PETITIONER:
LIC
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ASHA RAMCHANDRA AMBEKAR
DATE OF JUDGMENT28/02/1994
BENCH:
MOHAN, S. (J)
BENCH:
MOHAN, S. (J)
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N.(CJ)
CITATION:
1994 AIR 2148 1994 SCC (2) 718
JT 1994 (2) 183 1994 SCALE (1)748
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MOHAN, J.- Leave granted.
2. The short facts leading to this civil appeal are as
under. Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Corporation’) is the appellant in the
civil appeal. It was established under the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ’the
Act’). Section 49 of the said Act empowers the Corporation
to make regulations with prior approval of the Central
Government. In exercise of these powers, the Corporation
has framed the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff)
Regulations, 1960 providing for terms and conditions of
service of the staff of the Corporation. Regulation 4 of
the said regulations empowers the Chairman of the
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Corporation to issue such instructions or directions as may
be necessary to give effect and carry out instructions of
the Corporation in order to secure effective control over
the staff employed by the Corporation. The Chairman of the
Corporation with the approval of the Board on November 27,
1979 issued the Life Insurance Corporation Recruitment (of
Class III and Class IV Staff) Instructions, 1979. These
instructions also contain provisions for the appointment of
staff on compassionate ground upon demise of a member of the
staff of the Corporation while in service. These
instructions are statutory in character. Therefore, they
have the force of law.
3. Clause 2, sub-clause (iii) of these instructions reads,
inter alia, as under :
“ 2. Relaxation in favour of near- relatives
of an employee who dies while in service
(i)…
(ii)…
(iii) The relaxation shall be admissible only
where none of the members of the family -
widow, son or unmarried daughter - is
gainfully employed.”
4. A Circular No. 2D/636/ASP/87 was issued by the Central
Office of the Corporation on January 20, 1987. Clause 4 of
the amended circular is as under :
“4. Where any member of the family -is
employed, no appointment may be made on
compassionate grounds.”
5. One Shri Ramachandra Ambekar was employed as higher
grade Assistant in the Sanda Branch under the Nasik
Divisional Officer of the appellant Corporation. He expired
suddenly on September 11, 1987. Upon his demise, the first
respondent, his widow submitted an application seeking
employment on compassionate grounds with the appellant
Corporation. On December 12, 1987, the Corporation rejected
the abovesaid request on the ground that she had exceeded
the upper age limit of 45 years. Therefore, her request
could not be complied with.
6. Subsequent thereto, the second respondent made various
representations on May 8, 1989, July 1, 1989, June 18, 1990
and June 21, 1991 seeking employment on compassionate
grounds. By letter dated October 21, 1991, the appellant
Corporation relying on circulars dated October 6, 1987 and
January 21, 1987 rejected the request. Thereupon Writ
Petition No. 3157 of 1993 came to be filed by second
respondent to direct the appellant Corporation to appoint
him on compassionate grounds. By the impugned judgment
dated October 19, 1993 of the High Court, the appellant
Corporation was directed to appoint second respondent on
compassionate grounds within four weeks of the date of the
order. Hence, the present appeal.
7. Mr Harish Salve, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant Corporation would urge that the appellant
Corporation cannot be directed to
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act contrary to the regulations and instructions which
govern appointment on compassionate grounds. These
regulations which have been framed with good intent and
purpose cannot be bypassed. The regulations do not
contemplate appointment on compassionate grounds when one of
the members of the deceased family is gainfully employed.
8. Where the Corporation has acted bona fide and declined
to appoint the second respondent, that exercise of power
cannot be interfered with. Shortly put, the Corporation
cannot be directed by means of a mandamus to do something
which is per se illegal.
9. Learned counsel for the respondents would urge that the
High Court has correctly appreciated the matter and held
that appointment on compassionate ground is need based. As
far as first respondent is concerned, she withdrew her
application because she was age barred. Where the High
Court took into consideration the second respondent who was
in the prime of his life and youth and directed appointment
on compassionate grounds which is in accord with the rules
of the Government, no exception could be taken to the
judgment.
10. Of late, this Court is coming across many cases in
which appointment on compassionate ground is directed by
judicial authorities. Hence, we would like to lay down the
law in this regard. The High Courts and the Administrative
Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic
consideration. No doubt Shakespeare said in “Merchant of
Venice” :
“The quality of mercy is not strain’d;
It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath it is twice bless’d;
It blesseth him that gives, and him that
takes;”
These words will not apply to all situations. Yeilding to
instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It
should be remembered that “law is the embodiment of all
Wisdom”. Justice according to law is a principle as old as
the hills. The courts are to administer law as they find
it, however, inconvenient it may be.
