PETITIONER:
GURUNATH alias BHIMAJI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
KAMALABAI, KOM KENCHANGAUDANADGAUDAR AND OTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
10/12/1954
BENCH:
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
BENCH:
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
BOSE, VIVIAN
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
JAGANNADHADAS, B.
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
CITATION:
1955 AIR 206 1955 SCR (1)1135
ACT:
Hindu Law-Adoption-Widow’s power to adopt-When such power
terminates.
HEADNOTE:
It is well-settled according to Hindu Law that a widow’s
power to adopt comes to an end by the interposition of a
grandson or the son’s widow competent to continue the line
by adoption.
The mother’s authority to adopt is not extinguished by the
mere fact that her son had attained ceremonial competence.
The power to adopt does not depend upon any question of
vesting or divesting of property.
The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil (L.R. 70
I.A. 232) is not sound in so far as it relates to the
properties inherited from collaterals prior to adoption. In
respect of such properties the adopted son can lay no claim
on the ground of relation back.
Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango ([1955] 1
S.C.R. 1), followed.
Amarendra Mansing v. Sanatan ([1933] L. R. 60 I. A. 242),
explained.
Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra `Patil ([1943]
L.R. 70 I.A. 232), not relied on in part.
Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore ([1865] 10 M.I.A. 279); Pudma
Coomari v. Court of Wards ([1881] L.R. 8 I.A. 229);
Thayammal and Kuttisami Aiyan v. Venkatarama Aiyan ([1887]
L.R. 14 I.A. 67); Tarachurn v. Suresh Chunder ([1889] L.R.
16 I.A. 166); Ramkrishna
1136
Ramchandra v. Shamrao ([1902] I.L.R. 26 Bom. 526); Madana
Mohana v. Purushothama Deo ([1918] L.R. 45 I.A. 156);
Vijaysingji v. Shivsangji ([1935] L.R. 62 I.A. 161); Bapuji
v Gangaram ([1941] I.L.R. Nagpur 178); and Prem Jagat Kuer
v. Harihar Bakhsh Singh ([1945] I.L.R. 21 Lucknow 1),
referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 105 of 1953.
Appeal by Special Leave granted by this Court’s Order dated
the 24th September, 1951 from the Judgment and Decree dated
the 2nd day of September, 1949 of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 274 of 1948 from Original
Decree arising out of the Decree dated the 30th day of July,
1946 of the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division at Hubli
in Special Suit No. 56 of 1944.
K. R. Bengeri and Sardar Bahadur for the appellant.
S. B. Jathar and I. N. Shroff for respondents Nos. 3, 4
and 5.
1954. December 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.-This appeal raises a question of
importance “whether a widow can exercise a power of adoption
conferred on her or possessed by her at any time during her
life irrespective of any devolution of property or changes
in the family or other circumstances and even after a
grandson has come on the scene but has subsequently died
without leaving a widow or a son”.
The situation in which this question arises can properly be
appreciated by reference to the following genealogy:
1137
Dyamappa
I
———————————————————–
I
I
Kalasappa
I
I
Krishtarao
Radhabai=Gangabai
(deft.2) (Deft.1)
(Senior widow) (Junior window)
| Gurunath
| (Appellsnt adopted
| by Gsngsbai on
| | 18-11-53)
| |
| Dattatraya (son)
—————— (died 1913)
| | =Sundarabai (died after
| | her husband in 1913)
Kamalabai Yamunabai
(Resp.1) (Resp.2) |
|
|
————————————
| |
| |
Kalasappa Jagannath
(predeceased (died 1914)
Dattatraya)
—————————————————————-
Girimaji
|
Hanamanta
|
|
——————————————————
| |
| |
Malhar Ganesh
(Resp.3) (Resp.5)
Venkatesh Hanamant
(Resp.4) (Resp.6)
1138
Gurunath, the plaintiff, claims that he was adopted in 1943
by Gangabai, widow of Krishtarao. Krishtarao died in 1890,
leaving him surviving two widows Radhabai and Gangabai and a
son Dattatraya. Dattatraya died in 1913 leaving him
surviving a widow Sundarabai and a son Jagannath.
