a matter    of  that  any  other
contesting candidate.”
It, however, appears that following its own earlier decision
in Inayatullah Khan’s(1) case the High Court was disposed to
take the view that the enquiry under s. 101(a) was wider and
that in making its finding under the said provision, it     was
open  to the Tribunal to scrutinise the votes and  determine
whether     in  fact, the petitioner or some other     person     had
received a majority of the valid votes.     As we have  already
indicated,  this would be the position only if the  returned
candidate had recriminated; in the absence of recrimination,
it would not be open to the Election Tribunal
(1)  15 E.L.R. 219.
69
to allow the returned candidate to challenge the validity of
votes  cast  in     favour     of  the  petitioner  or  any  other
candidate  in whose favour a declaration is claimed  by     the
election  petition or to contend that any of his votes    were
improperly rejected.  We ought to add that the view taken by
the  Madhya  Pradesh High Court in the case  of     Inayatullah
Khan(1)     in regard to the scope of the enquiry under s.     101
(a) does not correctly represent the true legal Position  in
that  behalf.    Similarly, the view taken by  the  Allahabad
Court  in Lakshmi Shankar Yadav v. Kunwar Sripal  Singh     and
Ors. (2), cannot be said to interpret correctly the scope of
the  enquiry either under s. 100 or s. 101.  The  conclusion
which we have reached in the present appeal is substantially
in  accord with the observations made by this Court  in     the
case  of  Bhim Sen(3) though it appears that the  points  in
question  were    not elaborately argued before the  Court  in
that case.
There is another point to which reference must be made.     Mr.
Garg  contended that even if the view taken by the  Tribunal
about  the scope of the enquiry under s. 100 (1)  (d)  (iii)
and  s.     101  was right, the relief granted by    it  was     not
justified by the pleadings of the appellant -in the  present
proceeding  In support of this argument, he referred  us  to
paragraph 4 of the Special Pleas filed by the appellant, and
relied    on  the     fact  that at    the  initial  stage  of     the
hearing,- the Tribunal had framed 18 issues including  issue
No. 16 which consisted of three parts, viz.,-
(a)   Whether  any  votes cast  in  favour  of
respondent   No.    1  were      wrongly   rejected
specially      pertaining  to   polling   station
mentioned     in para 4 of the written  statement
under heading special pleas?
(b)   Whether many votes were wrongly accepted
in  favour of the petitioner  appertaining  to
the  polling stations mentioned in para  4  of
the special pleas in written statement?
(c)  What     is the effect of the above  in     the
case?
(1)15 E.L.R.219.
(3)  5 E.L.R. 219. E.L.R. 288.
(2) 22 E.L.R. 47.
70
Later on, when the respondent contended that in the  absence
of  any recrimination by the appellant these issues did     not
arise on the pleadings, they were struck out, and yet in its
judgment  the Tribunal has virtually tried these issues     and
given relief on grounds which were not included even in     his
written statement.  Since this appeal was admitted mainly on
the   ground  that  the     appellant  wanted  this  Court      to
reconsider  the observations made by it in the case of    Bhin
Sen(1),     we  do     not propose to rest our  decision  on    this
subsidiary point raised by Mr. Garg.
It  now remains to refer to two decisions which     were  cited
before    us during the course of the arguments.     In  Vashist
Narain    Sharma v. Dev Chandra and Ors. (2), this  Court     has
held that s. 100(1)(c), as it then stood, places a burden on
the  objector to substantiate the objection that the  result
of the election has been materially affected by the improper
acceptance  or rejection of the nomination paper.   In    that
connection,  this  Court observed that where the  margin  of
votes  is  greater than the votes secured by  the  candidate
whose  nomination  paper had been improperly  accepted,     the
result is not only materially not affected but not  affected
at  all;  but  where it is not possible     to  anticipate     the
result, the petitioner must discharge the burden of  proving
that fact and on his failure to do so, the election must  be
allowed to stand.
In  Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque and  others(1),
adverting to the expression “the result of the election”  in
s.  100(1)(c),    this  Court  stated  that  unless  there  is
something   in     the   context     compelling   a       different
interpretation, the said expression must be construed in the
same sense as in section 66, and there it clearly means     the
result    on the basis of the valid votes.  Basing himself  on
this  observation,  Mr.     Kapoor has  urged  that  while     the
Tribunal decides the question as to whether the election  of
the returned candidate has been materially affected or    not,
the  validity of the votes falls to be considered, and    that
inevitably  enlarges  the scope of the enquiry.     We  do     not
think  that the observation on which Mr. Kapoor     relies     was
intended  to  lay down any such proposition.  All  that     the
reference to s. 66 denotes is that
(1)  22 E.L.R. 288.
(3)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104 at P 1131.
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 509.
71
after  considering  the pleas raised, the  Tribunal  has  to
decide    whether the election of the returned  candidate     has
been materially affected or not, and that only means that if
any votes are shown to have been improperly accepted, or any
votes are shown to have been improperly refused or rejected,
the  Tribunal has to make calculations on the basis  of     its
decisions on those points and nothing more.  It is necessary
to recall that the votes which have not been rejected by the
-returning officer under r. 56 have to be treated as  valid,
unless    the  contrary is specifically  pleaded    and  proved.
Therefore,  we do not think that Mr. Kapoor is justified  in
contending  that  the observations in Hari  Vishnu  Kamath’s
case   support     his  plea  that  the    enquiry      under      s.
100(1)(d)(iii) is wide enough to take in the scrutiny of the
validity of all voting papers.
In Keshav Laxman Borkar v. Dr. Devrao Laxman Anande(1)    this
Court has pointed out that the expression ” valid votes” has
nowhere     been defined in the Act, but in ,the light  of     the
provision  of s. 3 6 (8 ) of the Act read with rule 58,     two
things    are  clear, first that the  candidates    are  validly
nominated candidates whose nomination papers are accepted by
the  returning officer after scrutiny, and second  that     the
provision of s. 58 provides that the ballot papers which are
not  rejected  under r. 57 are deemed to  be  “valid  ballot
papers” and are to be counted as such.
