PETITIONER:
ATTAR SINGH & OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF U. P.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
17/12/1958
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
SUBBARAO, K.
CITATION:
1959 AIR 564 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 928
CITATOR INFO :
D 1967 SC 57 (7)
RF 1967 SC 856 (13)
F 1967 SC1568 (6)
ACT:
Agricultural Holdings, Consolidation of-Constitutional vali-
dity of enactment-Procedure, if discriminatory-U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P. V of 1954) as amended by
Act No. XVI of 1957, ss. 8, 9, 10, 14 to 17, 19 to 22, 49-
Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 31(2).
HEADNOTE:
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of
the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U . P. V of 954), as
amended by the amending Acts, which was intended to
encourage the development of agriculture by the allotment of
compact areas to tenure-holders in lieu of scattered plots
so that large-scale cultivation might be possible with all
its attendant advantages. A notification was issued under
s. 4 Of the impugned Act declaring the decision of the State
Government to formulate a scheme of’ consolidation in
respect of the area where the petitioners held their lands.
This was followed up by a statement of proposals under s.
19. The petitioners objected to these proposals and
thereafter appealed to the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) but to no effect. It was contended, inter
alia, on their behalf that (1) the provisions of ss. 8, 9
and 10 read with those Of s- 49 Of the impugned Act were
discriminatory in that they laid down a procedure for
correction and revision of revenue records for
929
villages under consolidation that was vitally different from
that applicable to other villages under the U.P. Land
Revenue Act, 1901; (2) that ss. 14 to 17 as also ss. 19 to
22 read with s. 49 conferred arbitrary powers on the
consolidation authorities in respect of the lands of the
tenure-holder and his rights therein and deprived him of the
protection of courts available to other tenure: holders and
that (3) S. 29B which provided for compensation, by giving
inadequate compensation, offended Art. 31(2) Of the Con-
stitution.
Held, that the contentions must fail.
Although the procedure laid down by the impugned Act was to
some extent different from that under the U.P. Revenue Act,
1901, it was by no means arbitrary or devoid of natural
justice. Regard being had to the advantages that
consolidation conferred on the tenure-holder such difference
was supportable as a permissible classification on an
intelligible differentia reasonably connected with the
object of the Act. The expeditious procedure for
effectuating consolidation laid down by ch. II of the Act
read with the Rules, therefore, could not be said to violate
Art. 14 Of the Constitution.
Nor could for similar reasons the provisions of ch. III of
the Act be said to violate Art. 14 Of the Constitution. The
provision Of S. 22(2) Of the Act which made the decision of
the arbitrator final by ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary
courts even where a party had obtained a decree which might
be under appeal, was necessary in the interest of
expedition.
Having regard to the peculiar conditions in cases of this
kind and the advantages a scheme of consolidation offered to
the entire body of tenure-holders, it could not be said that
the cash compensation for tenure holders provided by s. 29B
of the impugned Act was inadequate, even assuming that Art.
31(2) applied to the case.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 119 of 1957.
Writ Petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Achhru Ram, J. P. Goyal and K. L. Mehta, for the
petitioners.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, K.L.
Misra, Advocate-General for the State of U. P. and Gopi Nath
Dixit, for the respondent.
1958. December 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
WANCHOO, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
challenges the constitutionality of the
117
930
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (U. P. V of 1954), as
amended by U. P. Acts No. XXVI of 1954, No. XIII of 1955,
No. XX of 1955, No. XXIV of 1956 and No. XVI of 1957,
(hereinafter called the Act). The applicants are four
brothers holding land in village Banat, tahsil Kairana,
District Muzaffarnagar. A notification was issued under s.
4 of the Act in respect of 223 villages in tahsil Kairana,
declaring that the State Government had decided to make a
scheme of consolidation in that area. This was followed up
by necessary action under the various provisions of the Act
resulting in a statement of proposals under s. 19.
Objections to these proposals were filed by the petitioners
and others, which were decided in April 1956. The
petitioners went in appeal to the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation), which was decided in August 1957. It was
thereafter that the present petition was filed in this
Court.