Sundarabai died shortly after Dattatraya while Jagannath
died in the year 1914. After an interval of about 30 years
since his death, it is alleged that Gangabai who survived
both her son, and grandson adopted the plaintiff, and thus
raised the problem which we are called upon to solve.
On the 15th of March, 1944 the appellant instituted the suit
out of which this appeal arises in forma pauperis on the
allegation that he was the adopted son of Krishtarao and
adopted to him by Gangabai, his junior widow, and as such
was entitled to the possession of his adoptive father’s
properties comprised in the suit. He also claimed a
declaration regarding the amount of compensation money
payable to the plaintiff’s family for the land acquired by
Hubli Municipality. The defendants who are the sons and
grandsons of the first cousin of Krishtarao disputed the
plaintiff’s adoption on the ground that Gangabai’s power to
adopt was extinguished when Dattatraya died in 1913, leaving
behind him a widow Sundarabai and a son Jagannath who could
continue the family line. Gangabai in her written statement
supported the plaintiff’s claim and asserted that the senior
widow Radhabai had given consent to her adopting the plain-
tiff.
The trial judge upheld the defendants’ contention and
dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. The factum of the
plaintiff’s adoption was however upheld, and it was further
held that Radhabai did not give her consent to the adoption.
On appeal this decision was affirmed by the High Court and
it was held that Gangabai’s power to adopt came to an end at
the time when her son died leaving a son and a widow to
continue the family line. No finding was given on the
question whether Radhabai had given her consent to the adop-
tion. That perhaps would have been the simplest way to end
the dispute. Against the decision of the High
1139
Court this appeal in forma pauperis is now before us by
special leave.
The only question canvassed in the appeal is in respect to
the validity of the plaintiff’s adoption. It was contended
that Hindu Shastric Law itself sets no limit to the exercise
of the widow’s power of adoption once she has acquired that
power or is possessed of it, and that being so, the power
can be exercised by her during her life-time when necessity
arises for the exercise of it for the purpose of continuing
the line of her husband. On the other hand, it was argued
that though Hindu Shastric Law itself sets no limit to the
exercise of the power, yet it has long been judicially
recognised that the power is not an unlimited and absolute
one, and that it comes to an end when another heir has come
on the scene and he has passed on to another the duty of
continuing the line. The question at what point of time the
widow’s duty of continuing the line of the husband comes to
an end has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions
of Indian High Courts and of the Privy Council and the point
for our consideration is whether the limits laid down in
these decisions have been arbitrarily fixed and are not
based on sound principles and should be reviewed by us.
A brief reference to -the different decisions of the Privy
Council is necessary for a proper appreciation of the state
of law on this subject at the present moment.
The two leading cases on this point are the decisions of the
Privy Council arising out of the adoption made by Shrimati
Chundrabullee and decided in 1876 and 1878. The judgment in
the first of these cases, i.e. in Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram
Kishore(1) was delivered by Lord Kingsdown. What happened
there was that one Gour Kishore died leaving a son Bhowanee
and a widow, Chundrabullee, to whom he gave authority to
adopt in the event of his son’s death. Bhowanee married and
died at the age of 24 without issue, but leaving him
surviving his widow Bhoobun
(1) (1965] 10 M.I.A. 279. 146
1140
Moyee. Chundrabullee then adopted Ram Kishore. Ram Kishore
brought a suit against Bhoobun Moyee for the recovery of the
estate. The Privy Council held that the claim of Ram
Kishore failed on the ground that even if he had been in
existence at the death of Bhowanee he could not displace
the widow of the latter. It was further held “that at the
time when Chundrabullee professed to exercise her power of
adoption, the power was incapable of execution on the ground
that Bhowanee had married and left a widow as his heir”.
The following quotation from the judgment of Lord Kingsdown
may be cited as indicating the reasons for the decisions:
“In this case, Bhowanee Kishore had lived to an age which
enabled him to perform-and it is to be presumed that he had
performed-all the religious services which a son could
perform for a father. He had succeeded to the ancestral
property as heir; he bad full power of disposition over it;
he might have alienated it; he might have adopted a son to
succeed to it if he had no male issue of his body. He could
have defeated every intention which his father entertained
with respect to the property.
