PETITIONER:
BALMER LAWRIE WORKERS’ UNION, BOMBAY AND ANR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BALMER LAWRIE AND CO. LTD. AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT21/12/1984
BENCH:
DESAI, D.A.
BENCH:
DESAI, D.A.
KHALID, V. (J)
CITATION:
1985 AIR 311 1985 SCR (2) 492
1984 SCC Supl. 663 1984 SCALE (2)1000
CITATOR INFO :
D 1988 SC1829 (6)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 14,19 (1) (a)
and (c)-Sec. 20 Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act 1971 conferring
exclusive right on recognised union to represent workmen in
disputes-Whether ultra vires the Constitution.
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention
of Unfair Practices “Act 1971, Sec. 20(2) (b)-Exclusive
Right conferred on recognised union to represent workman in
disputes Constitutional validity of Art. 14 and 19 (1) (a)
and (c) of the Constitution.
Industrial Disputes Act-Settlement between employer
and recognised union-Provision for deduction of 15% from
gross arrears payable Jo all workmen including members of
unrecognised Union-Amount to be credited to recognised
Union’s fund-Constitutional validity of - Whether
unconstitutional vis-a-vis workmen of unrecognised Union.
Payment of Wages Act-Deduction made from wages and
salary payable to an employee-Such deduction not authorised
by the Act but by a Settlement- Consent of Parties for such
deduction from wages-Validity and effect of.
HEADNOTE:
Section 19 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade
Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act 1971
(1971 Act, for short) provides for recognition of a union if
it complies with certain conditions specified in the
section. Section 20 enumerates the rights of a recognised
union. Clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) of s.20 confers an
exclusive right on a recognised union to represent workmen
of an undertaking in certain disputes and makes the decision
or order made in such proceedings binding on all the
employees while it denies such right to a workman to appear
or act or to be allowed to represent in any proceedings
under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 except in a
proceeding in which the legality or propriety of an order of
dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment. termination of
service or suspension of an employee is under consideration.
After a strike, the respondent-employer entered into a
settlement in respect of a number of pending industrial
disputes with its union, which was recognised under the 1971
Act. Clause 17 of the Settlement provided that the
493
company shall deduct an amount equivalent to 15% of the
gross arrears payable under the Settlement to each employee
towards contribution to the fund of the recognised union-
The appellant, a non-recognised union challenged in a writ
petition before the High Court the constitutional validity
of Clause 17 of the Settlement on the grounds, inter alia.
(i) that Clause 17 permits a compulsory exaction not
parented by the Payment of Wages Act from the arrears
payable to the workmen who are not the members of the
recognised union; (ii) that section 20 of the 1971 Act is
unconstitutional, since (a) it 1 unquestionably denies to
the workman who are not members of a recognised union, the
fundamental freedom guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a)
and(e) inasmuch as it inheres the pernicious tendency to
compel the Workmen to join the union which has acquired the
status of a recognised union even if it followed a socio-
economic or socio-political philosophy contrary to the
philosophy of non-members; (b) it denies to the unrecognised
union, the right to effectively participate in any
proceeding concerning the workmen of an industrial
undertaking, some of whom have formed a separate trade union
and (c) it does not treat all the unions at par as the
members of non-recognised union are compelled to be bound by
the action of the recognised union. The Single Judge of the
High Court dismissed the writ petition and the same was
affirmed in appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court.
Hence this appeal.
Dismissing the appeal by the appellant,
^
HELD: 1.1. In order to appreciate the controversy
between the parties a brief review of the Scheme of the 1971
Act would be advantageous. On the advent of industrial
revolution which aimed at mass production of commodities,
large scale industrial units came to be set up resulting in
concentration of workmen at one place under one employer.
Trade union movement representing the organised labour
developed as an adjunct of political party. The organised
Labour as a vote banks was assiduously wooed by political
parties. Every political party with a view to controlling
vote banks set up its labour wings. Combinations and
fragmentations of politics] parties had the pernicious
effect on trade union. Multiplicity of political parties had
its spill over in multiplicity of trade unions seeking to
represent workmen in an industrial undertaking or industry,
as the case may be. The fall out of the multiplicity of
unions was inter union and intra-union rivalry which
threatened peaceful working of the industrial undertaking or
the industry. Each union, as the unfortunate experience
shows, tried to over-reach the rival by making occasionally
experience and untenable demands. The emerging situation led
to conflict and confrontation disturbing industrial peace
and harmony directly affecting production. Therefore, a need
was felt that where there are multiple unions seeking to
represent workmen in an undertaking or in an industry, a
concept of recognised union must be developed In fact, even
amongst trade union leaders there was near unanimity that
the concept of recognised union as the sole bargaining agent
must be developed in the larger interest of industrial peace
and harmony. National Commission on Labour also after
unanimously and whole-heatedly expressing itself in favour
of the concept of recognised union and it being clothed with
powers of sole bargaining agent with exclusive right to r-
present workmen, addressed itself only to the question of
the method of ascertaining which amongst various rival
unions must be accorded the status of a recognised union and
it was agreed that the union which
494
represents the largest number of workmen working in the
undertaking must acquire the status as that would be in tune
with the concept of industrial democracy. [499H; 501B; 502G-
H; 503A-B; D-G]
1.2. It is therefore clear that every one was agreed
that where there are multiple unions in an industrial
undertaking or an industry, the union having the largest
membership of the workmen must be clothed with the status of
recognised union and consequently as the sole bargaining
agent. The under lining assumption was that the recognised
union represents all the workmen in the industrial
undertaking or in the industry. Thus, the 1971 Act was
enacted as its long title shows to provide for the
recognition of trade unions for facilitating collective
bargaining for certain undertakings, to state their rights
and obligations, to confer certain powers on unrecognised
unions; to provide for declaring certain strikes and
lockouts as illegal strikes and lock-outs; to define and
provide for the prevention of certain unfair labour
practices; to constitute courts (as independent machinery)
for carrying out the purposes of according recognition to
trade unions and for enforcing the provisions relating to
unfair practices etc. [504A-B; 499E-F]
1.3. Status to be the sole bargaining agent as a
recognised union is a hard won battle and need not be
permitted to be frittered away by a sentimental approach
that where trade union movement has ideological overtones,
such a provision would compel workmen either to become
members of a union, whose socio-political philosophy is not
in tune with his own or suffer isolation as such workman
cannot forge a tool of a trade union or even if they forge
one, the employer can ignore it with impunity. The matter
cannot be viewed from the perspective of same ideloguis but
has to be examined in the large perspective of public
interest of peace and harmony in the industry, healthy
industrial relations and large national interest which
eschews strikes, lock outs, conflict and confrontation.