It appears that the position under the English Law in regard
to  the     recounting of votes in proceedings  under  election
petitions is substantially similar.  As Halsbury points out:
“where    a  petitioner claims the seat  for  an    unsuccessful
candidate, alleging that he had a majority of lawful  votes,
either    party must, six days before that appointed  for     the
trial,    deliver to the master, and also at the    address,  if
any,  given by the other side, a list of the votes  intended
to be objected to and of the heads of the objection to    each
of those votes(1)”.  It further appears that no evidence may
be given against the validity of any vote or under any    head
not specified in the list, unless by leave of the Court upon
such terms
(1)  [1960] 1 S.C.R. 902.
(2)  Halsbury’s Laws of England, p. 306 paras. 553 & 554.
72
as  to amendment of the list, postponement of  the  enquiry,
and  payment of costs as may be ordered.  Where no  list  of
the  votes, to which it is intended to take  objection,     has
been  delivered within the time specified, the Court has  no
power to  extend the time or to allow evidence of the  votes
objected to or of the objections thereto to be given at     the
trial.    Therefore, it seems clear that in holding an enquiry
either under s. 100(1)(d)(iii) or under s. 101, where s.  97
has  not  been    complied with, it is not  competent  to     the
Tribunal to order a general recount of the votes preceded by
a scrutiny about their validity.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.  We  would
like to add that though we have accepted the construction of
s.  100(1)(d)(iii) and s. 101 for which Mr. Garg  contended,
no  relief  can be granted to the  respondent,    because     his
application for special leave to appeal against the decision
of the High Court has been dismissed since he was unable  to
make out a sufficient cause for condoning the delay made  by
him   in   preferring    the  said   application.    In     the
circumstances  of  this. case, we direct  that    the  parties
should bear their own costs.
We ought to mention that when this appeal was argued  before
us  on the 4th December, 1963, we were told that them  fresh
election  which     had been ordered to be held  in  accordance
with  the decision of the High Court was fixed for  the     6th
December,  1963;  and  so, after the  case  was     argued,  we
announced  our decision and intimated to the  learned  Advo-
cates  that our reasons will follow.  The  present  judgment
gives the reasons for our decision.
AYYANGAR  J.-While I agree that the appeal deserves,  to  be
dismissed for reasons which I shall indicate later, I regret
my inability to agree with the construction which my learned
brethren  have    placed    on  s. 100  (1)     (d)  (iii)  of     the
Representation of the People Act which for shortness I shall
call the Act. on which in ultimate analysis the question  of
law arising in the appeal turns.
The  facts  of    the  case  which  have    given  rise  to     the
proceeding as well as the points involved in the appeal have
all been set out in detail in the judgment of Gajendragadkar
J. and I consider it unnecessary to repeat
73
them.  I shall accordingly state only those facts which     are
relevant  for  the purpose of: (1) the    construction  of  s.
100(1) (d) of the Act, and (2) the conclusion I have reached
that the appeal should be dismissed.
The appeal arises out of a contested election to the  Morena
Constituency  of  the Madhya Pradesh  Legislative  Assembly.
The polling for the election took place on February 21, 1962
and there were as many as seven candidates who    participated
in  that poll.    The appeal is, however, concerned only    with
two  of them-Genda Lal and Jabar Singh-the latter being     the
returned  candidate  and is the appellant  before  us.     The
voting    procedure  adopted  was that set  out  in  rule     39,
Conduct     of  Election Rules, 1961, which I  shall  hereafter
refer to as the Rules, under which the voter makes a mark on
the  ballot  paper on or near the symbol of  the  contesting
candidate to indicate his choice.  On the first count of the
ballot papers the Returning Officer computed the valid votes
obtained  by Genda Lal as 5,703 as against 5,671  which     had
been  counted  in  favour  of  Jabar  Singh.   Jabar  Singh,
however, immediately applied for a recount under rule 63  of
the  ‘Rules  on the ground that the  original  scrutiny     and
counting  were    defective  and    this,  though  opposed,     was
acceded     to  by     the Returning Office r who  carried  out  a
recount.   I  might  mention in passing     that  the  Election
Tribunal  has found discrepancies. even in the total of     the
number of ballot papers in some of the polling stations, the
figures     of  the total number of valid votes  in  6  polling
stations  being     different from those found  in     the  result
sheet  prepared under rule 57(2) in Form 20.   The  scrutiny
and  recount  disclosed     that Genda Lal was  found  to    have
polled 5,654 votes as against 5,656 votes counted as  having
been  obtained by Jabar Singh.    As a result of this  recount
Jabar Singh was declared elected, he having obtained 2 votes
more than his rival-Genda Lal.
Genda  Lal thereupon filed the election petition  which     has
given  rise  to this appeal in which he sought to  have     the
election of Jabar Singh declared void and also made a  claim
to  the     seat.    The election was sought to be set  aside  on
various grounds but we are concerned in this appeal
74
solely    with  one of the them viz., the correctness  of     the
scrutiny and counting of votes at the recount vis-a-vis     the
petitioner and the returned candidate.    Shortly stated,     the
allegation in this respect in the election petition was that
49 valid votes cast in favour of the petitioner (who is     the
respondent  before us) were improperly rejected and that  32
votes  were  improperly accepted in favour of  the  returned
candidate  who is the appellant before us.  Needless to     add
these  allegations  were denied by the    returned  candidate.
Besides the denial, he also pleaded in his written statement
that  many votes cast in favour of himself had been  wrongly
rejected  in  regard to which details were  given  and    that
similarly  several votes were wrongly accepted in favour  of
the election-petitioner and in regard to which also  details
were  given  and it ended with the prayer that if  a  proper
scrutiny  and recount were made of the valid votes  received
by each, it would be found that he ‘the returned  candidate-
had.  in  fact, obtained a larger number of votes  than     the
election-petitioner  and for this reason he  submitted    that
the  election petition ought to be dismissed.  Though  Genda
Lal had by his election petition, besides seeking the relief
of  having the appellant’s election declared  void,  claimed
the  seat  for himself under s. 84 of the Act, none  of     the
respondents  to     the petition including     the  appellant     had
filed any recrimination in conformity with the provisions of
s.  97 of the Act against the grant of such  further  relief
and  it is the effect of this failure on the rights  of     the
parties that forms the principal point for consideration  in
the appeal.
