Court Judgments

PETITIONER:
RAM BALI RAJBHAR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1974

BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:
1975 AIR  623          1975 SCR  (3)     63
1975 SCC  (4)    47
CITATOR INFO :
F        1975 SC 609     (51)
F        1975 SC1165     (14)

ACT:
Maintenance of Internal Security Act-Public order-Section 14
read with Sec. 21 of the General clauses Act-its scope.

HEADNOTE:
The  petitioner was detained under MISA on the grounds    that
on  2 occasions, he along with his associates, hurled  bombs
on  a  tea-stall  and on a  watch  repairing  shop,  thereby
damaging furniture, watches showcases etc., endangering     the
lives  and  safety  of    the people;  and  creating  a  great
disturbance of public order.
In  a habeas corpus petition, the petitioner challenged     the
grounds of detention as “Vague, false, malafide, fanciful  &
nonexistent,  that there            was no  rational
nexus  between    the  grounds  with  permissible     objects  of
preventive detention and that the, offences mentioned in the
ground    could  be the subject-matter  of  ordinary  criminal
prosecutions but not of public order, the breach of which is
something more serious than mere breach of the Criminal     Law
of the land.
Dismissing the petition,
HELD:(1)  “Public  Order”  is  necessarily  an    elastic
concept     which is wider than the “security of  the  State”-a
category  separated  in the Act from it by  the     disjunctive
“or.” [66B]
(2)In  some cases, the facts may clearly indicate that    an
ordinary criminal prosecution would suffice and the  present
case, is not one of those cases. [66C]
(3)In a case of detention, the Court has to be careful    to
avoid substituting its own opinion about what is enough     for
the  subjective satisfaction of the  detaining    authorities.
and interference could be justified only if it is clear that
no reasonperson could possibly be satisfied about the  need
to  detain  the     person on the ground  saved.  The  required
satisfaction  must have reference to a need to prevent    what
is anticipatedfrom   the  detenu.   The     past  conduct     or
activity is only relevant in so      far    as   it      furnished
reasonable  grounds for an a apprehension.   Prevention     and
punishment  have  some,     common     ultimate  aims     but   their
immediate  objectives        and    modes of     action     are
distinguishable. [66D]
(4)In  the  Present  ease,  the     petitioner  was  given     a
personal  hearing  by the Advisory gourd.  The    Board  heard
another detenu. who was released )later.  The Board did     not
think that the petitioner should be released.  It shows that
the  Advisory  Board did apply its mind to the case  of     the
petitioner. [67H]
(5)As    regards     non-application  of  the  minds  of   the
detaining   authorities,  the  facts  of  the    case   speak
otherwise.   As regards the affidavit sworn by the  Tea-shop
owner  whose shop was attacked, that the petitioner did     not
attack his shot). were considered by a division bench of the
Calcutta  High and it rightly held that the affidavit  could
not vitiate the initial detention order which was passed  at
a  time     when  no  such     affidavit  was     either     before     the
detaining  authorities or placed before the Advisory  Board.
[68D]
(6)So  far as the second representation of the    petitioner
to  the State Govt. is concerned, under Sec. 14 of the    Act,
the  State Govt. can revoke or modify a detention  order  at
any time.  Sec. 14 of the Act apparently vests a wider power
than  that  which the State Govt. may have  possessed  under
Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act 1897, which is by  having
been specifically mentioned in Sec. 14 of the Act, makes  it
clear the power under Sec. 14 is not necessarily subject  to
the  provision of Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act.    This
means  that a revocation or modification of an order of     the
State Govt.
64
is possible even without complying with the restriction laid
down  in Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act; but  a  correct
interpretation    of  the two provisions would be that  it  is
left  to the State Govt. in the exercise of its     discretion,
either to exercise the power read with provisions of Sec. 21
of  the General Clauses Act or without the aid of  Sec.     21.
[69B-D]
(7)Further, it will be reasonable that judicious  exercise
of the power tinder Sec. 14 of the Act to refer a case    once
again  to  the, Advisory Board for its    opinion     before     the
subsequent representation made on fresh material by a detenu
is rejected and the Advisory Board can then adopt such parts
of the procedure laid down in Sec. 11 of the Act as could be
applied to a second representation. [69E-F; 70B]
(8)On a habeas corpus petition, what has to be    considered
by  the Court is whether the detention is prima facie  legal
or  not,  and  not whether the    detaining  authorities    have
wrongly or rightly reached a satisfaction on every  question
of  fact.   Further,  in  a  habeas  Corpus  petition,     the
petitioner  has     to  show, in a case  under  Maintenance  of
Internal Security Act, 1971. that there has been a violation
of  either Art. 21 or Art. 22 of the  constitution.  [70E-F;
71A]
in the present case, the Court directs that the State  Govt.
would  consider and take an early decision upon the  pending
fresh  representation of the petitioner in  accordance    with
the law laid down above.

JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 322 of 1974.
(Petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
P.   K. Chatterjee for the Petitioner.
D.   N. Mukherjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG,  J.-The  petitioner, Ram Bali Rajbhar, in    this  Habeas
Corpus    petition  under Article 32 of  the  Constitution  of
India,    seeks release from a detention ordered on  1-10-1973
by  the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, on  the  following
grounds supplied on the same day to him
“(1) On 5-9-1973 at about 17-40 hrs., you long
with  your associates Anwar Hossain  of  18/2,
Mominpur    Road,  Subal Das of Jhupri  at    Dock
East Boundary Road, Calcutta, and others,     all
being  armed with iron rods, lathis and  bombs
created a great disturbance of public order by
hurling  bombs at the tea-stall of  Lal  Mohan
Jadav at 19, Coal Berth, Calcutta, endangering
the  lives and safety of the  stall-owner     and
other  nearby shop-keepers, as he had  refused
to  supply  tea to you all,  without  payment.
The  incident brought widespread panic in     the
locality,      led  to  the    closure     of   shops,
suspension   of  vehicular  traffic,   thereby
jeopardising the, maintenance of public order.
(2)On  7-9-1973  at about 20.05  hrs.,  you
along  with  your associates  Kali  Das  alias
Tenia  of     Jhupri at  Strand  Road,  Calcutta,
Subed  Ali of 5/2 Bhukailash Road and  others,
all  being  armed with iron-rods,     lathis     and
bombs, attacked a Watch Repairing Shop  styled
as M/s.  Babloo Watch & Repairing Co., at     52,
Circular    Garden    Reach  Road,  Calcutta,      by
hurling bombs and damaging furniture,
65
watches,    show-cases of the said shop  as     Sk.
Azim,  the  owner     of  this  shop     had  earlier
refused  to pay you all for drinks,  when     the
local people came to intervene, you all hurled
bombs  indiscriminately  with a view  to    kill
them.    The    incident       clamped     fear,
frightfulness  and insecurity in the minds  of
the public thereby affecting public order.
And if left free and unfettered you are likely
to  continue to disturb maintenance of  public
order  by     acting     in  a    similar     manner      as
aforesaid”.
The  petitioner complains that the grounds of detention     are
“vague,     false,     malafide, fanciful, non-existent”.   It  is
submitted  that     there is no rational nexus of    the  grounds
with  permissible  objects of preventive detention.   It  is
urged  that  criminal  offences for  which  the     authorities
charged     with  maintaining  law     and  order  can   institute
ordinary criminal prosecutions are not meant to be made     the
subject     matter of detention orders.  “Public Order”, it  is
contended,  is something more serious than mere     breach     of;
the, criminal law for which the offender must be dealt    with
under the ordinary law.     “Public Order” mentioned in Section
3(a)(ii), it is suggested, must be read in conjunction    with
the  “security    of  the State” so that    only  a     person     who
indulges in activities which endanger something a kinto     the
security  of  the State should be deemed to  be     covered  by
provisions relating to preventive detention.
We  think it is too late in the day to argue that  there  is
any  misuse  of the provisions of  Maintenance    of  Internal
Security  Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’)  merely
because,  in  order to arrive at a satisfaction that  it  is
necessary  to  detain  a  person for  the  purposes  of     the
security  of the State or the maintenance of  public  order,
some instances are given of criminal activity, whether    they
could  have or have formed the subject matter of  successful
or unsuccessful prosecution.. (See Golam Hussain alias    Gama
Vs.   The Commissioner of Police Calcutta & Ors.  (1)  Milan
Banik  Vs.  The State of West Bengal & Ors., (2) Mohd  Salim
Khan Vs.’ Shri C. C. Base Deputy Secretary to the Government
of West Bengal & Anr(3) Sasti @ Satish Chowdhary Vs.   State
of West Bengal. (4) An order based upon such grounds  cannot
be  said  to  be affected by  extraneous  considerations  or
become    mala-fide for this reason only.     The legal  position
on   this   subject  has  been    recently  clarified   by   a
Constitution  Bench of this Court in Haradhan Saha Vs.    the-
State of West Bengal & Ors.,(5) where it was pointed out  p.
