PETITIONER:
EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF J.K. DUBASH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAYCITY.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
21/12/1950
BENCH:
KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
BENCH:
KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
CITATION:
1951 AIR 111 1950 SCR 969
CITATOR INFO :
R 1958 SC 269 (10)
RF 1986 SC 376 (21)
ACT:
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 25 Death of
person carrying on business–Executors carrying on business
as going concern for selling it under terms of will–Whether
“succeed in such capacity “to testator–Date of succession.
HEADNOTE:
A person who carried on a business on which tax had been
levied under the Income-tax Act of 1918 died on the 9th of
April, 1942, leaving a will by which he authorised his
executors to carry on his business as a going concern, as
if they were absolute owners but without being responsible
for loss, for a period not exceedin 12 months during
which if any of his nephews wanted to purchase the business,
they might sell it to him or them. The business was sold to
one of the nephews on the let January, 1993. The question
being whether for the purposes of s. 25 (4) of the Income-
tax Act of 1922 is amended in 1939 the succession to the
business took place on the 9th April, 1942, when
the testator died or on the 1st January, 1943, when the
business was sold:
Held, affirming the decision of the Bombay High Court,
that inasmuch as the business got vested in the executors on
the death of thetestator and the executors carried on the
business within the meaning of es. 3 and 10 of the Act, and
as such became personally liable as assessees and there was
thus a change in the assessee, a succession to the testator
“in such capacity” took place on the date of the death of
the assessee, even though the executors carried on the
business as a going concern under the terms of the will and
the business was also being carried on not lot the benefit
of the executors but for the benefit of the estate of the
testator.
Per PATANJALI SASTRI J.–The expression “succeeded by
another person” in s. 26 (2) and s. 25 (4) of the Act in-
cludes not only cases of succession inter vivos but also
cases of succession on death.
While it is true that a transfer of ownership is ordi-
narily involved in cases of succession falling within s. 26
(2) and s. 25 (4), it is not an essential element of
succession within the meaning those provisions.
The words “in such capacity” in 8.26 (2) and s. 25 (4)
mean nothing more than the capacity of a person who carries
on the business as the predecessor was carrying it on, that
is, with liability to be taxed on its profits and gains.
970
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v.P. E, Polson (L.R.
7 I.A. 196) referred to.
Jupuli Kesava Ra, o v. Commisioner of Icome-tax,
Madras (59 Mad. 377) explained.
JUDGMENT:
APPEAL (Civil Appeal No. CV of 1949) from a Judgment of
the Bombay High Court (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) dated
March 19, 1948, in a reference made by the Income-tax Appel-
late Tribunal under section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax
Act (Income* tax Reference No. 26 of 1947).
Sir N.P. Engineer (R. J. Kolah, with him) for the appel-
lant.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, (G. N. Joshi,
with him) for the respondent.
1950. December 21. The Court delivered Judgment as
follows:
KANIA C.J. — This is an appeal from a judgment of the
High Court at Bombay delivered on a reference by the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax
Act. The material facts are these. The assessees (appel-
lants) are the executors of the will of Mr. J.K. Dubash who
died on the 9th of April, 1942, having made his last will on
the 8th of April, 1942. Probate of the will was issued to
the executors on the 10th of August, 1942. During his life-
time, the testator carried on the business of shipping
agents. Clause 13 of the will contains directions about
carrying on this business of the testator till its disposal.
It directs the executors to carry on the business as a going
concern after his death with power to make fresh contracts
and discharge the existing and future liabilities and all
other usual-and necessary powers, unless special circum-
stances arose which, in the opinion of the executors, made
it expedient to sell the business earlier. This business was
to be carried on for a period not exceeding twelve months
during which time the executors were to ascertain whether or
not any of his nephews was willing to purchase the said
undertaking. For this purpose and generally for sale pur-
poses, he directed that the executors shall, as soon as
possible,
971
after his death, have a valuation made of the said undertak-
ing. The undertaking was to be sold so as to include all
his interest in the premises, the goodwill, the stock-in-
trade, plant, furniture etc. but excluding securities for
money and cash in the bank to the credit of the account of
that undertaking. If the executors were satisfied before
the expiration of one year from the testator’s death that
the said undertaking would not be sold to his nephews be-
cause none was willing or able to purchase it or if it
remained unsold, at the end of a year, to any of the nephews
then (whichever event first happened) the executors were
directed to sell the undertaking to such third person on
such terms and at such price as they thought proper. The
clause ended with the following words:-.-”I expressly de-
clare that in carrying on the said undertaking my trustees
shall, in addition to all powers, discretion and authorities
vested in them by law, have power to carry on or discontinue
any part of the said undertaking or to augment or diminish
the capital employed and generally to act as absolute owners
without being responsible for any loss.” The business was,
so1d to one of the nephews on the 1st of January, 1943. The
appellants contended that within the meaning of section 25
(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act the succession to the
business took place on the 1st of January, 1943, while the
taxing authorities contended that the succession was on the
9th of April, 1942, when the testator died. The first
question submitted for the High Court’s opinion related to
this dispute.