The Election Tribunal who inquired into the petition  framed
the necessary issues arising out of these pleadings.   Issue
6(a) dealt with the allegation in the petition that 49 valid
votes  cast  in     favour of Genda  Lal  had  been  improperly
rejected.    After  examining  the  evidence   adduced     and
considering the validity of those votes in regard to which a
dispute     was  raised,  the Election  Tribunal  recorded     the
finding that not 49 but only 10 votes of Genda Lal had    been
improperly  rejected.    In  regard to the  question  of     the
improper  acceptance  of 32 votes cast in  favour  of  Jabar
‘Singh which was covered by issue 6(b), the Tribunal  found,
again  after  going through the evidence in respect  of     the
‘particular  votes  in dispute, that not 32 but only  4     had
been
75
improperly accepted.  The result of these findings on issues
6(a)  and  6(b)     was that the total number  of    valid  votes
polled by Genda Lal became 5,664 as against 5,652 polled  by
Jabar  Singh.    The  Tribunal  consequently  held  that     the
,election  of  Jabar Singh who had obtained  a    minority  of
votes compared to Genda Lal must be declared void under
s.   100(1)(d)(iii).
So  far we are on non-controversial ground except this    that
on  this state of the voting Genda Lal claimed that  he     was
entitled  to the further relief that he be declared  elected
having obtained the majority of lawful votes satisfying     the
requirement of s. 101(a).  The Election Tribunal refused him
that  relief for reasons which it is unnecessary to set     out
,or  discuss and that decision having been affirmed  by     the
High  Court  in appeal and the special leave prayed  for  to
appeal    from  that decision of the High     Court    having    been
-dismissed  by    us, the possibility of the  disallowance  of
this  additional  relief  does not  require  to     be  further
noticed.
The  question about the scope of s. 100(1)(d)(iii)  and     its
relative  place in the scheme of ss. 97, 100 and 101 of     the
Act arises out of the plea made by Jabar Singh that  without
reference  to the irregularities in the counting of  the  49
and  the  32  votes alleged by Genda Lal and  which  he     had
denied,     and which were the subject-matter of issues  6     (a)
and 6 (b) to which I have already adverted, there were other
irregularities    in  the     scrutiny  and    counting  which,  if
examined,  would  establish  that  after  every     error     was
eliminated,  he himself had obtained a majority     of  ‘lawful
votes.     The question of law that was debated before us     was
whether     on the scheme of the Representation of     the  People
Act, 1951, Jabar Singh was entitled to make such a plea     and
claim to adduce proof in support thereof in order to sustain
his  election without filing a recrimination under s. 97  of
the  Act.  My learned brethren have held that he  could     not
and  it is on that point that I do not find it    possible  to
agree with them.
The  correct  answer to this question would  depend.  it  is
common ground, on a proper construction of  s.100(1)(d)(iii)
read in conjunction with s. 101(a). and
76
this  I     shall first consider.    I shall next deal  with     the
place and function of s. 97 in this context and its  bearing
on  the     interpretation     of  the  provisions  on  which     the
decision of this appeal turns.
Though    there  have been a few decisions  bearing  upon     the
question  of  law I have indicated, and they have  all    been
referred  to by Gajendragadkar J. it is common    ground    that
there  is  no binding decision of this    Court  touching     the
matter,     though some observations in Bhim Sen v. Gopali     and
Ors.(1)     would    appear to favour the construction  which  my
learned brethren have adopted.    As, however, the appeal     was
placed    before    this  Bench for the  consideration  of    this
question and we have proceeded on the basis that the  matter
is  res     integra I do not propose to refer to any  of  these
decisions   but     shall    proceed     merely     to  interpret     the
provisions  without advertence to the authorities  to  which
our   attention     was  invited  during  the  course  of     the
arguments.
Section 100(1) (d) reads:
“100.  Grounds  for declaring election  to  be
void-(1)    Subject     to the provisions  of    sub-
section    (2)   if   the     Tribunal   is      of
o
pinion………………………………….
(d)   that  the result of the election, in  so
far as it
concerns      a    returned       candidate,     has
been
materially affected-
(i)   by     the  improper    acceptance  of     any
nomination, or
(ii)  by any corrupt practice committed in the
interests     of  the returned  candidate  by  an
agent other than his election agent, or
(iii) by    the improper reception,     refusal  or
rejection of any vote or the reception of     any
vote which is void, or
(iv)  by      any    non-compliance     with     the
provisions of the Constitution or of this     Act
or of any rules or orders made under this Act,
the Tribunal
(1) 22 E.L.R. 288.
77
shall  declare  the election of  the  returned
candidate to be void.”
The short question arising for consideration in this  appeal
may  be     stated     thus:    In the    context     of  the  provisions
contained  in  s. 100(1)(d) which permits an election  of  a
returned  candidate  to be set, aside only on proof  of     the
“result” viz., the election of the returned candidate having
been   “materially   affected”    by  the      improprieties      or
illegalities referred to in the four clauses numbered (i) to
(iv)  what  is    the import of the  words  “by  the  improper
reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception
of  any     vote which is void”.  For our    present     purposes  I
might  omit  the  reference  to     the  latter  part  of    this
provision  relating  to “the reception of a  vote  which  is
void” and concentrate on the earlier part.
It  is    manifest that the jurisdiction of  the    Tribunal  to
declare     an election void arises only when it is of  opinion
that  “the  result  of    the  election  has  been  materially
affected”  by the defects or improprieties set out  in    cls.