2160)
“The   power   of     preventive   detention      is
qualitatively    different    from    punitive
detention.  The power of preventive  detention
is   a   precautionary  power   exercised      in
reasonable  anticipation.     It may or  may     not
relate  to an offence.  It is not     a  parallel
proceeding.  It does not-overlap with prosecu-
(1)  [1974] (4) S.C.C. p.530.
(2)  AIR 1972 S.C. 1214.
(3)  AIR 1972 S.C. 1670.
(4)  [1973] 1 S.C.R. 467.
(5)  AIR 1974 S.C. 2154 at 2160.
6-379SupCI/75
66
tion  even if it relies on certain  facts     for
which prosecution may be launched or may have,
been   launched.     An  order   of      preventive
detention      may  be  made     before     or   during
Prosecution.  An order of preventive detention
may be made with or without prosecution and in
anticipation   or     after    discharge  or    even
acquittal.  The pendency of prosecution is  no
bar  to an order of preventive detention.      An
order  of preventive detention is also  not  a
bar to- prosecution”.
“Public     Order” is necessarily an elastic concept which     is,
in  any     case,    wider  than  the  “security  of     the  State”
cat.–gory  separated in the Act from it by the     disjunctive
“or”.    It  is true that, in some cases, the  facts  may  so
clearly indicate that an ordinary criminal prosecution would
suffice     that  the necessity to order the  detention  of  an
offender for one of the objects of the Act could not be said
to be reasonably made out.  The case before us, however,  is
not  one  of those cases.  We have to be  careful  to  avoid
substituting  our own opinion about what is enough  for     the
subjective  satisfaction of the detaining  authorities    with
which  interference could be justified only if it  is  clear
that no reasonable person could possibly be satisfied  about
the  need to detain on the grounds given in which  case     the
detention  would be in excess of the power to  detain.     The
required  satisfaction    must  have reference to     a  need  to
prevent     what  is  anticipated from the     detenu.   The    past
conduct     or  activity  is  only relevant in  so     far  as  it
furnishes   reasonable     grounds   for     an    apprehension.
Prevention and punishment have some common ultimate aims but
their    immediate  objectives  and  modes  of    action     are
distinguishable.
A  reference to the facts of the decided cases    cited  above
will  indicate    that  it  is  not  enough  that     a  criminal
persecution was launched against the petitioner on  6-9-1973
for  the  alleged  participation of the     petitioner  in     the
incident  of  5-9-1973.      It is, however,  alleged  that  on
20-11-1973,  Lal  Mohan     Jadav,     whose    tea  shop  had    been
attacked by a number of persons who, according to the State,
include the petitioner, himself swore an affidavit in  which
he stated that he knew the petitioner and could say that the
petitioner  had     not participated in the attack on  his     tea
shop.
In  his counter affidavit in this Court, Respondent  No.  2,
the  Commissioner  of Police, Calcutta, gave  the  following
sequence of events which is not disputed by the petitioner :
1.The Petitioner was discharged by the Criminal Court  on
1-10  1973, the very date on which the detention  order     was
made by the Commissioner of Police.
2.The  grounds    of detention were also    served    upon  the
petitioner on 1-10-1973.
3.On  18-10-1973,  a  representation  by  the  petitioner
against his ,detention was received by the State Government.
4.On 22-10-1973, the detention order of the  Commissioner
of Police was approved by the State Government.
67
5.On 23-10-1973, the State, Government sent the petitioner’s
case  to  the Advisory Board together with  the     grounds  on
which the detention was ordered, the representation  against
it  made  by  the  petitioner, and  a  report  made  by     the
Commissioner of Police under Sec. 3, sub. s. (3) of the Act.
6.On  5-11-1973, the Advisory Board, after  examining.the
case,  gave its opinion to the State Government     that  there
was sufficient cause for the petitioner’s detention.
7. The State Government confirmed the detention order on  8-
11-1973 and- its order was served on the petitioner in    jail
on 14-11-1973.
8.  On 20-11-1973, Lal Mohan Jadav swore an  affidavit,     ‘in
the  Court of Magistrate 1st Class at Alipore, stating    that
the  petitioner Ram Bali Rajbhar did not participate in     the
attack    on his shop on 5-9-1973 and that he did not  mention
his name in the First Information Report for that reason.
