Archive for the ‘1986’ Category

MOHD. MUMTAZ Vs. NANDINI SATPATHY AND ORS.

Saturday, December 20th, 1986

PETITIONER:
MOHD. MUMTAZ

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
NANDINI SATPATHY AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1986

BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ)
KHALID, V. (J)
OZA, G.L. (J)
NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:
1987 SCR  (1) 680      1987 SCC  (1) 279
JT 1987 (1)    28

ACT:
Criminal  Procedure     Code,    1973:  ss.321  &  329–Nolle
prosequi-Withdrawal from prosecution–Right of public prose-
cutor–Charge  framed  against    accused–Withdrawal  whether
legal.

HEADNOTE:
Section  321  Criminal Procedure Code, 1973     empowers  a
Public    Prosecutor incharge of a case to withdraw  with     the
consent     of the court from the prosecution of any person  in
respect     of any one or more of the offences for which he  is
tried, at any time before the judgment is pronounced.
Respondent No.1 Ex-Chief Minister of Orissa, was alleged
to  have misappropriated a huge sum, said to have been    col-
lected    by District Congress Committees from various  compa-
nies  for  publication of their     advertisements     in  party’s
souvenirs  before  the 1971 General Elections.    A  case     was
registered  by    the Vigilance Department against her  and  a
charge-sheet submitted. The Addl. Chief Judicial  Magistrate
framed charges under ss.406,467,471 and 120 of the IPC.
After  the 1980 General Election, the  State  Government
took  a policy decision to withdraw cases against  political
leaders     who  were subjected to victimisation.    The  Special
Public    Prosecutor  on being satisfied that  the  charge  of
criminal breach of trust would fail against respondent    No.1
filed a petition under s.321 Cr.P.C. and sought the  permis-
sion  of the court in public interest for withdrawal of     the
case, when the case was posted for consideration of charge.
After  making an objective assessment of the  merits  of
the  application and being satisfied that the withdrawal  of
the  prosecution would in no way affect any public  interest
or  improve any public confidence the Addl.  Chief  Judicial
Magistrate granted consent to withdraw from the prosecution.
The  appellant’s revision petition having been dismissed  by
the High Court he appealed by special leave to this Court.
Dismissing the appeal the Court,
692
HELD: Per Oza, J. (Bhagwati C.J.I. and Oza, J.)
I. Once a charge has been framed against the accused  on
the  basis that there was ground for presuming that  he     had
committed the offence charged against him, the Public Prose-
cutor  cannot  make an application for withdrawal  from     the
prosecution  and the Magistrate cannot give his     consent  to
such withdrawal on the ground that there was insufficient or
no evidence to sustain the prosecution. [698H-699B]
2. The charge of criminal breach of trust framed against
respondent No. 1, however, was totally groundless. There was
nothing on record to indicate that the entrustment of  funds
to  her was for the specific purpose of being utilised    only
for  the  purpose of publication of  advertisements  in     the
souvenirs.  It was not the case of the prosecution that     any
of these amounts were handed over by any of the companies to
her. The entrustment of these amounts, if at all, was to the
souvenir  committee of the All India Congress Committee     and
respondent  No. 1 could not be charged for utilising any  of
these  amounts for the purpose other than that for which  it
was  entrusted    to her. The charge against  her,  therefore,
could not he sustained. [699E-G]
Instead  of permitting the prosecution to  he  withdrawn
under  s.321 the charge framed against respondent No.  1  is
quashed under s.239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[699H-700A]
Per Venkataramiah, J.
I.I.  Consent  can he given under s.321 of the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 for withdrawal from the prosecution
of a case at any time before the judgment is pronounced. The
framing     of the charge cannot be an impediment to give    con-
sent to such withdrawal.
1.2.  In  the instant case, the  Public  Prosecutor     had
applied his mind to the case before applying for  withdrawal
and  the  Chief Judicial Magistrate had     not  committed     any
error  in giving his consent to such withdrawal.  The  order
was, therefore, fully justified.”
2. The decision in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh  Pandey,
[1957]    SCR 279, interpreting s.494 of the Code of  Criminal
Procedure,  1898  and  the decision in R.K.  Jain  v.  State
through     Special Police Establishment & Ors., [1980]  3     SCR
982,  interpreting s.321 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,
1973 do not call for any reconsideration.[694C-E]
693
Per Khalid, J.
