PETITIONER:
RUKMANI BAI GUPTA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE GOVERNMENT OF MADHYA PRADESH BHOPAL& ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1974
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N.
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 991 1975 SCR (3) 72
1975 SCC (1) 627
CITATOR INFO :
D 1976 SC 424 (2)
R 1976 SC1125 (7,11)
ACT:
Madhya Pradesh Minor Minerals Rules, 1961 and Mines and
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, S. 3(e)-
Notification by Central Government of minor minerals-Scope
of-Rules of business.
Practice-Contention not raised before authorities and High
Court-Whether Supreme Court would interfere on such
contention.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent-Government in exercise of the power conferred
under s. 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, 1957 made the Madhya Pradesh Minor Mineral
Rules,- 1961 for grant of prospecting licences and mining
leases in respect of minor minerals. ‘Minor minerals’ are
defined in s. 3(c) of the Act, The Central Government, in
exercise of the power conferred under s. 3(e) issued a
notification in 1958 declaring, inter alia, “limestone used
for lime burning” to be a minor numeral. The notification
was amended in 1961 and the words “limestone used in kilns
for manufacture of lime used as building material” were
substituted.
The appellant was a lessee under a quarrying lease from
1961 to 1966 and it was renewed in 1966 for the period 1966
to 1971 for quarrying “limestone for burning”. Though there
was no option for renewal in the later lease, the appellant
applied for renewal of the lease for “limestone for burning
as a minor mineral.” As the application was not disposed of
in time it was deemed to have been refused and the appellant
applied for review.
Meanwhile, the 5th respondent applied for a quarrying lease
for the same area and as this application was not disposed
of in time, it was also deemed to have been refused and the
5th respondent also applied for review.
The Deputy Secretary rejected the appellant’s
application on the grounds,(a) that the quarrying lease
granted for “limestone for burning’s was null and void,
because, after the 1961 notification the lease was not for a
“minor mineral” and hence no renewal could be granted of a
null and void lease, and (b) the application was not proper,
because, the application was for “limestone for burning” and
hence was not for a minor mineral. The Deputy Secretary, by
the same order, allowed the 5th respondent’s application
observing that ‘there was no other valid application,’ but,
by that time, an application by the appellant for a
quarrying lease of. “limestone used-in kilns for manu-
facture of lime for use as building material,” filed by the
appellant abundanti cautela, was in fact pending before the
authorities.
As the lease deed in favour of the 5th respondent in
pursuance of the grant of the quarrying lease by the Deputy
Secretary, was not executed in time, the Additional
Collector, in exercise of his powers as a delegate of the
State Government. extended the time for execution of the
lease-deed and thereafter, a lease was executed in favour of
the 5th respondent.
The appellant’s application for a fresh lease was again not
disposed of in time and it was deemed to have been refused.
She filed a review application and also a revision against
the order of the Addl. Collector extending the time in
favour of the 5th respondent. The Deputy Secretary agreed
with the contention that the Additional Collector had no
power to extend time but himself extended the period for
execution of the lease deed and rejected the Appellant’s
application for grant of a fresh lease in her favour.
73
The appellant challenged the orders of the Deputy Secretary
but the High Court negatived the challenge,
In appeal to this Court it was contended, (i) that the
quarrying lease for 1966 to 1971 in favour of the appellant
was not void; (ii) the application of renewal by the
appellant was proper; (iii) no Power was delegated to the
Deputy Secretary by the State Government to extend the time
for execution of the lease deed; and (iv) the sanctioning of
the lease in favour of the 5th respondent proceeded on the
wrong basis that it was the only valid application for the
quarrying lease.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD:(1) Both under the original notification of the Central
Government of 1958 and the amended notification of 1961
‘limestone’ was contemplated to be used for burning for
manufacture of lime. The only difference was that for
classification as a minor mineral under the former, burning
could be by any means or process and the lime manufactured
could be for any purpose including building material while
under the latter, the burning should only be in kilns for
the manufacture of lime used only as building material and
for no other purpose. Hence, the use of the expression
“limestone for burning” would not indicate whether ’the
limestone referred to is a minor mineral or not, for that
would depend on how the limestone is to be burnt and for
what purpose. Moreover the proposition that the expression
“limestone for burning” could cover limestone as a minor
mineral is borne out by Schedule 3 of the Rules which
prescribes a minimum output for “limestone (for-burning)”.