9.   On      27-11-1973,    the   petitioner   made      a   second
representation which was received by the State Government on
28-11-1973.   This  %as still under consideration  when     the
petitioner  filed a Writ Petition under Article 226  of     the
Constitution  to  the Calcutta High  Court  questioning     his
detention.
10.  On     21-3-1973,  the Calcutta High    Court  rejected     the
Hebeas Corpus petition.
The petitioner asserts that, on the very grounds on which he
was  detained, one Kamal Singh @ Tiger son of Gurmel  Singh,
who,  like the petitioner, was alleged to be  “homeless’  in
Calcutta, was detained but released after a consideration of
his case by the Advisory Board.     The petitioner has attached
a  copy of the order of the State Government on the case  of
Kamal Singh which shows that, although, Kamal Singh made  no
representation at all to the State Government under  Section
8  of  the Act, yet, he was released  because  the  Advisory
Board, after considering all the materials placed before  it
and  after hearing Kamal Singh @ Tiger, in person,  reported
that in its opinion, “no sufficient cause for the detention”
of  Kamal  Singh  existed.  In    reply  to  the    petitioner’s
assertions  about the case of Kamal Singh, the    Commissioner
of  Police  stated, in paragraph 20 of his  affidavit,    that
they  are not relevant for the petitioner’s case.  We  think
that  they would be relevant to determine whether the  cases
of  the     petitioner  and of Kamal Singh     were  identical  or
distinguishable.   It is evident that Kamal Singh,  although
served    with identical grounds of detention, and,  similarly
described  as “homeless’, asked for and obtained a  personal
hearing      which     satisfied  the     Advisory  Board  that     his
detention  was    not justified.    Apparently,  the  petitioner
could not persuade the Advisory Board, similarly, to believe
that  his case fell in the same category.  This,  therefore,
shows  that the Advisory Board applied its mind to the    case
of  the     petitioner  which  in    its  opinion,  stood  in.  a
different class from the case of Kamal Singh
68
Learned     Counsel.for the petitioner then contended that     the
detaining  authorities did not appear to have applied  their
minds  to the case of the petitioner as they ought  to    have
done  and  that     this is evident from the fact    that  he  is
described  as “homeless’ when he holds a licence  for  money
lending and has an address in.    Calcutta.  It was  suggested
that  the petitioner may have been falsely  and     maliciously
implicated.by  some  of his,debtors and that  the  detaining
authorities   would  have  discovered  this  if      they     had
investigated   facts  properly.      In  support  of  such      an
inference,  it was submitted that it had been  alleged    that
the petitioner had participated in an attack upon a tea shop
when  Lal  Mohan Jadav, who ran the tea     shop,    had  himself
sworn  that  the  petitioner had  not  participated  in     the
attack.     On the other hand, it is asserted, in the affidavit
sworn  in by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, that     the
Commissioner  was satisfied, from the enquiries made by     him
through      reliable   officers,    that  the   petitioner     did
participate  in the alleged incident although he,  may    have
been able to secure an affidavit from Lal Mohan Jadav  after
his  discharge, the suggestion being that the affidavit     was
dishonestly sworn and procured after the petitioner had been
discharged.
A  Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had  considered
the  effect  of     the affidavit of Lal  Mohan  Jadav  on     the
petitioner’s detention.     In our opinion, it had rightly held
that  the affidavit could not vitiate the initial  detention
order  which was passed at a time when no  such     information
contained  in an affidavit was either before  the  detaining
authorities  or     placed     before     the  Advisory    Board.     The
petitioner  had     made  no assertion that he did     not  get  a
personal  hearing by the Advisory Board or that he  did     not
have  a full opportunity to make his representations  or  to
put  forward his case fully before the Advisory Board  which
could  fairly and impartially consider every  allegation  on
every question of fact.     The petitioner has not alleged     any
hostility  of the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta  or  of
any other officer towards him.- On the materials before     us,
we   cannot   be  satisfied  that  neither   the   detaining
authorities nor the Advisory Board had properly investigated
or applied their minds to all the relevant facts relating to
the  petitioner’s case, Nevertheless, it does appear to     us.
from  the affidavit of the Commissioner of Police, that     the
State Govt. had Perhaps not passed any order upon the second
representation    of the petitioner due to the belief that  it
may  be     improper  to pass any order on it  when,  a  Habeas
Corpus    petition of the petitioner is pending.    There  could
be  no reason whatsoever, now, after this Court as well     as
the High Court of Calcutta have considered the    petitioner’s
Habeas    Corpus    petitions,  for the  State  Govt.  to  delay
further investigation or action upon the petitioner’s second
representation.     The question which arises here is : what is
the   action  which  the  State     Govt.    can  take   on     the
petitioner’s second representation?
