PETITIONER:
AMARJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1974
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N.
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 984 1975 SCR (3) 82
1975 SCC (3) 503
CITATOR INFO :
R 1979 SC1628 (10)
F 1984 SC 363 (22)
ACT:
Civil Service-Integration of two services-Metnoratdum issued
by Government fixing inter se seniority-”Continuous Service”
and “date of appointment” meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
With effect from 15th July, 1964 the Provincial Civil
Medical Service and the Public Health Service of the State
were integrated into one service. After integration, class
I and class 11 posts in the respective services before
integration were equated to class I and it posts in the
combined cadre. While the post of District Medical Officer
corresponded to class 11 in the combined cadre the post of
Assistant Director of Health corresponded to class I in the
combined cadre. Before integration the State Government by
its order dated April 8, 1964 promoted with immediate effect
respondents 3 to 19 who were class II officer in the
Provincial Medical Service to class I but since the order
could not be conveyed to them immediately, they joined their
posts on different dates between April 27, 1964 and May 11,
1964. At the time of integration the appellant, a class 11
officer, though working in the post of Assistant Director
with effect from April 25, 1964, was not promoted to that
post but was merely working in that post on his own pay
scale as District Medical officer of Health. His
representation that he should be promoted to the post of
Assistant Director with retrospective effect from April 25,
1964, since he was working in that post was considered by
the State Government and he was allowed to continue in that
post on the date of integration. He was absorbed in a class
I post but his place in the combined cadre was below that of
respondents 3 to 19.
For the purpose of determining inter se seniority (if
officers belonging to, the two services the State Government
issued a memorandum on October 25, 1965, clause (2)(ii) of
which stated that seniority of Deputy Directors and
Assistant Directors on the cadre of the Public Health, on
integration in PCMS-1 should be termined with reference to
the length of continuous service from the date of
appointment in the group subject to the condition that the
seniority of a person in parent seniority list will not be
disturbed.
The appellant claimed that on the basis of the principle
laid down in clause 2(ii) of the office memorandum he was
entitled to seniority over respondents 3 to 19, because his
continuous service started from April 25. 1964 while that of
respondents 3 to 19 started only after that date. The State
Government rejected this claim of the appellant and issued
orders that the seniority of respondents 3 to 19 should be
reckoned from the date of their appointment namely, April 8,
1964.
In a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution a single
Judge of the High Court accepted this contention of the
appellant that he was senior to respondents 3 to 19 and
allowed the writ petition. On appeal the division bench
held that the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 laid down
the principle determining seniority only for Deputy
Directors and Assistant Directors in the Public Health
Service on integration in PGMS in Class I and did not
provide as to how seniority of medical officers already in
the Provincial Civil Medical Service Class I shall be
determined vis-a-vis Deputy Directors and Assistant
Directors on integration. The High Court upheld the order
of the Government determining that the seniority of
respondents 3 to 19 shall be reckoned from the date of the
order of appointment, namely, April 8, 1964 irrespective as
to when they assumed charge of their higher Posts.
On appeal to this Court it was contended that continuous
service in a post could commence only when the incumbent
took charge of the post and not
83
earlier and as such respondents 3 to 19 who took charge
after the appellant were junior to him. The State on the
other hand contended that it was competent to it to fix an
assumed date on which the continuous service of respondents
3 to 19 shall be deemed to have commenced for the purpose of
determining seniority in the integrated service.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (1) On a proper interpretation of clause 2(ii) of the
memorandum dated October 25, 1965 the principle of length of
continuous service from the date of appointment was
applicable to officers coming from both the services for the
purpose of fixing their inter se seniority in the integrated
service. [88D]
(2)It was competent to the State Government to issue cl.
(2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 in exercise
of its executive power. It is well-setted that where no
statutory rules are made regulating recruitment or
conditions of service, the State Government always can. in
exercise of its executive power, issue administrative
instructions providing for recruitment and laying down
conditions of service. [88E-F]
B.N. Naswaian v. State of Mysore [1966] 3 S.C.R. 682 and
Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [1968] 1 S.C.R.