On the death of Bhowanee Kishore, his wife succeeded as heir
to him and would have equally succeeded in that character in
exclusion of his brothers, if he had any. She took a vested
estate, as his widow, in the whole of his property. It
would be singular if a brother of Bhowanee Kishore, made
such by adoption, could take from his widow the whole of his
property, when a natural-born brother could have taken no
part. If Ram Kishore is to take any of the ancestral
property, he must take all he takes by substitution for the
natural-born son, and not jointly with him…….. The
question is whether the estate of his son being unlimited,
and that son having married and left a widow his heir, and
that heir having acquired a vested estate in her husband’s
property as widow, a new heir can be substituted by adoption
who is to defeat that estate, and take as an adopted son
what a legitimate son of Gour Kishore would not have taken.
1141
This seems contrary to all reason and to all the principles
of Hindoo law, as far as we can collect them………
If Bhowanee Kishore had died unmarried, his mother,
Chundrabullee Debia, would have been his heir, and the
question of adoption would have stood on quite different
grounds. By exercising the power of adoption, she would
have divested no estate but her own, and this would have
brought the case within the ordinary rule; but no case has
been produced, no decision has been cited from the Text-
books, and no principle has been stated to show that by the
mere gift of a power of adoption to a widow, the estate of
the heir of a deceased son vested in possession, can be
defeated,. and divested”.
In the result the suit of Ram Kishore was dismissed.
After the deaths of Bhoobun Moyee and Chundrabullee, Ram
Kishore got possession of the property under a deed of
relinquishment executed in 1869 in his favour by
Chundrabullee, who herself had entered into possession of
the property as mother and next heir of Bhowanee Kishore
after the death of Bboobun Moyee in 1867. If Ram Kishore’s
adoption was good he was undoubtedly the next heir to the
property. A distant collateral however claimed the estate
on the ground that his adoption was invalid. The Privy
Council then held that “upon the vesting of the estate in
the widow of Bhowanee, the power of adoption of Chudrabullee
was at an end and incapable of execution” and that Ram
Kishore had therefore no title. This was the decision in
Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards(1) wherein a second effort
to maintain the validity of his adoption by Chundrabullee
was made but without success. The High Court in its
judgment in Padma Coomari’s case(1) remarked that the
decision in Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore(2) did not decide
that Chundrabullee could not adopt on the extinction of the
issue either of natural-born son or of the first to be
adopted son, and that if Chundrabullee had on the death of
Bhoobun Moyee made the adoption and so divested her own
estate,, there would be
(1) [1881] L.R. 8 I.A, 229.
(2) [1865] 10 M.I.A. 279,
1142
nothing in the judgment of the Privy Council and nothing in
the law to prevent her doing that which her husband
authorised her to do, and which would certainly be for his
spiritual benefit, and for that of his ancestors and even of
Bhowanee Kishore. The learned Judges of the High Court
proceeded then to observe as follows:
“With all respect, therefore, we imagine that Lord Kingsdown
must have said by inadvertence, in reference to the idea of
adopting a son to the great grandfather of the last taker,
that at that time ‘all the spiritual purposes of a son,
according to the largest construction of -them, would have
been satisfied’; and again, Bhowanee Kishore had lived to an
age which enabled him to perform, and it is to be presumed
that he had performed, all the religious services which a
son could perform for a father. There is really no time at
which the performance of these services is finally
completed, or at which the necessity for them comes to an
end”.
To this Sir Richard Couch, who delivered the judgment of the
Privy Council, gave a very emphatic answer in these terms:
“The substitution of a new heir for the widow was no doubt
the question to be decided, and such. substitution might
have been disallowed, the adoption being held valid for all
other purposes, which is the view that the lower Courts have
taken of the judgment, but their Lordships do not think that
this was intended. They consider the decision to be that,
upon the vesting of the estate in the widow of Bhowanee, the
power of adoption was at an end, and incapable of execution.