11. At this juncture we may usefully refer to Martin Burn
Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta’. At page 535 of the Report
the following observations are found :
“A result flowing from a statutory provision
is never an evil. A Court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its
operation. A statute must of course be given
effect to whether a Court likes the result or
not.”
The courts should endeavor to find out whether a particular
case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed
falls within the scope of law. Disregardful of law,
however, hard the case may be, it should never be done. In
the very case itself, there are regulations and instructions
which we have
1 AIR 1966 SC 529, 535: (1966) 1 SCR 543
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extracted above. The court below has not even examined
whether a case falls within the scope of these statutory
provisions. Clause 2 of sub-clause (iii) of Instructions
makes it clear that relaxation could be given only when none
of the members of the family is gainfully employed. Clause
4 of the circular dated January 20, 1987 interdicts such an
appointment on compassionate grounds. The appellant
Corporation being a statutory Corporation is bound by the
Life Insurance Corporation Act as well as the Statutory
Regulations and Instructions. They cannot be put aside and
compassionate appointment be ordered.
12. Further it is well-settled in law that no mandamus will
be issued directing to do a thing forbidden by law. In Brij
Mohan Parihar v. M.P.S.R.T. Corpn.2 it is stated as under:
“The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and
in particular Sections 42 and 59 clearly debar
all holders of permits including the State
Road Transport Corporation from indulging in
unauthorised trafficking in permits.
Therefore the agreement entered into by the
petitioner, unemployed graduate, with the
State Road Transport Corporation to ply his
bus as nominee of the Corporation on the route
in respect of which the permit was issued in
favour of the Corporation for a period of five
years, was clearly contrary to the Act and
cannot, therefore, be enforced. In the
circumstances, the petitioner would not be
entitled to the issue of a writ in the nature
of mandamus to the Corporation to allow him to
operate his motor vehicle as a stage carriage
under the permit obtained by the Corporation
as its nominee.”
13. It is true that there may be pitiable situations but on
that score, the statutory provisions cannot be put aside.
14. In this very case, on the demise of Ramchandra Ambekar,
the first respondent staked her claim but she was age
barred. Therefore, the second respondent when he put forth
his entitlement, the appellant Corporation passed an order
dated October 21, 1991 in answer to the second respondent’s
request for appointment on compassionate grounds as follows:
“Life Insurance Corporation of
India,
Nasik Divisional Office,
`Jeevan Prakash’
Golf Club Ground,
Old Agra Road,
Post Box No. II 0,
Nasik – 422 002
Dated : 21st October, 1991
Ref:
Shri Nitin Ramchandra Ambekar,
s/o Smt A.R. Ambekar,
Jamner Road, Municipal Colony,
at & Post-Bhusawal, Distt. Jalgaon.
2 (1987) 1 SCC 13: AIR 1987 SC 29
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Dear Sir,
Re : Your appeal for suitable employment
on compassionate grounds
We had received your appeal dated June
21, 1991. We had submitted it to the
Competent Authority and we are sorry to inform
you that the Competent Authority has shown
inability to offer any employment to you.
Thanking You,
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
Sr. Divisional Manager.”
15. To say, as a court below has done, that the second
respondent is at the prime of his life and youth and is aged
about 21 years and the dues that are paid by the Life
Insurance Corporation to the family are the lawful dues that
are earned by the deceased. Therefore, on facts, he would
be entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds, is not
the correct approach.
16. We are totally unable to support this line of
reasoning. For aught one know, there may be other cases
waiting already for appointment on compassionate grounds,
they may be even harder than that of the second respondent.
17. Thus, apart from the direction as to appointment on
compassionate grounds being against statutory provisions,
such direction does not take note of this fact. Whatever it
may be, the Court should not have directed the appointment
on compassionate grounds. The jurisdiction under mandamus
cannot be exercised in that fashion. It should have merely
directed consideration of the claim of the second
respondent. To straightaway direct the appointment would
only put the appellant Corporation in piquant situation.
The disobedience of this direction will entail contempt
notwithstanding the fact that the appointment may not be
warranted. This is yet another ground which renders the
impugned judgment dated October 19, 1993 unsupportable. For
these reasons, the civil appeal will stand allowed. There
shall be no order as to costs.
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