111, referred to.
(3)(a) The contention of the State that it was competent to
it to fix an assumed date on which continuous service should
be deemed to have commenced for determining seniority is not
well founded. Under cl. 2(ii) of the memorandum what was
required to be taken into account was the actual length of
continuous service from the date of appointment and not the
length of continuous service reckoned from an artificial
date given by the State Government. [88H; 89B]
(b)Although the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 was in
the nature of an administrative instruction, the State
Government could not, at its own swee will, depart from it
without rational justification and fix an artificial date
for commencing the length of continuous service in the case
of some individual officers only for the purpose of giving
them seniority in contravention of that
clause.[89C]
(c)Where the State Government departs from a principle of
seniority laid down byit, albeit by administrative
instructions, and the departure is without reason and
arbitrary, it would directly infringe the guarantee of
equality under Arts. 14 and 16. [89D]
Vitaralli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 at 546-547; 3 Law Ed.
(Second Series) 1012 referred to.
(4)Where the order of appointment appoints a person with
effect from the date he assumes charge of the post, the
appointment would be effective only when the person
appointed assumes charge of the post and that would be the
date of his appointment. Where he is appointed with
immediate effect, the appointment would be effected
immediately,irrespective as to when the person appointed
assumes charge of the post. [90C-D]
In the instant case so far as respondents 3 to 19 were
concerned, the date of their appointment was April 8, 1964
and the length of their continuous service in PCMS Class I
was required to be reckoned from that date. Even though the
respond-ants joined their respective posts after April 25,
1964, that did not make any difference because the length of
continuous service was to be counted from the date of
appointment.
84
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 624 of
1971.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated
the 8th April, 1970 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
L.P.A. No. 433/1969.
B. R. L. Iyengar, S. K. Mehta for the appellant.
H. R. Khanna and O. P. Sharma for Respondents Nos. 1 and
1.
Hardev Singh, R. S. Sodhi for Respondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-This appeal raises the question whether the
appellant has been given his proper rank in the joint
seniority list of officers belonging to the Provincial Civil
Medical Service, Class I after its reorganisation on 15th
July, 1964.
There were, in the State of Punjab prior to 15th July, 1964,
two separate and independent services, namely, Provincial
Civil Medical Service (hereinafter for the sake of brevity
referred to as PCMS) and Public Health Service. Both
services comprised two classes, Class I and Class II, and
each had its own separate ranking for seniority and channel
of promotion. The post of District Medical Officer of
Health was a post in Class 11 of the Public Health Service,
while the post of Assistant Director Health Services was a
post in Class I of that Service. The appellant and one Dr.
Jagjit Singh were, until their promotion with retrospective
effect from 25th April, 1964, District Medical Officers of
Health in Class II of Public Health Service. Dr. Jagjit
Singh was admittedly senior to the appellant in rank.
Respondents, Nos. 3 to 19 were’ until their promotion by an
order dated 8th April, 1964, in Class II of PCMS. It appea
rs that some posts in Class I of PCMS fell vacant and
it was, therefore, decided to make promotions to these posts
from amongst officers belonging to Class II of PCMS and an
order dated 8th April, 1964 was accordingly issued by the
State Government. promoting inter alia respondents Nos. 3 to
19 to Class 1, PCMS with immediate effect. Though this
order was made on 8th April, 1964, it could not be conveyed
to respondents Nos. 3 to 19 until 23rd April, 1964 and
respondents Nos. 3 to 19 could, therefore, assume charge of
the higher posts of promotion only after 27th April, 1964.
In fact they took charge of the higher posts of promotion on
different dates between 27th April, 1964 and 11th May, 1964.
It may be pointed out that under the order dated 8th April,
1964 several other officers belonging to Class 11, PCMS, in
addition to respondents Nos. 3 to 19 were also promoted to
Class 1, PCMS, but it is not necessary to refer to them
since on bifurcation of the State of Punjab they were
allotted to the State of Haryana and they are no longer
contestants with the appellant in the ranking for seniority.