And if the question had come before them without any
previous decision upon it, they would have been of that
opinion. The adoption intended by the deed of permission
was for the succession to the zemindary and other property,
as well as the performance of religious services; and the
vesting of the estate in the widow, if not in Bhowanee
himself, as the son and heir of his father, was a proper
limit to the exercise of the power”.
The question of limitations upon the power of the
1143
widow to adopt thus stated in the Chundrabulle series of
decisions was again affirmed by the Judicial Committee in
Thayammal and Kuttiswami Aiyan v. Venkatarama Aiyan(1)
decided in 1887 and in Tarachurn v. Suresh Chunder(2)
decided in 1889.
In the year 1902 this question came up for consideration
before the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramkrishna
Ramchandra v. Shamrao(3). There a grandmother succeeded to
her grandson who died unmarried andit was held that her
power to make an adoption hadcome to an end and that the
adoption was invalid. Chandavarkar, J., who delivered the
judgment of the Full Bench, enunciated the principle in
these words:
“Where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son, and that son
dies leaving a natural born or adopted son or leaving no son
but his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption,
the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never
afterwards be revived”.
This principle was approved and applied by the Judicial
Committee in Madana Mohana v. Purushothama Deo(4) in these
words:
“Their Lordships are in agreement with the principle laid
down in the judgment of the Full Court of Bombay as
delivered by the learned judge, and they are of opinion
that, on the facts of the present case, the principle must
be taken as applying so as to have brought the authority to
adopt conferred on Adikonda’s widow to an end when Brojo,
the son she originally adopted, died after attaining full
legal capacity to continue the line either by the birth of a
natural-born son or by the adoption to him of a son by his
own widow”.
The next and the most important decision of the Judicial
Committee in regard to this matter was given in the year
1933 in Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan(5) where there was a
departure from or at least a reorientation of the old
doctrine, and stress was laid on the spiritual rather than
on the temporal aspect
(1) (1887] L.R. 14 I.A. 67.
(3) [1902] I.L R. 26 Bom. 526.
(2) [1889] L.R. 16 I.A. 166.
(4) [1918] L.R. 45 I.A. 150.
(5) [1933] L R. 60 I.A. 242.
1144
of adoption, linking it up with the vesting and divesting of
the estate. There a Hindu governed by the Benaras school
was survived by an infant son and a widow, to whom he had
given authority to adopt in the event of the son dying. The
son succeeded to his father’s impartible zamindari but died
unmarried at the age of 20 years and 6 months. By a custom
of the family which excluded females from inheritance the
estate did not go to his mother but became vested in a
distant collateral. A week after the son’s death she made
an adoption. It was held that the adoption was valid and it
divested the estate vested by inheritance in the collateral.
All the previous decisions were reviewed in this case by Sir
George Lowndes who delivered the judgment of the Board. At
page 248 of the report it is said as follows:
“In their Lordships’ opinion, it is clear that the
foundation of the Brahminical doctrine of adoption is the
duty which every Hindu owes to his ancestors to provide for
the continuance of the line and the solemnization of the
necessary rites. And it may well be that if this duty has
been passed on to a new generation, capable itself of the
continuance, the father’s duty has been performed and the
means provided by him for its fulfilment spent: the “debt”
be owed is discharged, and it is upon the new generation
that the duty is now cast and the burden of the “debt” is
now laid.
It can, they think, hardly be doubted that in this doctrine
the devolution of property, though recognised as the
inherent right of the son, is altogether a secondary
consideration………… that the validity of an adoption
is to be determined by spiritual rather than temporal
considerations; that the substitution of a son of the
deceased for spiritual reasons is the essence of the thing,
and the consequent devolution of property a mere accessory
to it.
Having regard to this well-established doctrine as to the
religious efficacy of sonship, their Lordships feel that
great caution should be observed in shutting the door upon
any authorised adoption by the widow of a sonless man, The
Hindu law itself sets no limit
1145
to the exercise of the power during the lifetime of the
widow and the validity of successive adoptions in
continuance of the line is now well recognised. Nor do the
authoritative texts appear to limit the exercise of the
power by any considerations of property. But that there
must be some limit to its exercise, or at all events some
conditions in which it would be either contrary to the
spirit of the Hindu doctrine to admit its continuance, or
inequitable in the face of other rights to allow it to take
effect, has long been recognised both by the Courts in India
and by this Board, and it is upon the difficult question of
where the line should be drawn, and upon what principle,
that the argument in the present case has mainly turned”.