[504H, 505A-B]
2.1. Sec. 20, sub-sec. 2 while conferring exclusive
right on the recognised union to represent workmen in any
proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
simultaneously denying the right to be represented by any
individual workman has taken care to retain the exception as
enacted in Sec. 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
This legal position is reiterated in Sec. 20(2) (b).
Therefore, while interpreting Sec. 20(2) (b), it must be
kept in view that an individual workman, who has his
individual dispute with the employer arising out of his
dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination of service
will not suffer any disadvantage if any recognised union
would not espouse his case and he will be able to pursue his
remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Once this
protection is assured, the question is whether the status to
represent workmen conferred on a recognised union to the
exclusion of any individual workman or one or two workmen
and who are not members of the recognised onion would deny
to such workmen the fundamental freedom guaranteed under
Art. 19(1) (a) and 19(1) (c) of the Constitution. [506B-D]
2.2. The restriction on the right to appear and
participate in a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 to a workman who is not prepared to be represented
by the recognised union in respect of a dispute not personal
to him alone such as termination of his service does not
deny him the freedom
495
of speech and expression or to form an association.
Conferring the status of A recognised union on the union
satisfying certain pre-requisites which the other union is
not in a position to satisfy does not deny the right to form
association [506E.F]
2.3. Forming an association is entirely independent
and different from its recognition. Recognition of a union
confers rights, duties and obligations Non-conferring of
such rights, duties and obligations on a union other than
the recognised union does not put it on an inferior position
nor the charge of discrimination can be entertained. The
members of a non-recognised association can fully enjoy
their fundamental freedom of speech and expression as also
to form the association. The Legislature has, in fact, taken
note of the existing phenomenon in trade unions where there
would be unions claiming to represent workmen in an
undertaking or industry other than recognised union. Sec.22
of 1971 Act confers some specific rights on such non-
recognised unions, one such being the right to meet and
discuss with the employer the grievances of individual
workman The Legislature has made a clear distinction between
individual grievance of a workman and an industrial dispute
affecting all or a large number of workmen In the case of
even an unrecognised union, it enjoys the statutory right to
meet and discuss the grievance of individual workman with
employer. It also enjoys the statutory right to appear and
participate in a domestic or departmental enquiry in which
itsh member is involved. this is statutory recognition of an
unrecognised union. The exclusion is partial and the embargo
on such unrecognised union or individual workman to
represent workmen is in the large interest of industry,
public interest and national interest. Such a provision
could not be said to be violative of fundamental freedom
guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(c) of the
Constitution. [506H; 507A-D]
3. Where a representative union acts in exercise of
the powers conferred by Sec 20(2) it is obligatory upon it
to act in a manner as not to discriminate between its
members and other workmen of the undertaking who are not its
members. However when a settlement is reached in a
proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act in which a
representative union has appeared, the same is to be binding
on all the workmen of the undertaking This would mean that
neither the representative union nor the employer can
discriminate between members of the representative union and
other workmen who are not members. Both the benefits,
advantages, disadvantages or liabilities arising out of a
settlement in any proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act to which a representative union is a party shall be
equally applicable to each workman in the undertaking There
shall not be the slightest trace of discrimination between
members and non-members both as regards the advantages and
also as regards the obligations and liabilities. Any other
view of Sec. 20(2)(b) would render it unconstitutional and
invalid as being violative of Art. 14. Equal treatment of
members and non-members is implicit in the section and by
its interpretation this Court only makes it explicit. [511F-
H; 512A-B]
(4) It is well known that no deduction could be made
from the wages and salary payable to a workmen governed by
the Payment of Wages Act unless authorised by that Act. A
settlement arrived at on consent of parties can however
permit a deduction as it is the outcome of understanding
between the parties even though such deduction may not be
authorised or legally permissible under the Payment of Wages
Act. [512D-E] H
496
(5) If under a settlement with the representative
union some benefits accrue to the workmen, and upon a true
interpretation of Sec. 20(2)(b), it is held all encompassing
and therefore binding on all workmen employer alike, all the
benefits would be available to the workmen who are not
members of the representative union and who may have formed
a rival union. If these work- i men could not be denied the
benefits, they would enjoy an unfair advantage if from the
package deal covered by the settlement, they draw benefits
and abjure liabilities. therefore, a clause like Clause 17
of the Settlement has to be understood in the context of
strengthening the trade union movement and to free it from
financial constraints. Workmen who are members of a union
may pay fee for membership and enjoy the advantage or
membership put if by the action of the representative union
all workmen acquire benefit or monetary advantage, the
members and non-members alike can be made to make common
sacrifice in the large interest of trade union movement and
to strengthen the trade union which by its activities
acquired the benefits for all workmen. Payment to trade
union fund in these circumstances can be styled as quid pro
quo for benefits acquired. It can neither be said to be
compulsory exaction nor a tax. Therefore, there is nothing
objectionable in Clause 17 of the Settlement which directs
the employer to deduct 15% of the gross arrears payable to
each employee under the settlement as contribution to the
trade union funds. Thereby the workman is not subscribing to
the philosophy of rival union but he is merely paying the
price of the advantage obtained. Another view would make the
union members suffer and the non-members benefit, a
situation which must at all costs be avoided. Therefore
clause 17 of the Settlement would not be invalid despite the
lack of consent of the workmen who are members of the
appellant union. The settlement having been made by the
representative union, its right to represent all workmen
would imply the consent of the members of the rival union.
This is the legal consequenee of the right of the
representative union to represent all workmen and the
binding effect of its action. [513G-H; 514A-E]
Reg. v. Duffield, 5, Cox’s Criminal Case, 404 referred
to.
Raja Kulkarni and Ors. v. State of Bombay [1954] SCR
384, relied upon.
Rum Prasad Vishwakarma v. The Chairman Industrial
Tribunal, [1964] 3 SCR 196, held in-applicable.
Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. Gujarat Spinning and
Weaving Mills Ltd. [1962] 2 Supp. SCR 890 and Santuram
Khudai v. Kimatrai Printers & Processors (P) Ltd. & Ors.,
[1978] 2 SCR 387, distinguished.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3527
(NL) of 1984
From the Judgment and Order/decree dated July 27, 1984
of the High Court of Bombay in Appeal No. 660 of 1984.
Danial Latifi, V.S. Desai R.S. Sodhi, K.V. Sreekumar, M.N.
Shroff and Ms. Radha-de’ Souza for the Appellants.
497
M.K. Ramamurthi, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, F.D Damania, A.M.
A Dittia and D.N. Misra or the Respondents.
M.N. Shroff the State of Maharashtra
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DESAI, J Two unions of workmen employed in the first
respondent Company M/S Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd (‘employer’
for short) are at logger-heads and their inter-se rivalry
has thus landed in this Court. Appellant Balmer Lawrie
Workers Union (‘non-recognised Union’ for short) filed Writ
Petition No. 1518 of 1984 in the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay challenging the constitutional validity of Sec. 20
(2) read with Schedule I of the Maharashtra Recognition of
Trade Union & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,
1971 (’1971 Act’ for short). To this petition, they
impleaded the employer company and the Balmer Lawrie
Employees Union (‘Recognised Union’ for short).
Few facts giving rise to the writ petition may be
stated. A settlement was arrived at between the employer and
the recognised Union resolving a number of industrial
disputes pending between them. Clause 17 of the Settlement
reads as under:
“17. Arrears will he paid within two months
from the date of signing of the. Settlement. Further,
the Company shall collect from each workman an amount
equivalent to 15% of the gross arrears payable to each
employee under this settlement as contribution to the
Union Fund and this Amount shall be paid to the Union
within 3 days of the payment of arrears by Payee’s .A/c
Cheque.”
The non-recognised union -the appellant apprehending
that if and when settlement would be arrived at between the
employer and the recognised union, there would be the usual
clause for deduction from amounts payable to the workmen
under the settlement for the benefit of the recognised union
Therefore the non-recognised union informed the employer not
to make any deduction pursuant to the settlement from the
arrears payable to the members of the non-recognised union
as and when the settlement is arrived at. Correspondence
ensued between the parties which led to the filing of the
writ petition No. 473 of 1984. This writ petition was moved
to forestall the settlement if any about any deduction from
the payments under the settlement as and when arrived at. An
undertaking was given before the
498
High Court that the employer would give notice of the
settlement, if it is finally arrived at and will implement
the same only a week thereafter. On this undertaking, the
writ petition was withdrawn. Thereafter the settlement was
arrived at which inter-alia included Clause No. 17 extracted
hereinbefore. The non-recognised union filed a fresh writ
petition inter alia contending that Clause 7 permits a
compulsory exaction not permitted by the Payment of Wages
Act from the arrears payable to the workmen by the employer,
without the consent of the workmen, who are not the members
of the recognised union. It was alleged in the petition that
if upon its true construction Sec. 20 (2) (b) of 1971 Act
permits such compulsory exaction without the consent of the
workmen concerned, the same will be unconstitutional
inasmuch as such union levy would force and compel the
workmen against their will to join the union which has
acquired the status of recognised union. Specific allegation
was that Sec. 20 (2) violates the fundamental freedom to
form association guaranteed by Art 19 (1) (c). There were
other incidental grievances made in the petition but the
main thrust of the petition was against the constitutional
validity of aforementioned section. The learned Single Judge
dismissed the writ petition and after an unsuccessful appeal
to the Division Bench of the High Court this appeal was
filed by special leave
Mr. Daniel Latifi learned counsel who appeared for the
appellant assisted by Mrs. Radha D. De’souja, the President
of non-recognised union and also as counsel appearing for
non-recognised union urged that if Sec. 20 (2) is so
interpreted as to mean that the employer or the recognised
union can discriminate between the members of the recognised
union and non-members though workmen of the same employer,
the same is violative of Art. 14 and if it compels the
workmen to join recognised union it is violative of Art. 19
(1) (a) and (c).
Sec. 20 of the 1971 Act enumerates the rights of the
recognised union. Sec. 20 (2) reads as under:
“20 (2): Where there is a recognised union for
any undertaking,-
(a) that union alone shall have the right to appoint
its nominees to represent workmen on the Works
Committee constituted under Section 3 of the
Central Act:
(b) no employee shall be allowed to appear or act or
be Hallowed to be represented in any proceedings
under the
499
Central Act (not being a proceeding in which the
legality or propriety of an order of dismissal,
discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of
service or suspension of an employee is under
consideration), except through the recognised
union; and the decision arrived at or order made,
in such proceeding shall be binding on all the
employees in such undertaking;
and accordingly the provisions of the Central
Act, that is to say, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
shall stand amended in the manner and to the extent
specified in Schedule I.”
Does Sec. 20 (2) which confers an exclusive right to
represent workmen of any undertaking on a union which
acquires the status of a recognised union under 1971 Act and
simultaneously denies the right to a workman to appear or
act or to be allowed to represent in any proceeding under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘lD Act’ for short)
violate the fundamental freedom to form association
guaranteed by Art 19 (1) (c).
The 1971 Act was enacted as its long title shows to
provide for the recognition of trade unions for facilitating
collective bargaining for certain undertakings, to state
their rights and obligations, to confer certain powers on
unrecognised unions; to provide for declaring certain
strikes and lock-outs as illegal strikes and lock-outs; to
define and provide for the prevention of certain unfair
labour practices; to constitute court (as independent
machinery) for carrying out the purposes of according
recognition to trade unions and for enforcing the provisions
relating to unfair practices etc There is in force in the
State of Maharashtra a comprehensive legislation, Bombay
Industrial Relations Act, 1946 touching almost all aspects
of industrial relations but it applies only to specified
industries. Industries other than specified industries are
governed by industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This latter act
is not comprehensive in character There is no provisions for
recognising union vis-a-vis the undertaking or the industry.
Unions of workmen employed by undertakings not governed by
Bombay Industrial Relations Act voiced dissatisfaction over
this discriminatory treatment and the lacuna in the 1947
Act. To bring the provisions of both the acts on par in
certain specific areas 1971 Act was enacted by the State
Legislature.