(i) to (iv), so that if notwithstanding that impropriety  or
illegality  of    the types set out in the four  clauses,     the
result    of  the     election is not  materially  affected,     the
returned  candidate  is entitled to retain his    seat.    With
this preliminary observation I shall proceed to consider the
import    of  the relevant words.”materially affected  by     the
improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote”  first
in  a case where there is no complication arising  from     the
petition  claiming  the seat in ‘addition to the  relief  of
having    the  election of the  returned    ,candidate  declared
void.    The  argument strenuously pressed before us  by     Mr.
Garg-learned  counsel  for  the     respondent  was,  that     the
Tribunal  in considering whether the result of    an  election
had   been   materially     affected,  was     confined   to     the
consideration  of  any impropriety alleged  as    regards     the
reception of the votes of the returned candidate as well  as
improprieties  alleged by the petitioner in. the refusal  or
rejection of votes stated to have been cast in favour of the
petitioner  and the denials of these charges or     allegations
by the returned candidate.  His further submission was    that
the returned candidate could not sustain his seat by showing
a similar improper reception of votes in favour of the
78
petitioner  or an improper refusal or rejection of  his     own
votes.     In other words, the argument was that the  Tribunal
dealing with a petition under s. 100(1)(d) bad    jurisdiction
to proceed only on the allegations made in the petition     and
that even where a case had been established for a  scrutiny,
and  a recount is ordered, it would be so confined and    that
its jurisdiction would not extend to cases of complaints  by
the  returned  candidate.  It is this argument that  I    feel
unable to accept.
When  an  election  petition is     filed    complaining  of     the
improper  reception or rejection of votes and praying for  a
scrutiny of the ballot papers for the purpose of determining
whether     the  votes  have  been     properly  counted  by     the
Returning  Officer, the Tribunal would doubtless have to  be
satisfied  that     a case is made out for scrutiny and  a     re-
count, for it is settled law that the petitioner is not as a
matter of right entitled to have such a scrutiny and recount
merely    because     he  prays for such a  relief,    but  has  to
allege, make out and prove the specific grounds to establish
that  the  scrutiny or counting was improper  and  that     the
return,     was in consequence erroneous.    If one reaches    that
stage and the Tribunal is satisfied that a case for scrutiny
and  recount  is made out it would mean that  the  Returning
Officer had not discharged his duties properly in the matter
of the scrutiny of the ballot papers and their counting.  If
in such circumstances the respondent (the returned candidate
)  also     makes allegations of the same    type  regarding     the
scrutiny  and the counting I consider it would be unjust  to
deprive     him of the opportunity of proving  his     allegations
and thus maintain his seat, unless of course, the  statutory
provision  clearly precludes him from doing so.      In  saying
this  I am not suggesting that the respondent need  make  no
averment  in  his  pleadings  making  definite     allegations
regarding  the particular votes regarding which     he  desires
scrutiny and which he says have been wrongly counted  either
for or against him.  Let us take a case where the allegation
of the petitioner is that there has been a miscount i.e.,  a
wrong  counting of the votes of the returned  candidate     and
nothing     more.     Let  us suppose that A     has  been  declared
elected     as having secured, say 200 votes as against  B     who
has secured 190.  If B in his election petition says that
79
A’s  votes  have been wrongly counted as  200,    whereas,  in
fact, if they were recounted they would only be 180 and     the
Tribunal  on a recount finds the allegation in the  petition
made  out and that the returned candidate had obtained    only
180  votes the acceptance of Mr. Garg’s argument would    mean
that  the  election  of A would have to be  set     aside    not-
withstanding  that there has been a similar mistake  in     the
counting  of  B’s votes and if these were  properly  counted
they might not amount to more than 170.     Mr. Garg  submitted
that  though if B claimed the seat there would have to be  a
recount     of the votes of both the candidates and this  also,
only  in the event of a recrimination being filed  under  s.
97,  still  if    no seat was claimed  the  election  ‘of     the
returned  candidate would be set aside and that     the  latter
had no means whereby he could maintain his election notwith-
standing that as a fact he had obtained a majority of lawful
votes.
It  is urged that this result flowed from the opening  words
of s. 100(1)(d) which speaks of “the result of the election”
being materially affected “so far as it concerns a  returned
candidate”.   I     do not find it possible to agree  with     the
construction or reasoning on which the submission is  based.
There  is, no doubt, that an election petition is  primarily
concerned with the validity of the election of the  returned
candidate.  It cannot also be disputed that the election  of
the  returned  candidate cannot be  declared  void,  unless,
confining oneself to the impropriety or illegality  involved
in the reception or refusal of votes, the returned candidate
is  proved  to    have  obtained    a  minority  of     votes,     for
otherwise  whatever  be     the impropriety or  its  degree  or
extensiveness,    the  result  of the election  would  not  be
materially  affected.  It is common ground and    beyond    con-
troversy  that the election petitioner is not restricted  as
regards     the manner or details of the improper reception  or
refusal of votes which he could allege and prove which would
achieve     that result.  If so much is conceded and is  common
ground,     I do not see any force in the contention  that     the
returned candidate is confined merely to disproving what  is
alleged to dislodge him from his seat and is for bidden from
proving that votes which under the law had to
80
be counted in his favour, have been wrongly omitted to be so
counted.   The    words in cl. (iii) do not  impose  any    such
restriction,  for they speak of the “improper  reception  or
refusal of any vote”, and as the inquiry under s.  100(1)(d)
is  for ascertaining whether the result of the election     has
been  materially affected which in the context of cl.  (iii)
obviously means “the returned candidate has been proved     not
to have obtained, in fact, a majority of valid votes”, there
appears to me no scope for the argument pressed before us by
Mr. Garg.