Therefore, it could not be said that merely because the
mineral for which the, quarrying lease was granted to the
appellant was described therein as “limestone for burning,”
it was quarrying lease for a mineral which was not a minor
mineral. [78C-G]
In the present case, the application of the appellant. the
order granting the lease, the rule (r. 29) under which the
power was exercised, the Form in which the lease was
executed and the royalty stipulated, all indicated that the
quarrying leasewas in respect of a minor mineral; that
is it was really a quarry lease for”limestone used in
kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material.”It
could not, in the circumstances. be condemned and void.
[78G-79C]
2(a) When column 6 of paragraph 4 of the application
requires an applicant to state the mineral which he intends
to mine, it is for the purpose of intimating to the State
Government the mineral for which the quarrying lease is
applied for. So long as the description given by the
applicant in the column ‘,is sufficient to identify the
mineral, the object of requiring the applicant to give the
information would be satisfied and the application would not
suffer from the fault of being vague or indefinite. In the
present case, the appellant Described the mineral intended
to be mined by her as “limestone for burning as a minor
mineral” that is. “limestone for burning” which was a minor
mineral or in other words “limestone used in kilns for
manufacture of lime used as building material”. Therefore.
the application for renewal was in respect of a minor
mineral and the State Government was wrong in rejecting it
on the ground that it was not an application in respect of a
minor mineral. [79D-G]
(b)But the application for renewal was misconceived
because there was no optionof renewal and hence the State
Government was right in rejecting it. [80C]
(3)The Deputy Secretary, in extending the time for
execution of the lease in favour of the 5th respondent, did
not act as delegate of the State Government, but in exercise
of the power of the State Government under the Rules of
Business. His order extending time was therefore, valid.
[81B-C]
(4)The State Government was in error in sanctioning grant
of lease in favour of the 5th respondent ignoring the
application of the, appellant; but the appellant never
raised this contention at any time before the State Govern-
ment or the High Court and hence, this Court would not be
justified in interfering with the order of the State
Government on this ground. [80 E-G]
74
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil ‘Appeal Nos. 612 & 613
of 1974.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
the 5th May, 1973 and 27th February, 1974 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petns. Nos. 552/72 and Misc.
Petn. No. 675 of 1973 respectively.
T. S. Krishnamurthy, P. V. Lale and S. S. Khanduja and
Sushil Kumar,for the appellant (In C.A. No. 612-13/74).
I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1-3 (In C.A. No.
612/74) and respondents Nos. 1-4 & 6 (In C.A. No. 613/74).
R.S. Dabir , V. S. Dabir, N. M. Ghatate and S.
Balakrishnan, for respondent No. 5 (In both the appeals).
R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 4 (in C.A. No. 612/74.).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-The Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development)
Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) divides
minerals into two classes, namely, minor minerals and
minerals other than minor minerals, which may, for the sake
of brevity, be referred to as major minerals. The Act
itself makes provisions in sections 4 to 13 for regulating
the grant of prospecting licenses and mining leases in
respect of major minerals but so far as minor minerals are
concerned, grant of prospecting licenses and mining leases
is left to be governed by rules to be made by the State
Government under section 15. The Madhya Pradesh Government,
in exercise of the power conferred under section 15, made
the Madhya Pradesh Minor Minerals Rules, 1961 for regulating
the-grant of quarry lease in respect of minor minerals and
for purposes connected therewith. These rules are ex
hypothesi applicable only in relation to grant of quarry
lease in respect of minor minerals. “Minor minerals” are
defined in section 3 (e) to. mean building stores, gravel,
ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for
prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central
Government may, by notification in the official Gazette,
declare to be a minor mineral. The Central Government, in
exercise of the power conferred under section 3(e), issued a
notification dated 1st June, 1958 declaring inter alia
“limestones used for lime burning” to be a minor mineral.