A brief review of the scheme of the 1971 Act would be
advantageous. It specifically provides for recognition of
unions. A conspectus of provisions included in Chapter III
headed recognition of unions
500
provide that every undertaking wherein 50 or more employes
are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding 12
months will be governed by the provisions therein set out.
Sec. I l provides for making of an application for
recognition of union. The eligibility criterion for
obtaining the recognition is that the union applying for the
status of a recognised union must have for the whole of the
period of six calendar months immediately preceding the
calendar month in which it makes the application, a
membership of not less than thirty percent of the total
number of employees employed in any undertaking. The
application has to be made to the Industrial Court set up
under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. On receipt of the
application, the Industrial Court has to cause a notice to
be displaced on the notice board of the undertaking,
declaring its intention to consider the said application on
a date to be specified in the notice and calling upon other
union or unions, if any, having membership of employees in
that undertaking and the employers and the employees
affected by the proposal to show cause why the recognition
should not be granted. If after considering all the
objections that may have been lodged pursuant to the notice
given as hereinbefore indicated, the industrial Court comes
to the conclusion that the conditions requisite for
registration are satisfied and the union complies with the
conditions specified in Sec 19, the Industrial Court shall
grant recognition to the applicant union under the Act and
issue a certificate in the prescribed form. At any point of
time, there shall not be more than one recognised union in
respect of the same undertaking. Sec. 13 confers power on
the Industrial Court to cancel the recognition if any of the
circumstances therein set out is satisfactorily established.
Sec. 14 provides for resolving the dispute inter se between
the recognised union and another union seeking recognition.
The obligations and rights of the recognised union are set
out in Secs. 19 and 20 in Chapter IV.
Mr. Daniel Latifi, learned counsel urged that the
embargo placed by Sec. 20 (2) (b) on any workman to appear
or to be represented in any proceeding under the ID Act 1947
barring those which are specifically excluded save by the
recognised union contravenes the fundamental freedom
guaranteed to the citizens under Art 19 (1) (a) and (c) of
the Constitution Art. 19 (1) (a) guarantees to the citizens
fundamental freedom of speech and expression and Art. 19 (1)
(c) guarantees fundamental freedom to form association.
Tersely put the question is: if a law relating to regulating
industrial relations between the employer and workmen
provides for a sole bargaining agent such as the recognised
union and simultaneously denies to the individual workman
the right to appear or to be represented in any
501
proceeding under the ID Act, 1947, would it contravene the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (a) and 19
(1) (c) ?
History bears a witness to the long-drawn out
unequal fight between the employer and the employed to be on
terms of equality. A brief resume would be helpful.
On the advent of industrial revolution which aimed at
mass production of commodities, large scale industrial units
came to be set up resulting in concentration of workmen at
one place under one employer. Individual employer has now
been replaced by corporations wielding immense economic
power. To say that workmen were at the mercy of the employer
is to state the obvious. It was even sacrilegious to think
of a right of a workman qua the employer Till the laissez
faire ruled the roost the State would not interpose itself
to protect the under-privileged and weaker partner in the
industry and left the workmen to fend for themselves, the
State concerning itself only with the problem of law and
order when a conflict arose between the employer and the
workmen. This was predicated upon an untenable if not wholly
erroneous assumption that as the society has moved from
status to contract, the employer and the workman would by
negotiations churn out a contract mutually beneficial to
both. That the parties were unevenly placed in the matter of
contracting was absolutely over looked. The liberal albeit
capitalist English society treated united refusal of work on
the part of workmen as conspiracy and as Jeremy Benthan put
it “the word conspiracy served judges for an excuse for
inflicting punishment without stint on all persons by whom
any act was committed which did not accord with the Judges’
notion concerning the act in question.” Justice Erle in Reg.
v. Duffield(1) summed up to the Jury as under:
“The unlawful combination and conspiracy is to
be inferred from the conduct of the parties. If several
persons take several steps, all tending towards one
obvious purpose, it is for the jury to say whether
these persons have not combined together to bring about
that and which their conduct appears adapted to
effectuate.”
English Common Law frowned upon combination of
workmen to achieve common object; Common Law looked upon
combination as criminal in character. On the enactment of
the Trade Unions Act, 1913 in United Kingdom, registered
trade union acquired corporate
(1) 5, Cox’s Criminal case. 404.
502
capacity, entitled to sue and be sued in its registered name
and enter into contracts as separate entity, separate from
its members. This status acquired by the trade unions, would
clothe a collective agreement arrived at between the
employer and the union with the semblance of legality though
Common Law for long refused to recognise it as enforceable
contract. Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer’s
Association under the Chairmanship of Lord Donovan (‘Donovan
Commission’ for short) which submitted its report in 1968
proceeded on the basis that collective bargains are not
subject to legal enforcement and number of arguments were
put forth in support of the proposition. Even though the
Commission in concluding portion of paragraph 472 of its
report observed that “Industrywide bargaining and workshops
or plant bargaining are, however, closely intertwined. To
enforce one without the other would be to distort the effect
of our collective system. That system is today a patch-work
of formal agreements, informal agreements and custom and
practice. No Court, asked to enforce a collective agreement
could disentangle the agreement from the inarticulate
practices which are its background.” Quest of justice by
labour, victim for long of exploitation of human being by
impersonal juristic persons such as corporations led to the
formation of industrial norms by a legislative enactment
generally styled as labour law. The main object of labour
law was to be a countervailing force to counter-act the
inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be
inherent in the employment relations. As stated by Otto-
Khan-Freund in his Hamalin lecture “this was an attempt to
infuse law into a relationship of command and obedience, in
other words in the field where one enjoys the power to
command and other suffers the duty to obey. To the extent
law limits the range of workers’ duty of obedience and
enlarges the range of its freedom, Labour Law fulfills one
of its objects.”(1)
In the context of the political society which we
resolved to set up in the post-independent India, on the
introduction of universal adult suffrage by Art. 326 of the
Constitution trade union movement representing the organised
labour developed as an adjunct of political part. The
organised labour as a vote bank was assiduously wood by
political parties. Every political party with a view to
controlling vote banks set up its labour wings. Combinations
and fragmentations of political parties had the pernicious
effect on trade unions. Multipli-
(1) See Report the Labour Laws Review Committee, Govt.
of Gujarat Publication 1974 Page 5.