I.    Order of withdrawal passed by the  Additional  Chief
Judicial Magistrate is upheld. [695D]
2.    Consent     can  be given under s.321 of  the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure for withdrawal from the prosecution of  a
case, not only when the charge is not framed but even  after
the  charge is framed and at any time before  the  judgment.
[694H-695A]
3. Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 is
not attracted to the facts of the case for the propriety  of
the charge framed was not at issue. [695B, C]
Sheo  Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar,  Criminal  Appeal
No. 241 of 1983 decided on 20th December 1986, applied.
State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957] SCR 279     and
R.K. Jain v. State, [1980] 3 SCR 982, referred to.
Per Natarajan, J.
1.    The consent given by the Additional  Chief  Judicial
Magistrate  to the Special Public Prosecutor for  withdrawal
of  the prosecution suffers from no error of law, patent  or
latent. [701G]
2.    There  is no material in the case to show  that     the
Special     Public     Prosecutor was influenced by  any  improper
motives     for  filing the application for withdrawal  of     the
prosecution  or     that he had acted against his will  at     the
behest of anyone else. The Additional Chief Judicial  Magis-
trate  had bestowed judicial consideration over     the  matter
and had thereafter passed a reasoned order. Not only he     but
also  the High Court had found after a careful    scrutiny  of
relevant factors and circumstances, that the application for
withdrawal  of    the prosecution made by the  Special  Public
Prosecutor  fully satisfied the tests laid down by  the     Su-
preme Court inasmuch as the Public Prosecutor had not  exer-
cised  his  executive function improperly and also  had     not
attempted to interfere with the normal course of justice for
illegitimate reasons or purposes. [700D-E, 701.E-F]
State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957] SCR 279     and
R.K. Jain v. State, [1980] 3 SCR 982, referred to.

JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal  No.49
of 1983.
694
From  the Judgment and Order dated May 14, 1981  of     the
Orissa High Court in Crl. R. No. 21 of 1981.
V.J. Francis for the Appellant.
Anil B. Divan, D.P. Singh, G.S. Chatterjee, R.K.  Mehta,
Salaman     Khurshid, L.R. Singh and Vinoo Bhagat for  the     Re-
spondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH,  J:    I agree that this appeal has  to  be
dismissed.  I am of the view that the decision in The  State
of  Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957] SCR 279    interpreting
section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and     the
decision  in R.K. Jain etc. v. State through Special  Police
Establishment  and  Others, [1980] 3. SCR  982    interpreting
section     321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 do     not
call  for any reconsideration. I am in full  agreement    with
the views expressed in these decisions. I am satisfied    that
the  Public  Prosecutor     had applied his mind  to  the    case
before applying for withdrawal and the Chief Judicial Magis-
trate  has not committed any error in giving his consent  to
such  withdrawal.  Such     consent can be given  at  any    time
before the judgment is pronounced. The framing of the charge
cannot    be an impediment to give consent to such  withdrawal
as it is evident from section 321(b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
KHALID,  J: I have just received (at 3.45 p.m. on    19th
December,  1986)  a draft Judgment by Oza. J. in  the  above
case. I agree with the conclusion that the appeal has to  be
dismissed,  but not, with respect, with the  reasoning    con-
tained    in the Judgment. Since the case is listed for  Judg-
ment  on 20th December, 1986, I do not have time to write  a
detailed Judgment.
The  question to be decided in this appeal is the  scope  of
Section     321  of Criminal Procedure Code. Oza,    J.  has     set
aside  the permission granted by the Court to  withdraw     the
prosecution under Section 32 1, Criminal Procedure Code, but
allowed     the appeal quashing the charge framed    against     re-
spondent  No.  1 under Section 239 of the Code    of  Criminal
Procedure. I regret to state that I cannot re-concile myself
with  this approach. A cursory. glance at Section 32 1    will
satisfy anyone that consent can be given for withdrawal from
the prosecution of a case,
695
not  only when the charge is not flamed, but even after     the
charge is framed and at any time before the Judgment.
