PETITIONER:
BHAGAT SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATEGURDEV SINGH– Caveator.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
19/12/1951
BENCH:
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
BENCH:
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA
CITATION:
1952 AIR 45 1952 SCR 371
CITATOR INFO :
R 1963 SC1620 (15)
ACT:
Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), s. 234 (1)–Mis-
joinder of charges–Firing single shot at two persons to
kill them–Whether one offence or two offences.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was tried in respect of the following
charges: (i) causing the death of A and thereby committing
an offence punishable under s. 302, Penal Code, (ii) firing
a shot at B and
372
C with the intention of causing their death and thereby
committing an offence punishable under s. 307, Penal Code,
and (iii) firing a shot at D with the intention of killing
him and thereby committing an offence punishable under s.
307, Penal Code. It was contended on his behalf that there
was a misjoinder of charges as the second charge was really
a charge in respect of two offences viz., attempt to murder
B and attempt to murder C and the accused had therefore been
charged with, and tried for, more than three offences in
contravention of s. 234 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
:.Held, that there was nothing wrong in the trial as the
single act of firing a shot at B and C is one offence and
not two offences and the trial was not bad for misjoinder of
charges. [Their Lordships however observed that they should
not be understood as laying down the wide proposition that
in no case can a single act constitute more than one of-
fence.]
Promotha Natha Roy v. King Emperor (17 C.W.N. 479),
Johan Subarna v. King Emperor (10 C.W.N. 520), Poonit Singh
v. Madho Bhot (I.L.R. 13 Cal. 270) and Sudheendra Kumar Roy
v. Emperor (I.L.R. 60 Cal. 643) approved.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
38 of 1950. Appeal from the judgment and order of the High
Court of Patiala (Teja Singh C.J., and Gurnam Singh J.)
dated 5th October, 1950, in Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1950,
affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant by
the Sessions Judge of Sangrur.
Gopal Singh and Kartar Singh, for the appellant.
Narinder Singh, Advocate General for the Patiala and East
Punjab States Union (Jindra Lal, with him) for the respond-
ent.
Jai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the Cavea-
tor.
1951. December 19. The Judgment of the Court was deliv-
ered by
FAZL ALl J.–This is an appeal against the judgment of
the High Court at Patiala upholding the conviction and
sentence of the appellant, who was tried by the Sessions
Judge of Sangrut for the offence of murder and sentenced to
death.
373
The prosecution story is a somewhat long and complicated
one, but ignoring unnecessary details, the material facts
may be shortly stated as follows :–
On the 5th October, 1949, there was a quarrel between
the appellant and one Darbara Singh, in the course of which
the appellant attacked the latter with a phawra (a cutting
instrument). About that time, Gurmail Singh, the deceased
person, returned to his house, which was close to the house
of Darbara Singh, from his cotton field, where he had been
working, in order to take tea for his companions who were
still working in his field. The appellant asked Gutmail
Singh to lend him a spear to enable him to kill Darbara
Singh, but since the latter refused to do so, there ensued a
quarrel between him and the appellant, in the course of
which they exchanged abuses and grappled with each other,
and the fight was stopped only by the intervention of cer-
tain persons present at the place. It appears that the
appellant was greatly affected by this quarrel, and thereaf-
ter he is said to have armed himself with a rifle and at-
tacked 3 persons in the vicinity of Gurmail Singh’s cotton
field. He fired firstly at Kartar Singh, son of Satwan
Singh, while the latter was returning to his house from the
field of Gutmail Singh, but he was not hurt. Soon after
that, while Gurmail Singh was returning to his field after
attending to his buffaloes in a garden which was nearby, the
appellant chased him and fired at him thereby causing his
instantaneous death. Lastly, he is said to have fired at
Kartar Singh, son of Bishan Singh and one Jangir Singh,
while they were raising an alarm, but the bullet missed
them. Upon these allegations, the following three charges
were framed against him :–
“(1) That you…… fired a shot at Gurmail Singh
deceased with rifle P.I. with the intention of killing him
and caused his death and thereby committed an offence pun-
ishable under section 302……
(2) That you…… fired a shot at Kartar Singh and
Jangir Singh with rifle P.I. with the intention of causing
death and made an attempt to cause their death
374
section 307…..
(3) That you……. fired a gun-shot at Kartar Singh
s/o Satwan Singh…… with the intention of killing him
and made an attempt to cause his death and thereby committed
an offence punishable under section 307…”
It appears that the appellant was an Instructor in the
Home Guards. and the rifle which he is said to have used had
been given to him by his superior officer with 20 rounds of
ammunition.