This notification was subsequently amended by the Central
Government by a further notification dated 20th September,
1961 and the words “limestone used in kilns for manufacture
of lime used as building material” were substituted for the words
“limestone used for lime burning”. The result was
that with effect from 20th September, 1961 only limestone
used in kiln for manufacture of lime used for building
material remained a minor mineral while limestone used for
burning for manufacture of lime for other purposes ceased to
be a minor mineral and became a major mineral. The
appellant was a lessee under a quarry lease of 25.32 acres
of land situate in village Badari, Tehsil Kurwara, District
Jabalpur granted to her by the State Government for
quarrying “limestone for burning” for a period of five years
from 21st
75
June, 1961 to 20th June, 1966. This quarry lease was
granted under the Madhya Pradesh Minor Minerals Rules, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and it was in Form V
annexed to the Rules and contained clause (15) giving an
option of renewal to the appellant for a further term of
five years. Before the period of the quarry lease was due
to expire, the appellant applied for renewal in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules and in the application for
renewal against column 6 of paragraph 3 the appellant
described the mineral which she intended to mine as
“limestone for burning”. This application for renewal was
not disposed of by the State Government before the expiry of
the quarry lease and it was, therefore, deemed to have been
refused under rule 8(3). The appellant thereupon made an
application for review under rule 28 and the State
Government, by an order dated 24th December, 1966 made in
exercise of the power conferred under rule 29, sanctioned
renewal of the quarry lease to the appellant. Pursuant to
this order a quarry lease was granted by the State
Government in, favour of the appellant for quarrying
“‘limestone for burning” for a period of five years from
21st June, 1966 to 20th June, 1971. This quarry lease was
also in Form V annexed to the Rules but it did riot contain
clause (15) giving an option of renewal to the appellant.
Even though the last mentioned quarry lease granted to the
appellant did not contain an option of renewal, the
appellant made an application dated 19th June, 1970 to the
State Government for renewal of.the quarry lease which was
due to expire on 20th June, 1971. This application was in
Form I annexed to the Rules and against column 5 of
paragraph 3, which required an applicant to state whether
the application was for a fresh lease or for a renewal of a
lease previously granted, the appellant stated that the
application was for renewal of’ quarry lease. The
application was, there-fore, clearly and avowedly an
application for renewal of the quarry lease which was
subsisting in favour of the appellant and not ‘an
application for a fresh lease. Then again, what was stated
by the appellant against column 6 of paragraph 3 is very
material. The appellant stated there that the mineral which
she intended to mine was “limestone for burning as a minor
mineral”. This application was not disposed of by the State
Government before the expiry of the quarry lease and it was,
therefore, deemed to have been refused on 20th June, 1971.
The appellant thereupon filed an application for review on
1st July, 1971 under rule 28.
Now, sometime after the application for renewal of the
quarry lease was made by the appellant, respondent No. 5
made an application dated 11th September, 1970 for, grant of
a quarry lease in respect of’ the same area. This
application was also in Form I annexed to the Rules and
against column 6 of paragraph 3 it was , stated that the
mineral which the applicant intended to mine-was “limestone
used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building
material”. The State Government failed to dispose of this
application within one year from the date of its receipt and
therefore under rule 8(2) it was deemed to have been refused
on 10th September, 1971. Respondent No. 5 too had, in the
circumstances, no choice but to file an application for
review,under rule 28 on 11th September, 1971.
76
It appears that after the appellant had made the application
for renewal, She felt that there might be some difficulty so
far as that application was concerned, and therefore, with a
view to err on the safe side, she made another
application for grant of a fresh lease on 21st June, 1971
immediately after the expiration of the subsisting lease.
This application in column 6 of paragraph 3 gave a full des-
cription of the mineral which the appellant intended to
mine, namely, “limestone used in kilns for manufacture of
lime for use as building material”. The State Government
failed to dispose of this application also within one year
from the date of its receipt and it was, therefore,by reason
of rule 8(2), deemed to have been refused on 20th June,
1972. The appellant thereupon preferred an application for
review under. rule 28 against the deemed refusal of her
application for grant of a fresh lease. But before that,
the two applications for review, one made by the appellant
on 1st July, 1971 and the other made by respondent No. 5 on
11th September 1971, were disposed of by the Deputy
Secretary exercising the power of the State Government by an
,order dated 19th May, 1972.
The Deputy Secretary by the order dated 19th May, 1972
rejected the application for review made by the appellant on
the ground that “limestone for burning” for which the quarry
lease was granted to the appellant was a major mineral after
the issue of the notification dated 20th September, 1961,
and hence the quarry lease granted by the Stale Government
under the Rules was null and void and no renewal could be
granted of such a null and void lease, and moreover, the
application for renewal made by the appellant was also not
proper as it was an application for mining “limestone for
burning” which was a major mineral. The Deputy Secretary
also by the same order allowed the application for review
made by respondent No. 5 and sanctioned grant of a lease to
him, as the area had become available for grant and,
according to the Deputy Secretary, “there was no other valid
application for this area”.