Section 14(1) of the Act lays down
“14(1) Without prejudice to the provisions  of
section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a
detention     order may, at any time. be  revoked
or modified-
(a)notwithstanding that the order has  been
made  by an officer mentioned  in     sub-section
(2) of section 3, by the
69
State  Government     to  which  the     officer  is
subordinate or. by the Central Government;
(b)notwithstanding that the, order has been
made  by    a State Government, by    the  Central
Government”.
The State Government can revoke or modify a detention  order
if  it    is satisfied, on new or     supervening  conditions  or
facts coming to light, that a revocation or modification had
become necessary.  Section 14 of the Act apparently vests  a
wider  power  than  that  which the  State  Govt.  may    have
possessed’ under the provisions of Section 21 of the General
Clauses     Act.  1897 which is, by  having  been    specifically
mentioned in section 14 of the Act, made applicable in    such
cases.     The  language of Section 14 of     the  Act,  however,
makes  it  clear  that the power under    Section     14  is     not
necessarily  subject to the provisions of Section 21 of     the
General     Clauses  Act.     This means  that  a  revocation  or
modification of an order of the State Govt. is possible even
without complying with the restrictions laid down in Section
21  of the General Clause Act.    Nevertheless, as  the  wider
power  under  Section 14 of the Act does not  over-ride     but
exists “without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of
the  General  Clauses  Act”,  we  think     that  the   correct
interpretation    of the provisions, read together,  would  be
that  it is left to the State Government in the exercise  of
the  discretion,  either  to exercise the  power  read    with
provisions  of    Section     21 of the General  Clauses  Act  or
without the aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
We think it will be a reasonable, and judicious exercise  of
the  power under Section 14 of the Act to refer a case    once
again  to  the    Advisory  Board for  its  opinion  before  a
subsequent  representation  made  on fresh  materials  by  a
detenu    is rejected.  It is true that the  conditions  under
which  a reference is made for the  opinion of the  Advisory
Board under Section 10 of the Act cannot be repeated.  It is
also  clear  that the express and mandatory  duty  to  refer
arises only under the conditions laid down by Section. 10 of
the  Act and there is no specific or separate provision     for
calling     for the opinion of the Advisory Board from time  to
time.    Nevertheless, if the power under Section 14  of     the
Act  can be exercised ‘,’in the like manner and     subject  to
the  like  sanctions  and conditions (if any),    to  use     the
language employed by Section 21 of the General Clauses    Act,
we can only interpret “like manner” and subjection to  “like
conditions”  to     mean similar and not identical     manner     and
conditions.   We think that a situation in which a power  of
revocation  or modification of a detention order is  invoked
by a second or a subsequent representation can, after making
allowance for intervening events which cannot be wiped    out
of  existence, be compared to and resembles a  situation  in
which  the opinion of the Advisory Board is sought after  an
approval or a preliminary confirmation of a detention  order
by  the     State    Government under Section 3(3)  of  the    Act,
awaiting  the  opinion    of  the     Advisory  Board,  which  is
expected  to  function quite impartially  and  independently
before    the Government makes a final order under Section  12
of the Act.  Section
70
10  of the  Act only provides, for the    1st  representation.
But, it appears to us that the power under Section 14 of the
Act, read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,  which
is  specifically mentioned in Section 14 of the     Act,  could
import    or imply a power of the State Government to refer  a
second representation likewise to the Advisory Board, if the
State Government so decades in an analogous situation.    And,
the  Advisory  Board  can  then     adopt    such  parts  of     the
procedure  laid down in Section 1 1 of the Act as  could  be
applied     to  a second representation.  In such a  case,     the
reference would not be under Section 10 of the Act but under
Section,14 of the Act read with the necessary implication of
preserving  the     power of the Govt. to act as laid  down  in
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.    In other words,     the
subsequent reference would result from a necessarily implied
power  of  the Govt. to act. so far as possible, in  a    like
manner to the one it has to adopt in confirming or  revoking
the  initial detention order under Section, 12 of  the    Act.
And,  if there is such a power in the Government to refer  a
subsequent  representation on fresh grounds to the  Advisory
Board    for  its  opinion,  there  will,  we  think,  be   a
corresponding implied power and obligation of the,  Advisory
Board  to give its opinion in accordance with the  procedure
prescribed  by    Section 1 1 of the Act    exception  that     its
report    will necessarily have to be submitted in such  cases
beyond ten weeks from the date of detention order but within
a reasonable time.