On an analysis of the situation the position would appear to
be  this.   Let     us  for instance  assume  that     the  voting
procedure adopted in an election was that prescribed in rule
59  i.e., by placing the ballot papers in the  ballot  boxes
set  apart  for the different  contesting  candidates.     The
returning officer counts the valid votes cast in the several
boxes and declares A elected as having secured 200 votes  as
against     B  whose votes are counted as 198.  If     B  files  a
petition  and alleges that the counting was irregular,    that
the totals of the ballot papers in the result sheet are     not
properly computed, and that as a matter of fact A’s  papers,
if  counted,  would be 196, Mr. Garg’s    submission  is    that
though the discrepancy disclosed in the totals is  consider-
able,  A cannot prove that there has been a  miscounting  of
B’s  votes  also, and that though if  properly    counted     his
total is only 190,, still A’s election should be set  aside.
It  is    said that the position would be     different  and     the
anomaly     would    be  overcome in     cases    where  the  election
petitioner, besides claiming a declaration that the election
of  the     returned candidate is void, also  seeks  a  further
declaration that he should be declared duly elected and     the
returned  candidate  files a recrimination  against  such  a
prayer    and  challenges     the  right  to     have  the   further
declaration.   This, however, obviously furnishes no  answer
for more than one reason.  It is the submission of Mr. Garg,
and  that  is the whole basis upon  which  the    construction
which he desires us to adopt of s. 100 (1) (d) (iii)  turns,
that  the question raised by the recrimination    arises    only
after  the  election of the returned candidate    is  declared
void.    Therefore  we  would have  the    anomalous  situation
wherein     the election of the returned candiate    is  declared
void by reason of his
81
not  obtaining    the majority of valid votes so    far  as     the
decision under s. 100(1)(d) is concerned and then after     the
matter     ,set  out  in    the  claim  to    the  seat  and     the
recrimination  is  inquired into and  decided  the  election
tribunal holds that the returned candidate had a majority of
lawful    votes but that this affected only the right  of     the
defeated  candidate to claim the seat.    In my  judgment     the
provisions  of    s. 100 read with s. 101 do  not     contemplate
this  position    of a candidate’s election  being  set  aside
because he did not get a majority of lawful votes but in the
same  proceedings and -as part of the same inquiry he  being
held  to  have    obtained  a majority  of  lawful  votes.   A
construction  of  s. 100 (1) (d) which would  lead  to    this
result must, in my opinion, be -rejected as unsound.
The  apart, there is the further circumstance  arising    from
‘the fact that according to Mr. Garg the enquiry in  respect
of a recrimination and its defence is identical with what he
says  is the scope of a petition and its defence.  This,  of
course,     is  logical, but it suffers from the  same  anomaly
which  I have pointed out as resulting from  the  acceptance
,of  the primary argument regarding the construction  of  s.
100(1)(d)(iii).       Applying  what  I  have   shown   already
regarding  a case where there was no claim to a seat  in  an
election petition in which the election of a returned candi-
date  has to be declared void, notwithstanding that he    had,
in  fact, obtained a majority of valid votes, because he  is
precluded from proving this fact, similarly in cases where a
seat is claimed, the petitioner so claiming would have to be
declared elected, notwithstanding that as a fact he has     not
obtained the majority of lawful votes, but that the returned
candidate  has obtained such a majority, because the  latter
is  precluded  from proving it.     If one took  a     case  where
there  were  more candidates than two, the  anomaly  I    have
indicated  would  be seen clearly.  If B  files     a  petition
against     A  the     returned candidate claiming  the  seat     and
impleads as he must C & D who are the other contestants, ‘no
proof  could be led by A to show that some of his own  votes
have been counted for C or D, though B would be entitled  to
prove  that  some  of C’s or D’s  votes     have  been  wrongly
counted as cast in favour of A. In such a case
134-159 S.C.-6.
82
it  is obvious that B gains no advantage  by  recriminating,
because     recrimination under s. 97 could only be  against  A
and not against the other contesting candidates impleaded as
respondents.   The result, therefore, would be that  though,
in fact, A has obtained the majority of lawful votes, B, the
petitioner,  will  be declared elected-recrimination  or  no
recrimination.    I cannot accept the position that either  s.
100(1)(d)(iii) or s. 101(a) contemplate this result which is
at  once  so  unjust and anomalous and    appears     to  me.  to
contradict  the     basic principles  underlying  election     law
viz.,    (1)  that  apart  from     disqualification,   corrupt
practices etc., the election of a candidate who obtains     the
majority  of valid votes shall not be set aside, and (2)  no
candidates  shall  be  declared duly  elected  who  has     not
obtained the majority of valid votes.
I  would  add that the entire argument proceeds     on  a    mis-
conception of the procedure involved in a scrutiny.  I    will
take  the case where the voting takes place, as in the    case
of the election before us, in accordance with the provisions
of  rule 39.  Then conformably to Rule 57(3) all the  ballot
papers    which  have been held to be valid  in  each  polling
station are bundled up and sealed by the Returning  Officer,
and similarly all the rejected ones of each station are made
into another bundle.  At the scrutiny by the Tribunal  these
two  sets  of bundles are examined to find out    whether     the
votes  cast in favour of each of the  contesting  candidates
have  been  properly counted or not.  How this can  be    done
compartmentally, as those cast for A or B or C separately as
is  suggested  by Mr. Garg, I am unable to follow.   If     the
votes  cast  in     favour of each     candidate  were  made    into
separate bundles, then at least, there might be scope for an
argument  that the bundle of A or B shall not be opened     up,
but  when  all the voting papers have to be  scrutinised  in
order  to  find out (a) whether the returned  candidate     has
really    been  proved to have received a     minority  of  valid
votes  and (b) whether the candidate claiming the  seat     has
obtained a majority of valid votes, this cannot obviously be
done  without an examination of the ballot papers  to  which
objection is taken and which are contained in the two  types
of bundles into which these are made up under rule 57(3).