This  appeal along with Criminal Appeal No. 48  of    1983
were  directed to be posted before a Constitution  Bench  to
consider the scope of Section 32 1, Criminal Procedure Code.
That  being  so, I do not think it proper  to  abandon    that
pursuit and take refuge under Section 239 of Criminal Proce-
dure Code.
In a separate Judgment to be pronounced by me in  Crimi-
nal  Appeal  No. 241 of 1983, I have outlined the  scope  of
Section 321 of Criminal Procedure Code. What is to be decid-
ed  in this case is whether the order passed by     the  MagiS-
trate under Section 32 1, Criminal Procedure Code, is proper
or not. We are not called upon to consider the propriety  of
the  charge  framed and then examine the  evidence  and     see
whether     the  accused  should be discharged  or     the  charge
framed should be upheld.
I  adopt the reasons given by me in Criminal Appeal     No.
241  of 1983, relying upon the decision reported  in  [1957]
SCR 279 (State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey) and in  [1980]
3  SCR    982  (R.K. Jain v. State) and uphold  the  order  of
withdrawal  passed by the Additional Chief  Judicial  Magis-
trate,    Bhubaneswar, and upheld by the High Court  in  revi-
sion, and dismiss the appeal.
OZA, J: [For himself and on behalf of Bhagwati CJ.]     The
present     appeal     by special leave is  directed    against     the
judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 14th May 1981  in
Criminal  Revision  No. 21 of 1981 arising out of  an  order
dated 20th September, 1980 passed by Additional Chief  Judi-
cial  Magistrate, Bhubaneswar allowing an application  filed
by  the     Special  Public Prosecutor wherein  he     prayed     for
withdrawal from the prosecution of the Vigilance Case No. 33
of  1977 against Respondent No. 1 By the impugned  judgment,
the  High  Court dismissed Criminal Revision  filed  by     the
appellant-petitioner  and  confirmed  the  order  passed  by
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate.
The      Vigilance  Department     submitted  a    charge-sheet
against     respondent No. 1 on the allegation that  All  India
Congress Party some time before the General Election of     the
Parliament  in    the year 1971 set out a programme  to  raise
funds  for  publication of Souvenir on behalf  of  the    said
party  by  each of the District     Congress  Committees  under
different  provincial Congress Committees to educate  people
about the policy and programme of the Congress Party and the
achievements in
696
the  context  of  1971 Elections. It was  alleged  that     the
Souvenir Committee was formed and huge amount was  collected
from different companies at Delhi and Bombay for publication
of  advertisements in the Souvenirs. It is  further  alleged
that Smt. Nandini Satpathy respondent No. 1  misappropriated
a sum of Rs. 1,02,200 out of this amount collected from     the
companies  and did not take steps for asking the  Companies’
advertisements    for  publication  in the  Souvenirs.  It  is
alleged that forgery was committed and Shri Ramanath  Panda,
respondent No. 2 was also alleged to have participated    with
respondent  No.     1  in    misappropriation  of  the  aforesaid
amount.     On the information of Shri  Shyamsunder  Mohapatra,
Ex-Member of Parliament, a case was registered by the  Vigi-
lance Department and ultimately a charge-sheet was submitted
against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Shri B.M. Patnaik the    then
Advocate General of Orissa was appointed as a Special Public
Prosecutor  to conduct the case. By order dated 27.9.  1979,
the  Additional     Chief Judicial     Magistrate  framed  charges
under  Sections 406, 467, 471 and 120 of the I.P.C.  against
respondent No. 1 and under Section 406 read with Section 34-
of the I.P.C. against respondent No. 2.
After  the    General Elections of  May/June,     1980,    Shri
Patnaik     resigned  from the office.Of Advocate    General     and
also informed the State Government that he was not  inclined
to continue as Special Public Prosecutor in the case against
Smt.  Nandini  Satpathy. In fact, though the case  had    been
fixed  on a number of dates between July and November,    1980
Shri Patnaik did ‘not appear in the case on any one of these
dates.