We  think that the High Court of Calcutta  while  dismissing
the Writ Petition, need not have expressed any opinion about
the worth of the affidavit sworn by Lal Mohan jadav, the tea
shop owner.  That, we think, is the function of     authorities
constituted  under the Act for deciding questions  of  fact.
On  a Habeas Corpus petition, what has to be  considered  by
the  Court is whether the detention is prima facie legal  or
not, and not whether the detaining authorities have  wrongly
or rightly reached a satisfaction on every question of fact.
Courts    have,  no  doubt, to zealously    guard  the  personal
liberty     of  the citizen and to ensure that the     case  of  a
detenu    is justly and impartially considered and dealt    with
by  the     detaining authorities and the Advisory     Board    But,
this  does  not mean that they have to or  can    rightly     and
properly  assume either the duties cast upon  the  detaining
authorities  and  Advisory Board by the     law  of  preventive
detention  or function as Courts of Appeal on  questions  of
fact.    The law of preventive detention, whether we like  it
or not, is authorised by our Constitution presumably because
it  was foreseen by the Constitution-makers that  there     may
arise  occasions in the life of the nation when the need  to
prevent     citizens  from     acting     in  ways  which  unlawfully
subvert     or  disrupt the bases of an established  order     may
outweigh the claims of personal liberty.
Every petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution has to
establish  an infringement of a fundamental  right.   Hence,
this  Court  cannot order a release from detention,  upon  a
Habeas    Corpus    petition,  until  it  is  satisfied  that  a
petitioner’s  detention is really unwarranted by law.    This
means that, in a case of detention under the Maintenance of
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Internal  Security Act, 1971, the petitioner has to  show  a
violation  of  either  Article    21  or    Article     22  of     the
Constitution.    That personal liberty of the  citizen  which
the  law  so sedulously and carefully protects can  also  be
taken  away by the procedure established by law when  it  is
used  to jeopardise public good and not merely    private     in-
terests.
Learned     Counsel  for  the  petitioner    could  not  indicate
material  which     could convince us that the  petitioner     has
been  denied the protection of either Article 21 or  Article
22 of the Constitution.     There is nothing here to show    that
the  petitioner     did not have the opportunity of  making  an
effective representation against his detention.     We are also
not satisfied, as we have already indicated, that the powers
under  the  Act     are  being utilised  in  this    case  for  a
collateral  purpose or in a manner which is malafide  simply
because     a  criminal prosecution was  launched    against     the
petitioner  which failed.  That is one of the matters  which
the  Advisory Board and the State Government can  take    into
account     in forming an the opinion on the  question  whether
the   petitioner’s  detention  or  continued  detention      is
necessary.   In     order    to make out a case  of    malafide  or
misuse    of  powers under the Act, we think that     better     and
more convincing material has to be forthcoming than what the
petitioner in the instant case has been able to place before
us.
We,  however,  must  observe here that    some  of  the  facts
noticed     above are enough to put the  detaining     authorities
and  the Advisory Board on their guard so that    they  should
also  examine the  possibility of having  been    misled    by
mechanically  reproduced  assertions  made  by     subordinate
police officers acting at the instance of persons with ques-
tionable   motives.   The  detaining  authorities  and     the
Advisory Board are the best judges of that.  They are  armed
with ample power and means to lift the cast iron curtain  of
impeccable  form  behind which this Court does not,  in     the
absence     of good and substantial reasons, try to peep in  an
attempt     to discover malafides or misuse of  drastic  powers
meant to be used honestly, carefully reasonably, and fairly.
This  Court presumes that they are being so used unless     and
until the contrary is palpable, but no such presumption need
hamper    the efforts which the detaining authorities and     the
Advisory  Boards ought to make to discover the real or    the
whole and unvarnished truth before determining the need for
a  preventive detention.  At any rate, no mere amour  propre
or  self esteem or any police officer should be, allowed  to
stand  in  the, way of. an- honest, careful,  and  impartial
investigation and decision.
For the reasons given above while we reject the petitioner’s
prayer    for  quashing  the detention order,  we     direct     the
Government  of West Bengal to consider and take up an  early
decision  upon    the  pending  fresh  representation  of     the
petitioner  in accordance with the requirements of  law     and
justice      as  indicated     by  us     above.      Subject  to    this
direction, this petition is dismissed.
S.C.                 Petition dismissed.
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