PETITIONER:
DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1995
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
HANSARIA B.L. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 283 1995 SCC (6) 62
JT 1995 (7) 154 1995 SCALE (5)435
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
By an order dated November 1, 1991 the matter was
referred to a Bench of three judges since an important
question of law relating interpretation of 20 A of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 [for short, 'the
Act'] as amended by Act 49 of 1964 was raised.
The admitted facts are that the appellant is
manufacturer of Vanaspati ghee. The position not in dispute
is that one Laxmi Narain resident of Joura was found selling
Vanaspati ghee. The Food Inspector had purchased the article
of food of 1500 grams from Laxmi Narain on payment of the
price. On analysis by the Public Analyst as per his report,
Ext. P3, it was found to have been adulterated. In
consequence, Laxmi Narain was prosecuted for an offence
under s.16 of the Act.
The article was sold on March 24, 1964. On March 1,
1965 when it was brought to the notice of the trial court
that the appellant is the manufacturer of the adulterated
article of food, the learned Magistrate had issued summons
to the appellant under s.20A of the Act. He questioned the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate to issue summons by filing a
revision before the Sessions Court and also in the High
Court. He was unsuccessful before both the courts below.
Thus, this appeal by special leave.
Learned counsel for the appellant candidly admitted
that on March 24, 1964, i.e., the date on which the sample
of the adulterated article of food was sold, the appellant-
company could also be prosecuted for alleged adulteration of
the article of food. But his contention is that during the
course of the trial, it could not be proceeded against it.
His emphasis is that the Magistrate has power, on the date
when the complaint was lodged before him, to issue summons
to the manufacturer, but the Magistrate could not proceed
during the trial on the premise that the accused Laxmi
Narain is only a dealer of the appellant and that there is
no material that Laxmi Narain is a vendee on behalf of the
appellant vendor; and as the latter is not a vendor, he
could not be jointly tried. We find no force in this
contention.
The punishing Section 16 (1) postulates that subject to
the provisions of sub-section (1-A), if any person -
“(a) whether by himself or by any other
person on his behalf, imports into India
or manufactures for sale, or stores,
sells or distributes any article of food
-
(1) which is adulterated within the
meaning of sub-clause (m) of clause (ia)
of Section 2 or misbranded with in the
meaning of clause (ix) of that section
or the sale of which is prohibited under
any provision of this Act or any rule
made thereunder or by an order of the
Food (Health) Authority;
he shall, in addition to the penalty to
which he may be liable under the
provisions of Section 6, be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than six months but which
may extent to three years, and with fine
which shall not be less than one
thousand rupees;…..
Section 20-A empowers the Court to implead the
manufacturer etc. and provides as under :
“where at any time during the trial of
any offence under the Act alleged to
have been committed by any person, not
being the manufacturer, distributor or
dealer of any article of food, the court
is satisfied, on the evidence adduced
before it, that such manufacturer,
distributor or dealer is also concerned
with that offence, then, the court may,
notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (3) of s.319 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or
in s.20 proceed against him as though a
prosecution had been instituted against
him under s.20.”
(Emphasis supplied)
A reading of Section 20-A clearly indicates that during
the course of the trial for any of the offence under the Act
alleged to have been committed by any person, if the
evidence adduced before the Court discloses that the
manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with
that offence, then the Court has been empowered,
notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of
s.319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, ‘the
Code’) to treat as if the manufacturer, distributor or the
dealer is being proceeded against under Section 20 of the
Act, as originally instituted thereunder. The concept of
vendor and vendee is known to civil law and passing of the
title in the goods is alien to the prosecution for an
offence under the Act. It cannot, therefore, be introduced
in a trial for the offence under the Act. The Act advisedly
made a person who sells adulterated article of food liable
to be prosecuted for the offence of adulteration of the
article of food. During the trial when it comes to the
notice of the Magistrate, from the evidence adduced, that
the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of that article of
food, which is the subject matter of adulteration, is also
concerned with the offence, then the court has been
empowered to proceed against such manufacturer, distributor
or dealer as if prosecution has initially been instituted
against him under Section 20 of the Act. In fact, for
general offences, Section 319 (1) of the Code empowers the
court where during the course of enquiry or trial of an
offence, if it appears from the evidence that any person not
being accused has committed any offence for which such
person could be tried together with the accused, to proceed
against such person for the offence which he appears to have
committed. In view of the language of Section 20-A of the
Act, whatever is contained in sub-section (3) of Section 319
of the Code, would not stand in the way of the Magistrate to
proceed at a trial against any person, i.e., the original
accused and against others mentioned in Section 20-A. In
other words, joint trial for the same offence is permitted.
The object appears to be that in a case where common
evidence discloses that the manufacturer, distributor or
dealer is also concerned with the offence for which the
prosecution was launched against a person from whom the
article of food was purchased, to avoid multiplicity of
prosecution and also keeping in view the doctrine of
autrefois acquit the Legislature introduced s.20A to have
joint trial.
The further contention that Laxmi Narain being a dealer
of the appellant, Section 20A has no application, as it
speaks of trial of a person not being, inter alia, a dealer,
has no merit, as the section has mentioned about trial of
commission of the offence by any person; and, if that person
be not the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, Section 20A
permits trial of such manufacturer, distributor or dealer
also, along with the person already before the court. So,
the fact that the person being tried is a dealer would not
make the section non-operational.
In these circumstances, we are of the view that there
was no embargo on the Magistrate during the trial of the
offence to issue notice to the appellant manufacturer for
holding joint trial.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. We direct the
Magistrate, Ist Class Joura, Distt. Morena, M.P., to proceed
with the trial in Crl. Case No.117/64, pending before him
expeditiously since it is a long pending case.