So far as Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant are concerned,
Dr. Jagjit Singh was on deputation with the Defence
Department, while the appellant was appointed to work- in
the post of Assistant Director Health Services on his own
pay scale from 25th April, 1964. This was the position
which obtained when PCMS and Public Health Service were
integrated as part of the administrative reorganisation of
the State Medical and Health Department with effect from
15th July, 1964.
85
The PCMS and Public Health Service were integrated with
effect from 15th July, 1964 and common combined cadres, both
in Class I and Class 11, were created which were known as
PCMS Class I and PCMS Class 11 cadres. The cadre of
District Medical Officers of Health, which constituted Class
11 in Public Health Service was equated with PCMS Class 11
cadre, while the cadre of Assistant Directors and Deputy
Directors, which constituted Class I of Public Health
Service, was equated with PCMS Class I cadre. Now at the
time of integration Dr. Jagjit Singh belonged to the cadre
of District Medical Officers of Health and the appellant,
though working in the post of Assistant Director was not
promoted to that post but was merely working in that post on
his own pay scale, of District Medical Officer of Health and
they would, therefore, have ordinarily been equated and
absorbed in the integrated PCMS Class 11 cadre. But the
appellant made a representation to the St-ate Government
that since he was working in the post of Assistant Director,
since 25th April, 1964, he should be promoted to that post
with retrospective effect from that date. The State
Government considered the representation of the appellant
and decided that the appellant should be given promotion to
the post of Assistant Director with effect from 25th April,
1964. But Dr. Jagjit Singh was senior to the appellant in
the cadre of District Medical Officers of Health and it
would, therefore, be unfair to him to ignore his claim and
give promotion to the appellant who was his junior. The
State Government therefore, “with a view to protecting his
right of promotion by virtue of his parent seniority which
could not be disturbed passed an order dated 24th July, 1965
granting absentia promotion to Dr. Jagjit Singh to the post
of Assistant Director, with effect from 25th April, 1964 and
since Dr. Jagjit Singh was on deputation with the
Defence Department, the State Government, by the same order,
promoted the appellant to, the post of Assistant Director
with effect from the same date vice Dr. Jagjit Singh Dr.
Jagjit Singh and the appellant were thus promoted to the
posts of Assistant Director with retrospective effect from
25th April, 1964 and they were accordingly Assistant
Directors on 15th July, 1964 when integration took place and
were, therefore, equated and absorbed as such in PCMS Class
I cadre.
Now, one question which arose consequent on the integration
of Class I of Public Health Service with PCMS Class I was as
to how the inter se seniority of the officers coming from
the two services should be determined in the integrated
service. The State Government by a memorandum dated 25th
October, 1965 decided that the inter se seniority of
officers belonging to the two integrating services should be
determined on the following principle vide clause 2(ii) :
“The seniority,of Deputy Directors and
Assistant Directors on the cadre of the Public
Health on integration in PCMS-1 should be
determined with reference to the length of
continuous service from the date of
appointment in the group subject to the
condition that the seniority of a person in
parent seniority list will not be disturbed.,,
This principle for determination of inter se seniority was
communicated by the Director, Health Services, Punjab to the
appellant in a letter
86
dated 27th October, 1964. The appellant was given an option
in regard to integration in PCMS Class I and was told that
on receipt of his opinion his seniority in PCMS Class I
would be fixed in accordance with the length of his
continuous service from the date of his appointment. The
appellant opted in favour of integration and he was ac-
cordingly, as stated above, integrated in PCMS Class 1. The
question then arose as to how the seniority of the appellant
vis-a-vis respondents Nos. 3 to 19 should be arranged. The
appellant claimed that on the basis of the principle of
seniority laid down in clause 2(ii) of the memorandum dated
25th October, 1965 he was entitled to seniority over
respondents Nos. 3 to 19 since his continuous service
started from 25th April, 1964, while the continuous service
of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 did not start until after 25th
April, 1964 when they assumed charge of their respective
posts. The State Government, however, issued an order dated
4th December, 1967 determining that the seniority of
respondents Nos. 3 to 19 shall be reckoned from the date, of
their order of appointment, namely, 8th April, 1964
irrespective as to when they assumed charge of their
respective posts and on this basis, rejected the claim of
the appellant. Subsequently, a provisional joint seniority
list of PCMS Class I was published by the State Government
and in this list, respondents Nos. 3 to 19 were shown as
senior to Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant.