83
Support was sought by Mr. Garg for the construction that  he
sought    to press upon us by reference to the  provisions  in
the other sub-clauses of s. 100 (1) (d).  His point was that
if  the     returned  candidate  could  not  put  forward     the
objections     contained  in  those  clauses  the   returned
candidate could        not likewise allege improprieties in the
reception of the    votes  of any other candidate  including
the  petitioner.  I am wholly unimpressed by  this  argument
which  does  not take into account both the  nature  of     the
objections  in these other clauses as well as their  bearing
on  the     question  whether  the     election  of  the  returned
candidate  has been materially affected, which is the  prime
question  for  consideration  in  the  provision  and  which
furnishes  the key to the interpretation of  the  sub-clause
now  under  consideration.  Let me take each  of  the  cases
provided  by the other sub-clauses.  Sub-cl. (i) deals    with
the  improper  acceptance of a nomination.  It    is  -obvious
that  allegations  and    proof  by  the    returned   candidate
regarding  the    improper acceptance of a  nomination  cannot
serve  to sustain his election.     A fortiori so, clause    (ii)
which reads
“(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the
interests     of  the returned  candidate  by  an
agent other than his election agent, or”
could  have no meaning in the present -context nor cl.    (iv)
unless the non-compliance has a bearing on the reception  of
votes in which case it would be wholly covered by cl. (iii).
In the case of cls. (i), (ii) and (iv) it is obvious, having
regard    to  the     very nature of     the  provisions,  that     the
returned candidate can do no more than prove (a) that  there
was no such impropriety or illegality as is alleged, and (b)
that even if there was, the same had not affected the result
of  his     election; in other words, that the  impropriety  or
illegality,  if     any,  was inconsequential  so    far  as     his
election was concerned.     But this would not be the  position
in  regard to the improper reception or rejection of  votes.
There  we  have     two factors: (1)  the    impropriety  of     the
reception or rejection, and (2) whether as a result of    such
improper  reception or rejection the result  was  materially
affected.   In    the  case  contemplated     by  cl.  (iii)     the
question  whether the result was materially affected or     not
could not, when
84
the  facts are ascertained, be a matter of doubt or  dispute
but  would  be one merely of  arithmetical  calculation     and
comparison.   No  doubt,  s. 100 of the     Act  casts  on     the
election   petitioner  the  onus  of  establishing  to     the
satisfaction  of  the  Tribunal     that  “the  result  of     the
election  was materially affected” by the impropriety  etc.,
and  taking  the  case of cl. (iii)  in     hand,    of  improper
reception or rejection of particular votes, but from this it
does not follow that the returned candidate is powerless  to
establish   to    the  satisfaction  of  the   Tribunal    that
notwithstanding     the improper reception or rejection of     the
particular votes alleged by the petitioner his election     has
not been materially affected.  The argument of Mr. Garg,  if
accepted, would mean that the returned candidate can  merely
combat    the  case alleged against him and is  disabled    from
establishing positively that the result of the election     has
not  been  materially  affected.  If the key  words  of     the
provision  on the fulfilment of which alone the Tribunal  is
invested  with    jurisdiction to set aside  an  election     are
taken  to be the words “The result of the election has    been
materially affected.” I do not consider that it is  possible
to  contend  that  it is beyond the power  of  the  returned
candidate  to establish this fact which he might do  in     any
manner    he  likes.  He might do this  by  establishing    that
though    a few votes were wrongly counted as in    his  favour,
still  a  larger  number of his own votes  were     counted  in
favour    of the petitioner or that votes which ought to    have
been  counted as cast for him, have-been improperly  counted
as  cast  in favour of defeated candidates  other  than     the
petitioner.  Without such a scrutiny it would manifestly not
be  possible  to  determine  whether  the  election  of     the
returned candidate has been materially affected or not.     Nor
do  I  see  anything  in the language  of  cl.    (iii)  which
precludes  the    returned candidate from     establishing  this.
This  clause employs the words “improper reception,  refusal
or  rejection of any vote” to confine oneself to  its  first
part.  No doubt, when a petitioner complains of a rejection,
he obviously means an improper rejection of votes in his own
favour and when he speaks of an improper reception he  means
also  obviously an improper reception of votes in favour  of
the  returned candidate.  But from this it does     not  follow
that  there might not be an improper reception of  votes  in
favour
85
of the election petitioner or of another candidate or of  an
improper  rejection of votes of the returned  candidate     the
clause    does not speak of the person in whose favour  or  as
against     whom the improper reception or rejection has  taken
place,    its content and significance have to be     ascertained
from  the purpose for which the provision is intended  viz.,
to  determine from a counting of the voting papers  after  a
scrutiny whether the election of the returned candidate     has
been materially affected.  For instance, let me take a    case
within    s.  100(1)(d)(i) where there has  been    an  improper
acceptance  of    any nomination.     The question arises  as  to
whether     the  election of the returned    candidate  has    been
materially affected by that improper acceptance.  Obviously,
a  nomination  which  is alleged  to  have  been  improperly
accepted and which is the subject of the charge under  s.100
(1)  (d) (i) is not the acceptance of the nomination  either
of  the     election petitioner where he has been    one  of     the
candidates  or of the returned candidate but only of one  of
the  other  defeated  candidates.   If    after  inquiry     the
nomination is found to have been improperly accepted and the
Tribunal  proceeds  to    inquire     as to    its  effect  on     the
election,  I take it, it would necessarily have to  consider
the votes received by that candidate.  If this is not to  be
done it would either mean that in every case-of an  improper
acceptance  of a nomination the election is to    be  declared
void  or  that in no case can such a  declaration  be  made.
Now,  if  the votes cast in favour of that  candidate  whose
nomination  was     improperly  accepted have  to    be  counted,
necessarily  there  has to be a scrutiny  and  the  Tribunal
would  have  to inquire and ascertain the  number  of  valid
votes cast for that candidate in order to determine  whether
the improper reception of votes in favour of that  candidate
has materially affected the result of the election i.e., has
resulted in the election of the returned candidate.  In that
context the scrutiny of the improper reception of the  votes
in  favour  of such candidate would obviously have  to    take
place and that could be done only by virtue of the provision
in s. 100 (1) (d) (iii).  This would at least show that     the
expression  of    ”any vote” in the clause has to be  read  as
meaning     ‘any  vote  cast in the  election  with  which     the
petition  is concerned’ and not ‘any vote cast in favour  of
the returned
86
candidate’, to take the illustration merely of the  improper
reception of a vote.