To support their version of the occurrence, the prosecu-
tion examined 3 eye-witnesses whose evidence has been ac-
cepted by both the courts below after careful scrutiny. The
learned Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant of the second
and third charges under section 307 of the Indian Penal
Code, holding that there was no convincing evidence that the
appellant intended to murder Jangit Singh and the other 2
persons. He however convicted him of the first charge under
section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to
death, which sentence was later confirmed by the High Court.
The learned counsel for the appellant had very little to
argue on the merits of the case, but he seriously contended
that there had been a misjoinder of charges which could not
be tried together under the law, and the illegality so
committed had vitiated the whole trial of the appellant. It
appears that in the High Court, the line of argument on this
point was somewhat different from the line adopted in this
court. What was stressed in that court seems to have been
that the three incidents in respect of which the appellant
was charged not having happened in the course of the same
transaction, they could not have been properly made the
subject of one trial, and for this contention reliance was
placed mainly on section 235 (1)of the Criminal Procedure
Code, which provides that “if, in one series of acts so
connected together as to form the same transaction, more
offences than one are committed by the same person, he may
be at one trial for, every such offence.” It should be noted
375
that that section is only one of the exceptions to the
general rule laid down in section 233 of the Code that for
every distinct offence, there shall be a separate charge and
every such charge shall be tried separately. In this court,
no reference was made to section 235, but the argument was
confined to the question as to whether the present case
falls within another exception of section 23’3 which is
contained in section 234 (1) which runs as ‘follows :-
“When a person is accused of more offences than one of
the same kind committed within the space of twelve months
from the first to the last of such offences, whether in
respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with,
and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding
three.”
It was argued before us that even though only 3 charges
have been framed against the appellant, he has in fact been
tried for 4 offences and not 3. The 4 offences are said to
be these :–
(1) Committing the murder of Gurmail Singh;
(2) Attempting to murder Kartar Singh, son of Sarwan
Singh;
(3) Attempting to murder Jangit Singh; and
(4) Attempting to murder Kartar Singh, son of Bishan
Singh.
The learned counsel contended that the fact that the
appellant has been acquitted of the last 3 offences and
convicted only of the first offence was immaterial to the
point raised by him, and we have only to see whether all the
offences mentioned above could be properly tried together.
In our opinion, the short reply to this contention is that
the second charge which relates to the appellant firing at
Kartar Singh and Jangir Singh is not a charge with respect
to 2 offences but is a charge with respect to one offence
only. The evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that
the appellant fired only one bullet. The word “offence” has
been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code as meaning ”any
act or omission made punishable by any law for the time
being in force”. There seems to be
49
376
nothing wrong in law to regard the single act of firing by
the appellant as one offence only. On the other hand, we
think that it would be taking an extremely narrow and arti-
ficial view to split it into 2 offences. There are several
reported cases in which a similar view has been taken, and
in our opinion they have not been incorrectly decided. In
Queen Empress v. Raghu Rai(1), where a person stole several
bullocks from the same herdsman at the same time, it was
held that only one offence had been committed. In Promotha
Nath Ray v. King Emperor(2), it was held that misappropria-
tion in regard to several account books constituted only one
offence. In Johan Subarna v. King EmPeror(3), it was held
that when an attempt to cheat a number of men by speaking to
them in a body had been committed, one joint charge was
valid. In Poonit Singh v. Madho Bhot (4), it was held that
only one offence had been committed by a person who gave
false information in one statement to the police against 2
persons. In Sudheendrakumar Ray v. Emperor(5), a person who
was chased by 2 constables had fired at them several times,
but it seems to have been rightly assumed that the firing
did not constitute more than one offence, though the point
was not specifically raised or decided. In our opinion,
there is no substance in the point raised, though we should
not be understood as laying down the wide proposition that
in no case can a single act constitute more than one of-
fence.
The other points urged on behalf of the appellant before
us were somewhat unsubstantial points relating to the merits
of the case, which it is not usual for this court to allow
to be raised in appeals by special leave.
In our opinion, this appeal is without merit, and it is
accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: R.S. Narula.
Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.
Agent for the caveator: Vidya Sagar.
(1) 1881 A.W.N. 154. (3) 10 C.W.N. 520. (5)I.L.R, 60 Cal
643,
(2) 17 C.W.N. 479. (4) I.L.R. 13 Cal. 270.
377