The appellant being aggrieved by the decision of the State
Government giving seniority to respondents Nos. 3 to 19 over
Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant, filed a petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana challenging the seniority list published by the
State Government. The main ground of challenge was that
according to the principle of seniority laid down by the
State Government in clause 2(ii) of the memorandum dated
25th October, 1965 the inter se seniority of the integrating
officers was to be determined with reference to the length
of continuous service from the date of appointment and if
this principle was properly applied, Dr. Jagjit Singh and
the appellant would be senior to respondents Nos. 3 to, 19
as their continuous service in the posts of Assistant
Director commenced from 25th April, 1964, while the
continuous service of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 in the
corresponding posts in PCMS Class I did not commence until
after 25th April, 1964 when they took charge of their
respective posts and the continuous service put in by them
was, therefore, longer in duration that that put in by
respondents Nos. 3 to 19. This ground was accepted by the
learned Single Judge who heard the petition and taking the
view that Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant were senior to
respondents Nos. 3 to 19 the learned Single Judge allowed
the petition and directed that the seniority list should
revised by the State Government so as to give seniority to
the appellant over respondents Nos. 3 to 19.
The State Government and the Director of Health Services,
Punjab thereupon preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 446 of
1969 before a Division Bench of the High Court. Some of the
respondents Nos. 3 to 19 also preferred separate letters
Patent Appeal No. 433 of 1969. Both these Letters Patent
Appeals were heard by a Division Bench of the
87
High Court. The learned Judges constituting the Division
Bench took the view that the memorandum dated 25th October,
1965 laid down the principle determining seniority only for
Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors in the Public
Health Service on integration in PCMS Class I and did not
provide as to how seniority of Medical Officers already in
PCMS Class I shall be determined vis-a-vis Deputy Directors
and Assistant Directors on integration. It was, therefore,
competent to the State Government to issue the order dated
4th December, 1967 determining that the seniority of
respondents Nos’ 3 to 19 shall be reckoned from the date of
their order of appointment, namely, 8th April, 1964
irrespective as to when they assumed charge of their higher
posts. The seniority of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 was
accordingly liable to be reckoned from 8th April, 1964 and
since the seniority of Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant
commenced only from 25th April, 1964, respondents Nos. 3 to
19 were rightly shown as senior to Dr. Jagjit Singh and the
appellant: The learned Judges on this view allowed the
appeal and upheld the provisional joint seniority list of,
PCMS Class I showing respondents Nos. 3 to 19 above Dr.
Jagjit Singh and the, appellant in seniority. That led to
the filing of the present appeal with special leave obtained
from this Court.
We must consider what was the true scope and ambit of the
principle of seniority laid down in clause (2)(ii) of the
memorandum dated 25th October, 1965. Did it apply in
relation to officers coming from both services for the
purpose of determining their inter se seniority in the
integrated service or was it intended to provide a principle
for determining seniority only for Deputy Directors- and
Assistant Directors on their integration in PCMS Class I ?
To answer this question it is necessary to understand what
was the problem before the State Government which it set
out to solve by issuing clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum
dated 25th October, 1965. The position which then obtained
was that with effect from 15th July, 1964 Class I of Public
Health Service, consisting of the posts of Deputy Directors
and Assistant Directors, was integrated with PCMS Class I
and since officers coming from these two different services
were to be absorbed and fitted into one integrated service,
it was necessary to evolve a fair and just principle for
determining their inter Se seniority in the integrated
service. It was for this purpose that the State
Government issued clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated
25th October, 1965. What clause (2) (ii) provided was that
on integration in PCMS Class I, the seniority of Deputy
Directors and Assistant Directors vis-a-vis the other
officer in that service should be determined by reference to
the length of continuous service from the date of
appointmentthat is, the continuous service of such
integrating officer shouldbe reckoned from the date of
his appointment in his group-whether it be in PCMS Class I
or in Public Health Service Class I-and the inter se
seniority should be arranged according to the length of such
continuous service. The measure or yard-stick for adjusting
inter se seniority of the officers coming from the two
services should be the length of continuous service of each
from the date of appointment in his group. This was the
principle laid down in clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum
dated 25th October, 1965 for bringing about integration of
the two services by adjusting the inter se seniority of the
officers in
88
the integrated service. There was no occasion or need at
that time to lay down any principle for determining
seniority inter se Deputy Directors or Assistant Directors.