In another part of the judgment their Lordships observed as
follows:
“It being clear upon the decisions above referred to that
the interposition of a grandson, or the son’s widow, brings
the mother’s power of adoption to an end, but that the mere
birth of a son does not do so, and that this is not based
upon a question of vesting or divesting of property, their
Lordships think that the true reason must be that where the
duty of providing for the continuance of the line for
spiritual purposes which was upon the father, and was laid
by him conditionally upon the mother, has been assumed by
the son and by him passed on to a grandson or to the son’s
widow, the mother’s power is gone. But if the son die
himself sonless and unmarried, the duty will still be upon
the mother, and the power in her which was necessarily
suspended during the son’s lifetime will revive”.
The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon
the last sentence in the passage in the Privy Council
judgment quoted above and contended that if the power of
-the widow which remained suspended during the lifetime of
the son could revive on the son dying sonless and unmarried,
logically the power must also revive when the son and his
widow and the grandson and his widow all died out. Reliance
was also placed on the passage already cited in which
1146
their Lordships laid emphasis on the proposition that the
substitution of a son of the deceased for spiritual reasons
is the essence of the thing, and the consequent devolution
of property a mere accessory to it and it was contended that
the grounds on which an outside limit was laid on the
exercise of the widow’s power in the Chundrabullee series of
decisions no longer survived, in view of the ratio in
Amarendra’s decision and that it having been held that the
power of adoption did not depend on and was not linked with
the devolution of property or with the question of vesting
or divesting of property and could be exercised whenever
necessity for continuing the line arose, it should be held
that when the son and his widow were dead and the grandson
to whom he handed the torch for continuing the line also
died, the power of Gangabai to make the adoption revived and
thus the adoption was valid. This argument, in our opinion,
is not well founded as it is based on an incorrect
apprehension of the true basis of the rule enunciated in
this judgment, the rule being that “where the duty of
providing for the continuance of the line for spiritual
purposes which was upon the father and was laid by him
conditionally upon the mother, has been assumed by the son
and by him passed on to the grandson or to the son’s widow,
the mother’s power is gone”. In the words of Chandavarkar,
J. affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Madana Mohana v.
Purushothama Deo(1) “the power having once been extinguished
it cannot afterwards be revived”. In other words the true
rule is this:
“When a son dies before attaining full legal competence and
does not leave either a widow or a son or an adopted son
then the power of the mother which was in abeyance during
his lifetime revives but the moment he hands over that torch
to another, the mother can no longer take it”.
The contention of the learned counsel therefore that even if
the second generation dies without taking steps to continue
the line the grandmother still
(1) [1918] L R. 45 I.A. 156.
1147
retains her authority and is still under a duty to continue
the line cannot be sustained.
The three propositions that the Privy Council laid down in
Amarendra’s case therefore cannot now be questioned. These
propositions may be summed up in these terms:
(1) That the interposition of a grandson, or the son’s
widow, competent to continue the line by adoption brings the
mother’s power of adoption to an end;
(2) that the power to adopt does not depend upon any
question of vesting or divesting of property; and
(3) that a mother’s authority to adopt is not extinguished
by the mere fact that her son had attained ceremonial
competence.
The rule enunciated in Amarendra’s case was subsequently
applied in Vijaysingji v. Shivsangji(1) and was again
restated and reaffirmed as a sound rule enunciating the
limitations on the widow’s power to adopt in Anant Bhikappa
Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil(2). One of the
propositions enunciated in this decision was not accepted by
this court in Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji
Kango(3), but that apart no doubt was cast in this decision
on the above rule.