Thereafter    respondent No. 4 who had been  appointed  as
Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the cases of the  Vigi-
lance Department under Section 24(6) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was instructed by the Government in the  Vigilance
Department  to    take charge of this case. On  5.11.80,    Shri
P.K.  Mohanty, Advocate sent a letter to the  then  Advocate
General     Shri  Gobind Das requesting him for  withdrawal  of
this .case and by letter dated 6.11. 1980 the learned  Advo-
cate  General Shri Gobind Das forwarded this letter of    Shri
P.K.  Mohanty, Advocate to the Chief Secretary who  endorsed
the  letter to Inspector General (Vigilance) asking him     for
his  comments. I.G. of Police (Vigilance) suggested that  it
would  be proper to obtain the views of the Law     Department,
and  after receipt of the comments of I.G. of Police  (Vigi-
lance)    the Chief Secretary referred the matter to  the     Law
Department  for     advice     and the  Legal     Remembrancer  after
considering  the legal position regarding the withdrawal  of
the prosecution observed as under:
697
“As it sometimes happens, Political leaders are subjected to
victimisation. Resort is had to law courts to harass politi-
cal  rivals.  In view of the law laid down  by    the  Supreme
Court  Government  may take a policy decision to  curb    such
political victimisation through law Courts and direct  with-
drawal irrespective of the question whether or not there  is
sufficient evidence in support of the prosecution.
The  instant  case is one instituted  against    Smt.
Nandini Satpathy, Ex-Chief Minister of Orissa.’ It is possi-
ble  for Government to take notice of the intense  political
rivalry     between Smt. Nandini Satpathy, on the one hand     and
the erstwhile leaders of Janta Party on the other hand    that
motive    behind institution of such cases was political    vic-
timisation  rather than vindication of the  law.  Government
may suggest withdrawal of such cases to the concerned Public
Prosecutor.”
On the receipt of this opinion from the law     Department,
the  file  was endorsed by the Chief Secretary    to  the     Law
Minister and the Law Minister endorsed the file to the Chief
Minister. After considering the matter from all angles,     the
Chief  Minister     passed an order dated 13.11.1980  that     the
case  be  withdrawn. By letter dated  15.11.1980,  the    I.G.
(Vigilance)  communicated the decision of the Government  to
withdraw  the prosecution to the Special  Public  Prosecutor
Shri  Dibakar  Bhuyan and requested him     to  take  necessary
action    in  the matter. After respondent No. 4    was  put  in
charge    of  the     case, he examined the case  diary  and     the
connected  papers and on being satisfied that the charge  of
criminal  breach  of trust would fail against  Smt.  Nandini
Satpathy, he filed an application under Section 32 1 of     the
Code of Criminal Procedure for withdrawal from the  prosecu-
tion on, having found that the charged amounts in this    case
are  contributions  to Souvenir Committee of the  All  India
Congress  Committee  and  that none of the  members  of     the
Central     Souvenir Committee has complained of any  dishonest
use or fraud or injury or wrongful loss to the Committee  or
AICC  for  such non-utilisation of the funds  and  that     the
offences  charged would ultimately depend upon the proof  of
dishonest  intention or fraud or wrongfUl loss to the’    Cen-
tral  Souvenir Committee or to the AICC. On 16.12. 1980     the
Special Public Prosecutor made an application for additional
ground to be added in the application for withdrawal and the
additional ground alleged was that in public interest and in
the  changed circumstances, the State Government desired  to
withdraw from the prosecution.
698
After  consideration of the case, the  Additional  Chief
Judicial  Magistrate  by  order dated  20th  December,    1980
recorded his consent and permitted the Special Public Prose-
cutor to withdraw from the prosecution. Thereafter one Mohd.
Mumtaz,     the present appellant who was not a party to  these
proceedings  filed a revision petition in the High Court  of
Orissa    challenging the order of the Additional Chief  Judi-
cial Magistrate permitting withdrawal of the case. But by an
order  dated 14.5.81 the High Court dismissed  the  revision
petition. Hence this appeal by special leave.
The     F.I.R. in this case was lodged by  one     Shyamsunder
Mohapatra against respondents Nos. 1 and 2 alleging that  in
January     and February 1971 certain companies had  issued  49
cheques in the    names of Presidents of the District Congress
Committees  of Orissa totalling Rs.1,08,200  for  advertise-
ments to be published in Souvenirs to be brought out in each
district  by  the respective  District    Congress  Committee.