503
city of political parties had its spill over in multiplicity
of trade unions A seeking to represent workmen in an
industrial undertaking or industry, as the case may be. The
fall out of the multiplicity of unions was inter-union and
intra-union rivalry which threatened peaceful working of the
industrial undertaking or the industry. Each union, as the
unfortunate experience shows, tried to over-reach the rival
by making occasionally exhorbitant and untenable demands.
The emerging situation led to conflict and confrontation
disturbing industrial peace and harmony directly affecting
production In the first Five Year Plan it was observed:
“Answer to class antagonism and world conflict
will arrive soon if we succeed in discovering a sound
basis for human relations in industry. Industrial
relations are there fore, not a matter between the
employers and employees alone but a vital concern of
the community which may be expressed in measures for
the protection of its larger interests.”
A need was felt that where there are multiple
unions seeking to represent workmen in an undertaking or in
an industry, a concept of recognised, union must be
developed. Standing Labour Committee of the Union of India
at its 29th Session held in July 1970 addressed itself to
the question of recognition of trade union by the employer.
In fact even amongst trade union leaders there was near
unanimity that the concept of recognised unions the sole
bargaining agent must be developed in the larger interest of
industrial peace and harmony. National Commission on Labour
chaired by late Shri P.B. Gajendragadkar, former Chief
Justice of India, after unanimously and wholeheartedly
expressing itself in favour of the concept of recognised
union and it being clothed with powers of sole bargaining
agent with exclusive right to represent workmen, addressed
itself only to the question of the method of ascertaining
which amongst various rival unions must be accorded the
status of a recognised union. Planting itself firmly in
favour of democratic principle, it was agreed that the Union
Which represents the largest number of workmen working in
the undertaking must acquire the status as that would be in
tune with the concept of industrial democracy. The fissures
arose as to the method of finding out the membership. The
Commission had before it two alternative suggestions for
ascertaining the membership (i) verification of membership
by registers and (ii) by secret ballot. As there was a sharp
cleavage of opinion, the Commission left the question of
adopting one or the other method in a given case to the
proposed Indus-
504
trial Relations Commission which was recommended to be set
up if the recommendations of the Commission were to be
accepted. What is of importance to us is that every one was
agreed that where there are multiple unions in an industrial
undertaking or an industry, the union having the largest
membership of the workmen must be clothed with the status of
recognised union and consequently as the sole bargaining
agent. The underlining assumption was that the recognised
union represent all the workmen in the industrial
undertaking or in the industry.
It may be mentioned in passing that the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act had incorporated provisions for
conferring the status of a recognised union and despite
strident criticism of the method of ascertaining membership,
the system seems to be working well. The Act went further
and developed the concept of approved union on which powers
were conferred for making reference of an industrial dispute
to the relevant authority for adjudication-a power which
under the Central Act is the close preserve of the
appropriate Government. The oft-repeated grievance voiced by
those opposed to the concept of recognised union entitled to
represent all workmen was that such a status will
concentrate so much power in the hands of the recognised
union that it can work to the disadvantage of those not
becoming its members as also those opposed to the political
or social philosophy of the recognised union and would
therefore keep away from it. The chink in the armous
appeared when it was found that a workman who is questioning
his termination of service, largely a personal punishment
and therefore provides a personal cause of action but who
was not a member of the recognised union was sought to be
thrown out of the court by the representative union
appearing to get the petition dismissed on the specious plea
that it alone is entitled to represent workmen. The
Legislature immediately became aware of the pitfall and
remedied the situation by introducing Sec. 2 (A) in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which provides that a workman,
who is dismissed, discharged or removed from service or
whose service is otherwise terminated can espouse his own
cause without the help of a recognised union and yet such a
dispute would be an industrial dispute. This very protection
is retained in the impugned provision Sec. 20 (2) (b).
Status to be the sole bargaining agent as a recognised union
is a hard won battle and need not be permitted to be
frittered away by a sentimental approach that where trade
union movement has idelogical overtones, such a provision
would compel workmen either to become members of a union,
whose socio-political philosophy is not in tune with his own
or suffer isolation as such workman can
505
not forge a to 1 of A trade union or even if they form one,
the employer can ignore it with impunity. Is there any
substance either in the contention or the apprehension
voiced ? The matter cannot be viewed from the perspective of
same ideloguis but has to be examined in the large
perspective of public interest of peace and harmony in the
industry, healthy industrial relations and large national
interest which eschews strikes, lock-outs, conflict and
confrontation.
Having briefly referred the history of the development
of trade unions, let us turn to the challenge in this case.
Mr. Daniel Latifi contended that Sec 20 unquestionably
denies to the workmen who are not members of a recognised
union the fundamental freedom guaranteed under Art. 19 (1)
(a) and (c). It was urged that the provisions of the Act
inheres the pernicious tendency to compel the workmen to
join the union which has acquired the status of a recognised
union even if followed a socio-economic or socio-political
philosophy contrary to the philosophy of non-members and
that such compulsion denies the free dom to form
association. It was also submitted that the right to form
association would be an empty formality if the association
is not in a position to effectively participate in any
proceeding concerning the workmen of an industrial
undertaking, some of whom have formed a separate trade
union. It was stated that either all the unions of the
workmen should be treated on par or at any rate in order to
safe guard the members of non-recognised union against the
imposition of the will of recognised union, they must be
free not to be bound by the action of the recognised-union.
It was stated that Sec. :0 (2) of the 1971 Act denies all
these safeguards and therefore it must be declared
unconstitutional.