The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the Act
on various grounds, of which the following five have been
urged before us:-
(1)Section 6 read with s. 4 of the Act gives arbitrary
powers to the State Government to accord discriminatory
treatment to tenure-holders in different villages by placing
some villages under consolidation while excluding others,
thus offending Art. 14 of the Constitution.
(2)Sections 8, 9 and 10 read with s. 49 of the Act provide a
procedure for the correction and revision of revenue records
for villages under consolidation, which is vitally different
from that applicable to villages not under consolidation,
and there is thus discrimination which offends Art. 14 of
the Constitution ;
(3)Sections 14 to 17 read with s. 49, confer arbitrary
powers on the consolidation authorities under which they can
deprive a tenure-holder of his land or rights therein and
the tenure-holder has been deprived of the protection of
courts available to other tenure-holders in villages not
under consolidation, thus creating discrimination which
offends Art. 14.
931
(4)Sections 19 to 22, read with s. 49, again create
discrimination on the same grounds as ss. 14 to 17, and are,
therefore, hit by Art. 14; and
(5)Section 29-B, which provides for compensation gives
inadequate compensation and is, therefore, hit by Art. 31(2)
of the Constitution.
Before we take these points seriatim, it is useful to refer
to the background of this legislation. As far back as 1939,
the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act No. VIII of 1939,
was passed. It was, however, of little effect, because it
could only be applied when more than one-third of the
proprietors of the cultivated area of a village applied for
an order of consolidation of the village. It was,
therefore, felt that some kind of compulsion would be
necessary in order to achieve consolidation of holdings in
villages. That consolidation would result in improving
agricultural production goes without saying and it was with
the object of encouraging the development of agriculture
that consolidation schemes with a compulsory character were
taken up in various States, after the recommendation of The
Famine Inquiry Commission, 1944, in its Final Report;
(Seepage 263). The State of Bombay. was the first to pass
an Act called the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and
Consolidation of Holdings Act, (Bom. LXII of 1947). This
was followed by the impugned Act in Uttar Pradesh. The
object of the Act is to allot a compact area in lieu of
scattered plots to tenure-holders so that large scale
cultivation may be possible with all its attendant
advantages. Thus’ by the reduction of boundary-lines saving
of land takes place and the number of boundary-disputes is
reduced. There is saving of time in the management of
fields inasmuch as the farmer is saved from travelling from
field to field, which may be at considerable distances from
each other.’ Proper barriers such as fences, hedges and
ditches can be erected around a compact area to prevent
trespassing and thieving. It would further be easier to
control irrigation and drainage and disputes over water
would be reduced considerably where compact areas are
allotted to tenure-holders. Lastly, the control of pests,
insects
932
and plant-disease is made easier where farmers have compact
areas under cultivation. These advantages resulting from
consolidation of holdings are intended to encourage the
development of agriculture and larger production of food
grains, which is the necessity of the day.
With these objects in mind, the Act was passed by the U. P.
Legislature in 1953 and received the assent of the President
on March 4, 1954. It was published in the gazette on March
8, 1954, and declarations under s. 4 were made for the major
part of the State of Uttar Pradesh, including the
petitioners’ village, in July, 1954.
The scheme of the Act is as follows:-
When consolidation of a village is taken up, the first thing
that is done is to correct the revenue records, and ss. 7 to
12 deal with that. Then comes the second stage of preparing
what are called statements of principles ; (see ss. 14 to
18). Objections to these principles are entertained and
decided and thereafter the principles are confirmed under s.
18. Then comes the third stage (vide ss. 19 to 23), which
deals with the preparation of the statement of proposals.
Objections to this are also invited and disposed of, and
then proposals are confirmed under s. 23. After the
proposals have been confirmed, we come to the last stage in
which the confirmed proposals are enforced; (see ss. 24
onwards). It will be clear therefore from the objects of
the Act and the advantages that accrue from its
implementation that it is a piece of legislation, which
should be a boon to the tenure-holders in a village and
should also lead to the development of agriculture and
increase of food-production. It is in this setting that we
have to examine the attack that has been made on the
constitutionality of the Act.
Re. 1 : Section 6 of the Act gives power to the State
Government at any time to cancel the declaration made under
s. 4 in respect of the whole or any part of the area
specified therein. When such declaration is made the area
ceases to be under consolidation operations and s. 5 which
provides for the effect of a declaration ceases to operate.