These  cheques    were deposited in the account  of  Chairman,
Souvenir  Committee in Canara Bank, Bhubaneswar. It  is     al-
leged  that respondent No. 1 misappropriated the  amount  by
drawing.  in favour of self-bearer 9 cheques aggregating  to
Rs.95,000 and two bearer cheques aggregating to Rs.32,854 in
the  name of respondent No. 2. It was alleged  that  neither
advertisements    were published nor the amounts    returned  to
the companies. It is significant to note that Shri Shyamsun-
der  Mohapatra was neither an office-bearer of the  U.P.C.C.
nor  of the A.I.C.C. Admittedly he was neither a  member  of
the  Central Souvenir Committee to which the money  was     en-
trusted     for transmission to the State or the District    Con-
gress Committee nor was he in any manner connected with     any
of the companies which paid the money for publication of the
advertisements.     Shri Shyamsunder Mohapatra lodged the    com-
plaint    when respondent No. 1 was not the Chief Minister  of
the State. He had been suspended from the Congress Party for
his  anti-party     activities when respondent No.     1  was     the
President of the U.P.C.C. and the Chief Minister of  Orissa.
It  is    significant that these monies were paid     by  various
companies  in the name of All India Souvenir  Committee     and
there is no material to indicate how the All India  Souvenir
Committee transferred these cheques to the respective  State
Congress  Committees  or the District  Congress     Committees.
There  is  no complaint also from any one of  the  companies
that  the  monies  paid by them were not  utilised  for     the
purpose     for  which they were given or were utilised  for  a
different purpose without their consent.
Now  it is difficult to appreciate how the  learned  Special
Public
699
Prosecutor could make an application for withdrawal from the
prosecution  and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate    gave
his  consent to such withdrawal on the ground that there  is
no  evidence  to sustain the prosecution when a     charge     was
already framed against respondent No. 1 on the basis that in
the  opinion  of the learned Chief Judicial  Magistrate     who
framed    the charge there was ground for presuming  that     re-
spondent  No. 1 had committed the offences  charged  against
her.  There  can therefore be no doubt that  the  withdrawal
from  the prosecution could not be permitted on     the  ground
that  there was insufficient’ or no evidence to sustain     the
prosecution.  But since entire record is before us  and     the
matter    has been argued at great length on :he basis of     the
material on record we propose to consider whether the charge
was rightly framed and if we take the view that on the basis
of the material on record no charge could be framed we    must
quash the charge against respondent No. 1.
It    is  clear from the material on record  that  various
companies  all over India gave monies by way of     cheques  to
the Souvenir Committee of the All India Congress  Committee.
We  will  assume  for the purpose. of  argument     that  these
amounts     were  given  by the companies for  the     purpose  of
publication  of     advertisements in the souvenir     which    were
entitled to be brought out by each District Congress Commit-
tee, but there is no material on record at all to show    that
when  these amounts were distributed by the All     India    Con-
gress  Committee to the respective provincial Congress    Com-
mittees     and by the provincial Congress Committees in  their
turn  to  the respective District Congress  Committees,     the
entrustment  of     these    amounts by the    All  India  Congress
Committee  was expressed to be for the specific     purpose  of
publication  of advertisements in the souvenirs. When  there
is nothing to indicate that the entrustment of these amounts
to  respondent No. 1 was for the specific purpose  of  being
utilised  only for the purpose of publication of  advertise-
ments  in  the    souvenirs, it is difficult to  see  how     any
charge of criminal breach of trust can be sustained  against
respondent No. 1. It is not the case of the prosecution that
any of these amounts were handedover by any of the companies
to respondent No. 1. The entrustment of these amounts, if at
all, was to the Souvenir Committee of the All India Congress
Committee and respondent No. 1 could not therefore  possibly
be charged for utilising any of these amounts for a  purpose
other  than that for which it was entrusted to her.  We     are
therefore  of  the view that the charge framed    against     re-
spondent No. 1 was totally groundless and we would therefore
quash it.