Before the introduction of Sec. 2-A in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the court leaned in favour of
the view that individual dispute cannot be comprehended in
the expression ‘industrial dispute’ as defined in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Any dispute not espoused by
the union for the general benefit of all workmen or a
sizeable segment of them would not be comprehended in the
expression ‘industrial dispute’ was the courts’ view. Often
an invidious situation arose out of this legal conundrum. An
individual workman if punished by the employer and if he was
not a member of the recognised union, the latter was very
reluctant to espouse the cause of such stray workman and the
individual workman was without a remedy. Cases came to light
where the recognised union by devious means compelled the
workmen to be its member before it would espouse their
causes. The trade union tyranny was taken note of by the
legis-
506
lature and Sec. 2-A was introduced in the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 by which it was made distinctly clear
that the discharge, dismissal retrenchment or termination of
service of the individual workman would be an industrial
dispute notwithstanding that no other workman or any union
of workman is a party to the dispute. Sec. 20, sub-sec. 2
while conferring exclusive right on the recognised union to
represent workmen in any proceeding under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 simultaneously denying the right to be
represented by any individual workman has taken care to
retain the exception as enacted in Sec. 2 A. This legal
position is reiterated in Sec. 20 (2) (b). Therefore while
interpreting Sec. 20 (2) (b) it must be kept in view that an
individual workman, who has his individual dispute with the
employer arising out of his dismissal, discharge,
retrenchment or termination of service will not suffer any
disadvantage if any recognised union would not espouse his
case and he will be able to pursue his remedy under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Once this protection is
assured, let us see whether the status to represent workmen
conferred on a recognised union to the exclusion of any
individual workman or one or two workmen and who are not
members of the recognised union would deny to such workmen
the fundamental freedom guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (a) and
19 (1) (c) of the Constitution.
We fail to see how the restriction on the right to
appear and participate in a proceeding under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to a workman who is not prepared to be
represented by the recognised union ill respect of a dispute
not personal to him alone such as termination of his service
denies him the freedom of` speech and expression or to form
an association. Conferring the status of recognised union on
the union satisfying certain pre-requisites which the other
union is not in a position to satisfy does not deny the
right to form association. in fact the appellant union has
been registered under the Trade Unions Act and the members
have formed their association without let or hindrance by
anyone. Not only that the appellant union can communicate
with the employer, it is not correct to say that the
disinclination of the workmen to join the recognised union
violates the fundamental freedom to form association. It is
equally not correct to say that recognition by an employer
is implicit in the fundamental freedom to form an
association. Forming an association is entirely independent
and different from its recognition. Recognition of a union
confers rights, duties and obligations. Nonconferring of
such rights, duties and obligations on a union other than
the recognised union does not put it on an inferior position
nor the charge of discrimination can be entertained. The
members of a
507
non-recognised association can fully enjoy their fundamental
freedom A of speech and expression as also to form the
association.
The Legislature has in fact taken note of the existing
phenomenon in trade unions where there would be unions
claiming to represent workman in an undertaking or industry
other than recognised union. Sec. 22 of 1971 Act confers
some specific rights on such non- recognised unions, on such
being the right to meet and discuss with the employer the
grievances of individual workman The Legislature has made a
clear distinction between individual grievance of a workman
and an individual dispute affecting all or a large number of
workmen. In the case of even an unrecognised union, it
enjoys the statutory right to appear and discuss the
grievance of individual workmen with employer. It also
enjoys the statutory right to appear and participate in a
domestic or departmental enquiry in which its member is
involved. This is statutory recognition of an unrecognised
union. The exclusion is partial and the embargo on such
unrecognised union or individual workman to represent
workman is in the large interest of industry, public
interest and national interest. Such a provision could not
be said to be violative of fundamental freedom guaranteed
under Art. 19 (1) (a) or 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution
Having examined the contention on principle, we may
now turn to precedents brought to our notice.
In Raja Kulkarni and Ors. v. State of Bombay(1), one
of the contentious canvassed before the Constitution Bench
was that Sec. 13 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
1946 as it then stood provided that a union can be
registered as a representative union for an industry in a
local area if it has for the whole of the period of three
months next preceding the date of its application, a
membership of not less than 15% of the total number of
employees employed in any F industry in any local area. If
the union does not satisfy that condition and has a
membership of not less than 5%, it could be registered as a
qualified union Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh was registered
as a representative union while the Mill Mazdoor Sabha was
registered as a qualified union. It was contended on behalf
to Mill Mazdoor Sabha of which the appellants before this
Court were the office-bearers that the provisions that
conferred an exclusive right only on the representative
union to represent workmen was violative of fundamental
freedoms guaranted to the members of Mill Mazdoor Sabha
.
(1) [1954] SCR 384.
508
or any other workman who is not a member of the
representative union under Art. 19 (1) (a) and (c) and was
also violative of Art. 14 inasmuch as the two
representatives of workmen were denied equality before law
or the equal protection of laws. The Constitution Bench
repelled the contention observing that such a provision does
no t deny either the fundamental freedom of speech and
expression or the right to form association. The Court said
that it is always open to the workmen who are not members of
the representative union to form their own association or
union and to claim higher percentage of membership so as to
dethrone the representative union and take its place. This
decision should have concluded the matter. Mr. Latifi
however, urged that this decision is of no assistance
because it was rendered at a time when sub-sec. (2) Of Sec.
114 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 provided
that where the representative union is a party to a
registered agreement or settlement, submission or award the
Provincial Government may after giving the parties affected
an opportunity of being hard by notification in the Official
Gazette direct that such agreement, settlement, submission
or award shall be binding union such other employers and
employees in such industry or occupation in that local areas
as may be specified in the notification. There was a proviso
to sub-sec. (2) which provided that before giving a
direction under sub-sec. (2) the Provincial Government may
in such cases as it deems fit, make a reference to the
Industrial Court for its opinion. It was urged that workmen
in an industry or in an undertaking, who are not members of
the representative union would not be bound by a settlement,
sub mission or award to which representative union alone is
a party, unless the Provincial Government took action under
sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 114 and there was a further safeguard
inasmuch as before making such a settlement, submission or
award binding on all workmen, a reference to the Industrial
Court for its opinion could be made. It was urged that these
safeguards are missing inasmuch as Sec. 20 (2) would make a
settlement or award to which a representative union is a
party binding on all the workmen in to undertaking or the
industry as the case may be and therefore the aforementioned
decision can be distinguished. We see no merit in this
submission. This Court did not uphold the vires of the
relevant provisions on the ground that there were safeguards
for non-members. The provision was held intra-vires on the
broad features of the pro visions that they neither deny the
fundamental freedom guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (a) nor 19
(1) (c).