It is urged that s. 4
933
gives arbitrary power to the State Government to cancel the
declaration, even with respect to a part of the area covered
by it and thus discriminates between villages which are
under consolidation and those which are not under
consolidation. The learned Additional Solicitor General
counters this argument in two ways: (i) Section 6 is nothing
more than a restatement of the power which the State
Government otherwise possessed under the General Clauses
Act; and (ii) the high status of the authority to whom the
power is given, namely, the State Government, and the rules
framed under the Act laying down a standard for the
Government to follow, remove any flavour of arbitrariness
which the terms of the section might import. It is not
necessary to express any opinion in this case on the said
contention, for, even if it be accepted, the result would be
only that s. 6 would be struck down. The petitioners would
be in the same position with s. 6 on the Statute or without
it. It may be that, if a citizen in whose favour an order
of consolidation has been made but subsequently cancelled,
comes to court with a grievance that the order of
consolidation was for his benefit but was cancelled in
exercise of a power under a void section, this question
might arise for consideration. It may also be that the
petitioners’ right might be infringed if s. 6 were not
severable from the other provisions of the Act which enable
the Government to direct consolidation of holdings. The
power of cancellation cannot be said to be so inextricably
mixed up with the power to order consolidation as to prevent
the operation of one section without the other. Nor can it
be said that the Legislature would not have conferred the
power on the Government to consolidate holdings without at
the same time conferring on them the power to cancel the
said order of consolidation. The said provisions are
clearly severable. In the circumstances, as the
petitioners’ case is not affected by s. 6 of the Act, we
leave this open to be decided in an appropriate case.
Re. 2: This deals with the first stage of revision and
correction of maps and records, which has to take place
before the actual consolidation scheme is put
934
into force. Section 7 provides for the examination of the
revenue records by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and
he is enjoined to test the accuracy of the village map,
khasra and the current annual registers by making a partal
in accordance with the procedure to be prescribed. After he
has done the partal, he is to prepare a statement showing
the mistakes discovered in the map, khasra and khatauni,
‘and the number and nature of disputes pertaining to land
records under the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. Then under
s. 8 he submits a report to the Settlement Officer (Con-
solidation) in this connection with his opinion whether any
revision of such maps and records is needed. On receipt of
this report, the Settlement Officer may either order the
Assistant Consolidation Officer to proceed with the
correction of maps and records, which we presume he will
order when there are not too many mistakes, or recommend to
the State Government for revision of maps or records in
accordance with the provisions of Ch. IV of the U. P. Land
Revenue Act, 1901, which he will presumably do if there are
too many mistakes found. If the Assistant Consolidation
Officer is ordered to make the corrections he will make a
further partal, if necessary, and correct the map or the
entries in annual register in accordance with the procedure
to be prescribed. The procedure is prescribed in r. 22 and
among other things it lays down that the Assistant
Consolidation Officer shall issue a notice to all persons
affected by the provisional entries proposed by him;
objections are invited and parties are examined and heard
and their evidence taken and then the Assistant
Consolidation Officer makes the corrections. His order is
open to appeal within twentyone days under s. 8(4) to the
Consolidation Officer, and the order of the latter is made
final.
It is urged that this procedure is vitally different from
the procedure prescribed under the U. P. Land Revenue Act
and that under s. 49 of the Act the jurisdiction of the
civil and revenue courts with respect to any matters arising
out of consolidation proceedings is barred, thus depriving
those affected by the orders of the Consolidation Officer
the right to file a suit as they
935
could have done under the provisions of the U. P. Land
Revenue Act; (see ss. 40, 41, 51 and 54). There is no doubt
that there is some difference between the procedure provided
under the Act and that which the tenure-holders ‘Would have
been entitled to if their village was not under
consolidation. But if consolidation is a boon to the
tenure-holders of a village, as we hold it is, and if it is
to be put through within a reasonable period of time, it is
necessary to have a procedure which would be shorter than
the ordinary procedure under the U. P. Land Revenue Act or
through a suit in a civil or revenue court. The procedure
that has been provided cannot by any means be said to be
arbitrary or lacking in the essentials of principles of
natural justice. The Assistant Consolidation Officer gives
notice to the persons affected, hears their objections and
gives them an opportunity to produce evidence. Thereafter
he decides the objections and one appeal is provided against
his order. This should, in our opinion, be enough in the
special circumstances arising under the Act to do justice to
those who object to the correction of records. All that has
happened is that the number of appeals is out down to one
and that in our opinion is not such a violent departure from
the ordinary procedure as to make us strike down the
provisions contained in Ch. II of the Act as
discriminatory, in the peculiar circumstances arising out of
a scheme of consolidation which must, if it has to be of any
value, be put through within a reasonable period of time.