The appellant being aggrieved by the order made by the
Deputy Secretary preferred a petition in the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh under articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution challenging the validity of that order on
certain grounds. But none of these grounds appealed to the
High Court and affirming the view taken by the Deputy Secre-
tary, the High Court upheld the impugned order and rejected
the petition. The appellant thereupon preferred Civil
Appeal No. 612 of 1974 ,after obtaining special leave from
this Court.
Now, the main part of rule 22 provided that where a quarry
lease is granted, a lease deed in Form V shall be executed
within three months of the order sanctioning the lease and
if no such lease is executed within that period, the order
sanctioning the lease shall be deemed to have been revoked.
The quarry lease in favour of respondent No. 5 should,
therefore, have been executed within three months of the
order dated 19th May, 1972 sanctioning grant of lease to
him. Unfortunately,, however, without any fault on the part
of respondent No. 5. the quarry lease could not be
executed within the stipulated period
77
of three months.. The order dated 19th May, 1972 sanctioning
lease in favour or respondent No. 5 would, therefore, have
stood revoked under the main part of rule 22. But the
proviso to that rule conferred power on the State Government
to permit the execution of the lease deed after the expiry
of the period of three months if it was satisfied that the
applicant for the lease was not responsible for the delay
‘in the execution of the lease deed. The Additional
Collector, purporting to exercise this power as a delegate
of the State Government, extended the time for the execution
of the lease deed and within such extended time, a quarry
lease. was executed by the Addl. Collector in favour of
respondent No. 5. The appellant, therefore, added respondent
No. 5 as a party respondent in her application for review
and also filed an application for revision under rule 32B
against the order of the Additional Collector granting
extension of time and executing the quarry lease. The
appellant contended that-the Additional Collector had no
power to extend the time for the execution of the quarry
lease as no such power had been delegated to him by the
State Government and in any event, no extension of time
could be granted after the prescribed period of three months
had expired and the order dated 19th May, 1972 sanctioning
grant of lease in favour of respondent No. 5 must,
therefore, be deemed to have been revoked and the quarry
lease must be held to be null and void, and an order should
be made sanctioning grant of quarry lease in favour of the
applicant. The Deputy Secretary, exercising the power of
the State Government, by an order dated 29th May, 1973,
agreed with the contention of the appellant that the power
of the State Government not having been delegated to him,
the Additional Collector had no power to extend the time for
the execution of the quarry lease or to execute the quarry
lease on behalf of the State Government, but taking the view
that respondent No. 5 was not responsible for the delay in
the execution of the lease deed within the prescribed period
of three months the Deputy Secretary extended the time for
the execution of the quarry lease upto 29th August, 1973 in
exercise of the power of the State Government under the
proviso to rule, 22. Both the application of the appellant,
one for review against the deemed refusal of her application
for grant of a fresh lease and the other for revision of the
order of the Additional Collector under rule 32B were
accordingly rejected by the Deputy Secretary. The appellant
thereupon preferred a petition in the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
challenging the validity of the order of the Deputy
Secretary, but the High Court negatived the challenge and
dismissed the petition. This led to the filing of Civil
Appeal No. 613 of 1974 with special leave obtained from this
Court.