The  construction which I have placed on s. 100(1)(d)  (iii)
would harmonise the provision contained in the opening words
of  s.    100  (1) (d) and s. 101 (a).   I  cannot  reasonably
conceive of the law providing (unless of course the language
employed leaves me no alternative) for the setting aside  of
an  election of the returned candidate because the  Tribunal
finds  that he did not receive the highest number  of  valid
votes  cast  at the election; but that after this  stage  is
over and the Tribunal proceeds to consider whether the claim
to the seat is made out or not its reaching the finding that
such a petitioner is not entitled to that relief because  on
further     scrutiny,  the     returned candidate  had,  in  fact,
secured     the highest number of votes.  Mr. Garg,  no  doubt,
contemplated this anomaly with equanimity suggesting that it
was  due not to any anomaly at all but a  situation  arising
merely from the application of different tests or being     the
result of inquiries directed to different ends at  different
stages    of  the petition.  It is this that I  am  unable  to
reconcile myself to.  The language used in s. 101 (a) is, no
doubt,    ”in fact received the majority of the valid  votes”.
I  do not, however, consider that the use of the  words     ‘in
fact’ involves scrutiny of a type different from that  which
the Tribunal conducts for ascertaining whether by reason  of
the improper reception or rejection of votes the election of
a  returned candidate has been materially affected so as  to
justify     its being set aside.  The inquiries are  identical.
If  every  vote     which    has  been  improperly  received      is
eliminated and every vote which has been improperly  refused
or rejected is added you get the totality of the valid votes
cast  in  favour  of a candidate.   That  is  precisely     the
inquiry     which    is  prescribed    to  be    conducted  under  s.
100(1)(d) read with cl. (iii).    The words ‘in fact’ used  in
s.  101 (a) to my mind do not add any new element as regards
either    the  scrutiny  or  the    counting.   If    so,  on     the
construction  which I have endeavored to explain, when    once
it is ascertained that the returned candidate has obtained a
majority of valid votes there is no question of his election
having    to be set aside.  But it might be shown that he     had
not obtained the
87
majority  of  valid votes. in other words, by  the  scrutiny
that  has taken place in order to test the validity  of     his
election  the  Tribunal might have arrived at  a  conclusion
that  he  had  not received the     majority  of  valid  votes.
Immediately  that  stage is reached and that  conclusion  is
arrived     at  the Tribunal proceeds to declare  the  election
void.  If there, is no claim to a seat there is nothing more
to be done, with the result that it stops with declaring the
election  void in which event there would be a    re-election.
If, however, the seat is claimed by a defeated candidate  or
on  his behalf there has to be a further inquiry  which     the
Tribunal  is  called upon to conduct.  For  the     purpose  of
declaring the election void the Tribunal would have  arrived
at  the figures, ,of the valid votes cast in favour  of     the
several     candidates.   It might be that the  petitioner     who
made  the claim to the. -seat or the person on whose  behalf
that  is made might not have obtained the highest number  of
valid  votes in which ,case, of course, a claim to the    seat
would be rejected.  It is this situation which is  indicated
by   s.     101(a).   It  provides     that  there  cannot  be   a
declaration  in     favour     of the claimant to  a    seat  merely
because     the  election of the returned    candidate  has    been
declared  void    but  he must in addition  have    secured     the
majority  of the lawful votes cast.  A question might  arise
as  to how this total is to be ascertained.  It     is  obvious
that  for this purpose the Tribunal ought to scrutinise     not
merely    the ballot papers of the claimant and  the  returned
candidate  but    also  of the other  candidates.      Thus,     for
instance,  taking the case only of the petitioner who  is  a
claimant,  among  the votes counted in his favour  might  be
some  which were really votes east in favour of     a  defeated
candidate  and similarly votes properly cast for  him  might
have  been  improperly    counted as the votes  of  the  other
defeated  candidates.  Undoubtedly the irregularities  would
have to be pleaded, but I am now concerned with whether even
if pleaded, the Tribunal would on a proper interpretation of
ss. 100 and 101 have jurisdiction to entertain the pleas and
embark    on such a scrutiny.  Proceeding then on the  footing
that the necessary averments have been made in the pleadings
filed there would have to be a scrutiny of the ballot papers
before it can be ascertained whether or not the, person     who
or on whose behalf the seat is claimed has obtain-
88
ed  a majority of valid votes in order to sustain the  claim
to.  the seat.    After this stage is passed and the  Tribunal
has  reached the conclusion that the claimant has, in  fact,
received  the  majority     of valid votes     that  the  Tribunal
embarks     on the further inquiry as to whether there are     any
reasons why he should not be declared elected.    And it is at
this  stage  that  the    provisions of s.  97  in  regard  to
recrimination come into play.  If no recrimination is  filed
then  on  the  terms, of s. 101(a)  the     claimant  would  be
immediately declared elected but if there is a recrimination
then  s. 101(b) is attracted and the Tribunal would have  to
inquire     whether if the claimant were a     returned  candidate
there  are  circumstances  in which his     election  could  be
declared void.    This, would indicate that the  recrimination
is  concerned with a stage which emerges after the  scrutiny
is  completed and assumes that the scrutiny has resulted  in
the  claimant being found to have obtained the    majority  of
valid    votes.     This  construction  would   harmonise     the
provisions of ss. 97, 100 (1(d)       and 101 and would lead to
a rational result.
This brings me to a submission based upon rule 5 7 (1) to
which reference was made by Mr. Garg.  He referred us to the
words of that rule reading:
“Every  ballot  paper which  is  not  rejected
under  Rule 56 shall be counted as  one  valid
vote”
as  throwing some light on the construction of s.  100(1)(d)
(iii)  and as favouring the intrepretation which he  invited
us to put upon the provision.  I consider that the rule     has
no  bearing at all upon the point now in controversy.    Rule
57  occurs  in Part V of the Rules beginning  with  rule  50
which  is  headed ‘Counting of votes  in  Parliamentary     and
Assembly Constituencies.’ Rule 55 prescribes the scrutiny at
the  time  of the opening of the ballot boxes  and  rule  56
with-the scrutiny and rejection of ballot-papers.  This last
rule lays down which shall be deemed to be a valid vote on a
ballot    paper  and which is not and  directs  the  Returning
Officer     to follow these directions and make  the  counting.