Whatever difference there may be may well be supported as a
permissible classification on an intelligible differentia
having a reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act. Further s. 12 provides that where
there is dispute as to title and such question has not
already been deter. mined by any competent Court, the
Consolidation Officer has to refer the question for
determination to the Civil Judge who thereafter will refer
it to the arbitrator. The arbitrator then proceeds in the
manner provided by r. 73 and gives a bearing to the parties
and takes evidence both oral and documentary before making
his award; and s. 37 of the Act makes the
936
Arbitration Act applicable to the proceedings before the
arbitrator in the matter of procedure. Taking, therefore,
the scheme of Ch. 11 and remembering that if consolidation
is to be put through there must be a more expeditious
procedure, there is in our opinion rational basis for
classification which justifes the procedure under Ch. 11 of
the Act read with the Rules in villages where consolidation
scheme is to be effective. The attack, therefore, under
Art. 14 of the Constitution on the provisions of Ch. II
fails.
Re. 3 and 4: The contentions on these heads may be taken
together. They attack the provisions of Ch. III dealing
with the Statement of Principles and Statement of Proposals.
The statement of principles is first published and
objections are invited. Under s. 17 the Assistant
Consolidation Officer decides the objections after hearing
the parties, if necessary, and taking into account the view
of the Consolidation Committee. He then submits a report to
the Consolidation Officer who after hearing the objectors
and taking such evidence as may be necessary passes final
order and confirms the statement of principles; (see r. 43-
B). Similarly, when statements of proposals are published,
objections are invited to them, and the same procedure is
followed in the decision of these objections as in the case
of the objections to the statement of principles. In the
case of the statement of proposals also, there is similar
provision to refer disputed question of title to the Civil
Judge, who, in his turn, refers it to the arbitrator.
Section 22 also provides that where such question has been
referred to the arbitrator, all suits or proceedings in the
court of first instance, appeal, reference or revision, in
which the question of title to the same land has been
raised, shall be stayed. Section 22(3) makes the decision
of the arbitrator final. There is no provision for appeal
in Ch. III though in fact two persons hear the matter,
namely, the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the
Consolidation Officer. But the main attack is on the
provisions of s. 22(2) on account of which it is said that
even where a party has obtained a decree which might be
under appeal, the jurisdiction of the ordinary
937
courts is taken away and the decision of the arbitrator is
made final. That is undoubtedly so. But if the
consolidation scheme has to be put through in a reasonable
period of time such a provision is, in our opinion,
necessary; but for it the consolidation schemes may never be
really put through for there will be little purpose in
making consolidation where a large number of disputes are
pending in the courts. Reasons which we have given in
dealing with the second point apply with equal force to
these two points also, and we are of opinion that there is a
rational basis for a classification which has a nexus with
the object of the Act, and therefore, the attack under Art.
14 on the provisons of Chapter III also must fail.
Re. 5. Under this head,, the inadequacy of compensation
provided under s. 29-B of the Act is raised. It may be
mentioned that the Act, as originally passed, did not
contain any provision for compensation. There were a number
of writ applications in the Allahabad High Court and that
court held that inasmuch as some property was taken away
under s. 14(1) (ee) for public purposes and no compensation
was provided, that provision was void under Art. 31 (2) as
it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,
1955 (hereinafter called the Fourth Amendment,). Appeals by
the State Government from that decision of the Allahabad
High Court are pending before us and we shall deal with them
separately. The legislature then enacted s. 29-B laying
down the principles on which compensation would be paid for
lands taken away under s. 14 (1) (ee) after the decision of
the Allahabad High Court. This section was put by Act XVI
of 1957 in the original Act with retrospective effect from
the date from which the original Act was enforced. It is
urged that the compensation provided therein is inadequate,
and, therefore, the provision should be struck down under
Art. 31 (2), as it was before the Fourth Amendment.