We will first consider Civil Appeal No. 612 of 1974. Two
questions arise for consideration in this appeal. First,
whether the quarry lease for the period 21st June, 1966 to
20th June, 1971 granted by the State Government to the
appellant was null and void; and secondly, whether the
application for renewal made by the appellant was proper so
as to merit consideration by the State Government. So far
as the first question is concerned, the High Court took the
view that “limie stone for burning”, for which the quarry
lease was granted by the State Government to the appellant,
was a major mineral at the date when the quarry lease was
granted, and therefore, the quarry lease was null’
78
and void. The correctness of this view was challenged
before us on behalf of the appellant and we find
considerable force in this challenge. The original
notification dated 1st June, 1958 described “limestone used
for lime burning” as a minor mineral but by the amending
notification dated 20th September, 1961 only “limestone used
in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material”
was regarded as a minor mineral. The field of minor
mineral, in so far as it concerned limestone, was narrowed
down. Formerly limestone used for burning for manufacture
of lime, whatever may be the uses to which such lime may be
put, whether as building material or for other purposes, was
within the definition of ‘minor mineral’, but after the
amendment, it was only limestone used for burning in kilns
for manufacture of lime used as building material that was
covered by the definition of minor mineral. When limestone
is used for burning for manufacture of lime for industrial
or sophisticated purposes otherwise than as building
material, it would have to be of superior quality and hence
after the amendment, it was classified as major mineral,
leaving only limestone used for burning in kilns for
manufacture of lime used as building material to be regarded
as minor mineral. But in both cases, whether under the
original notification or the amended notification, limestone
was contemplated to be used for burning for manufacture of
lime. The only difference was that in the former, burning
could be by any means or process and lime manufactured
could be for any purpose including building material, while
in the latter, burning could be only in the kilns and for
manufacture of lime used only as building material and for
no other purpose. It would, therefore, be seen that the
mere use of the expression “limestone for burning” would be ambig
uous. It would not indicate whether the limestone
referred to is a major mineral or a minor mineral. That
would all depend on how the limestone is to be burnt whether
in kilns or otherwise, and what is the use to which lime
manufactured by burning is to be put, whether as building
material or for other purposes. The expression “limestone
for burning” would, therefore, equally cover limestone as a
minor mineral and that is clearly borne out by the Third
Schedule to the Rules which prescribes a minimum output of
200 tonnes per acre per annum for “limestone (for burning)”.
It cannot, therefore, be said that merely because the
mineral for which the quarry lease was granted by the State
Government to the appellant was described in the quarry
lease as “limestone for burning”, it was a quarry lease for
a major mineral. Whether it was a quarry lease for a minor
mineral or a major mineral would have to be gathered from
the other provisions of the quarry lease and the
circumstances surrounding its execution.
Now in the present case the quarry lease was granted to the
appellant pursuant to the order dated 24th December, 1966
made by the State Government it on the application for
renewal made by the appellant. The application for renewal
was in Form I annexed to the Rules which was the form
prescribed by the Rules for an application for grant of a
quarry lease for a minor mineral. The order dated 24th
December, 1966 also treated the application of the appellant
as one made for a quarry lease for a minor mineral under
the Rules and sanctioned renewal of the quarry lease in
favour of the appellant in exercise
79
of the power under rule 29, which was a power exerciseable
in relation to grant or renewal of a quarry lease in respect
of a minor mineral. The quarry lease was also in Form V
annexed to the Rules which is the form prescribed for a
quarry lease in respect of a minor mineral. The royalty
stipulated in the quarry lease was Rs. 2/- per tonne and
that also clearly indicated that the quarry lease was in
respect of a minor mineral. Vide the First Schedule to the
Rules. It is, therefore, clear that though the mineral for
which the quarry lease was granted to the appellant was
described as “limestone for burning”, it was a quarry lease
for “limestone for burning” as a minor mineral, that is, for
“limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as
building material” and it could not in the circumstances be
condemned as null and void.
That takes us to the second question, namely, whether the
application for renewal made by the appellant was proper ?
The only ground on which the State Government rejected the
application for renewal was that against column 6 in
paragraph 3 the mineral which the appellant intended to mine
was described as “limestone for burning as a minor mineral”.
The State Government took the view, and this view was
affirmed by the High Court, that “limestone for burning” was
a major mineral and the application for renewal was,
therefore, an application for a quarry lease for a major
mineral and the State Government was not competent to grant
it under the Rules. We do not think this view taken by the
State Government and approved by the High Court is correct.
It rests on too strict a construction of the application for
renewal ignoring the substance of the matter. When column 6
of paragraph 3 of Form V requires an applicant to state the
mineral which he intends to mine, it is for the purpose of
intimating to the State Government as to what is the mineral
for which the quarry lease is applied for by the applicant.
So long as the description given by the appellant against
column 6 of paragraph 3 is sufficient to identify the
mineral, the object of requiring the applicant to give
information against column 6 of paragraph 3 would be
satisfied and the application would not suffer from the
fault of being vague or indefinite and the only question
then would be whether the mineral mentioned there is a minor
mineral. Here in the present case, against column 6 or
paragraph 3 the mineral intended to be mined by the
appellant was described as “limestone for burning as a minor
mineral”. The words “as a minor mineral” following upon
“limestone for burning” clearly indicated that the mineral
which the appellant intended to mine was not “limestone for
burning” which was a major mineral but “limestone for
burning” which was a minor mineral, that is, “limestone used
in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material”.