The second question referred to the High Court for its
opinion was in respect of an amount paid by the executors to
the widow of the testator. That question was answered
against the appellants by the High Court. Learned counsel
appearing for the appellants intiated that he did not want
to contest the High Court’s decision on the point. The
appeal therefore is limited to the first question only.
Section 25 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1939, gives
certain concessions in respect of a business where tax had
been paid by the person carrying the business
972
under the provisions of the Indian Income tax Act, 1918.
The material part of sub-clause 4 of section 25 is in these
terms :–
“Where the person who was at the commencement of the
Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939 (VII of 1939),
carrying on any business, profession or vocation on which
tax was at any time charged under the provisions of the
Indian Incometax Act, 1918, is succeeded in such capacity
by another person………… ”
The scheme of section 25 read with the provisions of
section 26 (2) appears to be to give relief, inter alia, to
persons who were carrying on business in 1921 and had been
taxed on their income under the Income-tax Act of 1918. By
a change effected by the Incometax Amendment Act of 1922
they were subjected to taxation twice on’ the income of
1921-22. The relief is intended against this levy of tax
twice over.
The rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties
are these. The assessee contends that on the death of the
testator under clause 13 of the will of the deceased, the
executors were carrying on the business of the deceased only
for the purpose of winding it up, and there was no succes-
sion to the business on the death of the deceased within the
meaning of section 25 (4) of the Income-tax Act. It is
argued that the clause provides for nothing else than a
direction to carry on the business with a view either (a) to
sell it within a year to one of the nephews, or (b) to sell
it to someone else at the end of the year as a going con-
cern. it was pointed out that all directions in the clause
permitting contracts to be made etc. were for the purpose of
keeping the business alive and not allowing it to die so
that the business which was a valuable asset of the deceased
could be sold as a going concern with its goodwill. It was
therefore argued that the succession to the business took
place only on the 1st of January, 1943, when the business
was sold by the executors to one of the nephews in terms of
clause 13 of the will. In actual money, the contest is
whether the executors
973
are entitled to get the benefit of the exemption from in-
come-tax in respect of the profits earned only for the nine
days between the 1st of April and the 9th of April, 1942, or
between the 1st of April, 1942, and 1st of January, 1943,
under section 25 (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The High
Court has answered the question against the assessee.
In our opinion, the conclusion of the High Court is
correct. It cannot be disputed that in the event of a sale
or gift of the business by the original owner the succession
within the meaning of section 25 (4) will take place only on
the date of such sale or gift and the exemption from liabil-
ity to tax will be for a period terminating on. that day.
It cannot again be seriously disputed that if the testator
settled’ his business on trust under a deed of settlement
there will be a succession to the business by another person
on the day of the settlement. Similarly in the event of his
death intestate his heir-at-law will succeed to the business
on the date of his death. The argument advanced on behalf
of the appellants that in the present case having regard to
the terms of clause 13 of the will there has been “no suc-
cession in such capacity to another person” because the
executors were carrying on the business only with a view to
sell it as a going concern, cannot be accepted because on
the day of the death of the deceased the estate including
the business got vested in the executors and the executors
carried on the business within the meaning of section 3 read
with section 10 of the Act and as such became personally
liable as assessee. Thus there came about a change in the
assessee and therefore “a succession in such capacity” took
place within the meaning of section 25 (4) of the Income-tax
Act. It seems clear that if the testator had transferred
the business to a trustee, although the trustees will not be
the beneficial owners, in law there will be a succession of
the business to another person within the meaning of. sec-
tion 25 (4) of the Indian Income.tax Act. If in such a case
that result follows there appears no reason why when the
legal estate is transferred by operation of law to an execu-
tor
974
there should not be considered a succession to the estate by
another person within the meaning of the same section 25
(4). The words “in such capacity” in that clause further
make the position clear. It makes the distinction of legal
and beneficial ownership irrelevant. The contention that the
business was to be carried on by the executors as such, as a
going concern or that it was being carried on for the bene-
fit or loss of the testator’s estate is not relevant for the
present discussion. The only relevant question under sec-
tion 25 (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act is whether in
respect of the business there is a succession to another
person. This is a provision to give relief and the scope of
the relief must be governed by the words used in the Act.