We accordingly dismiss the appeal but instead of  permitting
the
700
prosecution  to be withdrawn under Section 321 we quash     the
charge framed against respondent No. 1 under Section 239  of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
NATARAJAN,    J: This is a case where the  Special  Public
Prosecutor  (Vig.) C.D. Cuttack had filed a  petition  under
Section     321 Cr.P.C. and sought the permission of the  Court
for withdrawal of the case against the first respondent when
the  case  was    posted for consideration  of  charge.  Under
Section 321 Cr.P.C. a Public Prosecutor or Assistant  Public
Prosecutor  incharge of a case may, with the consent of     the
court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced,  with-
draw from the prosecution of any person either generally  or
in  respect of any one or more of the offences for which  he
is tried.
In    this case the Special Public Prosecutor had set     out
in  paras 5 and 6 of his application the relevant  materials
which had prevailed upon him to seek withdrawal of  prosecu-
tion of the case, after obtaining the consent of the  Court,
to  subserve  the interests of justice better. There  is  no
material in the case to show that the Special Public  Prose-
cutor was influenced by any improper motives for filing     the
application for withdrawal of the prosecution or that he had
acted against his will at the behest of any one else.
The     learned  Additional Chief Judicial  Magistrate     has
bestowed  judicial  consideration over the  matter  and     has
thereafter passed a reasoned order. While giving his consent
for the withdrawal of the prosecution the learned Magistrate
has borne in mind the principles laid down by this Court  in
R.K. Jain v. State, [1980] 3 SCR 982 which has followed     the
earlier     decision  of this Court in State of  Bihar  v.     Ram
Naresh Pandey, [1957] SCR 279. Before passing the order, the
learned Magistrate has been fully alive to the responsibili-
ty  of the Court before it grants consent to an     application
made  under Section 321 Cr.P.C. The portion extracted  below
from  the  order of the learned     Additional  Chief  Judicial
Magistrate fully reveals this position :–
“While mentioning the facts in the petition, I
have  already indicated the reasons for  which
the prosecutor does not want to prosecute. Now
the  Court  has to  consider  whether  consent
should  be given or not. The discretion as  to
whether consent should be given to withdraw is
with  the     court but it  should  be  exercised
judiciously  and on correct legal     principles.
It  is not to be given as a matter  of  course
nor  the court shall surrender its  own  inde-
pendence of judgment.”
701
After  making  an objective assessment of the merit  of     the
application,  the learned Additional Chief  Judicial  Magis-
trate held that the withdrawal of the prosecution “would  in
no  way     affect any public interest or    improve     any  public
confidence” and concluded as follows:-
“Considering  all these circumstances  if     the
public prosecutor most judiciously thought  it
proper  to withdraw from the case in my  opin-
ion, the court should be not a stumbling block
by disallowing its consent. I feel it just and
proper to allow the petition”.
The     order    of  the learned     Additional  Chief  Judicial
Magistrate  was     affirmed,  after a careful  scrutiny  by  a
learned     Judge of the Orissa High Court in Crl. Rev. No.  21
of 1981 filed in the High Court. The learned Judge  observed
that  the  ratio  laid down in R.K. Jain  v.  State  (supra)
“would    not  justify entertaining this    application  when  a
public prosecutor in his application had indicated that     the
evidence  already collected did not support the     prosecution
and there was no prospect of a conviction and the  appropri-
ate authority had taken the view that the prosecution in the
broad ends of justice need not continue”.
It may be thus seen that not only the learned Magistrate
but also the High Court has found, after a careful  scrutiny
of relevant factors and circumstances, that the     application
for withdrawal of the prosecution made by the Special Public
Prosecutor fully satisfied the tests laid down by this Court
in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey (supra) reiterated in
R.K.  Jain v. State (supra) for its being allowed viz.    that
the executive function of the public prosecutor in  applying
for  withdrawal of the prosecution has not  been  improperly
exercised  and that it is not an attempt to  interfere    with
the  normal  course of justice for illegitimate     reasons  or
purposes.
The     appellant  has failed to establish in    this  appeal
that  the  consent  given by the  learned  Additional  Chief
Judicial  Magistrate  to the Special Public  Prosecutor     for
withdrawal of the prosecution suffers from any error of law,
patent    or latent. Consequently, the appeal fails  and    has,
therefore, to be dismissed.
P.S.S.                              Appeal
dismissed.
702