It cannot be gain said that it would have been better if the
full description of the mineral had been given against
column 6 of paragraph 3, but absence of reiteration of the
full description cannot be regarded as having any invali-
dating effect on the application for renewal. What was
stated by the appellant against column 6 of paragraph 3 was
sufficiently specific to identify the mineral as “limestone
used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building
material” and that showed clearly beyond doubt that the
application for renewal was an application in respect of a
minor mineral. We are, therefore, of the view that the
application for
80
renewal was a proper application in respect of a minor
mineral and the State Government was wrong in rejecting it
on the ground chat it was an application in respect of a
major mineral.
But that does not mean that the application for renewal made
by the appellant should have been-granted by the State
Government. When the quarry lease in Form V was executed by
the State Government in favour of the, appellant, clause
(15) of that form was deleted. There was, therefore, no
option of renewal in the quarry lease and the appellant
could not lay any claim to renewal on the basis of such
option. It is apparent that an applicant can ask for
renewal of the quarry lease only if there is an option of
renewal in his favour. Otherwise, all that he can apply for and
obtain is a fresh lease. The application for renewal
was, therefore, misconceived and the State Government was
entitled to reject it. We accordingly uphold the rejection
of the application for renewal by the State Government
though for different reasons.
The appellant then contended that the order dated 19th May,
1972 sanctioning lease in favour of respondent No. 5 was
invalid since it proceeded on a wrong hypothesis that the
application of respondent No. 5 was the only valid
application for a quarry lease for this area before the
State Government. There was also before the State Govern-
ment, pointed out the appellant, the application made by her
for grant of a fresh lease and though this application was
later in point of time than the application of respondent
No. 5, the State Government was bound to consider it as the
State Government it could under rule 12(2), for special
reasons to be recorded, grant “quarry lease” to an applicant
whose application was received later in preference to an
applicant whose application was received earlier”. Now,
there can be no doubt that on 19th May, 1972, when the State
Government sanctioned grant of quarry lease in favour of
respondent No. 5, the application of the appellant for grant
of a fresh lease was before the State Government and
therefore, it would seem that the State Government ought to
have considered that application along with the application
‘of respondent No. 5 for the purpose of deciding whether
quarry lease should be granted to the appellant in
preference to respondent No. 5 even though the application
of the appellant was received later than the application of
respondent No. 5. Prima facie, the State Government was in
error in sanctioning grant of lease in favour of respondent
No. 5 ignoring the application of the appellant. But we do
not think we would be justified in interfering with the
order of the State Government on this ground because we do
not find that this contention was at any time raised by the
appellant before the State Government or even before the
High Court. The appellant could have ‘raised this
contention in the application for review preferred by her
against the deemed refusal of her application for grant of a
fresh lease and even if it was not raised at that stage, the
appellant had another opportunity to raise it and that was
in either of the two petitions filed by her in the High
Court. But the appellant did not avail herself of this
opportunity and it was only at the hearing of this appeal
before us that she for the first time
81
sought to raise this contention. We cannot permit that to
be done and we accordingly do not propose to entertain this
contention and interfere with the order of the State
Government on this ground.
So far as Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1974 is concerned, the
appellant contended that the Deputy Secretary had no power
to extend the time for the execution of the quarry lease in
favour of respondent No. 5 as no such power had been
delegated to him by the State Government. But this
contention is based on the erroneous assumption that the
Deputy Secretary, in extending the time for the execution of
the quarry lease, acted in exercise of the power purported
to have been delegated to him by the St-ate Government. The
Deputy Secretary did not act as delegate of the State
Government. He acted in exercise of the power of the State
Government under the Rules of Business. The order made by
him extending the time for the execution, of the quarry
lease was, therefore, an order of the State Government and
no infirmity attached to it on the ground that the power to
extend the time was not delegated to him.
The appellant also tried to urge the same contention in this
appeal which she urged in Civil Appeal No. 612 of 1974,
namely, that the order dated 19th May, 1972 sanctioning
grant of lease in favour of respondent No. 5 was invalid
inasmuch as it was made without considering the application
of the appellant for grant of a fresh lease. But for
reasons which we have already given we cannot allow
the,appellant to raise this contention for the first time at
the hearing of these appeals before us and hence we need not
express any final opinion upon it.
The result is that both Civil Appeals Nos. 612 of 1974 and
613 of 1974 fail and are dismissed with costs. There will
be only one hearing fee in one set in both appeals.
V.P.S. Appeals dismissed.
7-L379Sup.CI/75
82