In our opinion the answer to this question, on the facts of
the present case, must be in the affirmative and the. date
of such succession must be considered to be the death of the
testator, which was on the 9th of April, 1942. The result
is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
PATANJALI SASTRI J.–I agree that this appealshould be
rejected.
The material facts have been set out in the judgment
which has just been delivered. The only question now re-
maining for decision is:on what date was the testator, who
was carrying on the business of shipping agent and land
contractor “succeeded in such capacity by another person”
within the meaning of section 25 (4) of the Act–on the 9th
April, 1942, when the testator died and the appellants as
the executors took over the business and carried it on or on
the 1st January, 1943, when the business was sold by them as
a going concern ?
The business being admittedly one which was charged
to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1918, if there was no
succession within the meaning of section 25 (4) until the
sale took place, as the appellants contend, the profits and
gains of the period from 1st April, 1942, to 1st January,
1943, would not be liable to tax, whereas. if the testator
could be said to have been “succeeded”
975
by the appellants, the profits of the much shorter period
between 1st April, 1942, and 8th April, 1942, alone would be
exempt from taxation. The reason for this relief is to be
found in the change of the basis of taxation when the Act of
1922 was passed which resulted in the profits of the year
1921-22 being assessed twice over, once in that year as the
income thereof on adjustment” under the Act of 1918 and once
in the next year as the income of the “previous year” under
the Act of 1922 [see Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay
v.P.E. Poison(1)]. The relief was, however, confined to
discontinued businesses, as, in cases of succession till
1938 the successor alone was assessed to tax on the whole of
the profits of the previous year including those earned by
his predecessor before the succession occurred. But the
Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939, (hereinafter
referred to as the amending Act), having amended section 26
(2) so as to provide, in the case of a succession in busi-
ness, prolession or vocation, for the assessment of the
predecessor and the successor, each in respect of his actual
share of the profits of the previous year, the relief was
extended, by enacting section 25 (4), to cases of succes-
sion occurring after the commencement of that Act, with the
same object as in the case of discontinuance, namely, to
redress the hardship of the business having been Charged
twice over on the income of 1921-22. In other words, the
predecessor is given the same relief as if he had discontin-
ued the business on the date of succession. It will thus be
seen that the enactment of section 25 (4) is consequential
on the amendment of section 26(2), and the scope and
meaning of the expression “succeeded in such capacity by
another person” in section 26 (2) must determine also its
scope and meaning in section 25 (4).
The first question which arises on the language of the
amended section 26 (2), which speaks of “the person succeed-
ed” being “assessed” and of his not being “found”, is wheth-
er the sub-section should be construed as applicable only to
cases of succession
976
inter vivos. Whatever force there may have been in the
suggestion that the sub-section could not have contemplated
cases of testamentary or intestate succession if there
was no provision for the assessment of profits earned by
a deceased person in the hands his representatives, there
seems to be no sufficient reason for excluding from the
scope of the sub-section cases of succession on death in
view of the provision in section 24B. On the other hand,
proviso (c) to section 24(9), which refers to a person ‘
‘succeeded in such capacity by another person otherwise than
by inheritance “, would seem to imply that “succession”, as
that term is used in the Act, includes devolution on death.