Arguments were also addressed on the question whether s. 29-
B would be saved by the
118
938
Fourth Amendment. We, however, think it unnecessary to go
into these arguments for we have come to the conclusion that
in the circumstances of this case the compensation provided
under s. 29-B is adequate. Assuming that the case is
governed by Art. 31 (2) as it was before the Fourth
Amendment, s. 29-B provides for payment of cash compensation
equal to four times the value determined at hereditary rates
to a bhumidar and two times the value to a sirdar. The
difference between the two rates has not been attacked for
the rights of a bhumidar are much higher than the rights of
a sirdar. The bhumidar is the owner of the land while the
sirdar is merely a tenant; but the argument is that the
amount provided is inadequate, and that it is certainly not
the fair market value of the land.
Let us see what s. 14 (1) (ee) provides. It lays down the
basis on which the tenure–holder will contribute towards
the land required for public purposes and the extent to
which vacant land may be utilised for the said purpose. We
are here concerned with the first part, namely, the
contribution of tenure-holders towards land required for
public purposes. In this case the petitioners had lands in
one chak of the rental value of Rs. 20-6-0 and they have
been allotted lands of the rental value of Rs. 20-5-0
instead. In another chak, in place of land the rental value
of which is Rs. 148-10-0 they have been allotted land of the
rental value of Rs. 147-13-0. Thus out of the land valued
at Rs. 169-0-0, they have been allotted land of the value of
Rs. 168-2-0, and land valued at Annas 0-14-0 has gone to the
common pool. The percentage is just over a half per cent.
it hardly ever exceeds one per cent. Thus the land which is
taken over is a small bit, which sold by itself would hardly
fetch anything. These small bits of lands are collected
from various tenure-holders and consolidated in one place
and added to the land which might be lying vacant so that it
may be used for the purposes of s. 14 (1) (ee). A compact
area is thus created and it is used for the purposes of the
tenure-holders themselves and other villagers. Form CH-21
framed under r. 41 (1) shows the purposes to which this land
would be applied,
939
namely, (1) plantation of trees, (2) pasture land, (3)
manure pits, (4) threshing floor, (5) cremation ground, (6)
graveyards, (7) primary or other school, (8) playground, (9)
panchayatghar, and (10) such other objects. These small
bits of land thus acquired from: tenure-holders are
consolidated and used for these purposes, which are directly
for the benefit of the tenure-holders. They are deprived of
a small bit and in place of it they are given advantages in
a much larger area of land made up of these small bits and
also of vacant land. The question then is whether in these
circumstances it can be said that the tenureholders have
been given adequate compensation by. s. 29-B for the small
bits of land acquired from them for public purposes. This
case must be distinguished from other cases where lands are
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, for here the
benefit is direct to the tenure-holders while in ordinary
cases of land acquired for public purposes, if there is any
benefit to the person from whom the land is acquired, it is
indirect and remote. It is contended on behalf of the State
in the circumstances that the compensation which the tenure-
holders get is not merely the cash compensation which they
receive under s. 29-B but also the advantage which they
receive by these small bits taken from them being
consolidated into a larger area of land in which they will
have benefits, the nature of which is indicated in form CH-
21, over and above the advantage of having their scattered
holdings consolidated into a compact block. The question,
therefore, is whether in these circumstances the provision
of actual cash compensation under s. 29-B can be said to be
inadequate. We are of opinion that taking into account the
peculiar conditions in cases of this kind and remembering
that the land taken from each individual tenure-holder may
be a small bit and it is then consolidated into a large area
by adding some other lands taken from other tenure-holders,
and the whole is then used for the advantage of the whole
body of tenure-holders, it cannot be said that the cash
compensation, added to the advantages which the tenure-
holders get in the
940
large area of land thus constituted and on account of
getting a compact block for themselves, is inadequate.
Therefore, assuming that Art. 31 (2) applies as it was
before the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be said that the
compensation which the tenure-holders will get under s. 29-B
is inadequate in the circumstances. This ground of attack
also therefore fails.
There is no force in this petition and it is hereby
dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.