In Ram Prasad Vishwakarma v. The Chairman, Industrial
Tribu-
509
nal(1), an industrial dispute arising out of the termination
of service A of the appellant in that case was espoused by
the union and which was referred for adjudication to the
Tribunal. When the matter was before the Tribunal, the
appellant workman made an application that he may be
permitted to represent his case by his two colleagues and at
any rate not by the Secretary of the union The Tribunal
rejected the application and after an unsuccessful writ
petition the matter came to this Court. It was contended
that even though the case of the appellant was espoused by
the union, he was entitled to a separate representation.
Repelling the contention, this Court held that any
individual grievance is not comprehended in the expression
‘industrial dispute’ as defined and the dispute would only
acquire the character of an industrial dispute if espoused
by the union and therefore, the workman would not be
entitled to a separate representation. The decision turns on
the interpretation of expression ‘industrial dispute and
before the introduction of Sec. 2-A in the Industrial
Disputes act, 1947. It does not shed any light on the issue
under discussion.
In Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. Gujarat Spinning and
Weaving Mills Ltd.,(2) the right of the representative union
to appear in a proceeding under the Bombay Industrial
Relations Act to the execusion of the workmen likely to be
adversely affected by the decision of the court came up for
consideration. The representative union and the employer
entered into a settlement for grant of bonus to the workmen
and in consideration thereof the representative union agreed
not to press for any compensation for the workmen discharged
by the employer. Subsequently 376 persons, who had been in
the employment of the company prior- to its closure gave
notice under Sec. 42 (1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations
Act and claimed compensation for the period of closure. As
the parties failed to arrive at a settlement, an application
under Sec. 42 (4) was made to the Labour Court. During the
pendency of this application, the representative union made
appearance before the Labour Court and contended that the
application should be dismissed in view of the compromise
which had been arrived at before the Labour Appellate
Tribunal. The Labour Court accepted the contention and
dismissed the application. In the appeal to the Industrial
Court, it was contended that considering that no individual
workman could be permitted to appear in any proceeding where
representative union appears as representative of employees,
yet if the action of the representative union was malafide,
(1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 196.
(2) [1962] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 890.
510
the Labour Court should not have permitted the
representative union to appear and thereby deny the
adversely affected workmen to be represented and then non-
suited at the instance of the representative union The
Industrial Court dismissed the appeal. A writ petition to
the High Court failed and thereafter the matter was brought
to this Court. After an exhaustive review of the various
provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, this
Court held that bona fides or the mala fides of the
representative union can have nothing to do with the ban
imposed upon appearance of any one other than a
representative union in any proceeding under the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act The decision goes so far as to
suggest that even where the action of The representative
union may be such as would appear to be disadvantageous to
some workmen yet its action has to be judged in the light of
the fact that it does not tend to cater to the needs of a
section of the workmen but the workmen represented by it as
a whole. Incidentally it must be pointed out that the
question of vires was not raised in this case.
The view taken in Girja Shankar’s case was affirmed
and approved in Santuram Khudai v. Kimatrai Printers &
Processors (p) Ltd.& Ors (1) wherein this Court observed
that the legislature has clothed the representative union
with exclusive right to appear or act behalf of the
employees in any proceeding under the Bombay Industrial
Relations Act and has simultaneously deprived the individual
employee or workman of the right to appear or act in any
proceeding under the Act where representative union enters
appearance or acts as representative union of employees. The
question of vires was not raised.
Prima facie on the arguments urged and decisions
examined, we are satisfied that there is no substance in the
challenge that Sec. 20 (2) (b) upon its true construction
violates Art. 19 (1) (a) and (c) of the Constitution. We
must however make it clear that we may keep this question of
constitutionality open for a more detailed argument and in-
depth examination because in this case at the fag end of
arguments, the parties more or less buried the hatchet and
there was the spirit of give and take to which we would
presently advert.
The change in the law made by the introduction of Sec.
2-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been taken note
of by the State Legislature in introducing a safeguard in
Sec. 20 (2) (b) in that
(1) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 387.
511
an individual workman who has been either dismissed,
discharged, A removed, retrenched or whose services has been
terminated in any manner or who is suspended would be on his
own entitled to raise an industrial dispute concerning the
termination of his service in any manner and he would be
able to pursue his remedy in a proceeding arising out of the
legality or validity of the order of termination of service.
The representative union would not be able to supplant the
workman by its appearance and act to the detriment of the
workman Cases are not unknown where an individual workman
whose services has been terminated and who wanted his cause
to be espoused by the union was not only ignored by the
union but occasionally the power of representative union to
exclude the workman from the proceeding was exercised to the
disadvantage of the workman by appearing in the proceeding
and after excluding the workman to so get the proceedings
disposed of as to be wholly disadvantageous to the workman
and the workman was left without a remedy Care has been
taken to deny such steam rolling power to the representative
union and this position is further strengthened by the
provisions contained in Sec. 22 of the 1971 Act which
confers certain rights on unrecognised unions more
especially right to meet and discuss with the employer the
grievances of an individual member relating to his
discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or
suspension as also to appear on behalf of its members
employed in the undertaking in any domestic or departmental
enquiry held by the employer. This is certainly an advance
on the similar provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations
Act.
Sec. 20 (2) (b) is more or less in pari materia with
the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946,
The provisions relating to the status, character, powers and
obligations of a representative union as envisaged in the
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 have been extended to
cover industries not governed by that Act but by the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Where a representative union
acts in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 20 (2) it
is obligatory upon it to act in a manner as not discriminate
between its members and other workmen of the undertaking who
are not its members. However when a settlement is reached in
a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes act in which a
representation union has appeared, the same is to he binding
on all the workman of the undertaking. This would mean that
neither the representative union nor the employer can
discriminate between members of the representative union and
other workmen who are not members. Both the benefits,
advantages, disadvantages or liabilities arising out of a
settlement in any proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act to
512
which a representative union is a party shall be equally
applicable to each workman in the undertaking. There shall
not be the slightest trace of discrimination between members
and non-members both as regards the advantages and also as
regards the obligations and liabilities. Any other view of
Sec. 20 (2) (b) would render it unconstitutional and invalid
as being violative of Art 14. Equal treatment of members and
non-members is implicit in the section and by its
interpretation we only make it explicit.