The seniority of Deputy Directors or Assistant Directors
inter se in Public Health Service Class I was already
determined and known and clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum
dated 25th October, 1965 in fact provided that the
adjustment of inter se seniority in the integrated service
according to the length of continuous service from the date
of appointment should be subject to the condition that ”the
seniority of persons in the present seniority list will not
be disturbed.” Clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated 25th
October, 1965, was, therefore, not intended to provide for
seniority of Deputy Directors or Assistant Directors inter
se in their parent service. What ever was the inter se
seniority of Deputy Directors or Assistant Directors in
their parent service was not to be disturbed while adjusting
the, seniority of the officers in the integrated service and
so also was the inter se seniority of the officers already
in PCMS Class I not to be violated while fixing seniority in
the integrated service. There can, therefore, be. no doubt
that on a proper interpretation of clause (2)(ii) of the
memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 the principle of length
of continuous service from the date of appointment was
applicable to officers coming from both the services for the
purpose of fixing their inter se seniority in the integrated
service.
Now, it is true that clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated
25th October, 1965 Was not a statutory provision having the
force of law and was merely an administrative instruction
issued by the State Government in exercise of its executive
power. But that does not present any difficulty, for it is
now well settled by several decisions of this Court that %IV
no statutory rules are made regulating recruitment or condi-
tions of service; the State Government always can in
exercise of its executive power issue administrative
instructions, providing for recruitment and laying down
conditions of service. Vide B. N. Nagarajan v. State of
Mysore(1) and Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Anr.
(2) It was, therefore, competent to the State Government to
issue clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October,
1965 in exercise of its executive power laying down the
principle to be followed in adjusting inter se seniority of
the officers in the integrated service.
But the question then arises whether the State Government
could issue the order dated 4th December, 1967 providing
that the seniority of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 shall be
reckoned from the date of issue of their order of
appointment, namely, 8th April, 1964 irrespective as to when
they assumed charge of the higher posts, if such order was
in contravention of the principle of seniority laid down in
clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965.
The argument urged on behalf of the State Government was
that it was competent toit to fix an assumed date on which
the continuous service of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 should be
deemed to have commenced for the purpose of determining
their seniority in the integrated service, and the order
dated 4th December, 1967 was, therefore, not beyond its
power.
(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 682.
(2) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 111.
89
But we do not think this argument is well founded. Clause
(2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 provided
that the seniority of the officers in the integrated service
shall be determined by reference to the length of continuous
service from the date of appointment in the group within
their respective service. What was, therefore, required to
be taken into account was the actual length of continuous
service from the date of appointment and not the length of
continuous service reckoned from an artificial date given by
the, State Government. Now, it is true that clause (2) (ii)
of the memorandum dated. 25th October, 1965 was in the
nature of administrative instruction, not having the force
of law, but the State Government could not at its own sweet
will depart from it without rational justification and fix
an artificial date for commencing the length of continuous
service in the, case of some individual officers only for
the purpose of giving them, seniority in contravention of
that clause. That would be clearly violative of articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution. The sweep of articles 14 and 16
is wide and pervasive. These two articles embody the
principle of rationality and they are intended to strike
against arbitrary and discriminatory action-taken by the,
‘State’ Where the State Government departs from a principle
of seniority laid down by it, albeit by administrative
instructions, and the departure is without reason and
arbitrary, it would directly infringe the guarantee of
equality under articles 14 and 16. It is interesting to
notice that in the United States it-is now well settled that
an executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards
by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must
scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation
of an act in violation of them. vide the judgment of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Vitaralli v. Seton(1) This view is of
course not based on the equality clause of the United State
Constitution and it is evolved as a rule of administrative
law. But the principle is the same, namely, that
arbitrariness should be eliminated in State action. If,
therefore, we find that the order dated 4th December, 1967
gave an artificial date from which the continuous service of
respondents Nos. 3 to 19 shall be deemed to have commenced,
though in fact and in truth their continuous service
commenced from different dates and it was thus in con-
travention of the principle of seniority laid down in clause
(2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965, it
would have to be held to be void as being violative of
articles 14 and 16.