The next question is what is the meaning to be at-
tributed to the phrase “in such capacity”? A Full Bench of
the Madras High Court in Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Commissioner
of Income tax. Madras(1), held that the expression meant “in
the capacity as owner “, so that “the person who succeeds
another must, by such succession, become the owner of the
business which his predecessor was carrying on and which he,
after the succession, carries on in such capacity, that is.
the capacity as owner “. Applying that test they held that
the sole surviving member of a Hindu undivided family did
not succeed to the business of the family within the meaning
of section 26(2), as he was previously a part-owner of the
business’ and there was no transfer of ownership. While it
is undoubtedly true that a transfer of ownership is ordi-
narily involved in cases of succession failing within sec-
tion 26 (2) or section 25(4), it cannot, in my opinion, be
regarded as an essential element of succession within the
meaning of those provisions. The Income-tax Act directs its
attention primarily to the person who receives the income,
profits or gains rather than to the ownership or enjoyment
thereof. The assessee is defined in section 2 (2) as the
person by whom the income-tax is payable and by section 10
the tax is payable by an assessee who carries on the busi-
ness, profession or
(1) I.L.R 59 Mad 377
977
vocation. The statute thus fastens on the person who carries
on the business, etc., the liability to pay the tax on the
profits earned by him regardless of their destination or
enjoyment. It is also worthy of note that in serviral in-
stances person who have no proprietory or other right in
the income charged to tax are made liable to pay the tax for
no other reason than the convenience of assessment and
collection. Such instances are to be found in section 26(2)
proviso, section 18 (7), section 23-A (3), section 25-A and
section 42(1). As observed by Lord Cave in Williams v.
Singer & Others(1) “the fact is that, if the Income-tax Acts
are examined, it will be found that the person charged with
tax is neither the trustee nor the beneficiary as such, but
the person in actual receipt and control of the income,
which it is sought to reach”.
There seems to be no warrant, therefore, to insist on a
transfer of ownership as the decisive test of ’succession’
within the meaning of section 26(2) or section 25(4) any
more than for insisting on the ownership of the business by
the person carrying on a business, for the purposes of
section 10. I do not of course wish to be understood to say
that a clerk or an agent in management of a business would
be an assessee liable to be taxed in respect of its profits
and -gains. Some kind of title there must be, though not of
a beneficial character. Nor need it be of the same quality
in the predecessor and the successor. The question in each
case must be: Is the person who has come in carrying on the
business as a principal ? If so, the Revenue looks to him
and makes him liable for payment of the tax. The words “in
such capacity” in sections 25 (4) and 26 (2) mean nothing
more than the capacity of a person who carries on the busi-
ness as the predecessor was carrying it on that is, with a
liability to be taxed on its profits and gains.
Applying these principles to the present case, I am
clearly of opinion that the testator who was carrying on the
business in question was succeeded in such
(1) [1921] 1 A.C. 65
125
978
capacity by the appellants when the former died on 9th
April, 1942, and his estate vested in them. As already
stated, the testator expressly authorised the appellants
to carry on the business as a going concern for one year
after his death and gave them power to enter into fresh
contracts and to discharge liabilities past and future.
They are thus an “association of persons” carrying on
business, and, being assessable as such in respect of the
profits and gains of the business carriedon by them under
section 10 read with section 3 of the Act, they are liable
to be taxed on the profits earned after the 9th April,
1942.
It was objected that the appellants being assessable as
the representatives of the testator under section 24-B in
respect of the profits earned by him in the accounting
year, they could not be treated as successors assessable
under section 26 (2)in respect of the profits earned
during the rest of that year, as such apportionment would
be meaningless, the same interest, namely, the testator’s
estate, having to bear the incidence of the tax in either
case. It was accordingly suggested that unless there was
a break in the continuity of the interest represented by the
executors, there could be no real apportionment such as is
contemplated by section 26 (2) and, therefore, no succes-
sion within the meaning of that section or of section 25
(4) where the same expression is used. The argument is,
in my opinion, fallacious. It overlooks the distinc-
tion between the position of the executors visa vis the
Revenue and their position visa vis the testator’s estate.
As already pointed out, their liability to pay the tax on
the profits earned after the testator’s death arises under
section 10 (1) and, being that of assessees carrying on
the business, is personal to them, although as between
them and the estate they would be entitled to be indemni-
fied in respect of the tax paid; while their liability to
pay tax on the profits earned during the testator’s
life-time arises under section 24-B and, being that of
legal representatives of the testator, is limited “to the
extent to which the testator’s estate is capable of meet-
ing the charge”. It is therefore not correct to
979
say that an apportionment under section 26 (2) would be
meaningless, though, if the testator’s estate was suffi-
ciently solvent, it would have no practical signifi-
cance.
DAS J.–I agree with the Chief Justice.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: R.S. Narula.
Agent for the respondent:P. A. Mehta.