A serious grievance was vioiced by Mr. Latifi that by
the impugned Clause 17 of the Settlement, the non-members
are subjected to compulsory exaction for the benefit of the
representative union with whose philosophy the non-members
are not in agreement and they are made to pay to advance a
rival philosophy. It was urged that this is some-thing like
a tax for the propogation of a philosophy which the members
of the appellant union consider harmful or disadvantageous
to the workmen in general. Clause 17 of the settlement is
already extracted. After a strike, a settlement was arrived
at between the first respondent employer and the second
respondent representative union, Clause 17 of which mandated
the employer to deduct 15% of the gross arrears payable
under the settlement to each employee as contribution to the
union fund. It is well-known that no deduction could be made
from the wages and salary payable to a workman governed by
the Payment of Wages Act unless authorised by that Act. A
settlement arrived at on consent of parties can however
permit a deduction as it is the outcome of understanding
between the parties even though such deduction may not be
authorised or legally permissible under the Payment of Wages
Act.
The contention is that where members who form a union
pay the membership fee and receive the benefits or
advantages of being members of the union yet, persons who
are not members of the union without their consent were
forced to part with their earnings as if paying a tax which
is compulsory. If the same is held permissible under Sec. 20
(2) (b), either the section will be constitutionally invalid
or that part of the settlement being severable would be
illegal and invalid qua non-members On the face of it, the
contention appears to be attractive but anyone who, has some
understanding and appreciation of the working of a trade
union would be able to fully appreciate the provision like
the one under discussion. Though unfortunate, it is
notorious that in some cases resorting to strike has by
itself become an industry and the unions invest in the
strike by sustaining morale of the workmen
513
when during the strike the employer would deny wages. In a
case of genuine grievances and forced strike, the workmen
unable to stand up for want of wherewithal or cushions, the
trade union may help them sustain their vigour by some
monetary assistance during the period of strike. When the
strike ends in a settlement or where even without a strike.
benefits under a settlement are made retro-active and the
arrears are required to be paid under the settlement,
naturally the union in order to vigorously carry on its
activities free from financial constraints would expect the
workmen for whose benefit the dispute was raised which on
settlement may bring in monetary benefits to reimburse
itself. As the members and non-members are entitled to equal
treatment under the settlement both can be asked as a
condition of settlement to part with a portion of the
benefits towards union activities. Such deductions can
neither be said to be compulsory exaction nor a tax.
Therefore such a provision of deduction at a certain rate as
agreed between the parties for payment to the union, the
same being with the consent and as part of overall
settlement would neither be improper nor impermissible nor
illegal.
Mr. Daniel Latifi, however, urged that in case of
non-members, the deduction would be without their consent,
and therefore has the nefarious tendency of making non-
members pay for the benefit of a rival union. Expanding the
submission, he urged that the trade-union movement has more
or less developed as an appendage of the political parties
and therefore each union is influenced by its own parent
identity and therefore the rival union would certainly he
expected to have a rival parent identity and yet the rival
union not having acquired, the status of a representative
union would be compelled by the settlement to contribute to
the coffers of the representative union funds, which would
expended to propogate its own philosophy to the detriment of
the rival union. It was urged that this amounts to
compelling an individual to contribute against his will for
the propogation of the cult of an opponent. Maybe there may
be some harsh truth in the submission. It can not however be
examined from a setarian point of view. The submission has
to be examined in the proper perspective of the trade union
movement. Shorn of embellishment such a provision would show
that benefits and liabilities both must be shared equally.
If under a settlement with the representative union some
benefits accrue to the workmen, and upon a true
interpretation of sec. 20 (2) (b), it is held all
encompassing and therefore binding on all workmen and the
employer alike, all the benefits would be available to the
workmen who are not members of the representative union and
who may have formed a rival union. If these workmen
514
could not be denied the benefits they would enjoy an unfair
advantage if from the package deal covered by the
settlement, they draw benefits and abjure liabilities. Heads
I win and tails you lose could hardly be a fair and just
approach in settling inter-union disputes. Therefore a
clause like Clause 17 of the Settlement has to be understood
in the context of strengthening the trade union movement and
to free it from financial constraints. Workmen who are
members of a union may pay fee for membership and enjoy the
advantage of membership but if by the action of the
representative union all workmen acquire benefit or monetary
advantage, the members and non-members alike can be made to
make common sacrifice in the larger interest of trade union
movement and to strengthen the trade union which by its
activities acquired the benefits for all workmen. Payment to
trade union fund in these circumstances can be styled as
quid pro quo for benefits acquired. Therefore, we see
nothing objectionable in Clause 17 of the Settlement which
directs the employer to deduct 15% of the gross arrears
payable to each employee under the settlement as
contribution to the trade-union funds. Thereby the workman
is not subscribing to the philosophy of rival union but he
is merely paying the price of the advantage obtained.
Another view would make the union members suffer and the
non-members benefit, a situation which must at all costs be
avoided. Therefore clause 17 of the Settlement would not be
invalid despite the lack of consent of the workmen who are
members of the appellant union. The settlement having been
made by the representative union its right to represent all
workman would imply the consent of the members of the rival
union. This is the legal consequence of the right of the
representative union to represent all workmen and the
binding effect of its action.
Mrs. Radha De ‘souza who also appeared along-with Mr.
Daniel Latifi for the appellant-union urged that the refusal
of the representative union to admit all workmen of the
first respondent industrial undertaking had forced those
denied membership to form the appellant union. President of
the second respondent representative union was present in
the Court and after consulting him Mr. M.K. Ramamurthy,
learned counsel stated in the Court that all workmen of the
first respondent industrial undertaking are entitled and
are, eligible to be the members of the representative union
and they will be admitted without let or hindrance on a
proper application being made as members of the second
respondent representative union. Mrs. Radha De’souza stated
that all the members of the appellant-union would as early
as possible make the necessary application and the President
of the second respondent representative
515
union stated that all of them will be admitted without any
further scrutiny. On such membership being granted the
appellant-union would stand dissolved. This would certainly
go a long way to strengthen the trade union movement.
Having considered all the aspects of the matter and
keeping in view the interpretation we have placed on Sec. 20
(2) (b) and Clause 17 of the settlement dated June 18, 1984
this appeal must fail and is dismissed with no order as to
costs.
Whatever benefits are yet to be paid to the members of
the appellant-union under the aforementioned settlement
shall be paid within 2 months from today.
M.L.A. Appeal dismissed.
516