The result of these series of decisions is, that now for
about three quarters of a century the rule that “the power
of a widow to adopt comes to an end by the interposition of
a grandson or the son’s widow competent to adopt” has become
a part of Hindu Law. though the reasons for limiting the
power may not be traceable to any Shastric text; and may
have been differently stated in the several judgments. It
is well known that in the absence of any clear Shastric text
the courts have authority to decide cases on principles of
justice, equity and good conscience and it is not possible
to bold that the reasons stated in support of the rule are
not consistent with these principles. During the arguments
no substantial grounds have
(1) [1935] L.R 62 I.A. 161. (2) [1943] L.R. 70 I.A. 232.
(3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1.
147
1148
been suggested for holding that the rule is either in-
equitable or unjust or is repugnant to or inconsistent with
any doctrine or theory of Hindu Law of adoption. In this
situation we are bound to hold that it is too late in the
day to say that there are no limitations of any kind on the
widow’s power to adopt excepting those that limit the power
of her husband to adopt, i.e. that she cannot adopt in the
presence of a son, grandson or great grandson. Hindu Law
generally and in particular in matters of inheritance,
alienation and adoption gives to the widow powers of a
limited character and there is nothing in the limitations
laid down by the course of decisions above referred to
repugnant to that law. For the reasons given above, we are
unable to depart from the rule that a widow’s power to make
an adoption comes to an end by the interposition of a
grandson or the son’s widow competent to continue the line
by adoption.
The learned counsel for the appellant placed considerable
reliance on two decisions of the Indian High Courts in
support of his contention and suggested that the rule laid
down in Amarendra’s case had no application to the situation
that has arisen in the present case and that on the death of
the grandson the widow’s power to adopt which was in
abeyance during his life revived. Reference in this
connection was made to the decision of the Nagpur High Court
in Bapuji v. Gangaram(1). There a Hindu died leaving a
widow and his son and the son died leaving a widow only who
re-married. It was held that the power of the mother
revived on the re-marriage of the son’s widow. Reliance for
this proposition curiously enough was placed on the decision
of the Judicial Committee in Amarendra’s case as appears
from the following quotation from that judgment:
“If the observation quoted from Amarendra Mansingh v.
Sanatan Singh(2) be understood as limited to the case where
the widow D or the grandson E stands between (is interposed)
the grand widow C and her power, everything is clear except
for the
(1) (1941) I.L.R. Nagpur 178. (2) [1933] I.L.R. 12 Pat.
642, 658.
1149
words “and can never be revived” quoted from Ramkrishna v.
Shamrao(1). Strictly the above is the true meaning of their
Lordships’ words. That amounts to nothing more than this:
that while D or E is alive and competent to adopt his or her
existence prevents any adoption being made by C. That leaves
at large what happens when the “interposition” is ended.
Logic says that as the death of the son removes his “inter-
position” whereupon C’s power revives so the death of D
removes her interposition and so C’s power revives”.
In our judgment there is not only an obvious fallacy in this
reasoning but it is based on a wrong apprehension of the
true reasons stated for the rule in Amarendra’s case. The
reason for the rule in Amarendra’s case was “where the duty
of providing for the continuance of the line for spiritual
purposes which was upon the father, and was laid by him
conditionally upon the mother, has been assumed by the son
and by him passed on to a grandson or to the son’s widow,
the mother’s power is gone”. If that is the true reason,
obviously the duty having come to an end cannot be revived
on logical grounds. We are therefore clearly of opinion
that the ratio of the decision in Bapuji v. Gangaram(2) was
erroneous. The second decision to which reference was made
is a decision of the Lucknow Court reported in Prem Jagat
Kuer v. Harihar Bakhsh Singh(3). The learned Judges in that
case followed the decision of the Nagpur High Court above
quoted, and further added (though under some
misapprehension) that this decision had been approved by
their Lordships of the Privy Council. As a matter of fact,
there was another decision reported in the same report on a
different question that had been upheld by the Privy Council
and not the decision above referred to. The authority of
this later decision therefore is considerably shaken by this
error and even otherwise the decision gives no independent
reasons of its own apart from those contained in the Nagpur
case.
(1) [1902] I.L.R. 26 Bom. 526. (2) [1941] I.L.R. Nag, 178.
(3) [1945] I.L.R. 21 Luck. 1.
1150
For the reasons given above, this appeal fails and is
dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case we will make
no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.