And  it     is  in that context that we have rule    57  and     the
provision  in sub-r. (1).  It obviously means only  that  so
far  as     the  Returning Officer is  concerned  and  for     the
purpose     of  enabling him to declare the result     the  ballot
papers which are not rejected are to be
89
deemed as valid.  It is manifest that if that validity    held
good even at the stage of the election petition and for     the
conduct     of  the  inquiry before the  Tribunal,     that  could
really    be no scrutiny of the ballot papers and s.  100     (1)
(d)  (iii)  would become meaningless.  The meaning  of    rule
57(1) is only this that ballot papers not rejected shall  be
deemed    to  be    valid so far as     the  Returning     Officer  is
concerned  and even as regards himself it is subject to     the
provision  in rule 63 under which a recount may be  demanded
and  granted.    His  decision has, of  course,    prima  facie
validity  at  the  stage  of the  inquiry  by  the  Election
Tribunal  because  the    impropriety  of     his  acceptance  or
refusal has to be pleaded and proved by the party  objecting
to  this scrutiny and it is only if the Tribunal  finds     the
impropriety established, that the vote would be     differently
treated or counted.  It appears to me to be clear  therefore
that  rule  57    does not bear upon the    construction  of  s.
100(1)(d)(iii)    or of s. 101 (a) for which purpose  reliance
was placed upon it.
The next question that arises is the result of the construc-
tion  which  I have endeavoured to explain of  the  relevant
provisions of the Act and now I shall set out a few  further
findings of the Election Tribunal which bear upon the  point
next to be considered.    The Election Tribunal found after  a
scrutiny  of the voting papers to which objection  had    been
made  by the petitioner-Genda Lal-and on a recount  that  it
resulted in Genda Lal having obtained 5,664 votes as against
5,652  obtained by the returned candidate-Jabar Singh  which
meant  that the election of Jabar Singh should    be  declared
void.    The  Tribunal  then  proceeded    to  investigate     the
allegations  made  by Jabar Singh as  regards  the  improper
reception  of votes in favour of Genda Lal and the  improper
rejection  of votes in his own favour and after     considering
the  ballot  papers  of the  several  polling  stations,  it
arrived     at  the result that Genda Lal had  been  improperly
credited  with    10 votes and that Jabar Singh had  been     im-
properly denied the benefit of 12 votes cast in his  favour.
If this position could be sustained the result would be that
Genda  Lal had obtained 5,654 votes as against    5,664  votes
polled by Jabar Singh which would mean that the election  of
Jabar  Singh could not be declared void, for “the result  of
the election had not been materially affected.” It was this
90
that  was strenuously urged before us by Mr.  Kapoor-learned
counsel for the appellant Jabar Singh.    Both the Tribunal as
well  as the High Court on appeal therefrom have  held    that
because     Jabar Singh had not recriminated this deduction  of
10 votes in favour of Genda Lal and the addition of 12 votes
in favour of Jabar Singh could not be made and    consequently
denied    to  the appellant the benefit of this  finding.      In
view  of  what    I  have stated    earlier     as  to     the  proper
construction of ss. (100)(1)(d)(iii) and 101(a) the  absence
of  recrimination could not lead to this result and if    this
finding could be sustained I would have allowed the  appeal.
But  this  finding  of the  Tribunal  has  proceeded  partly
without     any pleading to support it.  When an  objection  is
taken  to  the improper reception or refusal of a  vote     the
facts  upon which such impropriety has occurred have  to  be
set  out and the other party has to be given an     opportunity
to  meet-  the    case.    Though there  might  be     no  express
requirement  of     the  Act or any  rule    made  thereunder,  I
consider that it is implicit in the pleadings required to be
filed  under ss. 81 to 83 of the Act read with the frame  of
s.  100 that a party who alleges an impropriety or error  in
the  scrutiny by the Returning Officer, and needless to     add
this  would  apply  to every allegation     of  impropriety  or
illegality   by     whosoever  committed,    must  specify    with
particularity  the  grounds of attack on the action  of     the
Returning  Officer in regard to the scrutiny of     the  ballot
paper  or the counting.     In the present case it is  admitted
that  though in his written statement, the  appellant  Jabar
Singh  challenged the propriety of the reception of  certain
votes  in favour of Genda Lal and the improper rejection  of
some  of his own votes, he did not specify all of  these  in
regard to which impropriety has been found by the  Tribunal.
The  Tribunal has, as I have already stated, found  that  10
ballot papers whose numbers have been specified ought not to
have been counted in favour of Genda Lal.  But of these,  it
is  now     admitted, that in regard to 6 of them no  plea     had
been  made  in the written statement, with the    result    that
only  4     votes could be taken into account  as    having    been
wrongly     counted, bearing in mind the pleading in the  case.
Similarly,  as regards the rejection of Jabar Singh’s  votes
the  Tirbunal,    as stated eariler, has found that  12  votes
ought  to  have     been  counted in  his    favour.      Of  these,
however, the written statement con-
91
tained allegations only as regards 6 and not as regards     the
rest.  This would mean that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to find that more than 6 votes had been improperly  rejected
in his case.  If the votes regarding which no plea of impro-
priety    had been raised by Jabar Singh were  eliminated,  it
would  follow that as a result of the final  scrutiny  Genda
Lal had obtained properly 5,660 valid votes as against 5,658
polled    by  Jabar  Singh.   The     result     of  the   election,
therefore, was materially affected by the improper reception
or  refusal  of     votes and therefore  I     consider  that     the
election  of Jabar Singh was properly set aside and that  is
why  I    concur    in  the order  that  the  appeal  should  be
dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

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