We do not, however, think that the order dated 4th December,
1967 providing that the seniority of respondents Nos. 3 to
19 shall be reckoned from the date of their appointment,
namely, 8th April, 1964 constituted a departure from the
principle of seniority laid down in clause (2) (ii) of the
memorandum dated 25th October, 1965. The test for
determining seniority in the integrated cadre laid down by
clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965
was the length of continuous service from the date of
appointment in the group. The appellant contended that
continuous service in a post could commence only when the
incumbent took charge of the post and not earlier and,
therefore, though respondents Nos. 3 to 19 were promoted
under the order dated 8th April, 1964, their continuous
service
(1) 359 U.S. 535 at 546-5473 Law. Sd. (Second Series) 1012.
90
in the posts of promotion in PCMS Class I did not commence
until after 25th April, 1964 when they took charge of their
respective posts of promotion and hence the length of their
continuous service in PCMS Class I was less than that of Dr.
Jagjit Singh and the appellant in Public Health Service,
Class 1. This contention is fallacious in that it fails to
give sufficient importance to the words “from the date of
appointment and ignores the true meaning and effect of the
order dated 8th April, 1964. First let us see what the
words “date of the order of appointment” mean. Are they
synonymous with “date of the order of appointment” ? We
think not. An order of appointment may be of three kinds.
It may appoint a person with effect from the date he assumes
charge of the post or it may appoint him with immediate
effect or it may appoint him simpliciter without saying as
to when the appointment shall take effect. Where the order
of appointment is of the first kind, the appointment would
be effective only when the person appointed assumes charge
of the post and that would be the date of his appointment.
It would be then that he is appointed. But in a case of the
second kind, which is the one with which we are concerned
since the order dated 8th April, 1964 appointed respondents
Nos. 3 to 19 to PCMS Class I “with immediate effect”, the
appointment would be effective immediately irrespective as
to when the person appointed assumes charge of the post.
The date of his appointment in such a case would be the same
as the date of the order of appointment. It is, therefore,
obvious that so far as respondents Nos. 3 to 19 were
concerned, the date of their appointment was 8th April, 1964
and the length of their continuous service in PCMS Class I
was required to be reckoned from that date. It is true that
respondents Nos. 3 to 19 did not assume charge of their
respective posts of promotion until after 25th April, 1964,
but that makes no difference because the length of
continuous service is to be counted from the date of
appointment on the hypothesis that once the appointment is
effective the person concerned is in the post and his
service in the post is deemed to have commenced though under
the rules governing his conditions of service he may
not be entitled to the salary and allowances attached to the
post until he assumes charge of the post. The continuous
service of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 in PCMS Class 1,
therefore, commenced from 8th April, 1964 and since that was
longer than the continuous service of Dr. Jagjit Singh and
the appellant in Public Health Service Class I, which
commenced only on 25th April, 1964, respondents Nos. 3 to 19
were entitled to be placed senior to Dr. Jagjit Singh and
the appellant in the joint seniority list of the integrated
PCMS Class 1.
We, therefore, uphold the joint seniority list of the
integrated PCMS Class I prepared by the State Government
giving seniority to respondents Nos. 3 to 19 over Dr. Jagjit
Singh and the appellant and dismiss the appeal. There will
be no order as to costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.
91